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Abstract  
Energy, as a matter of security, is the major challenge during the 21st century.  
The energy mix in the world will change in the future, predominantly to 
renewable energy sources, followed by natural gas. Nevertheless, the latter will 
act as the bridge for the transitional era to the non–hydrocarbon period. 
The EU will be the foremost gas importer by 2030 and the rate of LNG imports 
will double by 2020. The UK, France, Spain and Italy are the main EU entries 
for LNG imports and approximately 80% of the regional terminals are located in 
these countries importing 87% of the Union LNG needs. Obviously, the 
mentioned EU member states will be more influential for the regional energy 
security in the future.  
Diversification of LNG routes and suppliers is an important objective in the EU’s 
energy policy and its security of supply. For this reason, it has already been at 
the top of the EU’s agenda. 
The Persian Gulf, as the gas richest area worldwide, holds 40% of global gas 
reserves. Iran and Qatar, as the potential and actual LNG suppliers, embrace 
nearly 30% global gas deposits or 75% of Middle East reserves. So, this low–cost/ 
high–risk region could be influential on the EU’s energy security in the future. 
Therefore, in the current multi–level analysis consisting of the EU and the 
Persian Gulf, as the macro and micro levels, the role of the natural gas within 
the Persian Gulf for the energy security of the EU will be examined. The 
research, furthermore, aims to analyse the role of the actual Qatari LNG and 
potential Iranian LNG on the UK, France, Spain and Italy in the future. 
This multiple–case study centres on a comparison of different actual and 
potential LNG suppliers towards the EU, on the basis of testing the four 
indicators of the energy security, comprising acceptability, availability, 
affordability, and accessibility. It will finally to determine the position of the 
Persian Gulf and its main regional LNG suppliers in the future amongst the 
main global exporters.  
iv 
 
Positioned in the intersection of the Persian Gulf and the EU, the existing 
dissertation pursues a multi–level explanation and analysis of energy–related 
issues of the both regions and their case–studies domestically, regionally and to 
lesser extent globally.    
In parallel, the study is a detailed examination of the emerging gas and LNG–
related challenges and vulnerabilities in addition to investigate the security of 
LNG supply–related issues, approaches, and policies of the EU and the main 
suppliers, particularly within the Persian Gulf. 
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Introduction            
Energy has always been regarded as a matter of security (McGowan, 2011: 490), 
and will be the most significant challenge during the 21st century (Bahgat, 2011: 
1&2; Alhajji, 2007), so the energy security would be at the top of the global 
agenda. Whilst the energy security is traditionally concentrated on oil supply 
(Cherp & Jewell, 2011: 203), natural gas has increasingly become the fuel of 
choice (Luft & Korine, 2009: 555; Eurostat 2010: 6); therefore security of gas 
supply has entered the global energy literature. The global energy mix will 
change between 2010 to 2030, primarily to renewable energy sources, followed by 
natural gas (BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 31). As a result, the share of the 
former rises to around one third of total primary energy sources worldwide, 
while the latter is the fastest growing fossil fuel globally (figure 1). It seems that 
natural gas will act as the main bridge for the transitional era to renewable 
energy sources for global use (Global Energy Assessment 2012: 75). The global 
natural gas demands will increase by around 50% by the end of the next decade 
and its share in the global energy mix will rise from 21% in 2010 to 25% in 2030 
(IEA Special Report, 2011: 7–8).  
Figure 1: Development of total primary energy sources in Global Energy System (GEA), 1850–2050 
 
Source: Book, entitled “Global Energy Assessment–Toward a Sustainable Future”, 2012: 76 
The EU will be the first gas importer by 2030 (European Commission Working 
Paper, 2011: 2) and will import around 80% of natural gas needs after 2020 (BP 
2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 78–79), however 1.3% of global natural gas reserves 
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are situated in this region (BP 2011) and also it encounters a number of internal 
and external challenges in this respect. In addition, it is likely that the growing 
role of unconventional gas and renewable energy sources will impact on the 
amount of EU’s natural gas import in the future. 
It is expected that the capacity of global LNG trading will double by 2020 and 
more by 2030 (CEDIGAZ 2011: 6). The rate of the EU’s LNG imports will rise 
close to 90% in 2020, compared to 2010 and this percentage will increase further 
by 2030. For this reason, the Union has decided to import LNG, during the next 
years, more than the current capacity and the current 31 existing, under 
construction, and under consideration LNG terminals within the region proves 
this point (annexes 11–15). In addition, 24 of these facilities, roughly 80%, are 
placed in the UK, France, Spain and Italy and these countries have imported 
nearly 87% of the regional LNG needs (IGU World LNG Report, 2010: 8). That is 
because, the mentioned EU members would be more important in the future not 
only for the Union’s energy, but also for the whole of Europe.  
Diversification of natural gas and LNG suppliers has also been at the top of the 
EU’s statements from various suppliers regarding future policy (Regulations 
over EU safeguard security of gas supply, 2010: 2). 
The Middle East holds 40% of global gas reserves, approximately all of which are 
situated in the Persian Gulf (Oil and Gas Journal, 2012), as the gas richest area 
worldwide with its exclusive features economically, politically, strategically and 
geo–politically. Iran and Qatar embrace nearly 30% global natural gas or 75% of 
Middle East gas reserves (M. Wietfeld, 2011: 206) and these two, alongside more 
four littoral states in the region are among the top 20 natural gas holders 
worldwide, hence this low–cost/ high–risk region could be influential on the EU’s 
energy security. 
Iran, as the Persian Gulf’s largest natural gas producer (US EIA 2011: 52), has 
two main Grand Energy Strategy and Outlook Documents, in addition to the 
ambitious target of increasing its current 1% share in the gas global market to 
8%–10% by 2023 and taking part more actively in Gas Exporting Countries 
 3 
 
Forum (GECF). So, the LNG projects currently both under construction and 
consideration will play an important role in this regard and could put Tehran 
among the top five global LNG exporters by 2020. However, this plan has 
encountered two huge impediments (Bahgat, 2010: 333–347). In addition, the EU 
is amongst the main destinations for the future Iranian LNG export. So, the 
research deficiency of the dual effects of Iran’s LNG supply on this country and 
also the EU’s energy security is apparent. 
Demand for gas in Qatar, as the fourth largest gas consumer in the Middle East 
and Persian Gulf (IEA, Natural Gas Information 2010), has been more than 
doubled since 2000 as a result of its economic and domestic growth and this will 
most likely continue in the future (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 
2011: 27). 
The EU’s LNG markets have been attracting around 33% of the Qatari LNG 
(http://www.eia.gov/countries/Qatar), as the leading supplier worldwide in recent 
years. For the time being, there are two main arguments regarding the future of 
the Qatari LNG supply. The first insists on the preservation of the current 
supply, while some Qatari officials have emphasised on this country’s leadership 
in the global LNG market in the future. 
In this study, the role of the Persian Gulf’s natural gas, in general, and LNG 
supply from Qatar (actual) and Iran (potential), in particular, for the EU, in 
general, and the UK, France, Spain and Italy, in particular, will be analysed. 
Obviously, this supply could impact on Qatar and, in particular, Iran’s energy 
security, too. So, some secondary questions, followed by the main question will be 
raised. 
The independent variable of the non–directional (Creswell, 2003: 111) and 
descriptive hypothesis is the Persian Gulf’s natural gas and its actual, as well as, 
potential LNG supply, while the dependent variable is the EU’s energy security. 
Moreover, this kind of data collection would be related to the future of energy 
security and investigating the future events, so the best technique is scenario–
building (http://duo.dur.ac.uk/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp). 
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This multiple–case study is the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
research and will be descriptive–exploratory (Grix, 2001: 66–67) or descriptive–
analytical, methodologically. Therefore, it needs to use both field studies and 
library research methods or a mixed method on the basis of concurrent 
qualitative and quantitative data collection in one single phase without any 
sequence (Creswell, 2003: 211). 
Although mixed method will be applied to this research, the data will be 
analysed more qualitatively than quantitatively, based on deductive approach. 
Deductive approach means that the research should be based on fundamental 
theories. It seems that the most suitable theoretical framework for the EU–27, 
as the “macro–region” (Farrell et al. 2005: 87–95) and the most integrated region 
worldwide would be New Regionalism, as the EU’s indicators are coincident with 
the above–mentioned criteria of the theory. 
The Subordinate System, as a regional subsystem, would be a proper theory for 
the Persian Gulf, as the micro and unstructured region as well. In the third 
stage, the Regional Security Complex Theory could connect these two regions 
and their theoretical frameworks, so the energy security, as the main connecting 
factor between the Persian Gulf and the EU in the research hypothesis, can be 
considered as the sixth element of this theory. Then, the energy security’s main 
indicators should be extracted and be tested on various actual and potential LNG 
suppliers’ relationships with the EU to test the research hypothesis and answer 
the question(s). 
Research Question(s) 
According to Grix (2001: 64: 57–60), literature review is drawn in three stages. 
The first two phases of my literature review will be argued broadly in the 
chapter one. Nevertheless, in the third stage, some secondary questions have 
been raised and then by narrowing the focus (Grix, 2001: 64: 57), the main 
question, as the main gap, will be brought up that has not been asked and 
answered by anybody else, followed by the research hypothesis. 
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I plan to find the analytical answers for these “associated sub–questions” in my 
research before the central question (Creswell, 2008: 112–115), as follows: 
 How do the different gas–rich regions worldwide impact on the EU’s 
energy security? 
 What is the position of Persian Gulf’s natural gas reserves, amongst the 
other areas, on the EU’s energy security? 
 How do the different actual and potential LNG suppliers impact on the 
EU’s energy security? 
 What is the position of LNG export from the Persian Gulf, in general, and 
also Iran, as well as, Qatar, in particular, amongst the other actual and 
potential suppliers, on the EU’s energy security? 
 How will Iran’s potential LNG supply in the future towards the EU and 
also Qatar’s LNG development, or at least the maintenance of the current 
production, influence these two countries’ energy security? 
 How can the EU secure its natural gas and LNG demands and what role 
the Persian Gulf plays in the energy securityof the EU? 
Therefore, by combining these secondary questions (Hafeznia, 2010: 117), the 
main research “descriptive question” (Creswell, 2003: 112) could be raised: 
“How might the EU’s future energy security be impacted by the development of a 
comprehensive natural gas export strategy among Persian Gulf states?” 
This research is a fresh attempt to answer these main and secondary questions, 
based on an appropriate theoretical framework, methodology and the methods of 
data collection that will be explained in this chapter. 
Research Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this thesis is: “The Persian Gulf’s natural gas reserves, in 
general, and its actual and potential LNG supply, particularly from Qatar and 
Iran, could play an important role for the energy security of the EU in the future 
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and also this relationship could also impact on the energy security of the states 
within the Persian Gulf region.” 
The “independent” (Hafeznia, 2010: 47) or “explanatory” (Grix, 2001: 9) variable 
of this “descriptive hypothesis” (Frankfort & Nachmias, 2008: 56–59 and 436) is 
natural gas deposits within the Persian Gulf and its actual and potential LNG 
supply, while the “dependent” (Hafeznia, 2010: 48) or “outcome” (Grix, 2001) 
variable is the EU’s energy security.  
The researcher has had some predictions prior to the literature review regarding 
the relations between the two variables and also simultaneous with the initial 
dip in to the latest natural gas and LNG literature, but the energy security’ 
indicators should be tested on different suppliers to the EU in order to test the 
hypothesis for confirming or disproving the primary forecasts. As a result, the 
hypothesis would be “non–directional” (Creswell, 2003: 111). 
Methodology, Research Methods and Data Analysis 
This “multiple–case study” (Grix, 2001: 67; Hafeznia, 2010: 296) research will be 
“descriptive–exploratory” methodologically (Grix, 2001: 66–67), as in some 
chapters, at first, certain historical and the present energy policies and geo–
politics issues, particularly within the EU and the Persian Gulf will be 
considered and secondly, by testing the energy security indicators, including 
acceptability, availability, affordability, and accessibility, on different actual and 
potential LNG routes toward the Union (figure 2), followed by the testing the 
hypothesis, this research precedes the exploratory stage and attempts to find 
relationships between the two variables analytically (Hafeznia, 2010: 296).  
This kind of research methodologically needs to use field studies and library 
methods (Hafeznia, 2010: 70–75) or “natural language data collection” 
(http://duo.dur.ac.uk/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp), mostly including interviews, 
official and primary reports and statistics, as well as archived documents, etc.  
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Hence, on the basis of this methodology, the data collection methods referred to 
below have been selected in order to test the hypothesis and finally find the 
suitable answers for central and secondary questions (Burnham et al.2008: 39). 
So, it requires a mixed method (Creswell, 2003: 211), including thematic texts, 
interviews, primary reports and statistics, in addition to documents, on the basis 
of “concurrent qualitative and quantitative data collection” in one single phase 
without any sequence (Creswell, 2003: 211). It seems that this “triangulation” 
(Grix, 2001: 84) and using more than one method in this research could improve 
the validity of the results (Grix, 2001: 94). 
So, different “descriptive and non–descriptive statistics” (Hafeznia, 2010: 274), 
having been issued by the main energy organizations (IEA, EIA, BP, CEDIGAZ, 
The Directorate–General for Energy for the European Commission), ministries 
(Qatar Petroleum, Iran’s Ministry of Petroleum, the related ministries in four 
EU case studies), institutes (annex 2), etc., as the primary numerical data, as 
well as some figures, tables, etc., in some books and journals will be used for 
inferential numeric analysis (Creswell, 2003: 220). 
Another method to be employed in this research is gas and LNG expertise and, to 
some extent, elite interviews that could help the researcher, especially in the 
exploratory phase of the thesis.  
As for the choice of interviewees, various views on natural gas and LNG supply 
toward the EU in the future from actual and potential suppliers were extracted. 
So, a number of gas experts, academic personalities and think–tanks have been 
chosen at the first step, from the case studies within the Persian Gulf and the 
EU and, in the second stage, from other European countries and the US. 
I focused on the energy ministries, institutions and think–tanks in the above–
mentioned regions and countries and contacted nearly 90 energy elites, experts 
and academic personnel. Altogether, 23 interviews were conducted (annex 1) in 
person, through telephone, email contact or Skype (Burham et al. 2008: 244; 
Frankfort & Nachmias, 2008: 213–223) over the course of June 2009 to May 
2012with these Arabs, non–Arabs and western scholars from Iran, the UK, 
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France, Spain, Italy, the Directorate–General for Energy for the European 
Commission, Norway, and the US that some of whom have tens of years of 
experience in the energy and gas fields. 
The interviews were conducted as semi–structured predetermined questions 
(Grix, 2001: 74–77) with five essential questions (annex 4), but in some 
interviews, based on the situation and the time limitations, some more necessary 
and desirable questions (Burham et al. 2008: 240) have been raised from 
respondents or the interviewees to obtain more detailed information in terms of 
supplementary point(s) regarding the natural gas and LNG issues. 
Some of the secondary sources which will be used are as follows:  
o Reference and text books regarding the international theories, energy 
security, natural gas and LNG;  
o Reference journals (annex 3), and academic papers;  
o Newspapers, news agencies, websites;  
o Archives and documentary documents; 
o Related maps and tables, extracted from reliable sources; 
The researcher will try to gather information and materials which have been 
prepared by Arabs, Iranian, Western, including European and the US’ 
organizations, ministries, institutes and think–tanks together with authors to 
avoid any bias. 
Operationalisation and quantification of the concepts in the hypothesis, 
principally the energy security term, in order to measure the indicators shows 
that the existing thesis is quantitative to some extent. To be analytically helpful, 
a measure of energy security indicators, comprising acceptability, availability, 
affordability, and accessibility need to be quantifiable. Therefore, quantitative 
indicators are necessary to understand the “energy security consequences of 
different development pathways” (Kruyt et al. 2009: 1). 
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As the current research is descriptive–exploratory and mixed methods are 
employed for data collection, so data analysis would be partly quantitative but 
mostly qualitative for “in–depth investigation” (Hafeznia, 2010: 74–75). 
Therefore, in–depth investigation, description, categorisation and finally 
interpretation, as well as analysis of data (Creswell, 2003: 182) demonstrates 
that the current thesis is a combination of qualitative and quantitative research 
that is more suitable for political science and energy issues (Creswell, 2003: 74–
77). 
Moreover, this kind of data collection would be related to the future of energy 
security and investigating the future events, so the best technique is “scenario–
building” (http://duo.dur.ac.uk/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp); that means what 
happens in the given context with different possibilities, such as in Chapter 3, 
regarding different scenarios about the amount of natural gas and LNG import 
in the future for the EU, or the main three scenarios regarding the amount of 
Iran’s gas export in the future (see details in Chapter 2). 
I will analyse the collected data based on coding, demarcating and then 
summarising them in the form of thematic categorisation and drawing of 
“descriptive statistics” figures (Hafeznia, 2010: 274), while some of the gathered 
data needs content analysis, such as interviews. Then it will be necessary to put 
these coded summarised data into the appropriate themes and, finally, the 
relationships between them should be discovered interpretively (Grix, 2001: 184), 
because this method is appropriate for case study researches 
(http://duo.dur.ac.uk/webapps/ portal/frameset.jsp). 
These resources will be used to generate the information to answer the research 
questions posed in the study and to test the hypothesis. 
Ethics in the research 
On the basis of the “Reflections on Ethics in Educational Research”, issued by 
Durham University (http://www.dur.ac.uk/r.j.coe/experiments/ethics.pdf), the 
quality of a research largely depends on ethical issues together with originality.  
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The author has always endeavoured to observe the ethical principles in his 
research, particularly in interviews and exact reference–writing for citations, 
quotation, etc. and also putting the someone else’s direct text in quotation marks. 
According to the Research Ethics Policy issued by the School of Government and 
International Affairs at Durham University, Principle 6.b (annex 5), “consent in 
relation to interview research should be based on simple agreement to 
participate in the interview process with the right to withdraw at any point”. 
In the first stage, I explained to the interviewees very clearly who I am, what the 
topic and the project are exactly about, why I am doing it, etc.  This makes for 
informed consent, meaning they truly understand what they are getting involved 
in.   
It is, moreover, a general ethical principle that participants should be made to 
feel that they can pull out at any time, without any pressure. Fortunately, none 
of the interviewees withdrew after expressing their satisfactions to participate in 
my research and answer to my questions. The collected data used only for 
purposes specified in my dissertation and my target has been legitimate.   
Moreover, I have not disclosed any personal or security data of the interviewees, 
excluding what they had permitted. These senior scholars have all consented 
that their responds could be published by the author with the full names, the 
date of interviews and also the positions of them (annex 2).  
Those have been in accordance with the principle 7 of the Research Ethics Policy 
arguing that “where a guarantee of anonymity is given as part of the process of 
obtaining consent, this must be strictly observed at all parts of the research 
process and in written outputs”. 
On the basis of principle 9, there should be provision for feedback on the results 
of the research to be given to participants if they request it, unless a justification 
for withholding is provided. As a result, I have got in touch with some of my 
interviewees since the first interview in June 2009 to ask them any new 
question(s) or any unclear point(s) and also convey my new findings to them. 
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In addition, I have put direct phrases of someone else’s text in quotation marks 
or referenced and also cited the work of the others. 
The author has used different primary and secondary resources, such as internet 
and online sources, and the real references have been brought in bibliography 
section at the end of the thesis.  
The author has also tried to avoid falsifying of data by referencing at the end of 
each key data and statistics or putting the major figures in the annex section of 
the thesis. So, the research integrity has been mostly reinforced by accurately 
recorded data. Likewise, I left my bias out throughout my research and tried to 
be rational.  
Original Contribution(s) 
This research is of a primary source character in energy security area and the 
purpose of this original research is to produce new knowledge in security of gas 
and LNG supply, rather than to present the existing knowledge in a new form, 
such as summarising or classifying the previous findings by other scholars. 
As mentioned, the “Reflections on Ethics in Educational Research” of Durham 
University (http://www.dur.ac.uk/r.j.coe/experiments/ethics.pdf) qualifies any 
academic research in accordance with the ethical issues and its originality. 
Grix (2001:108) said that a “substantial contribution to knowledge” means 
“…you must have produced original research on a given topic and embedded it 
firmly in the received wisdom of a particular field…” . 
Prof. Michael Talbot of the University of Liverpool described the nature of 
originality with two major elements, comprising facts and ideas, and that both 
might be either new (never before presented to the world) or old (familiar from 
earlier commentary), so four possible combinations arise: 
1. New facts + New ideas 
2. New facts + Old ideas 
3. Old facts + New ideas 
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4. Old facts + Old ideas  
He argued that the combinations 1–3 all lead to originality. Only the 
combination 4 is guaranteed to miss out on originality. Therefore, some new facts 
that have not been already discovered may become the base of a new idea and 
development.  
In the current research, the author has used the old facts, both in primary 
resources, such as official reports by international energy organizations, 
institutes, think–tanks, etc. and also secondary references, e.g. books, journals, 
etc. Nevertheless, the new facts have been achieved through interviews. As a 
result, both the categories 1 and 3 with new ideas and achievements have 
highlighted in this research.  
Now, this question is come up that is the outcome of this research really an 
important step forward in the development or progress of national, regional and 
global energy security and security of gas and LNG supply knowledge? 
Meaningful research is designed to fill up knowledge gap. So, this gap filling 
requires originality of ideas, theory, method or interpretation of existing theory, 
leading to contribute to the current knowledge. 
The more data to be collected, the higher the chance for a more original work. 
The author has tried to look beyond the raw data, asking myself some questions, 
for instance “what does this mean?”, or “what if …?”,etc.  
The current project would be original in the following categories and aims to 
make a contribution to Iranian energy security, together with regional security 
of gas and LNG supply.  
o Originality in an empirical work: This analysis provides objective results 
that policy–makers might be able to use as an input to the decision–
making process. For this reason, it will be a “practical” research, rather 
than a “fundamental” one (Hafeznia, 2010: 296). Carrying out an energy 
policy related problem, particularly the security of LNG supply that has 
not been done before. Iran has the energy targets by 2023, for instance in 
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gas area, and this research has considered the importance of LNG 
production and supply by Tehran on its ambitious energy objectives in the 
future.  
o Originality in new conceptualisation of the main theoretical frameworks: 
The “EU–[GCC+2]” model for energy relations on the basis of analysing of 
the Cantori and Spiegel’s theory, Davidson’s model, etc. has achieved. 
While Buzan et al. (1998: 105) believed that the energy policy has been 
securitised; energy could be added as the sixth element in the Regional 
Security Complex Theory that affect security. Therefore, the Regional 
Energy Security Complex Theory has emerged. 
o Originality in exploring an unexplored area: Analysis of the old and new 
facts and data in order to discover a new field of research and extension of 
the existing knowledge. I have conducted a major investigation in the field 
of the security of LNG supply from the Persian Gulf actual and potential 
suppliers to the EU which have never been previously investigated and 
could be useful empirically, such as the Persian Gulf’s LNG supply, in 
general, and Qatar as well as Iran, in particular, towards the EU in the 
future and also the security of LNG supply in the mentioned regions on 
the basis of the four main indicators of the energy security.  
Producing a critical analysis, together with synthesis and investigation of 
information that have not formerly examined was another aspect of the 
originality of this research, for example in the area of the security of 
unconventional gas supply, mainly from the US and its influence(s) upon 
the geopolitics of the main unconventional gas suppliers in the coming 
years. This includes interpreting the dataset differently from how it has 
been interpreted in the existing research literature and also contributes to 
the current knowledge both empirically and conceptually. 
I could not find reference in any work as to why the Persian Gulf gas reserves 
are/are not able to influence the EU’s energy security on the basis of energy 
security’s indicators. Nobody, in Iran, particularly in the Institute for 
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International Energy Studies and also probably outside this country, has dealt 
with the role of Iran’s potential LNG export for both the EU and this country in 
the future, as well as the impact of the continued and the future Qatar LNG 
exports, in addition to the potential of Iran’s natural gas and LNG supply on the 
EU’ energy security.  
Most researches, especially at Ph.D level, ought to be able to generate at least 
one, and probably several, journal articles in peer–reviewed and refereed 
journals. A research article should provide an acceptable claim for originality. If 
a piece of work is of poor quality, it is unlikely to produce any findings worth 
publishing. Therefore, I have already extracted four original topics from my 
doctoral dissertation and definitely decide to publish them in the mentioned 
journals, as follows: 
1. The outlooks of the conventional gas and unconventional gas supply 
in the future and the impact(s) of the latter on the geopolitics of the 
Persian Gulf’s gas supply; 
2. The position of the Persian Gulf’s actual and potential LNG supply 
in the EU energy security in the future amongst the main global 
suppliers towards Europe on the basis of the energy security 
indicators; 
3. The proposed security model for energy ties and gas supply between 
the Persian Gulf and the EU;  
4. The position of Iran’s LNG supply in its energy targets by 2023 and 
its interaction on this country, as well as the EU energy security.  
Value of the work 
The current literature in the energy security and the security of gas and LNG 
supply lacks a comprehensive study on the role of the actual and potential LNG 
suppliers within the Persian Gulf region for the EU energy security in the mid 
and long terms, based on the indicators of the energy security, while this 
relationship could also affect the security of the regional suppliers within the 
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Persian Gulf. So, his study has a wider perspective than that of existing energy 
security literature, which helps to make a broad evaluation of security of LNG 
supply. There have been no such empirical studies made to measure the level of 
impact of different actual and potential LNG suppliers towards the EU in the 
future in accordance with the four main indicators of the energy security. 
Likewise, the significance of this research stems from the fact that no in–depth 
empirical study has been already taken in Iran or elsewhere regarding the 
significance of LNG supply for the energy security of this country and also its 
grand energy strategy by 2023, while Tehran has been under international 
sanctions in its energy industries. Moreover, the increasing growth in 
unconventional gas production in the world could threaten the position of Iran, 
as an outstanding LNG supplier in the future. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to fill in the gap(s) in the existing academic works by 
exploring in the following arenas: 
 The level of impact(s) of the Persian Gulf’s LNG supply, amongst the other 
regions and countries, on the energy security of the EU in years to come; 
 To what extent the global unconventional gas production, largely by the 
US, could limit the Persian Gulf’s conventional gas supply, as the gas–
richest area worldwide and affect the geopolitics of this region in the 
future; 
 The best proposed security model to ensure the energy security and the 
security of LNG supply of the Persian Gulf and the EU;  
 The role of Iran’s potential LNG supply for the energy security of this 
country and the EU in the mid and long terms; 
 The position of Iran’s LNG supply in its energy targets by 2023.  
The purpose statement 
The author would like to compare different actual and potential LNG suppliers’ 
relationships, including the low–cost/low–risk, low–cost/high–risk, high–cost/ 
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low–risk, and high–cost/high–risk ones, to the EU, on the basis of testing the 
four energy security’s indicators individually and then determine the position of 
the Persian Gulf’s LNG exporters, especially Iran and Qatar, amongst them.  
Therefore, the level of units in the current research is “multi–level analysis” 
(Grix, 2001: 64), while in “macro–level” or structured–centred (Grix, 2001: 64) 
the role of the natural gas within the Persian Gulf for the energy security of the 
EU will be considered and in “micro–level” or actor–centred (Grix, 2001: 64) the 
role of the actual Qatari LNG and potential Iranian LNG on the UK, France, 
Spain and Italy will be analysed. 
Figure 2: The map and the methodology of the thesis 
 
Source: by Author 
Therefore, the four extracted energy security indicators should be tested on the 
LNG relationship between different actual and potential LNG suppliers, such as 
the Persian Gulf, particularly its two case studies, and the EU in order to test 
the research hypothesis and answer the main and secondary questions.  
The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of an introduction alongside the six chapters, as follows: 
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In the Introduction part, the main question and associated sub–questions, the 
hypothesis of the research, the methodology, the data collection methods, as well 
as the analysis techniques have been discussed. Furthermore, the ethics in the 
current research, original contributions, value of this thesis, the purpose 
statement, as well as the structure of that have been mentioned in detail. 
In the first chapter, the comprehensive literature review on key concepts, such as 
energy security, security of gas and LNG supply, etc. have been primarily raised. 
The terminology of the energy security and its main four indicators, extracted 
from different definitions, will be completely analysed. This section; nevertheless, 
includes the introduction of the latest and the existing studies alongside writings 
as the initial focus, followed by the critical literature review. The deficiencies in 
the mentioned studies and the importance of this gap have been dealt with in 
this section. 
In addition, the huge amount of collected data has been analysed “deductively”, 
because the data should be employed for testing the research hypothesis, on the 
basis of one theory or mixture of certain theories (Hafeznia, 2010: 44–46; 
Frankfort & Nachmias, 2008: 41–42) and, in other words, from one “general 
theory” to the “particular” finding(s) (Grix, 2001: 39). Therefore, these three 
applied theories, comprising the Subordinate System, new regionalism, and 
Regional Security Complex Theory, are explored in greater detail in this chapter.  
The second chapter is devoted to the geo–politics of natural gas within the EU, 
the scenarios regarding the amount of gas demand in the future, as well as the 
existing and the potential pipelines and LNG routes towards this region. The 
EU’s energy security has been influenced by both internal and external factors 
that have contributed to anxieties over Europe’s ability to meet future gas 
demand. As a result, the Union has decided to increase its piped gas and LNG 
imports from the actual and potential suppliers in the future, on the basis of two 
different scenarios. Likewise, this chapter concentrates on the EU’s energy policy, 
Europeanisation of energy by increasing of the renewable energy sources share 
in total primary energy sources and analysis of this process in the UK, France, 
Spain and Italy, while 24 out of 31 LNG terminals currently existing, under 
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construction, or under consideration in the EU, roughly 80%, are situated in 
these four case studies. As a result, their energy policies, outlooks and the share 
of natural gas in their energy mix impact on the future EU’s gas market. 
In the third chapter, the thesis will focus on the geo–politics of the Persian Gulf 
and common features and disputes amongst the regional states.  
In the fourth chapter, the Persian Gulf’s natural gas related issues, followed by 
Iran’s and Qatar’s gas geo–politics and their grand strategies will be discussed. 
The Persian Gulf has some challenges in order to develop its natural gas and 
LNG industries and more export in the future, such as unconventional 
gasproduced by the US that will be dealt with in detail in this chapter.  
On the basis of Iran’s Energy Outlook 2023, this country plans to increase its 
existing 1% share of natural gas global market to 8%–10% and takes part in 
GECF more actively, so the LNG projects both under consideration and under 
construction will play a significant role in this respect, while the EU would be 
one of the destinations for the future LNG exports. However, this country has 
encountered two impediments and three main scenarios regarding these two 
obstacles against its natural gas and LNG projects and exports in the future. 
Qatar’s economic and domestic growth, as the leading global LNG exporter has 
accelerated, based on “National Vision 2030 Document” and demand for energy 
more than doubled since 2000, having turned this country to the fourth largest 
gas consumer in the Middle East/Persian Gulf. Some officials mentioned that 
this country does not propose to build any more LNG facilities in the years to 
come, while some others believe this country could increase its current export 
capacity to preserve its global position against other competitors.  
The potential role of the GECF in the future of natural gas market with 
attendance of Iran, Russia and Qatar, as the three top global gas holders and its 
outlook, as well as its challenges are amongst the other issues in the final section 
of this chapter. 
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In the chapter five, the main four indicators of the energy security should be 
tested on the major actual and potential LNG suppliers towards the EU in order 
to clarify the position of the Persian Gulf among them, followed by the analysis 
of key findings and discussion. 
In the chapter six or final conclusion, the findings of the research will be 
discussed and the final results and analysis categorised in order to test the 
research hypothesis, as well as answering the central and secondary questions. 
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Chapter 1: Comprehensive literature review, terminology of the energy security 
and the theoretical frameworks   
1.1. Comprehensive literature review  
The researcher has broadly studied on the topic of the existing research to enrich 
his understanding of the field. In the phase of general literature review in energy 
security and security of energy supply, the author has attempted to articulate 
what previous studies have shown. Thus, a number of main common points have 
been found that the global energy organizations and institutes, as well as senior 
scholars have urged on them, stipulating at the end of this section in italic form. 
This is useful for narrowing down the scope of my reading in the critical 
literature review stage and establishing the perspective that my research will 
take.  
In the second step, so–called “the critical literature review”, the author has tried 
to investigate the controversies amongst the above–mentioned resources, 
comprising energy organizations and institutes, in addition to gas experts 
critically over the major factors that would affect the EU’s gas and LNG 
demands in the future, the role of other potential and actual suppliers, and also 
how this Union could secure its security of gas supply under these circumstances. 
This trend has largely helped me work out where there are gaps in the research, 
which provided me with a niche for the thesis and finally enabled the researcher 
to find out how the research could extend and also enhance the studies already 
done.  
Therefore, these arguments have been studied thematically and then a number 
of results achieved that the researcher will bring all in italic form at the end of 
the critical literature review section. 
Finally, in the third stage of the literature review, as indicated in the 
Introduction, the author has formulated the six secondary questions to identify 
the gaps in the literature and also narrow down the research topic and then 
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highlight the main niche of the thesis, as the main research question (See 
Research Questions section).  
As a result, the researcher has divided this part in three separate sections, 
encompassing general or initial dip in literature review, critical literature review 
and also the gap(s) and secondary questions (Grix, 2001: 64: 57–60) in order to 
raise the main research question. 
The current dissertation; moreover, has deductive approach, rather than 
inductive, from a number of general theories to particular points. It means that 
the research should be based on basic theories that will discuss in this chapter 
comprehensively.  
1.1.1. Initial Dip and General Literature Review 
Energy is the “lifeblood of civilisation” and the backbone of all economies for 
more growth and development (Proedrou 2012), as a “crucial entry point” for 
dealing with the global challenges during the 21st century (Global Energy 
Assessment, 2012: 92), as the energy century (Peimani, 2011: 1), while Prof. 
Peimani believes that energy will be “the single major challenge” for the current 
century, because of its direct connections with major social, economic, security 
and development goals, such as sustainable development, poverty eradication, 
adequate food production, climate change, peace and security (Global Energy 
Assessment, 2012: 1). This is because Charles Doran (2008) reiterates that 
“Energy is at the heart of the world politics”. It has also played a key role in the 
development of human civilisation (Bahgat, 2011: 1). The geo–politics of energy 
resources has been a strategic concern for both exporting and importing states, 
so the progressive dependence of developed and new emergent economies on 
energy supply and also confrontations in core areas has placed energy at the top 
of their geo–political agenda (O’Tuathail, 2006: 205–206). 
So, energy has always been as a matter of security (McGowan, 2011: 490), while 
Felix Ciuta (2010: 136) believes that energy security means the security of 
everything and Alhajji (2007), as well as Prof. Bahgat (2011: 1) have introduced 
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it as a major challenge in the world in the 21st century (see in detail in Chapter 
5). 
Energy security is traditionally focused on crude oil supply by the end of the Cold 
War (Cherp & Jewell, 2011: 203), but since the 1990s, natural gas has 
increasingly become the “fuel of choice” (Luft & Korine, 2009: 555; Eurostat 2010: 
6), so and additional term has entered the global energy literature, so–called 
security of gas supply (Luft & Korine, 2009: 555). 
The global energy mix will most likely change between 2010 to 2030 and the 
most important change will relate to renewable energies, followed by natural gas. 
The former will demonstrate a dramatic shift, so BP in its Energy Outlook 2030 
(2012: 12) estimates that the share of this non–hydrocarbon will rise to around 
one third of total primary energies consumption by 2030. On the other hand, the 
latter is the fastest growing fossil fuel globally (BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 
31), unlike crude oil and coal (BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 11). 
Global Energy Assessment (GEA) Writing Team in its latest work (2012: 75) 
explained that under the proper conditions, the share of renewable energy 
sources in global energy mix will be 35% to 70% by 2050, while decarbonisation 
in the electricity could be 75% to 100% by the middle of the 21st century. 
According to this assessment, natural gas is the major bridge or transitional 
technology in the short to medium term for total accessibility to renewable 
energy sources global use.  
According to BP (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011), global gas 
production was 86.86 tcf and 115 tcf, in 2000 and 2010 respectively, but this 
number will increase at least to 133.8 tcf and 168 tcf by 2020 and 2030 (US EIA 
2011: 50). 
So, the share of natural gas in the global energy mix will rise from 21% today to 
25% in 2030, due to its technological, transportation, economic, as well as 
environmental characteristics, compared to other fossil fuels (IEA Special Report, 
2011: 7–8). 
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It seems that natural gas consumption and demand will grow at faster rates 
than other fossil fuels in the future, according to different official statements, 
such as the IEA in its special report in 2011, entitled “Are we entering the 
Golden Age of gas?”, OPEC Energy Outlook (2011: 54), and the US EIA (2011: 
43), so based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2011: 4 & 49), natural 
gas demand increases from 111 tcf in 2008 to 168 tcf by 2030 globally.   
While the role of natural gas will increase compared with other fossil fuels, the 
rate of import will differ from each other. Natural gas consumption in the EU 
has grown from 18% in 1990 to 24% in 2009, based on BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy, June 2011, and this region will be the foremost importer 
worldwide until 2030 and will import around 80% of gas needs until then, 
followed by new–emerging economies, like China and India (BP 2012, Energy 
Outlook 2030: 78–79; European Commission Working Paper, 2011: 2), so energy 
security within the EU means “security of gas supply” (CER, 2011: 83; Luft, 2009: 
555). Moreover, the US is the leading gas consumer worldwide, but after more 
production of unconventional gas, this country will be self–sufficient in importing 
(see details in Chapters 2&5). 
Francesc Morata and Israel Solorio Sandoval in their published book, entitled 
“European Energy Policy, An Environmental Approach” in 2012, referred to 
Energy as a foundation of European integration after the Second World War and 
a continuous matter for the Union influencing its security, while “it is essential 
to the daily lives of every European” (EU’s Green Paper 8th March 2006: 4). 
BP in June 2011 also announced that by the end of 2010, EU held 1.3% of global 
natural gas reserves and according to EIA outlook published in 2011, the largest 
decreases in regional reserves throughout the world took place in the EU, so 
more than half of these reserves have been extracted (see details in Chapter 3: 
Geo–politics of EU’s indigenous natural gas); as a result, this union’s natural gas 
imports will rise from 64% in 2009, up to 80–90% by 2020 (Eurostat 2010) and, 
apart from Norway, as the non–EU country, gas production not only within this 
Union but also in OECD Europe has been in decline (US EIA, 2011: 51). 
Consequently, while the EU’s gas production in 2000 was close to 232 bcm, 
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however this number reached to close to 175 bcm in 2010, equal to 5.5% global 
natural gas production, and will reach 165 bcm, as well as, 113 bcm in 2020 and 
2030, respectively. Moreover, the EU will be affected by some external factors, 
such as more demand by other countries and regions, even the Middle East, 
North Africa and, in particular, the emerging economies (see details in Chapter 
3).  
It has not been observed in any scholar’s book, essay, working paper, energy 
organization or think–tank’s report, etc., in the “initial dip within the energy 
literature review” (Grix, 2001: 56) that a contrasting position will result in that 
the role of natural gas in the world and also within the EU might decrease! 
Therefore, in the first step of the literature review, the major common points of 
the studied writings and reports can be summarised and categorised, as follows: 
 Natural gas demand will grow at faster rates than for other fossil fuels in 
the future; 
 Competition among the major importers as the attraction of natural gas 
increases; 
 The EU will be the foremost natural gas importer worldwide until 2030; 
 The rate of LNG trading will grow more than piped gas. 
1.1.2. Critical Literature Review 
By the investigating of different works, presented by gas specialists, institutes, 
etc., I have found that there are two main arguments among researchers, 
affecting the rate and the amount of EU’s gas import in the future: the growing 
roles of both unconventional gas and renewable energy sources. 
In this second step after the initial dip and general literature review in to the 
current gas literature review, I plan to study these “controversies” (Grix, 2001: 
61) more critically as “the critical literature review” (Grix, 2001: 60) and use 
“thematic approach” (http://duo.dur.ac.uk/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp) for 
examining these literatures, rather than chronologically.  
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In the first stage of the thematic literature review, I will bring different views 
regarding the impact of unconventional gas and renewable energy sources on the 
volume of required natural gasand LNG which is critically important for the 
future of the EU. 
Some energy experts count the unconventional gas as a serious rival for the 
conventional gas during the next two decades as “the unconventional gas 
revolution” (IGU World LNG Report, 2010: 23). They argue that this “game 
changer”, according to Bahgat and “energy revolution”, on the basis of Davidson’s 
comment, could reshape the global natural gas and LNG systems, especially in 
North America, providing that the US will no longer need to import LNG over 
the next decades, and that other countries could replicate the experience of the 
US (IGU World LNG Report, 2010: 9). Bahgat (2010) and Prof. Giacomo Luciani 
in their writings and interviews, have insisted on this point. 
However, there is another argument that, while unconventional gas will grow 
more in the future, the position of conventional gas will be still in place.  
S.A. Gabriel and his colleagues (2012), as well as Zhi Ying. N (2012) argue that 
unconventional gas faces the future with some constraints, such as 
environmental, financial, ecological and infrastructure.  
The Energy Director–General within the European Commission in its final 
report on unconventional gas in Europe, published on 8th November 2011, 
confirmed these points. It focused on shale gas, compared to tight gas and coal–
bed methane, because this kind of experience for unconventional gas exists 
relatively less in Europe, but argued that “no commercial scale shale gas 
exploitation has taken place yet and it is only expected in a few years time”. 
Lochner and David (2009), drew attention to this point regarding unconventional 
gas in North America, taking effect on the short–and mid–term development of 
the North American gas market, however they believed that its influence on the 
long-term are expected to be smaller, mostly because of the costs involved. 
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Apart from the above–mentioned restrictions, production of unconventional gas 
is expected to grow from 13 tcf in 2008 to 31 tcf in 2035, in particular in the US 
and Canada and, to a lesser extent, in Russia, China and the EU, however global 
gas production will be to around 170 tcf until 2035 (EIA International Energy 
Outlook 2011: 50). 
It could be concluded that, notwithstanding some of the energy experts counting 
the unconventional gas as a serious rival for conventional gas during the two 
next decades, particularly in North America, that conventional gas will preserve 
its full supremacy on the global gas market at least until 2035 and, by analysis 
of certain official statistics issued by international energy organizations and 
institutes, it could be illustrated that the percentage of unconventional 
gascompared to conventional gas will be 17.95% by 2030 while this number was 
12.5% in 2010 and will be 15% in 2020.  
On the basis of official statistics issued by BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
(2011: 4&49), global natural gas demands will increase from 111 tcf in 2008 to 
133 tcf and 168 tcf by 2020 and 2030, respectively. These figures show that 
global gas demands will grow by nearly 50% until the end of the next two 
decades and then gas producers should increase their supplies by almost 50%, 
while unconventional gas will grow under 18%, and it shows demand for 
conventional gas in next decade(s) is more than 2010. For instance, according to 
CEDIGAZ in its report in 2011, the EU imported 86.25 bcm/y of LNG in 2010, 
while this volume must increase to 160.8 bcm/y by 2020 (see details in Chapter 
3).  
In addition, most of the produced unconventional gas in North America should 
be consumed domestically, so, in 2035, unconventional gas will provide 24% of 
the consumed natural gas in the US, up from 6% in 2008 (DOE–IEA, Annual 
Energy Outlook 2010: 3; see details in Chapter 4: unconventional gas as a rival 
for Persian Gulf’s conventional gas), while Luciani and Bahgat believe that by 
the US’ having more self–sufficiency in gas production, the previous volumes of 
gas exported to this country, can move elsewhere.  
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Luciani indicated to the point of “any unexpected events in the future” for the 
increasing demands of natural gas and LNG, such as what happened in the 
Fukushima Daiichi disaster, in Japan in 2011, which caused the huge amount of 
LNG to flow to the Far East and, of course, led to raise demands for LNG.   
The second point that could be influential on the amount of imported piped and 
LNG towards the EU in the future, in some energy scholars’ words, would be the 
rate of progress in renewable energy sources technology, particularly the degree 
of fulfilling of the 20/20/20 targets by 2020, based on its commitment regarding 
the Kyoto Protocol, in order to achieve the “Europeanisation” of energy, 
according to the Energy Summit of the European Council on 4th February 2011 
(see Chapter 2).    
According to the EU’s Road Map for 2050 (2011: 2) and the “renewable energy 
sources Roadmap” (European Commission 2007a), renewable energy sources 
share in energy mix should rise by 20% until 2020. 
Prof. Gonzalo Escribano (2011: 39–59) tried to explore an energy strategy with a 
geo–economic approach for the EU that could integrate the tensions between 
geopolitics and the market in a coherent external EU’s energy policy. Then he, 
alongside his academic colleagues in the newly–published book (2012), believed 
that the EU could deal with the new strategy and approach, as the 
Europeanisation of energy corridors to this Union (2012: 276). Then in chapter 
15, he and his colleagues put the European renewable energy sources corridors 
and cross–border renewable energy sources flows, like solar plan from 
Mediterranean countries, could be influential on the EU’s energy security, but 
with conditions. Escribano considered this new approach as a choice for the EU 
energy supply in the future, while the difficult economic situation since 2007, 
political instability in the Middle East and North America, and also rising 
energy consumption in the emerging countries have pressurised the Union’s 
energy market and its tensions, like price volatility, increased and might 
continue to increase in the future.  
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Nevertheless, some EU and non–EU institutions, high–ranking officials and 
energy experts acknowledge that the share of 20% renewable energy sources in 
the Union energy mix until 2020 and also energy efficiency targets would be less 
likely and should go beyond that and even to 2050. 
The EU Commissioner for Energy said that the Union will obtain only 9% in 
energy savings instead of 20% by 2020 (Oettinger, 10th November 2010: 2). 
The US’ Congressional Research Service (CRS); moreover, in its recent report 
issued on 13th March 2012 argued that the EU’s growing needs to shift fuels to 
more decarbonisation is a major energy challenge for the future (CRS Report, 
R42405, 13th March 2012). 
Dr. Gal Luft, and Dr. Anne Korine (annex 1) in their book (2009: 565) argued 
that the EU could not solve its energy problems just with renewable energy 
sources and energy efficiency and Rafael Kandiyoti (2008: 235) discussed that 
these non–hydrocarbons are not a comprehensive solution in the short– and 
mid–term for the EU. 
That is because; Proedrou Filippos (2012) argued that energy security and 
energy policy in the EU should be based more on hydrocarbons, especially 
natural gas in the future, despite growth in renewable energy sources 
consumption.  
He added that the relatively high price of renewable energy sources technology 
simultaneous with the economic crisis is the main reason behind the slow growth 
of renewable energy sources in the Union energy market. O’Tuathail and Dolby 
(2006: 210–211), analysed that not only renewable energy sources, but also other 
non–hydrocarbons, such as bio–fuel, solar, nuclear, etc., could not replace 
hydrocarbons on a significant scale during the next few decades.  
According to Eurostat Statistical Book, ISBN 1831–3256 (2009: 126), most of the 
EU’s member states have a long way to go to achieve the renewable energy 
target for 2020, while 16 out of 27 should promote their own renewable energy 
sources use between 200% to more than 1250% by the end of the current decade 
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and need around €1 trillion investment by 2020 (EU’s energy 2020: 2; CER 2011: 
7; CRS Report, 2012).  
This has been the point that Prof. Hooman Peimani (annex 1) in his newly–
published book (2011) made that renewable energy sources are yet to become a 
serious alternative to hydrocarbons due to the lack of sufficient investment (see 
details in Chapter 2: the EU’s energy policy).  
R. Odell (2002) stipulated that the European market for gas is in an 
“expansionist mode”, while this involves a nearly 100% increase in gas use in 
Western Europe and 150% rise in the east of this continent by 2025, compared to 
1995.   
It is obvious that natural gas is too crucial for the EU’s energy security in the 
future; nonetheless, different institutes and energy personalities, e.g. the 
European Commission’s Directorate–General for Energy and Transport, CIEP 
(Clingendael International Energy Program), Eurogas, OME (Observatoire 
Méditerranéen de l'Energie), Eurostat, and CEDIGAZ, have raised a few 
scenarios regarding the volume of imported natural gas and LNG in the future, 
including “High growth in gas demand” by little growth of renewable energy 
sources and also “Low growth in gas demand” after increasing growth of 
renewable energy sources share in the EU energy mix (see details in Chapter 2).   
By analysing these energy institutes, this result could be achieved that the EU 
should import 550 to 670 bcm/y just until 2020, based on low and high demands 
within this region, based on how the EU implements its energy efficiency and 
renewable energy sources policies, while European gas production will be around 
130 bcm/y, excluding Norway (see details in Chapter 2). 
Consequently, in this critical phase, as the second step of the current gas 
literature review (Grix, 2001: 60–62), and by “hierarchy of evidence of this 
literature” (http://duo.dur.ac.uk/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp), these results will 
be achieved: (see details in Chapters 2 & 5). 
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 The unconventional gas holds under 18% of global gas production by 2030 
and more than the other 82% belongs to the conventional gas; 
 The global gas demands grow by nearly 50% by 2030, so gas suppliers 
must produce 50% more, while unconventional gas could cover nearly 18% 
of this growing production; 
 The EU imported 64% of its needed gas in 2009 and this percentage will 
rise to 80% after 2020;  
 The renewable energy sources target by 2020 is ambitious, while 16 out of 
EU–27 should promote their own renewable energy sources use between 
200% to more than 1250% by 2020 and it needs €1 trillion investment;  
 The rate of the EU’s LNG imports will rise close to 90% in 2020, compared 
to 2010 and this percentage will increase further by 2030 further; 
So, the importance of diversification of gas suppliers has much significance for 
the EU, particularly after the gas dispute with Russia in 2006–2009, led to 
disruption of supply. Ariel Cohen in his essay, published by Heritage Foundation 
in 2006 wrote that “The North European Gas Pipeline threatens Europe’s energy 
security, because Russia builds a strategic new pipeline to Europe that will affect 
energy security in this continent for years to come, this direct link has the 
potential to increase the dependence of the EU on Russia.”  
Malcolm Wicks, the British ex–Energy Minister and the current parliamentarian 
in some of his work (2009), insisted on the importance of LNG trading for the EU, 
particularly over long distances, while diversification of LNG suppliers and its 
flexibility over destination would be critical to ease some various supply risks, 
such as might exist with the Russian domination of the EU’s gas market.  
On the other hand, Pascual and Zambetakis in the chapter of “The Geopolitics of 
Energy From Security to Survival” in the book, entitled “Energy Security: 
Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications” (2010: 21) argue that 
diversification of suppliers and LNG routes is costly and needs construction 
process. 
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Any opposite arguments have not been found yet, while all believe that the EU 
must diversify its natural gas and LNG import routes more in the future. 
John Gault, the President of the Energy Project Development in Geneva, in his 
two essays (February & November 2004), discussed this point and concluded that 
“in the future, most of the resources from the Persian Gulf will be drawn toward 
faster–growing markets in Asia, so the EU will compete with China and other 
Asian markets for gas from the Persian Gulf’s reserves”. 
He has also explained that the EU remains vulnerable to the threat of gas 
disruption from Russia.  
Sascha Muller–Kraenner in his work, entitled “Energy Security: re–measuring 
the world” in 2007, argued that Russia, Caspian, as well as Middle East/Persian 
Gulf regions are situated in the “Strategic Ellipse”. He continued that the Union 
should more actively compete with other thirsty gas importers during the “Great 
Game of the 21st century” by diversifying of the “Trans–European energy 
networks”. Sascha cited to the Commission’s study that competition with the 
main gas importers worldwide will become tougher in the future. 
The author of the above–mentioned book has finally raised the three focal 
questions that the EU should find proper answers in order to more security of 
gas and LNG supply in mid and long terms, as follows:  
1. How to structure the relations with Russia? 
2. Will Iran successfully be integrated into the international system and 
global economy? 
3. Is Turkey to become a member of the EU? 
On the other hand, Richard Young, moreover, in the book of “Energy Security: 
Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge” publishing in 2009, believes that the EU 
has been slow in competition with its global rivals to draw more energy. 
Therefore, he advised that the Union should concentrate further on the 
mentioned ellipse with its less–stable countries. 
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He indicated to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative that a small 
number of the EU member states have already approved it and most of the 
European countries opposed to exert strong pressure on the main gas producers 
and exporters in the “Energy Ellipse”. So, he concluded that while the EU 
supports governance reforms, more democracy, as well as human rights in 
energy producers as an approach to its energy security, but energy and 
democracy–related decisions was disconnected from each other. 
Anthony Cordsman in his book, “The role of Europe in the Middle East”, believes 
that the energy sources in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf, will 
influence on the EU until 2020 and beyond. 
Dr. Sanam S. Haghighi (2007), believed that the current energy agreements 
between the EU and main suppliers, including Russia, the Mediterranean and 
the Persian Gulf’s countries could not secure all required demands in the future, 
so the Union should move towards both bilateral and also regional negotiations 
and agreements with the main gas holders. 
Dr. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh from the International Institute for Asian Studies, 
the International Energy Program in the Netherlands, in his various writings, 
such as “Globalization, Geo–politics and Energy Security in Central Eurasia and 
the Caspian Region” and Prof. Abbas Maleki, from MIT University, the US and 
the Iranian ex–deputy Foreign Minister, in his work (2007), pointed out to the 
role of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf’s gas reserves for not only the 
Union but also for global energy security, while Europe is surrounded by a “sea 
of gas”. 
Construction of new pipelines and also LNG will be essential to ensure access to 
the gas–rich regions, especially in the Caspian Sea, the Middle East/Persian Gulf 
and Africa. This has been insisted in some European statements, like the Green 
and White Papers, as well as the EU’s energy charter. (Green Paper, 03rd August 
2006)  
In summary, the key element of the EU’s energy supply strategy is to shift to a 
greater use of natural gas, compared to other fuels and this point has been 
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emphasised by not only the Union’s main bodies in their approved statements 
and actions, like the establishment of the Gas Coordination Group in May 2006, 
Green Paper on security of supply  (2000: 44), “Energy Action Plan for 2010 to 
2014” on 6th April 2010, Regulations over EU’s safeguard security of gas supply 
in 2010, but also in ultra– regional distinguished institutes, such as CRS Report 
2012. Hence, natural gas could be the “Achilles heel of the EU’s energy security”, 
according to Herbert Ungerer, Deputy Director General, DG Competition (2007: 
2). 
Natural gas can be transported both in the form of piped gas and liquefied. LNG 
is more globalised than pipeline (C. Schofield, 2011) and now accounts for 30.5% 
of global gas trade (BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011: 4). The 
number of exporters, moreover, has increased from 13 in 2005 to 18 in 2010, 
under 40% growth, while the figure of importers rose from 11 to 22 countries, 
around 200% increase, during the same period, according to IGU in 2010.  
It is expected that the capacity of LNG trading will increase from 270 bcm in 
2008 to 450 bcm in 2015 and 540–566 bcm in 2020, according to IEA Special 
Report (2011: 45), as well as CEDIGAZ’s report on 24th June 2011. So, most of 
this volume flows to the Asian and newly–emerging economies in this continent, 
followed by the EU, according to the report by CEDIGAZ, as well as BP Energy 
Outlook 2030 published in 2011. The latter report added that the LNG trade 
grows twice as fast as global gas production. 
Europe’s gas imports are nearly 81% delivered by pipelines (Eurogas Statistical 
Report: 2010), whereas the situation in the EU’s natural gas market has changed 
considerably over the last few years, so Europe’s LNG regasification capacity has 
almost tripled in just 6 years (CEDIGAZ, Statistical Database) and the share of 
LNG in this region’s total gas trading will expand from almost 15% in 2010 
(CEDIGAZ , 24th June 2011) to more than 24% by 2020, according to the EU 
Energy Commissioner (Oettinger, 2010: 5–6) and 40% by 2030 (BP, 2011: 57; see 
details in Chapter 2: External LNG routes toward the EU). 
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Luft and Korine (2009), in addition to Pascual and Zambetakis (2010: 21) argued 
that the LNG producers and consumers can establish a special relationship 
directly without any transit players and this interdependency, according to 
Cindy Hurst (2009), will increase the security of supply, as well as local, national, 
regional and global energy security. 
I have not found any book, journal, working paper, etc. that reject the fact of the 
growing demands of LNG within the EU, but they do discuss issues of import 
volumes in the future.  
Luciani (2012) argued that the EU’s LNG in the future depends on “the level of 
economic growth in the Union, shifts to nuclear, renewable energy sources and 
even coal and also on the potential for domestic gas production from 
unconventional gas sources. Nevertheless, Laura El–Katiri (annex 1) added 
winter weather conditions and peak demand to these elements. 
As a result, the EU decides to increase its LNG capacity import during the next 
years by 31 existing, under construction, and under consideration LNG 
terminals so that 24 out of which, roughly 80%, are placed in the UK, France, 
Spain and Italy, while nearly 87% of LNG is imported by the UK, Spain, France, 
and Italy, equal to 25% of the world’s LNG import, according to IGU (World LNG 
Report, 2010). So, these four countries will be more important in the future not 
only for the Union, but also for the whole of Europe, while for the time being, 
there are two online terminals, operating in just non–EU Turkey and the three 
proposed terminals in Croatia and Albania (see further details in Chapter 2). 
Hence, I have chosen the above–mentioned countries as my case studies within 
the EU. 
Inge Bernaerts, the Head of Unit, Electricity and Gas within the Director 
General Energy, the European Commission (annex 1) argued that it is difficult to 
foresee how the current LNG import by EU and also suppliers will continue or 
change in future, while the quantity of LNG imported in the EU from Qatar has 
been constantly increasing during the past years. He believes that, “the choice of 
suppliers stays with commercial entities and is not steered by EU institutions. 
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The role of institutions is to create a stable, clear and predictable legislative 
framework, so that energy and gas companies can adequately plan and realise 
their investments.”  
R. Odell (2002) explained that under the growing demand contexts within the 
EU, the cost of longer–run supplies could become a critical variable in the future.  
Hartley and Medlock (2006: 407–439), compared various gas holders worldwide, 
while they believed that the South American gas suppliers will be neither a gas 
importer nor exporter and, unlike Australia, some of the gas exporters within the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be amongst the major 
exporters by 2025 and after that they will probably convert to importers. They 
acknowledged that Russian pipeline and Persian Gulf’s gas would be critical in 
the future, particularly for Asia and Europe. 
James Baker Institute at Rice University, the US, issued the World Gas Trade 
Model (BIWGTM) and analysed the future of global natural gas and LNG 
markets and concluded that due to growing gas demand by 2040, as well as 
decrease or depletion of gas resources in many areas during the next decade, the 
main gas holders, like Qatar, Iran and Australia will hold around 50% of global 
LNG export in the future, while the first two countries could play an important 
role to connect the regional gas markets for a more globalised gas trading system. 
Lochner and Bothe (2009) argued that because of Europe’s LNG demands, 
particularly from 2020, the main gas holders within the Middle East/Persian 
Gulf and North Africa will be much more important. 
The Middle East holds 40% of global gas reserves, while nearly the whole of 
these deposits are situated in the Persian Gulf, as the richest gas area worldwide. 
For this reason, both the Middle East and the Persian Gulf should be considered 
with each other throughout this thesis, so–called the Middle East/Persian Gulf. 
Iran and Qatar embrace nearly 30% global natural gas or 75% of Middle East 
gas reserves and these two, alongside more four littoral states in the region, are 
among the top 20 natural gas holders worldwide, according to EIA International 
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Energy Outlook 2011: 33 and 64, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 
2011, BP, 2010: 22 and Oil and Gas Journal Statistics on 1st Jan, 2011.  
The least–expensive, after abundant, is the second feature of the gas production 
within Luciani’s chapter 11 (2012: 236–259). He argued that the low price of 
natural gas within the Persian Gulf, in addition to other factors, has resulted in 
Saudi Arabia being less interested in exploring and increasing its natural gas 
production capacity. 
Peimani (2011), Howard Rogers (annex 1), Lochner and Bothe (2009), Prof. 
Bahgat (2011: 13–14) all believe that the field size and the amount of natural gas  
in the region, particularly in shared fields between Iran and Qatar, lead to the 
lowest production costs.  
Prof. Paul Rogers (annex 1) mentioned (2012) that the price of natural gas is 
significant in the future; for this reason the importance of some cheap gas 
holders, particularly within the Persian Gulf, in the future terms are two–fold 
(see details in Chapter 4 and, especially, Chapter 5).    
However, the Persian Gulf region has some challenges in order to develop its 
natural gas and LNG industry appropriately and to increase exports during the 
next years (see details in Chapters 3 and 4; Persian Gulf challenges against its 
natural gas outlook).  
The low–cost/high–risk Persian Gulf is a relatively unstable region and most of 
the problems regarding the future of natural gas and LNG export from this 
region are based on this fact.  
M. Wietfeld (2011) who previously worked in Qatar and some other Sheikdoms’ 
top gas institutes and official organizations for a couple of years, raised this 
question of why the Middle East/Persian Gulf with 40% of global reserves 
produces just roughly 12% of global production.  
He, then, in referring to this challenge added further queries. Michael Bauer 
(2011) believed that mistrust and the zero–sum game is the major regional 
challenge. So, Mert Bilgin (2009) examined different gas corridors towards the 
 37 
 
EU and concluded that the Union should prioritise the Republic of Azerbaijan’s 
gas, followed by Iraq and Iran, because of more political disputes within the 
Persian Gulfthan the Caspian Sea. He, of course, believed that more LNG supply 
in the future could ensure the Union’s energy security further (see details in 
Chapter 4: Persian Gulf challenges against its natural gas outlook).  
H. Hayes and G. Victor (2006) suggested that the GIRI (General Investment Risk 
Index), based on the internal situations within gas holder countries, the number 
of transit countries in piped gas and checkpoints in LNG routes, any risk in 
consumers, and geopolitical relationships, with a couple of elements on the basis 
of the ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) could help greatly to measure 
the degree of risks among different countries and regions with gas deposits. PRS 
Group Inc., moreover, with its regular publications will also assist the researcher 
very much (see details in Chapter 5: Accessibility).  
While nearly 30% of global natural gas or 75% of Middle East/Persian Gulf are 
situated in Iran and Qatar, these two countries definitely consider the best ways 
in order to utilise this potential most appropriately, as has happened in Qatar.  
Iran has a non–deniable geo–political position, while Rogers (2012) explained 
that Iran’s geo–strategic importance is primarily based on its oil and gas 
deposits, as well as the only bridge between the Middle East/Persian Gulf in the 
south and Central Asia in the north, with over half of the world’s known 
hydrocarbon reserves.  
Prof. Pirouz Mojtahed Zadeh (annex 1) in his book (2010: 268) counted Iran as 
the short and cheap energy corridor for the Caspian and Persian Gulf basins in 
their aims to transfer gas to the Indian subcontinent, Far East, Europe and 
Africa. He believes that the Persian Gulf is in the middle of the way between the 
two main gas importers, including Asia and Europe.  
That is because Kemp and Harkavy (1997: 111) defined Iran at the centre of the 
“Energy Ellipse”. They added that the resources of the Caspian Sea basin should 
be considered together with those that are in the Persian Gulf, so the “Persian 
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Gulf–Caspian Energy Ellipse” has become “one of the most significant geo–
strategic realities of our time.” 
This country possesses 17.3% of the known global reserves, while 62% of these 
deposits remain unexploited (US EIA, 2007 & BP, Statistical Review of World 
Energy, 2009). More than 68% of these reserves are located off–shore and 85% of 
them are non–associated gas. The South Pars, as the largest non–associated gas 
field in the world, is the name of the Northern portion of the joint field with the 
Qatari North Dome. 
Based on Iran’s “20–Year Outlook Document (2005–2025)”, followed by “Iran’s 
Grand Energy Strategy by 2023”, this country plans to increase its current 1% 
share in the gas global market to 8%–10% by 2023 and takes part in GECF more 
actively, so LNG projects will play an important role in this regard. Tehran has 
some LNG plans under consideration and under construction with the aim of 
being among the top five global exporters by 2020, but it has encountered two 
impediments, including foreign sanctions and increasing domestic demand, while 
Iran is the Middle East/Persian Gulf’s largest natural gas producer (US EIA 
2011: 52). All of the scholars, as well as officials confirm these two obstacles, so 
on the basis of them, three scenarios could be perceived for the country’s LNG 
projects and export in the future (see details in Chapter 4: Iran’s three major 
scenarios regarding the two impediments). 
Regarding the second hindrance, Iran’s Majlis (Parliament) on 5th January 2010 
ratified the subsidy reform plan aims to bring gas prices to the real market level 
by the end of the fifth development plan, 2010–2015, leading to phase out 
subsidies gradually, so high domestic gas consumption in Iran, has started to 
ease since 2010 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011). However, 
foreign sanctions are still in place. 
Aarts and Van Duijne (2009: 74), Amineh and H. Holman (19th July 2010: 60) 
and many other top researchers, in addition to certain Iranian high–profile 
energy officials, explain that any rise in Iran’s gas production is related to the 
structural industrial and technological changes, so it needs to attract almost 
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$200 billion of investments by the end of the Five–Year Development Plan in 
2015. 
Luft and Korin (2009: 13) argued that without LNG there would be no way for 
Iran to sell its gas to some far–distant importers in the east like China, and to 
the west, like the EU’s countries, in order to increase its share in the global gas 
market in the future. 
Peimani (2011) believes that “the EU does not take advantage of shortage of 
Iran’s gas capacity, while the Asian markets attract most of the global LNG in 
the future.” 
Most of the Iranian top officials and energy experts acknowledge the importance 
of LNG industry for the country’s gas policies and the seven liquefaction projects 
prove it. According to the European Commission, Director General Trade’s report 
on 27th March 2012, 90% of Iran’s exports to the EU have been energy related 
and this country, without considering the recent oil sanctions, is the EU’s 
6thlargest energy supplier, so Tehran has decided to expand these energy 
relations to LNG exports in the future and is studying this project in the 
Ministry of Petroleum and its main affiliated, the so–called Institute for 
International Energy Studies (IIES). However, foreign sanctions against Tehran 
put these vital projects on hold (see details in Chapter 4: LNG projects in Iran). 
Qatar’s “Gas Strategy” caused a shift from oil to natural gas, basically LNG,  
with 13.8% of global known reserves and converted this country to the top LNG 
exporter worldwide and its LNG export has been more than doubled between 
2008 and 2011 towards Asia, Europe and even South America (Platts, 4 July 
2011: 25). The EU’s LNG markets including Belgium, the UK, Italy, and Spain 
have been attracting around 33% of the Qatari LNG destination in recent years, 
based on EIA’s report regarding Qatar.  
Qatar’s economic and domestic growth, on the other hand, has accelerated and 
demand for energy more than doubled since 2000, according to BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy (June 2011: 27), and will almost certainly move further 
ahead in the future, while this country is the fourth largest gas consumer in the 
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Middle East/Persian Gulf, on the basis of Natural Gas Information 2010, issued 
by IEA.  
Luciani (2012), indicated this point, that economic growth is always accompanied 
by growth in energy demands and some other GCC1 countries, except Qatar, face 
a shortage of gas for domestic purposes and their development, like the United 
Arab Emirates and Oman. 
So, Qatar attempts to put an end to the enormous subsidisation of local energy 
prices and aims for more conservation, as well as uses gas for its development 
more, based on “Qatar’s National Vision 2030 Document”. However, there are 
some who predict, including certain researchers at Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies (OIES), e.g. Laura El–Katiri, and also the US EIA in its report, entitled 
“Country Analysis Briefs: Qatar”, January 2011, that Doha might have some 
problems in the future, particularly after 2015, in order to increase its export.  
Howard Rogers (2012) also believes that Qatar might raise its LNG exports to 
the EU, if Australia expands its LNG supply toward the Far East and Qatar’s 
LNG to the Atlantic basin will dramatically decrease.  
Peimani (2011) believes, in the absence of the American gas market, Qatar could 
expand its LNG export capacity to Asia–Pacific and the EU’s markets. 
However, we could not ignore this point that global demand is expected to 
increase by 50% over the next 25 years, according to US EIA (2011: 43) and 
Qatar Petroleum (2007, issue 1: 1), while the US’ self–sufficiency by 
unconventional gas will be under 18% by 2030 (Chapters 4&5). 
Qatari officials, moreover, announced that any more LNG facilities will not be 
constructed in the future, and some others have insisted on this country’s 
                                                          
1
 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Created on 25th May 1981 and included 2,500,000 km2. The 
Council comprises the Persian Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates. Iran and Iraq are currently excluded, although both nations have a 
coastline on the Persian Gulf.  
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leadership in the global LNG supply as the key policy goal for the government in 
the future, according to the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs (European 
Commission, Qatar Country File, 2011).  
In summary, Bahgat (2010) expressed that, “there is no way to predict the 
outcome of this assessment over the amount of Qatari LNG export to the EU.”    
On the basis of official data analysis, Iran and Qatar could be the main natural 
gas and LNG producers since 2020 after Russia and the US. The US EIA in its 
International Energy Outlook (2011: 43) acknowledges that both Iran and Qatar 
can hold 20% of global gas production in the mid–term. According to this report, 
the Middle East/Persian Gulf will hold the most growth in gas production 
worldwide between 2008–2035, but face some challenges and competitors (see 
details in Chapter 4: unconventional gas as a rival for Persian Gulf’s 
conventional gas).  
1.2. Terminology of the energy security  
Energy is “at the heart of economic development in every country” (Pascual & 
Elkind, 2010: 1) and “affects everything, and everything affects energy” (Sovacool 
& Lim, 2011: 416), so this term has always been “a matter of security” (McGowan, 
2011: 490).  
Since the Industrial Revolution, “the geo–politics of energy has been a driver of 
global security”, and the challenge of energy security has been the topic of 
decades–long debate in the world (Pascual & Elkind, 2010: 6 & 9). On this basis, 
some predict that energy would be as a major concern for almost all countries 
worldwide during the 21st century (Bahgat, 2011: 1 & 2; Alhajji, 2007), while it 
has been a huge anxiety during the last 100 years and strongly affected globally 
by some events, such as the US oil embargo on Japan prior to the Second World 
War, the Arab and some non–Arab oil embargoes following the Yom–Kippur 
Arab–Israeli war in 1973, Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979, as the second major 
oil crisis and stronger than previous ones (Proedrou, 2012), the Iran–Iraq war in 
the 1980s, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Persian Gulf war in 
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the 1990s, Russia’s gas cut–off to Ukraine in 2006–2009, insurgencies in Iraq 
and Nigeria, as well as strikes in Venezuela (Luft, 2009: 43–56).  
As a result, the main concept in the research hypothesis is the energy security. 
Barry Buzan et al. (1998: 105) argued that the energy policy has been more 
securitised, thereforethe excessive dependence on energy has boosted pressure 
on the energy security, or its synonym “the security of supply” (Alhajji, 2007). 
According to Felix Ciuta, energy security means the security of everything (2010: 
136), for two major reasons: growing expansion of global energy needs, and 
environmental challenges because of the increasing consumption (Peimani, 2011: 
1).  
Energy can be considered in three aspects:  
 The type of energy resource, like nuclear, renewable energy sources or 
hydrocarbons;  
 The sectors of activity, e.g. extraction, transport or distribution (Ciuta, 
2010: 132);   
 The main actors, including producers, transit states, consumers, and 
international organizations (Luft & Korine, 2009: 8).  
Nevertheless, the economic considerations and political issues are the two sides 
of the coin for the energy security; therefore it is necessary to explain the 
challenges that both provide (Proedrou, 2012).  
Luft and Korine (2009: 335–350) have also separated the energy security realists’ 
literature from idealists’ literature over this concept, while the former insists on 
the below items. 
 Energy security in line with the national interests;  
 Uncertainty over the long–term energy supply; 
 Political utilisation from strategic commodities, such as natural gas and 
oil; 
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 More interdependence for a more collective energy security;  
 Probable energy war in the future. 
The energy security idealists, however, like the EU’s energy policy–makers, 
emphasise on: 
 The power of the energy market, logic and its interconnections; 
 The lower cost of negotiation compared to any conflict to access the 
hydrocarbons.    
Notions of security of energy supply or in short–form energy security (Löschel et 
al. 2010: 1665–1671) sometimes differs by personal and institutional 
perspectives. It has been defined by different literatures with nearly 45 
definitions of this concept (Sovacool & Lim, 2011: 3), raised by different global 
energy organizations, bodies and institutions, as well as some high–profile 
realist and idealist experts, that have some common indicators.  
The IAEA (2007: iii) has insisted on a secure supply of energy, protection against 
disruptions and price volatility, encouragement of diversity of technologies and 
sources in order to create more self–sufficiency, competition within markets that 
distributes those fuels and also improvement of environmental sustainability.  
The IEA, furthermore, explains the IAEA’s energy security indicators, for instant 
more reliance on indigenous resources that are environmentally clean, reliable 
access or availability of resources (the IEA Model of Short–Term Energy Security, 
2011: 9), while W.C. Ramsay, Deputy Executive Director of this international 
energy body emphasised on ensuring energy security by secure, reliable and 
affordable energy in addition to concerns over the environment (W.C. Ramsay, 
2008). 
The US Department of Energy also believes that energy security should be 
promoted through reliable, clean, and affordable energy, the same definition 
used by some energy security prominent experts, saying “the provision of 
reasonably priced, reliable, without any interruption and environmentally 
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friendly energy” (Müller–Kraenner 2007: xi; Yergin 2006, Alhajji 2007a; C. 
Jansen & Seebregts, 2010: 1655).  
The US Chamber of Commerce, in its study in 2010, has presented the four 
dimensions of energy security, comprising: 
 Geo–political (energy imports, particularly from politically unstable 
regions);  
 Economic (high energy intensity and trade imbalances);  
 Reliability (adequacy and reliability of infrastructure); 
 Environmental (related to the carbon intensity of the energy system and 
greenhouse gases). 
The European Commission has concentrated more on the energy security since 
the 2000 Green Paper on “Security of Energy Supply” and defined this term: 
“Energy supply security must be geared to ensuring…the proper functioning of 
the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability…at a price which is 
affordable…while respecting environmental concerns… security of supply must 
seek to reduce the risks of energy dependence” (European Commission, 2000: 2). 
These characteristics are just the same as a definition raised by Cambridge 
Energy Research Associates (CERA, 2006: 22), Barton and his colleagues (Barton 
et al. 2004: 5), as well as the World Energy Assessment that all argue on the 
constant availability of energy flow for the foreseeable future in various forms 
and in sufficient quantities at affordable and reasonable prices.  
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2001, has also repeated 
these energy security indicators but emphasises the importance of the 
availability of sufficient different energy sources. Peimani (2011: 2) has urged 
these features, too. 
According to Anas F. Alhajji, the energy security includes six dimensions, these 
being economic, environmental, social, foreign policy, technical and security 
(Alhajji, 2007c), while Cherp and Jessica (2011: 202–212) believe that the geo–
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political aspect of the energy security is the key theme of energy insecurity 
during the 21st century and also Wicks, the current UK Prime Minister’s energy 
representative and ex–Energy Secretary has argued, (Wicks, 2009: 1) that the 
technical and economic dimensions are more important than the other aspects.  
So, the brief elaboration on these dimensions is followed by this definition of 
energy security, which encompasses the above six dimensions: “The steady 
availability of energy supplies in a way that ensures economic growth in both 
producing and consuming countries with the lowest social cost and the lowest 
price volatility” (Alhajji, 2007d). 
Cherp and Jewell (2011: 209) have also indicated to the three energy security 
dimensions, comprising “sovereignty, resilience, and robustness”. They have 
suggested that the sovereignty perspective on energy security concentrates on 
the threats posed by the external actors, such as embargoes, acts of sabotage or 
terrorism, so the ability to switch to more dependable suppliers or diversifying of 
energy sources could lead to a reduction in the effects of these threats (Cherp 
&Jewell, 2011: 207). The “resilience” viewpoint insists on capability to respond to 
diverse disruptions and threats by more infrastructure, flexibility and 
adaptability (Cherp & Jewell, 2011: 208), and the “robustness” perception urges 
adequacy and reliability of resources and infrastructure.  
According to the World Energy Council, energy security means “reduced 
vulnerability to short–term or long–term physical disruptions to import supplies, 
as well as the availability of local and imported resources to meet the growing 
demand for energy over a period of time and at affordable prices”.  
K. Sovacool and Wei Lim (2011: 424), have argued that the energy security is not 
only physical but psychological, so “the perception of any possible interruptions 
in supply, even the supply and demand of energy remain unchanged, can result 
in the feeling of insecurity”. 
On the basis of the importers’ perspective, energy security means security of 
supply without any energy shortage at reasonable and even competitive prices 
without further deterioration the state of the environment (Proedrou, 2012). For 
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exporters, on the other hand, “energy security equates with security of demand 
at competitive prices that will guarantee significant profits for the exporter with 
no excessive cost to the environment”, so economic downturn in importing states 
leads to reducing energy demand and the exporters do not support recession or 
switching to alternative sources (Proedrou, 2012).  
Luft and Korine (2009: 9), as well as Pascual and Elkind (2010: 4) argue that the 
importers support security in energy supply adequately with lower and 
affordable prices and exporters are keen on long–term guarantee demands by 
importers with fair pricing and development of new fields with advanced 
technology and enormous investment. As a result, both of them support a 
diversification policy of supply and markets (Luft & Korine, 2009: 361), whereas, 
the transit countries by attracting investments attempt to strengthen their 
energy security as well (Luft & Korine, 2009: 335–350). 
This concept has also concentrated on global, regional, states, organizations and 
companies, as well as individual levels.  
Level and time frame, moreover, are two additional aspects of energy security. It 
is influential in three scales: the household, the nation–state, and the global 
context (Pachauri, 2011: 191–205). Gal Luft and his colleagues (2011: 43–56) and 
also Peimani (2011: 2) add regional scale to these three, which is affected by 
political, economic, military/security, social, and environmental factors. So, at 
the state level concentration is on bilateral energy relations between two states, 
whereas in the regional level, the focus is on dependencies or interdependencies 
within the region and inter–regional relations. While electricity, heating and 
transportation prioritise in energy security concept (Luft & Korine, 2009: 6), at 
household and nation–states or micro and meso levels (K. Sovacool, 2011: 2), long, 
medium and short–terms policies against any challenges seem vital (D'Agostino, 
2011: 205–218).  
Gal Luft, Anne Korin, and Eshita Gupta (2011: 43–56) attempt to identify many 
of the threats to regional and global energy security as the macro level (K. 
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Sovacool, 2011), such as geo–political struggles over resources, environmental 
pollution, and climate change. 
The energy security, however, is threatened by some dangers, such as the 
increase in energy prices, and growing global competition for energy resources 
with the emergence of huge economies, 
like China and India (Wicks, 2009: 3). 
Pascual and Elkind argue (2010) that 
the geo–political dimensions of energy 
security account for energy–related 
relationship between exporters and 
importers. However, the new aspect of 
that takes shape between various 
consumers competing over more 
energy supply. 
Growing population and rising 
standards of living could push global 
energy demand up by 40% by 2030, 
and this will lead to pushing up global 
prices (European Commission, 7th Sepember 2011: 2). 
Regarding time frame, Jansen specified five different time dimensions of energy 
security challenges, comprising:  
 Near real time, or less than 1 minute; 
 Short term, or less than 2 years; 
 Medium run, or 2 to 15 years; 
 Long run, or greater than 15 years; 
 Very long term, or greater than 50 years (Jansen & Van der Welle, 2011: 
239–250).  
Figure 3: The umbrella of the energy security 
 
Source: World Energy Forum, 2006:8 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 58: Energy security; An Umbrella Term
Source: World Energy Forum (2006), “The New Energy 
Security Paradigm”, p. 8 
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Short–term physical disruptions of energy supply occur due to temporary and 
non–predictable events, such as political events, technical failure, extreme 
natural or climate accidents, and terrorist attacks, hence it needs to react 
promptly to sudden changes in supply and demand (Fattouh, 2007: 7).    
More transparency in the global gas markets and energy prospects (W.C. 
Ramsay, 2008) on the basis of international organizations’ cooperation, such as 
the IEA (Yergin, 2006: 69–82), as well as more attention to intensify security 
levels, such as maritime, against any threats are the most important solutions to 
combat this short–term challenge to improve the energy security (Jansen & Van 
der Welle, 2011: 239–250). Consequently, in all these respects, the short, 
medium and long terms perspectives of energy security are essential (Gheorghe 
& Muresan, 2011: 2).   
The medium and long–term physical disruptions of energy supplies are more 
related to structural dimension of energy security and as a result of the 
prolonged political problems, environmental and lack of adequate investment 
(Gheorghe & Muresan, 2011: 2). So, diversifying of energy resources and 
suppliers alongside more energy efficiency, more research and innovation, as 
well as development of high–tech (Yergin, 2006; W.C. Ramsay, 2008), sufficient 
investment in energy industries and infrastructures both in consumers and 
producers (Eurogas, 2010: 6) are amongst the measurements that could fight the 
medium and longer–term energy security challenges. 
In addition, Daniel Yergin (2006) has referred to the “security margin”, as the 
buffer against shocks and interruptions, such as sufficient spare production 
capacity, strategic reserves, adequate storage capacity, etc. 
Energy interdependency and collaboration amongst the consumers and also 
between consumers and producers bilaterally or within multilateral frameworks 
(Yergin, 2006), as the “cooperative energy security” (Cutler, 1999), leads to 
economic development and world peace (Bahgat, 2011: 2).  
Contrary to President Nixon’s remark that first called for energy independence 
(Pascual & Elkind, 2010: 212), in an era of intensifying of international and 
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transnational interactions, any move toward a fully energy independence would 
most possibly weaken rather than enhance notions of security and could even 
lead to greater costs, as well as an isolationist energy policy (Proedrou, 2012). 
Moreover, participation in the global market is beneficial and functions as a 
shield against supply shortages and energy independence is neither feasible for 
most countries nor realistic and achievable goal in itself (Pascual & Zambetakis, 
2010: 31 & 152).  
Failure to ensure energy security could cause an energy crisis. From the 
exporters’ view an energy crisis takes place when the exporter is unable to sell 
its energy at affordable prices and that can lead to a fall in investment and 
profits. Hence, an energy crisis erupts when energy resources are scarce 
(unavailable), when producers are unreliable (inaccessible) or when the prices 
rise to an unsustainable level (unaffordable) (Proedrou, 2012). 
Hisham Khatib, Honorary Vice Chairman of the World Energy Council believes 
that, “We always try to define energy security as being the continuous 
availability of energy in the right forms, in sufficient quantities and at 
reasonable prices, although the only forms of energy available now, and in the 
future, are fossil fuels, based on the major indicators” (Khatib, 2005: 14; World 
Energy Council, 2008). 
As a consequence of examining the above–mentioned definitions of the energy 
security by organizations, institutes, think–tanks, and energy specialists, four 
common main indicators could be observed. Bahgat (interview, 2012) argued that 
the main international energy organizations, such as the IEA, believe that the 
energy security has four major standard indicators, comprising acceptability, 
availability, affordability, and accessibility (figure 4). The Institute for Energy 
Security Unit of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) for the European Commission 
(2010: 4), the APERC (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre) and many of energy 
experts’ conceptualisations, like Jessica Jewell in “the IEA Model of Short–term 
Energy Security”, have taken into account these four indicators, despite some 
restrictions.  
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Peimani has employed sustainability as synonymous with acceptability and 
Global Energy Assessment (GEA 2012: 22) and Sovacool (2011: 337) applied the 
term of feasibility, equivalent to accessibility. Furthermore, the latter energy 
expert has used reliability in place of accessibility (K. Sovacool, 2011: 9). 
Therefore, “the new vision of 
energy security”, based on this 
classification scheme (Elkind, 2010: 
144) is the cornerstone of this 
research for testing them on the 
EU’s LNG relations with different 
actual and potential suppliers, 
such as the Persian Gulf and then 
comparing them for ranking to 
establish the most suitable 
suppliers in the future:  
 Acceptability, or 
environmental and social elements; 
 Availability or geological elements; 
 Affordability or economic elements;  
 Accessibility or geo–political elements. 
The energy security had, moreover, traditionally focused on crude oil supply 
disruptions by the end of the Cold War (Fattouh, 2007: 23; Cherp & Jewell, 2011: 
203), but with the expansion of the EU, the break–up of the USSR and the 
economic explosion in the Asia–Pacific region, some core shifts in energy demand 
and supply have taken place. Consequently, since the 1990s, natural gas became 
more the “fuel of choice” (“The New Energy Security Paradigm”, 2006: 11) with 
an increase of its use in recent years and also in the future, in particular within 
the EU. Hence, this tendency increases concerns relating to security of gas 
supply (Kruyt et al. 2009: 2167). So, energy players’ definitions regarding the 
Figure 4: The indicators of the global energy security  
 
Source: Energy Policy 37 (2009): 2168 
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energy security depend on their energy situation and their views over their 
vulnerabilities to energy disruptions. For Americans, for instance, energy 
security is more about oil and transportation. However, for the EU members, 
energy security is much more dependent on natural gas (Luft & Korine, 2009: 11; 
Pascual & Zambetakis, 2010: 9) so, “Gas is the new oil”.  
High oil prices since the mid–2000s, the discovery of a number of new gas fields 
in previous years, the least–carbon intensity of natural gas, technological off–
shore and on–shore innovations, as well as unconventional gas (Proedrou, 2012), 
political instability within the oil markets, the function of cartels, such as OPEC, 
a rather unclear picture for oil trade in the mid–term (Cable, 2010: 75–82) have 
resulted in the importance of natural gas and LNG increasing in recent years 
and this is expected to continue in the future (Proedrou, 2012). 
Aleh Cherp and Jessica Jewell, conversely, said there some limitations in the 
ability of the existing energy security indicators to measure it (Cherp & Jewell, 
2011: 330–356), and also Bert Kruyt and his colleagues believed that there is no 
single ideal indicator for energy security (Kyuyt et al. 2011: 291–313).   
I will try to quantify these indicators (Hafeznia, 2010: 47–49) and operationalise 
the energy security, as the main concept in my hypothesis (Creswell, 2003: 220), 
while some of them remain qualified (see details in Chapter 1&5: The 
terminology of the energy security and its main indicators), and then test these 
mostly quantified indicators (Frankfort & Nachmias, 2008: 403–408) on the LNG 
relationships between the various actual and potential suppliers and the EU for 
hypothesis testing (Burnham et al, 2008: 42; see details in Chapters 5 and 6). 
1.3. Theoretical Frameworks 
It is necessary to select three appropriate theoretical frameworks for this 
research and I will try to discuss an appropriate theoretical framework for the 
EU firstly, followed by another suitable theory for the Persian Gulf and, in the 
third stage, I should connect these two theoretical frameworks by one more 
theory that should be related to security issues, as the concept of the energy 
security is the main connecting factor between the Persian Gulf and the EU in 
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my hypothesis. As a result, at the conceptual and theoretical level, I adopt the 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) on energy security to connect the 
“New Regionalism” theory for you the EU and the “Subordinate System” theory 
for the Persian Gulf. Then, I should extract the main indicators of the energy 
security and will test on various actual and potential LNG suppliers’ 
relationships with the EU to test my research hypothesis and answer the 
question(s). 
The EU, comprises 27 independent countries, united under one European 
institutional structure, while maintaining national sovereignty. This Union, as a 
“Marco–Region” (Farrell et al. 2005: 87–95) or “core region” (Fawcett & Hurrell, 
2004) and one subsystem between the state and the global levels (Farrell et al. 
2005: 24) is the most integrated region worldwide (Fawcett & Hurrell, 2004) and 
might develop further in the future when some other countries of the European 
continent join this Union.  
A region is a geographical structure with a set of states with common feature(s), 
at least geographically and strategically. Of course, economic, cultural, political, 
and security are sometimes the pillars of the region without geographical 
proximity, such as Arab Union (Mojtahed Zadeh, 2010: 230–231). 
According to Buzan and Weaver (2003), regionalisation constitutes a level of 
analysis of international relations situated between the local and the global.  
Regional co–operations and institutionalisation have been part of the process of 
decentralisation in the international system (Mojtahed Zadeh, 2002: 247) and 
also one response to the competitive economic pressures associated with 
globalisation (Beeson, 2006: 544). 
Regionalism was regarded as a multidimensional integration ranging from 
economic, cultural, political, social characteristics to security aspects with states, 
non–state actors, organizations, institutions and social groupings, as the main 
actors (Farrell et al. 2005: 8), refer to “new regionalism”, particularly after 1990 
(Karoline, 2007: 564–565) and the “post border” age (Dear & Lucero, 2005: 317–
321) in a multipolar world order and differing from the old regionalism of the 
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1960s. The latter, was basically formed in a bipolar Cold War context, based on 
governments and relations between nation states, and demarcated the regions in 
terms of boundaries for growth, job markets and the like.  
The Energy Policy in the EU has been adopted regionally and concentrates on 
forming a competitive internal energy market or the “Pan–European energy 
market” (Sascha Muller–Kraenner, 2007: 33) with high quality service at low 
prices, developing renewable energy sources, declining dependence on imported 
fossil fuels, decreasing of consumption of both hydrocarbon and non–hydrocarbon 
energies and also more energy efficiency. After the adoption of legally binding 
energy targets to address climate change, energy security and competitiveness, 
the 27–member states are now emphasising on the implementation of these 
targets. As a result, energy decision–making within the Union is more regionally, 
rather than nationally. For this reason, new regionalism seems to be the most 
appropriate theory to analyse the EU’s energy security in the future. 
So, the indicators of the European integration are based on “new regionalism” 
theory, as the most appropriate theoretical framework for the EU in this 
research.  
Fawcett and Hurrell (2004: 312–313), counted two more kinds of regions, 
comprising the “intermediate regions”, being closely linked to the core regions, as 
well as “the peripheral regions” within the international system. The latest are 
politically turbulent, such as the Persian Gulf region and also economically 
stagnant. So, the regional arrangements are fragile and make the security issues 
much more of a priority. 
The Persian Gulf, as the “micro–region” (Farrell et al. 2005: 87–95), the “regional 
grouping” (Mojtahed Zadeh, 2010: 240; Karoline, 2007: 558) or “unstructured 
region” due to its insufficient security interdependence (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 
492) exists between the national and the local level (Farrell et al. 2005) and 
includes some quite independent states with a degree of economic and geo–
politics commonalities (Mojtahed Zadeh, 2010). 
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This region consists of the GCC, Iraq, as non–GCC Arab country and non–Arab 
Iran, as well as some ultra–regional players, such as the US, France, etc. 
Louis Cantori, and Steven Lospiegel in their co–authored book, entitled “The 
International Relations of Regions”, published in 1970 and also an essay, entitled 
“International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems”, 
released in International Studies Quarterly, Volume 13, No: 4, in December 1969, 
theorised the “Subordinate Systems”. 
They argued that the subordinate system, as a regional subsystem (Cantori & 
Spiegel, 1970: 5) in international relations (Cantori & Spiegel, 1970: 378), 
consists of the core or center sector, the peripheral section and the intrusive 
player(s). This system consists of a number of adjacent and interacting states 
which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, religious, and 
historical bonds, or at least have geographical proximity. However, the 
diplomatic orientation of some of these states is sometimes toward the ultra–
regional player(s). 
They added that the states within the core sector of a region or subordinate 
system have shared social, political, economic, religious or organizational 
backgrounds and also there can be even more than one core section within a 
given subordinate system. The peripheral sector includes all those states which 
are separated from the core sector to some degree by economic, organizational, 
social, religious or political factors, but play a role in the politics of the 
subordinate system. In addition, relations between the core and periphery are 
often more important than between the periphery countries, while the relations 
with the international system take precedence over relations with such a 
subsystem (Cantori & Spiegel, 1969: 375).  
The periphery members, especially those which are isolated, often attempt to 
manipulate the security objectives of the intruding powers (Cantori & Spiegel, 
1970: 171) and, occasionally, the peripheral actors interact to a higher degree 
than in other peripheries, likely to be united, at least in part, by a common 
intrusive power (Cantori & Spiegel, 1970: 171).  
 55 
 
The intrusive or penetrating (Cantori & Spiegel, 1970: 297) part consists of the 
external power(s) participating in the region politically, militarily and also in 
and organizational cohesion process (Cantori & Spiegel, 1970: 293).  
The power of intervention, moreover, has politically significant involvement and 
participation in the balance of power of a subordinate system through possession 
of a colony, the transfer of economic or military aid, formal alliance, and troop 
commitment. Therefore, this external power impacts on policies of both core and 
periphery players, as well as the regional affairs. 
In the Persian Gulf region, as the subordinate system of the Middle East, the 
GCC is considered as the core section, due to the common political, economic and 
social features amongst the states, despite other differences. 
Iran and Iraq are the peripheral players, as they have some significant 
disagreements with GCC, but the former states, particularly Iran, have the 
power to exert influence on the regional policies. 
Finally, the US, during the recent decades, has been the main power of 
intervention in the Persian Gulf area, while some other ultra–regional states 
have participated in regional order and policies, such as France.  
In the third stage of this theoretical framework, the researcher attempts to 
investigate the relationship between the Persian Gulf’s subordinate system and 
the EU’s new regionalism theories, as in the research hypothesis stated in the 
case of the above–mentioned regions linked to each other by the energy security. 
So, it seems that the regional security approach (Buzan & Waever 2003: 27) is 
located between the global and state levels and would be a proper theory in this 
respect. 
Regional Security Complexes Theory (RSCT) is a theory of regional security that 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever developed in their co–authored book, entitled 
“Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security” in 2003. In 
essence, this book systematised the authors’ earlier analysis of Regional Security  
Complex (RSC), in the previous works, entitled “People, States & Fear” and the 
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“Security: A New Framework for Analysis” published in 1991 and 1998, 
respectively into the RSCT. Indeed, they argued in the 1991 work that in 
geographically shaped regions, how security is explained by the concept of 
regional security complex. However, Classical Security Complex Theory, one 
stage before the RSC (Buzan, 1998: 15), was raised by Buzan in the first edition 
of People, States and Fear in 1983 (pp. 105–115). 
So, the regional security complex, as a distinct level of analysis located between 
global and state levels (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 27), can be seen as a group of 
security dilemmas concentrated into certain geographical areas (Buzan & 
Waever, 2003: 4) where essential threat perceptions by states and non–states 
caused to create a kind of security interdependence, so that the security of one 
state cannot be easily separated from the security of another (Buzan & Waever, 
2003: 44).  
According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, the sectors of security in the Regional 
Security Complex Theory are military, political, economic, societal and 
environmental security.  
Buzan and his colleagues (1991: 215–220) described four main concepts as the 
structure of the security complex that could be conveyed to the Regional Security  
Complex (Buzan et al. 1998: 13), including: 
1) Maintenance of the status quo, that structure of the security complex does not 
need to change as a result of some developments; 
2) Internal transformation, that structure of the security complex changes within 
the existing boundaries of the complex as a result of some developments; 
3) External transformation, that outer boundary of the security complex is 
changed, because new states move into the complex or states move away from 
the complex;   
4) Overlay, which in military security means overwhelming military presence by 
the more powerful state in the area of weaker state(s) that suppress functioning 
of normal security dynamics of the region. 
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As the researcher has mentioned previously and also will indicate in Chapter 5, 
the recent and the current literature review employs energy as a matter of 
security and Barry Buzan alongside his colleagues (Buzan et al. 1998: 105) 
believe that the energy policy has been securitised. So, “the heavy reliance on 
energy with the rise of a combination of geo–political, geological, economic, and 
environmental challenges alongside the sporadic global distribution of energy 
deposits, has increased pressure on the energy security”, or its synonym the 
security of supply (Alhajji, 2007). In his 2007 work “Energy Security and the 
Regional Security Complex Theory,” Mikko Palonkorpi endeavored to develop the 
indicators and definitions of the mentioned theory to energy issues. While Buzan 
alongside his colleagues (Buzan et al. 1998: 105) believe that the energy policy 
has been securitised, as a result, the Regional Security Complex Theory could be 
applied to the energy, as the sixth security sector with already established 
military, political, economic, societal and environmental security sectors. 
Therefore, the mentioned notions could change under various circumstances and 
the structure of the energy security complex within the EU, considering natural 
gas and LNG as the fieldwork of this research, could be matched to the four 
mentioned parameters. On this basis: 
 Status quo, that the EU supports the existing natural gas and LNG in the 
region, therefore the current plans for LNG constructions seems sufficient 
and also growing dependency on Russian gas will not influence this 
position; 
 Internal transformation would occur when regional energy projects within 
the EU, like LNG liquefaction facilities, show the Union’s trend regarding 
the change of the present situations, such as gas dependency on special 
suppliers; 
 External transformation can take place as a result of new natural gas and 
LNG routes bringing substantial amount of additional energy resources to 
the complex from ultra–regional suppliers and leads to change the energy 
dependency patterns and link new states to the complex; 
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 Overlay in the energy security complex could be viewed as almost total 
dependency on one gas supplier, hence this state turns to a monopoly in 
gas supply. 
On the basis of the current EU’s energy policy, this region decides to increase its 
natural gas and LNG imports in the future and the number of existing LNG 
facilities, together with those under construction and under consideration 
confirms this point, while the Union becomes dissatisfied with huge dependency 
on Russian gas during the later years and diversification of natural gas and LNG 
suppliers is amongst the vital EU energy trinity (Internal transformation) (see 
details in Chapter 2). 
In addition, some LNG projects are in progress in gas suppliers and the EU will 
be one of the most important destinations of these actual and potential exporters 
in the future (External transformation). 
As a result, the EU is not interested in supporting the status quo in its natural 
gas and LNG policies and also could not tolerate dependence on special gas 
suppliers (overlay).  
The level of analysis of the energy security would be at least from state and 
regional levels, while in the state level, it concentrates on bilateral natural gas 
and LNG relations between two states, whereas in the regional level, the focus is 
on dependencies or interdependencies between two regions. In addition, natural 
gas is not a globalised commodity, but a regional one. 
In summary, the Regional Energy Security Complexes are formed by energy 
interaction between two or more states or regions in a limited geographical area 
with different players, comprising exporter(s), importer(s) and transit state(s). 
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Chapter 2: The EU energy matters 
2.1. Introduction 
Energy has been a shared issue among the European countries during recent 
decades and the energy security is a primary objective of the EU’s foreign and 
policy, leading to grand EU’s energy policy approval by its “energy trinity”, 
comprising emergence of the competitive internal market, environmental/climate 
change, and security of supply together to prepare the Union for the 21st century 
energy challenges as well as, “Europeanisation” of energy by increasing of the 
renewable energy sources share in the energy mix.  
It is important to indicate that the energy policy in the EU has approved 
regionally and any single voice in energy decision–making should not be strong 
in the future.  Therefore, new regionalism seems to be a proper theory to analyse 
the EU’s energy security in the future.   
The European Commission, however, foresaw a greater reliance on imports in 
the future, to around 80% of natural gas needs in 2030, according to BP 2012, so 
some believe that the energy security within the EU means “security of gas 
supply” and the shortest way aims to ensure security of supply is primarily 
diversification of gas suppliers, consequently natural gas will be the “Achilles 
heel of the EU’s energy security”, while the role of LNG in the Union rises.  
The EU’s energy security has been influenced by both internal and external 
factors. Internally, steadily rising energy prices, declining European energy 
production and a fragmented internal energy market have contributed to 
anxieties over Europe’s ability to meet future energy demand. The strain on 
global demand exerted by the emerging economies of countries such as China 
and India, political instability in energy–producing regions and some transit 
states, the threat of terrorist strikes against energy infrastructure, any possible 
disruption of gas supply by natural or political reasons, and Russia’s apparent 
willingness to use its energy power as a political leverage, are all raising 
concerns in the EU. According to BP, June 2011, by the end of 2010, the EU held 
1.3% of global natural gas reserves. Natural gas is projected to be the fastest 
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growing fossil fuel globally by 2030, with production growing in every region 
except Europe. The EU’s gas production in 2010 was the equivalent of 5.5% 
global gas production and this figure alongside non–EU Norway reached 8.8%, 
according to BP Statistical Review of World Energy in June 2011. 
According to EIA outlook published in 2011, the largest decreases in regional 
reserves throughout the world take place in the EU. The Union will be the 
world’s largest gas importer by 2030, raising the gas import dependency of the 
region from 64% in 2009 to over 80% by 2020. 
The Union receives more than 30% of its gas from Norway and partially from the 
UK, the Netherlands and other EU member states, as well as 34% from Russia. 
The rest of EU imports, 35%, come from Algeria, Qatar, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria 
and other exporters.  There are 31 LNG terminals in the EU, either existing, 
under construction or under consideration, with the exception of cancelled and 
suspended ones, 24 of which, close to 80% of the Union facilities, are situated in 
the UK, France, Spain and Italy. So, these four EU member states imported 
nearly 80 bcm/y LNG, 15% of gas needs in 2010, and it is expected that this will 
increase to 24% by 2020, to 157 bcm/y out of nearly 670 bcm/y of annual gas 
needs. So, some main energy organizations predict that the share of LNG in total 
imports will expand to more than 40% by 2030 within the EU. As a result, in 
2020, EU’s LNG needs will rise 60% compared to 2010. Consequently, a high 
number of new LNG import terminals have been proposed in recent years in 
response to the increase in LNG demand in the EU. Some of these are already 
under construction and nearly 70% of new facilities would be in the four EU 
countries mentioned previously. Based on the future of natural gas imports 
within the EU, both pipeline and LNG, this will depend on some factors, 
particularly the effectiveness of the 20/20/20 targets by 2020 and the objectives 
of the EU’s energy policy.  
Accordingly, it suggests a range of gas demands in the EU, from 600–750 bcm/y 
by 2020 and 620–800 bcm/y by 2030, according to the scenarios mentioned below. 
By adding an estimated indigenous EU production, alongside Norway, of some 
180–220 bcm/y in 2020 and 148–150 bcm/y by 2030, these supplies from non–
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European suppliers will be in the range of 420–530 bcm/y until the end of the 
current decade and nearly 480–650 by 2030. 
Therefore, the EU will require 120–160 bcm/y LNG by 2020 and 220–300 bcm/y 
until 2030, whereas the amount of importing LNG in 2010 was approximately 80 
bcm.  
In addition, if some pipeline projects do not materialise, the amount of LNG 
imported should be increased by end of the existing decade.  
As mentioned above, it is possible to considered two different scenarios, 
including: 
 Scenario 1: High growth in natural gas and LNG demand or base case 
demand; 
 Scenario 2: Low growth in natural gas and LNG demand. 
Pipelines are expected to remain the most dominant means of gas transport in 
Europe by 2020, however Europe’s natural gas imports by pipelines will face 
some challenges, such as transit risk, Russian domination over most of the 
Caspian region natural gas reserves, delay in constructing new gas pipelines due 
to the geo–political issues and technical constraints and complexity of 
negotiations with different producer and transit countries, so diversification of 
natural gas import supply by LNG would be critical to ease these various supply 
risks.  
Global LNG trade is expected to grow faster than gas trades by pipeline, growing 
from 296 bcm in 2010 to 540–566 bcm in 2020. In 2010 almost 15% of the EU gas 
imports were delivered by LNG from non–EU countries, compared to 13% in 
2008. 
Moreover, a number of the Union member states are constructing new LNG 
terminals for their needs and also to transport the extra inside the region. On 
this basis, LNG import outlook in the EU will rise to 24% by 2020, a 60% 
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increase compared to 2010, and also 40% by 2030; however continental gas 
production will decline from 51% in 2010 to 33% by the end of the current decade. 
It is important to emphasise that the EU’s effective fulfilment of its energy 
efficiency and renewable energy sources policies, as well as the number of 
commissioned pipeline projects in the future, will be the main two factors that 
will determine how much LNG should be supplied to the EU in the future. 
Now, some questions are raised in this chapter and the analytical replies will be 
examined at the end: 
o What is the position of natural gas and LNG in the EU’s energy policy and 
its energy mix, past, present and the future? 
o What is the position of natural gas and LNG in the energy mix of the UK, 
France, Spain and Italy past, present and the future, as well as which 
policies do they follow?  
o Which role do these four countries play in the EU, as the main LNG 
entrances, past, present and the future? 
2.2. European Energy Background    
Energy was a cornerstone of European integration by establishment of the 
European Coal Organization (ECO) in 1946 and then the Organization of the 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 (Morata & Solorio Sandoval 
2012: 1), followed by the two treaties with a special focus and common approach 
regarding energy cooperation in coal and steel, the so–called the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, as well as the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) in 1957 (European Commission 10th January 2007: 3; R. 
Odell, 2002: 502) that represents some of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) energy challenges in the era (Eurostat Statistical Book, ISSN 1831–3256, 
2009: 4).  
However, the Arab oil embargo in 1973 threatened the global and also the 
European energy security, as “the EU’s energy security could not be separated 
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from global energy security” (Bahgat, 2010: 333–347). This led to the institution 
of the IEA in 1974 in order to adopt the new measurements and effective energy 
policy to ensure the energy security in importers (McGowan, 2011: 487). 
The European Commission also placed energy and energy security at the top of 
the Community’s political agenda because of the 1970s oil crises (Morata & 
Solorio Sandoval 2012: 11). This was intensified more than three decades later 
by the 2006–9 gas crises (McGowan, 2011: 488), as a key issue not only on the 
EU’s policy agenda during the first decade of the 21st century (Council of the EU, 
11th December 2008), but also a global issue in years to come (BP 2012, Energy 
Outlook 2030: 82). So, the energy security is a primary objective of the EU’s 
foreign and security policy, according to Inge Bernaerts’ interview on 2nd April 
2012 (annex 1). 
Fifty years after the Treaties of Rome, the evolution of energy issues in Europe, 
such as increasing move to gas–fired power plants, somewhat remarkable after 
the Union’s decision regarding more use of natural gas in power generation in 
1992 (Kandiyoti, 2008: 38), and also the importance of the renewable energy 
sources in energy mix, necessitates new energy policies and regulations 
(Eurostat Statistical Book, ISSN 1831–3256, 2009: 4) with aims to more 
extensive use of renewable energy sources and narrow use of fossil fuels 
(Proedrou, 2012: 1). 
Since the middle of the 1990s, the EU broadened its energy activities by the 
Energy Charter Declaration and the Commission’s White Paper in 1995, 
highlighted some regional energy concerns, such as dependence on any special 
supplier (the European Commission’s White Paper, 1995: 21). 
In December 1994, the European Energy Charter, a basic treaty for a common 
pan–European energy policy (CRS Report; RL33636: 4) and an initiative for 
promoting of energy cooperation and security by incorporating at least one major 
supplier, Russia, in addition to diversifying of exporters, was signed (Florini, 
2010: 165), however this declaration entered into legal force in 1998 
(www.encharter.org). 
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2.3. The EU’s Energy Policy 
The European Commission in its Green Paper, entitled “Towards a European 
Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply”, warned (2001: 3), that “without an 
active energy policy, the EU will not be able to free itself from its increasing 
energy dependence alongside the urgent need to diversify the various sources of 
supply geographically”. As “the energy is fundamental to the daily lives of every 
European” (EU Green Paper 8th March 2006: 4), the EU’s Heads of State and 
Government in their summits in October and December 2005, put the energy 
security on the EU’s political agenda and asked the Commission to concentrate 
on internal markets, environmental/climate change, and security of supply 
together (Morata & Solorio Sandoval, 2012: 3). 
These led to the Green Paper adoption on 8th March 2006, entitled “A European 
Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” (figure 5), while the 
sides of this “energy trinity” for the “forward–looking EU’s energy policy” 
(Davidson, 2012: 2), have looked to the indigenous energy supply, internal 
energy market and external energy relations (Belkin, 2008: 26) to prepare the 
Union to face the 21st century energy challenges (Morata & Solorio Sandoval, 
2012: 2). 
Figure 5: The EU’s energy policy targets 
 
Source: Lefèvre Thierry & Lefèvre, Francois (2009), “Energy Security: The European Approach and the 
ASEM Ministerial Conference Perspectives”, Energy Security in SEA and beyond-from Competition to 
Cooperation? Conference, Singapore, 20-22nd October: 17 
 65 
 
The Council of Europe (2007: 11) explained the EU’s energy policy goals, 
comprising:  
 More strength of the security of supply; 
 Ensuring the competitiveness of European economies and the availability 
of affordable energy price; 
 Promoting environmental sustainability and combating climate change. 
The European Commission also insisted that the European people and industry 
rely on safe, secure, sustainable and affordable energy (European Commission, 
2011a: 2).  
The EU’s energy policy objectives are similar to the international energy policy, 
such as IEA’s energy policy indicators, entitled “The Shared Goals” passed by 
IEA Ministers on 4th June 1993 in Paris, which aimed to ensure more short, 
medium and long–term energy security, comprising diversity and efficiency 
within the energy sector, more environmentally acceptable energy sources, 
competitive and open energy markets (Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 
2009: 158) 
The European Commission (2006a: 4) also states that these three objectives are 
“the pillars of … [the EU’s] daily life”, and are all interrelated and deal with both 
the short– and medium–term targets and a longer–term strategy, such as 
roadmaps for 2050 (Buchan, 2011: 32) with the aim of guaranteeing the Union’s 
energy security (McGowan, 2011: 505).  
R. Odell argues in his book that the competitiveness and security of supply have 
some records in Europe, dating back to 1950s and 1960s, showing that the 
continental energy markets were open to competition between coal and rapid 
growth in oil demand (R. Odell, 2002: 477).  
Sustainable energy, furthermore, includes the lasting and reliable access to 
primary energy sources that needs to have adequate infrastructures to produce 
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and deliver the required amount of environmental–friendly energy satisfactorily 
to the consumers (J. Pérez–Arriaga, 2007: 3). 
The security of supply, moreover, as the “Gulliver in chains”, according to the 
European Commission’s Green Paper in 2001, entitled “Towards a European 
Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply” (2001: 22) could be achieved through 
full market integration or a Pan–European gas market from nationally to 
regionally–based, according to Hans Haider, Austrian Honorary President for 
Eurelectric (2005: 109) or the “EU’s Grid” (J. Pérez–Arriaga, 2007: 13) and also 
by liberalisation, as well as competition (McGowa, 2011: 494), whereas “the road 
to competition is longer and more complex than was anticipated” (Chevalier J.M, 
2006: 5), while any improvements in energy efficiency and increase in renewable 
energy sources consumption have effects security of supply by decreasing energy 
demands (Taylor et al. 2005: 360). 
In other words, the new energy paradigm and policy insists on securing supply, 
sufficient energy infrastructures, cooperation among the importers and exporters 
in order to secure a more globalised gas market, environmentally sustainable 
policy, as well as energy efficiency initiatives that the EU has observed and 
adopted in its energy policy (Proedrou, 2002: 17–20). 
The Lisbon Treaty on Functioning of the EU (TFEU) provides a legal basis for 
the EU’s energy policy aimed at securing energy supplies in Art. 194, 1, TFEU9, 
which argues as follows: 
 Ensure the functioning of the energy market;  
 Ensure the security of supply in the EU; 
 Promote energy efficiency and energy saving, as well as development of 
the new renewable energy sources; and 
 Promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
Consequently, the aspects of the energy security, including the security of supply 
(availability and accessibility), economic efficiency (affordability) and protection 
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of the environment (acceptability) (Proedrou, 2002: 11) have been laid down in 
the EU’s energy policy to ensure “the uninterrupted physical availability of 
energy products and services on the market, at a price which is affordable for all 
consumers, while contributing to the EU’s wider social and climate goals” (EU’s 
Energy Strategy for 2020, 10th November 2010: 2).  
2.4. The EU’s energy mix 
The EU open market is now entering its third phase, while the second Energy 
Efficiency Action Plan is underway and renewable energy sources energy 
legislation is entering its second  
phase (figure 6), on the basis of the renewable energy sources Directive, as part 
of the major energy and climate package, unveiled by the European Commission 
in early 2008 (Eurostat Statistical Book, ISSN 1831–3256, 2009: 3). 
Figure 6: Development of EU’s Competitiveness and Sustainability Eenergy Policy over time 
 
Source: Eurostat Statistical Book, ISSN 1831-3256, 2009: 3 
The EU has tried to shift gradually to a low–carbon society, particularly by 
renewable energy sources since 1997 (European Commission, 10th January 2007: 
13), and then by ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by all the Member States in 
2002  in order to create “Europeanisation” of energy, according to the Energy 
Summit of the European Council on 4th February 2011. 
The global energy mix, moreover, according to official forecasts, will probably 
change between 2010 and 2030, while natural gas is the fastest growing fossil 
fuel globally (BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 31), contrary to a dramatically fall 
in oil and coal demand, especially crude oil (BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 11). 
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The most important shift, nevertheless, is 
related to renewable energy sources to 
around one third of total primary energy 
sources consumption by 2030 (figure 7). 
However, because of the domination of 
hydrocarbons on global energy markets in 
the coming decades, energy security and 
energy policy should be based on more oil 
and natural gas (Proedrou, 2002: 2). 
These non–hydrocarbons renewable 
energy sources, with the least greenhouse gases and much greater 
environmentally friendliness (acceptability) (D. D’haeseleer, 2005: 50) take 
advantage of the four major global energy security indicators (which will be dealt 
with in Chapter 5), to a great extent, while different kinds of them are available 
in every community (availability) but not always commercially. The developed 
countries, mostly, get access to these because of better high–tech capabilities 
(accessibility), however, they are generally more costly than other energy sources 
(BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 41) (affordability) in terms of capital costs and 
investment (K. Sovacool & Lim, 2011: 418). 
According to Eurostat 2011 (figure 13), the main EU’s renewable energy sources 
producers in recent years have been Denmark, France, Sweden, Italy, Spain and 
the UK. Nevertheless, each of the EU–27 has a separate renewable energy 
sources portfolio to use, one or more of which in its own energy mix, influenced 
by a number of factors ranging from resource cost and internal laws, such as 
legislation over curbing nuclear energy production in some countries (Belkin, 
2008: 21) to the scale of economic development and prosperity of each (Peimani, 
2011: 2). 
Austria and Latvia, for instance, prefer hydro power more, whereas the southern 
European countries, like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece mainly desire 
photovoltaic solar energy, and Germany, as the global leader of solar energy 
(lovass, 2009: 318–335), bio–diesel (European Commission, 10th January 2007: 14) 
Figure 7: The global energy mix, 1970–2030 
 
Source: BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 12 
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is the leading country amongst the EU–27 regarding research programme on UG 
(Oil & Energy Trends, July 2011: 8). 
Furthermore, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Denmark (IEO, 2011: 76) and the UK 
prioritise wind (IEA 2010, the UK: 21), but Germany is leading in the use of this 
kind of renewable energy (lovaas, 2009: 318–335), though Italy, Sweden, 
Hungary, France and Germany are the major producers of geothermal heat in 
Europe (European Commission, 2007a and 2007b), and some other EU’s 
members have decided to develop the least–cheap clean coal–burning process 
(Belkin, 2008: 22).  
The Eurostat in its report in May 2011 announced (figure 8) that, on the basis of 
20/20/20 by 2020 level approved by the European Council on 8th and 9th March 
2007, Lithuania, Sweden, Austria and Finland use renewable energy sources in 
their own energy mix at more than 20%, while Denmark, Romania, and Estonia 
have employed it in their mix of energy at between 10% to 20%. As a result, 
renewable energy sources in nearly 19 EU member states out of 27, was used at 
levels between nil to 10% of the energy mix in 2009. 
Figure 8: The EU’s Energy mix, consumption by product, in 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat May 2011, the DG ENERGY of the European Commission’s Market Observatory for 
Energy and Key Figures, June 2011: 13 
According to the European Commission (2011: 29), biomass, wind and hydro are 
the technologies which will progress most rapidly in the EU by 2020 (figure 9).          
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Figure 9: Renewable energy sources in the EU, 2010–2020
 
Source: Eurostat May 2011, the DG ENERGY of the European Commission’s Market Observatory for 
Energy and Key Figures, June 2011: 29 
According to European Commission (COM (2004) 366) the share of green energy 
(renewable energy sources) in total primary energy sources should reach 12% in 
2010 and also on the basis of European Commission, Green Paper on 29th 
November 2000 (COM (2000) 769 final), this share should increase up to 15% by 
2015 and also 8% for bio–fuel by the same date. This body in different documents, 
like “renewable energy sources Roadmap” (European Commission, 2007a), has 
insisted on achieving an ambitious (European Commission, 10th January 2007: 
14; The EU’s Road Map for 2050, 2011: 2) target of 20% renewable energy 
sources in the EU’s energy mix by 2020.  
While energy generation has largely remained a domain of national sovereignty, 
environmental and greenhouse gases legislation has been heavily impacted by 
EU directives (Cole, 2010). So, the Proposal for a Directive on renewable energy 
sources, approved on 23rd January 2008 in Brussels, has specified each of the 
EU–27’s renewable energy sources share in total primary energy sources by 2020. 
The table 1 illustrates that this share is set to rise from 9.2% in 2006 (Eurostat 
Statistical Book, ISSN 1831–3256, 2009: 132) to 20% up to the end of the current 
decade.  
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Table 1: Share of renewable energy sources target in final consumption in the EU’s member states, 2005–2020 
 
Source: Eurostat Statistical Book, ISSN 1831–3256, based on COM (2008) 19 final, 2008/0016 (COD), 2009: 
126 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) in its recent report issued on 13th March 
2012 argues that the EU’s growing need to shift fuels in order to achieve the 
target of the climate change policy is a major energy challenge during the coming 
years (CRS Report, R42405, 13th March 2012) particularly given the relatively 
high price of renewable energy sources technology, as the main reason behind its 
slow growth in the Union energy market (Proedrou, 2012: 12) compared to the 
increasing demand for the traditional energy sources (European Commission, 
10th Jan 2007: 13), necessitating huge investment, up to €1 trillion in new 
technologies by 2020 (EU energy 2020: 2; CER 2011: 7; CRS Report 2012), while 
it has dropped since 2008 by 10% and the euro–zone crisis could be an important 
obstacle in this respect (Buchan, 2011: 5). 
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Figure 10: Renewable energy sources percentage in total primary energy sources in the IEA’s member, 2008 
 
Source: Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France, 2009: 89 
In addition, most of these renewable energy sources, like solar, hydro and wind, 
are irregular and different in European countries (figure 10), so this kind of 
energy is not a comprehensive solution in the short– and mid–term (Kandiyoti, 
2008: 235) and also based on table 1, most of the EU’s member states have a long 
way to go to achieve the renewable energy sources target for 2020, while 16 out 
of 27 should promote their own renewable energy sources use between 200% to 
more than 1250% by the end of the current decade. 
Regarding nuclear power, there are different views over using of this kind of 
low– carbon fuel in the EU. While one third of regional electricity was generated 
by approximately 175 nuclear reactors, especially in France, Denmark, the UK, 
Sweden, and Spain, based on Eurostat 2011 (figure 11), some other European 
countries, such as Italy, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic 
decided to build new reactors, preferring to import uranium from the reliable 
countries, like Canada and Australia, rather than fully depend on Russian gas 
(Checchi et al. 2009: 28). However, a number of EU members, like Germany, as 
the second EU country with nuclear power generation (Rosner, 2009: 160–176), 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and even Spain, have committed to phase out 
their nuclear reactors by 2020, replacing them with gas–powered facilities, due 
to the considerable cost of online nuclear reactors, roughly €2 to 3 bn for each 
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without showing any return of the initial capital before 15–20 years (Checchiet al. 
2009: 29). There is also the controversial nature of nearly 40,000m3 of radioactive 
waste produced annually in the EU (Checchiet al. 2009: 29), as well as its 
potential irreversible damage, such as what happened in Chernobyl (USSR–
1986), the Three Mile Islands (the US–1979), Tokai–mura (1999), Forsmark 
(2006) and particularly after Fukushima Daiichi disaster (Japan–2011) (Belkin, 
2008: 22).   
Figure 11: The share of Nuclear in National Electricity Generation in 2009 (in %) 
 
Source: Eurostat May 2011, the DG ENERGY of the European Commission’s Market Observatory for 
Energy and Key Figures, June 2011: 21 
Accordingly, the IEA forecasts that electricity generation from nuclear power 
within the EU will decrease from 31% to 21% by 2020 (IEA 2008, The EU 
Review).  
The high–tech and costly nuclear fusion, alternatively, without any dangerous 
waste, such as the French $10 bn project, currently under construction has been 
considered (Valentine, 2011: 56–74), but it is assumed it will be used 
commercially only at least after 2030 (World Energy Council Report, 2007) and 
even after 2070 (D. D’haeseleer, 2005: 52).  
K. Sovacool and Lim argued (2011: 418) that the nuclear energy is not wholly in 
accordance with the energy security indicators (this will be addressed in Chapter 
5), so while uranium reserves are situated in a number of countries, mostly 
reliable ones (availability) with some constraints to access to advanced 
technology (accessibility), it has some nuclear waste with a high sensitivity 
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against any attacks or natural disasters (acceptability) with extremely high 
capital and operating costs (affordability). 
Following the European Commission’s Green Paper 2000, energy efficiency has 
become one of the most notable pillars of the EU’s energy policy that impacts on 
its energy security in the future, being underscored in some other documents, 
such as “the EU’s Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan” (European 
Commission, 2008f), as well as the “20/20/20 by 2020”. However, according to the 
EU Commissioner for Energy, due to the current regional circumstances, the 
Union will reach only 9% in energy savings instead of 20% by 2020 (Oettinger, 
10th November 2010: 2), while some other energy experts, such as Gal Luft 
argues that the EU could not solve its energy problems just with renewable 
energy sources and energy efficiency (Luft & Korine, 2009: 565). 
As stressed by the IEA in its special report in 2011, entitled “Are we entering the 
Golden Age of Gas?”, natural gas is rapidly becoming the key energy source of 
the future at faster rates than either coal or oil, in particular in the EU–27 
(figure 12), both in percentage terms and volumes (OPEC Energy Outlook 2011: 
54).  
A key element of the EU’s energy supply strategy has been to shift to a greater 
use of natural gas (CRS Report, 2012), leading to publication of the Green Paper 
on Security of Supply (2000: 44), in which the European Commission emphasised 
natural gas, compared to other fuels. 
Unlike oil, as the global commodity, natural gas is a regional product with 
mostly regional buyers and sellers (CRS Report, 2012) whereas, nearly 11 
member states out of the EU–27 import the total of their own gas needs and 9 
more import more than 80% of their required natural gas from other suppliers. 
As a result, the whole of the Union’s countries are the natural gas importers, 
excluding Denmark and the Netherlands (figure 24), so, natural gas will be the 
“Achilles heel of the EU’s energy security”, according to Herbert Ungerer (2007: 
2), DG ENERGY for the European Commission.  
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The Green Paper 2000 also anticipated a greater reliance on imports in the 
future, around 80% of natural gas needs in 2030 (BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 
79), so energy security within the EU means “security of gas supply” (CER, 2011: 
83; Luft & Korine: 2009) whereas the shortest way aims to ensure security of 
supply is primarily through diversification of gas suppliers (G. Victor & Hayes 
2006: 319–357). 
Figure 12: The shares of global fossil imports, 1990–2030
 
Source: BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 78 
“Diversification” of energy exporters and sources, including hydrocarbon and 
non–hydrocarbon alongside expanding the energy links between the European 
network and suppliers and ultra–regional cooperation with energy suppliers 
(European Commission, 7th Sep 2011: 2–3; European Commission Working Paper 
2011: 2) is another sub–category of security of supply, having been addressed in 
the EU’s energy policy and brought to different documents. In its proposals, the 
so–called “energy policy for the enlarged EU, its neighbours and partner 
countries” in 2003 (COM 2003, 262 final: 18), the European Commission tried to 
focus on integrating other neighbouring suppliers into the internal energy 
market and in “Energy Action Plan for 2010 to 2014” (2010: 1), the European 
Commission has placed unprecedented (Bosse & Schmidt–Felzmann, 2011: 480) 
emphasise security of supply and external dimension of the EU’s energy policy. 
As a result, diversification of gas routes towards the EU is essential for 
improving its security of supply (Regulations over EU safeguard security of gas 
supply, 2010: 2). 
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On the other hand, some of the pivotal tenets of external energy policy of the 
Union have remained uncertain as the EU has made progress in carrying out of 
its new energy initiatives (Young, 2009: 49). 
Herbert Ungerer (2007: 9) argued security of supply has two internal and 
external dimensions, that the Union needs to have the stable ultra–regional 
energy partnerships, simultaneous with competitive, integrated and liberalised 
markets, as well as increasing the share of renewable energy sources in total 
primary energy sources alongside energy efficiency, all leading to sustainable 
reduction of supply risks. 
The internal dimension of security of supply, as the third side of the EU’s 
“energy trinity”, is associated to the development of the single European gas 
market, as the “EU’s energy policy heart” (Rosner, 2009: 160–176), having 
primarily started in 1993 by the European Commission (R. Odell, 2002: 421 & 
510), but the European Council’s liberalisation and Gas market Directive 
1998/30/European Commission and also gas market Directive 2003/55/European 
Commission, adopted the main rules to create a more transparent competitive 
gas market with non–discriminatory third party access (Eurostat Statistical 
Book, ISSN 1831–3256, 2009: 4) by 2015 in order to put an end to the “energy 
islands” (Buchan, 2011: 17). 
The EU’s Third Gas Directive, which was adopted in 2009 and implemented in 
March 2011, also seeks to strengthen third party access requirements (Platt’s 
International Gas Report, No. 624, 25th May 2009: 10–12), though with the 
enlargement of the EU towards the Eastern European countries, the completion 
of an internal market depends more and more on non–European gas suppliers 
(Roze, 2007: 6). 
So, the number of natural gas and LNG suppliers with sufficient gas supplies 
plays an important role in this process, being emphasised in the 9th paragraph of 
the Council’s Directive on 26th April 2004/67/European Commission, “Security of 
Supply Directive”. Nevertheless, in the 10th paragraph, there was insistence on 
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“ensuring continued investments in gas supply infrastructure, including pipeline 
and LNG facilities”. 
Since 1950, supply costs have been problematic (R. Odell, 2002: 431) and this 
point was emphasised during the first ever the Heads of the EU Governments’ 
summit on 4th February 2011 (Buchan, 2011: 5), whereas the liberalisation of the 
gas sector, as a complex process, according to the President of Eurogas (Bosmans, 
2007: 3) improves access to different natural gas and LNG suppliers (European 
Commission, COM (2002) 488: 11–12), with affordable prices (European 
Commission, COM (2002) 488: 7), but needs to develop a common approach to 
security of supply within the EU’s internal gas market, according to the 
Council’s Directive on 26th April 2004/67/European Commission. It is also 
necessary to centralised the energy decision–making within the Union (Checchi, 
et al. 2009: 22). 
However, some argue (Taylor et al. 2005: 360) that market liberalisation with 
lower gas prices, due to competition, has a negative effect on energy efficiency by 
increasing energy consumption and produces conflict between environmental 
objectives and economic considerations (R. Odell, 2002: 462). 
Nevertheless, Karen Sund (annex 1) believes (interview on 8th April 2012) that 
as long as the EU concentrates more on gas in a scenario with low prices, the 
policy of diversification and “trans–European energy networks” (Sascha Muller–
Kraenner, 2007: 93) is more important to import the least expensive natural gas 
and LNG. Nonetheless, the producers will prefer other lucrative markets with 
higher prices and also the investors might be interested in investing into the 
areas with high return.  
In addition, in such a gas market, arbitrage (M.Jaffe et al.  2006) and spot 
contracts with short–term gas trading grew more, rather than long–term 
contracts or take–or–pay (Checchi et al.  2009: 23), having resulted in some 
important gas exporters’ reactions, such as Russia and Algeria. They argue that 
the short–term contracts mean that pricing risks move to the producers, 
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compared with the current sharing of those risks between importers and 
exporters (R. Odell, 2002: 471). 
The EU Commissioner for Energy believes that the external dimension of the 
Union’s internal market should be reinforced (Oettinger, 2010: 2–5) hence, the 
EU’s well–coordinated external energy policy and the internal energy market are 
complementary and promote both the EU and national energy interests beyond 
the Union’s borders (European Commission, 7th September 2011: 17). 
Prof. Van der Linde, Director of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 
CIEP in the Netherlands, believes without a this grand policy, and a more strong 
energy diplomacy (Chevalier J.M, 2006: 19) the Union’s external energy policy 
would be less effective and even slower (Van der Linde, 2007: 11 & 12) and the 
European Commission has indicated this point in different documents, such as 
one produced 10th January 2007. Sascha Muller–Kraenner (2007) also believes 
that energy could change foreign policy during the current century.  
The European Council and the EU’s high–profile officials regarding Common 
Foreign and Security Policy are the main bodies responsible for the Union’s 
energy security, in general, and security of supply, in particular (Rosner, 2009: 
160–176), whereas the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR), as the deputy for the European Commission, and also this 
body play an important role in this regard. The Gas Coordination Group set up 
in May 2006 under the Council’s Directive, assists the European Commission by 
preparing the required data concerning the EU security of gas supply nationally 
and regionally with the third parties, based on “the Regulation on security of gas 
supply”, adopted on 11th October 2010 (Regulations over EU safeguard security 
of gas supply, 2010: 5), as well as the share of information regarding some gas 
issues, such as supply disruptions (Council Directive 2004/67/European 
Commission) and also Network of Energy Security Correspondents (NESCO) 
which was created in the EU with some representatives from the member states 
and the Council’s Secretariat in order to gather, consider and exchange the 
required information and data regarding the Union’s energy security problems 
(Rosner, 2009: 160–176).  
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Consequently, in the “Review of the EU’s Security Strategy Energy” in 2008, the 
Union proposed to develop its ties and cooperation with gas suppliers and transit 
countries, in addition to market liberalisation and integration (Council of the EU, 
December 2008) as in this year, Benita Ferrero–Waldner, the Commissioner for 
External Relations, confirmed that “a greater focus on energy in the EU’s 
international relations is crucial to its energy security” (Brussels, IP/08/1696: 1). 
2.5. Geo–politics of the EU’s indigenous natural gas  
Natural gas grows dramatically by the end of the next decade, unlike crude oil 
and coal, and production will grow in every region except Europe (BP, 2011: 47) 
in spite of the fact that natural gas is the most important component in the 
energy supply of the EU (Regulations over EU safeguard security of gas supply, 
2010: I).  
The history of natural gas in Europe started with the discovery of the Groningen 
field in the Netherlands in 1959. Later, natural gas fields were discovered and 
developed on the British shelf. In 1965, Britain and France both started 
importing LNG from Algeria. In the mid–1960s Algeria started exporting natural 
gas through pipelines to the European continent. Spain and Italy followed in 
1970 by starting to import LNG from Libya, and during the 1970s pipelines 
brought gas from the former Soviet Union and Norway to continental Europe. In 
the late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium LNG supply grew 
toward the EU. As of the first January 2012, proved world natural gas reserves, 
based on Oil and Gas Journal report, were estimated at 3,330,137 bcf, sufficient 
for 63 years of production and at least 75 years of the current consumption (IEA 
Special Report, 2011: 7).  
In addition, global gas demands will reach 5.1 tcm in 2035, 1.8 tcm more than in 
2011, because of its flexibility, abundant, technological advances in global trade, 
extensive use in power generation, as well as environmental benefits compared 
to other fossil fuels, like coal and oil (IEA Special Report, 2011: 7–8). 
According to BP, June 2011, and Oil and Gas Journal (annex 20), by the end of 
2010 and 2011, the EU would hold less than 1.3% of global gas and the UK is 
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among the producers of gas within the EU with 0.1% global natural gas reserves, 
while its reserves at the end of 1990 and 2000 were 0.3% and 0.2% of the world’s 
natural gas deposits, respectively. The Netherlands is the most important EU 
member with 0.6% global natural gas reserves and Norway, as the non–EU 
country holds 1.1.% natural gas reserves worldwide (BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy June 2011: 20).  
Many EU countries have only limited domestic reserves of natural gas, and are 
therefore dependent on a number of pipelines and LNG exporters to secure their 
supplies. 
Europe has domestic natural gas reserves, concentrated in off–shore areas of the 
North Sea countries, including the UK, Norway, and the Netherlands, as well as 
on–shore fields in the latter country alongside France, Germany and Italy. 
However, more than half of these reserves have been extracted and the North 
Sea gas fields are in decline (Norwegian Facts 2007: 82).  
For the EU, the share of imported natural gas will continue to rise as North Sea 
resources are depleted. Hence, with indigenous natural gas production 
decreasing each year alongside the increased production costs, the security of gas 
supply has become a major issue in European energy policy (King & Spalding, 
2006: 2). 
The very large natural gas Groningen field made the Netherlands an important 
supplier in the EU, so this country exports over half of its production to other 
European countries. There are some recoverable reserves left on the Norwegian 
shelf, including Troll, Ormen Lange and Barents Seas, similar to the Snohvit 
natural gas field along with Russia’s field at Shtockman (Belkin, 2008: 19).  
According to BP 2011, EU gas production in 2000 was close to 232 bcm, however 
this number was close to 175 bcm in 2010, 5.5% of global gas production (BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011: 22) with the most gas production 
decrease in the future, globally (IEA Special Report, 2011: 27).  
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Figure 13 illustrates that the main EU’s gas producers have been the 
Netherlands (2.2% global production), the UK (1.8%), Denmark, Germany and 
Romania (0.3%), Italy (0.2%), and Poland (0.1%). Norway, as the non–EU 
country and the second–largest exporter of natural gas to the EU, must be added 
with its 3.3% global production. Based on EIA, since 2010, Spain, Italy, France, 
Germany, and the UK have changed to net natural gas importers within the EU 
(EIA 2011, Key World Energy Statistics: 11). 
Figure 13: The main producers of energy in the EU in 2009 (in Mtoe) 
 
Source: Eurostat May 2011, the DG ENERGY of the European Commission’s Market Observatory for 
Energy and Key Figures, June 2011: 18 
Based on figure 14, the gap between production and consumption varies by 
region and fuel. European net natural gas imports, among the other 
industrialised and also new emerging economies, will dramatically rise, while 
domestic production will decline and regional gas consumption rise. So, this gap 
between European production and consumption is clear and the security of 
supply of natural gas would be much more important for this region in 
comparison with others (BP, 2011: 73).  
Figure 14: Global natural gas production and consumption, 1990–2030 
 
Source: BP 2011, Energy Outlook 2030: 46 
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The EU’s member states are strongly reliant on the import of fossil fuels, while 
growing energy consumption, particularly natural gas, is clear among them, 
however gas markets within this region are largely different between one 
country and another (Dorsman et al. 2011: 88–91). 
In 2009, as it is shown in figure 15, Denmark and the Netherlands were the only 
gas exporting countries among the EU–27 and could be expected to remain so at 
least until the end of 2018 and 2020, respectively (Denmark Oil and Gas Security, 
IEA 2011: 3).  
Figure 15: Gas import dependency in Member States in 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat May 2011, the DG ENERGY of the European Commission’s Market Observatory for 
Energy and Key Figures, June 2011: 10 
However, according to EIA outlook published in 2011, the largest decreases in 
regional reserves throughout the world, attributed to Europe, including notable 
declines for Norway, Denmark, and the UK, which in combination saw a 14% 
decline in reserves just from 2010 to 2011 (EIA, International Energy Outlook 
2011: 38). As a result, all of the European gas producers have been in decline 
since 2000, excluding Norway, the Netherlands, and, to lesser extent, Poland. 
However, annex 8 shows that EU’s gas consumption has increased from more 
than 440 bcm in 2000 to nearly 492.5 bcm in 2010 or 15.5% global gas 
consumption (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011: 23).  
Europe’s unconventional gas resources are also significantly bigger than its 
conventional gas. However, the concrete prospects for unconventional gas 
production, in particular in the EU, will remain uncertain until around 2020 (BP, 
2011: 55).  The environmental impact of unconventional gas production is among 
the genuine concerns. Moreover, unlike the US, European rock strata containing 
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unconventional gas resources are located more deeply in the earth and beneath 
the groundwater. While this may raise the costs of exploration drilling, it also 
lowers any risks of groundwater contamination (CER, 2011: 88).  
Natural gas consumption in the EU has grown from 18% in 1990 to 24% in 2009, 
based on figure 16, primarily as a result of increasing consumption in the electric 
power sector. Recent actions by some European governments to reduce their 
reliance on nuclear power in the wake of Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
disaster are likely to provide a further boost to natural gas use even in electricity 
generation (Platts International Gas Report, 2011: 8 &10).  
Figure 16: EU’s gross inland energy consumption by fuel in 1990 and 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat May 2011, the DG ENERGY of the European Commission’s Market Observatory for 
Energy& Key Figures, June 2011: 11 
Thus, the EU is the world’s largest energy importer, and Russia, Norway, as well 
as Algeria represent together 85% of the EU gas imports and this region will 
increasingly compete along with other importing countries and regions for 
natural gas. (European Commission Working Paper, 2011: 2). Hence EU will be 
the world’s largest gas importer by 2030 (Davidson, 2012) raising the gas import 
dependency of the region from 64% in 2009 to over 80% by 2020 (Eurostat 2010; 
Wicks, 2009: 47). The EU has taken steps to increase “Europe–wide production” 
and the use of alternative resources and renewable energy sources. 
2.6. The EU’s natural gas demand–supply gap in the future  
The EU imports its gas needs through pipelines and LNG, so this trend will 
continue in the future. However, the volume of imports will depend on some 
factors, particularly the effectiveness of the 20/20/20 targets by 2020 and beyond 
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that, particularly the rate of renewable energy sources growth, as well as energy 
efficiency within the Union.  
Accordingly, two main gas scenarios could be perceived for the future, as follows: 
 Scenario 1: Strong growth in natural gas demand:  
Based on this scenario, the increased demand for natural gas must be met by 
non–EU suppliers with an affordable price (CIEP 2008: 67), while European 
indigenous natural gas reserves are limited and declining. This will require 
massive investment in production and transportation capacity. Based on 
20/20/20 by 2020 and EU Energy Policy targets, if fuel efficiency and renewable 
energy sources grows by 10% of final energy consumption, rather than 20% until 
the end of the existing decade, the EU will need to import up to 730 bcm/y of 
natural gas by 2020, according to European Commission, DG TERN (2007) and 
OME (2010) scenarios, while this number could increase to 800 bcm/y by 2030. 
Nonetheless, the volume of regional gas demand in 2010 was 522 bcm, according 
to the Head of Unit Electricity and Gas within the European Commission, DG 
TERN (interview, 2012). 
 Scenario 2: Low growth in natural gas demand: 
This scenario will also depend on the rate of renewable energy sources and 
energy efficiency growth in the EU. According to CIEP (2008), if renewable 
energy sources and energy efficiency within the EU grow to 15% and all of the 
planned external pipeline projects towards this region materialize, so the EU 
demands would be 600–640 bcm/y in the second half of the current decade. The 
European Commission, DG TERN (2007) and OME (2010) scenarios confirmed 
these approximate volumes with slight changes, while the figure could rise to 
670 bcm/y by 2030. 
According to the European Commission, the natural gas imports in the EU 
countries will increase from 221 bcm in 2000 to 472 bcm in 2030 in the low 
demand scenario and reach to 652 bcm in the high demand scenario (figure 17). 
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However, the Commission predicted that the continental production will drop 
dramatically by 2030. 
Figure 17: European Commission’s scenario regarding the EU gas demand, 2000–2030 
 
Source: European Commission, EUR 22581, 2007: 19 
On the basis of OME’s scenarios being very close to the European Commission 
prediction, gas import in Europe–34, including the EU–27, Switzerland and all 
the Balkan countries, will rise to 470 bcm in 2030 in the low gas demand 
scenario and could increase to 650 bcm in the high demand scenario (figure 18). 
This represents a doubling, in the former scenario, or a tripling, in the latter 
scenario, of imports from 2000 until 2030. European gas production would also 
be in decline seriously, as well.  
Figure 18: OME’s scenario regarding the Europe-34 gas demand, 2000–2030 
 
Source: Hafiner et al, OME, 2010 : 2 
On the other hand, the EU produced 178 bcm of natural gas in 2010, based on 
the Head of Electricity and Gas within the European Commission, DG TERN 
(interview, 2012) and this will probably fall to 130 bcm in 2015 (CIEP, 2008). The 
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European Commission, DG TERN (2007) and OME (2010) argued that this 
volume alongside Norwegian gas production will reach 180–220 bcm/y in 2020 
and around 150 bcm/y in 2030 (figure 33). 
As can be seen in figure 30, Europe continental production (including Norway) 
will drop from nearly 280 bcm/y in 2010 to 222 bcm/y in 2020. In other words, 
while European production accounted for 59 % of supplies to EU gas markets in 
2010, it is expected to drop to a third by 2020 and to a quarter by 2030 (Eurogas, 
2010: 5). It is important to mention that European gas demand will rise by 43% 
by 2030 (Eurogas, 2010: 5). 
On the basis of figure 19, the EU’s natural gas and LNG contracts with other 
suppliers will start expiring since 2015 and by 2030 it would be nearly five times 
more than the middle of the current decade. So, as figure 5 demonstrates, all 
contracts will terminate before 2030.  
Furthermore, European production (comprising Norway) will decline from 233 
Mtoe/257 bcm in 2010 to 185 Mtoe/204 bcm in 2020 and then to 158 Mtoe/174 
bcm in 2030 (figure 19). 
Figure 19: Eurogas’ scenario over the gap of supply–demand in the EU, 2005–2030 
 
Source: Eurogas 2010, “Natural gas demand and supply in long Term Outlook to 2030”: 3 
Natural gas consumption in EU member states is expected to increase from 438 
mtoe/482 bcm in 2005 to 625 Mtoe/690 bcm (figure 20) in 2030, which is an 
increase of 43%. The share of natural gas, moreover, in the European total 
primary energy sources demand that increased from 18% in 1990 to 24% in 2009, 
will rise to 30% up to 2030 (Eurogas 2010: 3).  
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Figure 20: EU–27 natural gas demand outlook by sector, 2005–2030 
 
Source: Eurogas 2010, “Natural gas demand and supply in Long–Term Outlook to 2030”: 3 
CEDIGAZ in its report in June 2011 illustrated that the amount of the EU gas 
demands will be nearly 670 bcm in 2020, while share of LNG will rise from 15% 
of regional gas imports in 2010 to 24% in 2020. As a result, while the EU 
imported 80 bcm LNG in 2010, based on the Head of Unit of Gas within the 
European Commission, DG TERN (interview, 2012), this volume will rise to 
approximately 160 bcm by 2020 (figure 21). BP (figure 24) also forecasted that 
the EU’s LNG demand will soar to at least 230 bcm/y by 2030. This volume could 
increase from 220 to 300 bcm/y by 2030 in low and high demands, on the basis of 
figures 22 and 24, while Europe will need extra gas with nearly between 80–100 
bcm/y by pipelines. Nevertheless, European continental production (including 
Norway) will drop from nearly 280 bcm/y in 2010 to 222 bcm/y in 2020. In other 
words, while European production accounted for 59% of supplies to EU gas 
markets in 2010, it is expected to drop to a third by 2020 and to a quarter by 
2030 (Eurogas, 2010: 5). It is important to mention that European gas demand 
will rise by 43% by 2030 (Eurogas, 2010: 5). 
Figure 21: European natural gas and LNG supply prospects 
 
Source: CEDIGAZ (2011), “World LNG market: current developments and prospects”, 24th June: 10 
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In accordance with figure 22, with all the above scenarios, it suggests a range of 
gas demands in the EU, from 600–750 bcm/y by 2020 and 620–800 bcm/y by 2030. 
Adding an estimated indigenous European gas production of some 180–220 
bcm/y in 2020 and 148–150 bcm/y by 2030, these supplies from non–European 
suppliers are placed in the range of 420–530 bcm/y until the end of the current 
decade and between 480–650 by 2030. Therefore, the EU will require 120–160 
bcm/y LNG by 2020 and 220–300 bcm/y until 2030, whereas the amount of 
imported LNG in 2008 and 2010 was approximately 50 bcm and 80 bcm, 
respectively. In addition, if some pipeline projects would not be operational, then 
the amount of LNG imported could be increased in the future.  
Figure 22: The gap of supply–demand of natural gas and LNG within the EU, 2010–2030 
 
 Indigenous gas production (including Norway, except in 2010)/ EC = European Commission    
Source: By Author 
Global natural gas trade increased by 10.1% in 2010 and the share of world LNG 
shipments grew to 22.6% in the same year. LNG, as more globalized than 
pipeline, could be transported domestically, inter–states or inter–regionally (C. 
Schofield, 2011) and for the time being, accounts for 30.5% of global gas trade 
(BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011: 4). Hence, LNG capacity will 
increase from 270 bcm in 2008 to 450 bcm in 2015 and 540 bcm in 2020 (IEA 
Special Report, 2011: 45).  
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The CEDIGAZ report (2011: 4&10) has also estimated that LNG trade will grow 
faster than gas trades by pipeline, growing from 296 bcm in 2010 to 566 bcm in 
2020 (figure 23). Based on figure 24, below, European market will be the main 
LNG market worldwide until 2020, while figure 23 shows that the most LNG 
demands belongs to Asia by 2020. The growing demands, particularly from newly 
emerging economies, and their rivals, in addition to any unexpected events, such 
as Japan’s earthquake in January 2011, access to more LNG supplies would be a 
challenge for the EU in the future. 
Figure 23: The world’s LNG demand prospects (in bcm) 
 
Source: CEDIGAZ (2011), “World LNG market: current developments and prospects”, 24 June: 6 
LNG supply is set to grow 4.4% per annum to 2030, more than twice as fast as 
total global gas production (2.1% p.a.), and its share in gas supply throughout 
the world will increase from 9% in 2010 to 15% in 2030. European and non–
OECD Asia, particularly China and India, demand for LNG would be in the 
leading positions (figure 24).  
Figure 24: LNG trade grows twice as fast as global gas production 
 
Source: BP Energy Outlook 2030, 2011: 56 
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However, it is expected that unconventional gas production in Europe would 
grow by 0.3% of global gas production by 2020 and 1.7% by 2030 (See figure 25 & 
annex 7).  
As figure 25 illustrates, the role of LNG will rise in Europe by 40% of the total 
gas imports (BP, 2012: 34), while the EU Commissioner for Energy is expected to 
enhance the volume of LNG imported by around 24% by 2020, through 
diversification of LNG suppliers and routes in the future European gas market 
(Oettinger, 2010: 5–6). 
Figure 25: Conventional and unconventional gas sources of supply by region, 1990–2030 
 
Source: BP Energy Outlook 2030, 2012: 34 
In addition, Europe’s gas imports by pipelines will face some challenges, 
including:      
- Transit risk, such as what happened in Ukraine and Belarus during 2006–
2009;  
- Russian domination on some of the Caspian littoral states’ gas policies;    
- Delay in constructing of new gas pipelines due to the geopolitical or 
technical constraints and complexity of negotiations with politically less–
stable suppliers and transit countries. 
- Permanent pipelines are expensive and need long construction times 
without capability of diverting to any other potential destinations, unlike 
LNG tankers (Sascha Muller–Kraenner, 2007: 8). 
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Therefore, diversification of gas supply by LNG would be critical to ease these 
various supply risks (RREEF Research, 2011: 3), as the producers and 
consumers can contact directly with each other without transit players and also 
interdependency and new energy relations will emerge (Luft & Korine, 2009: 13), 
without  paying attention to geographical boundaries among the states and 
regions.  
As a result, these reasons mentioned, alongside flexibility of LNG over the 
destination and shorter duration of its contracts (Wicks, 2009: 36) could lead to 
more use of LNG and then rising of local, national, regional and global energy 
security in the future (Hurst, 2009: 271–282). However, construction of gas 
pipelines over long distances is not economical (Wicks, 2009: 36).  
In addition, LNG ports offer greater resilience than pipelines as the former can 
receive from different suppliers, while the latter should import generally from 
fixed exporters (IEA (MOSES), 2011: 26). This would require increasing supplies 
in the years to come from the traditional European gas suppliers, including 
Norway, Russia and North Africa, as well as some new natural gas and LNG 
suppliers. 
When European production decreases, to at least 30% less than today’s 
production by 2020, and even further until 2030 (Eurogas Long–Term Outlook to 
2030: 5), gas imports will increase, compared to the current level. So, the EU will 
require finding new gas suppliers, in particular, more adjacent to this region. As 
figure 26 shows, the EU imported 41% of its natural gas and LNG demands from 
outside the continent, but this percentage reached 48% in 2010. According to 
Eurogas’ estimation (2010: 6), the Union might import 68% and 74% of its 
natural gas and LNG demands from non–European suppliers by the end of the 
current and future decades respectively. 
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Figure 26: EU–27 natural gas and LNG import percentage from outside Europe, 2005–2030
 
Source: Eurogas 2010, “Natural gas demand and supply in long Term Outlook to 2030”: 6 
Andris Piebalgs, ex–European Commissioner for Energy, argued that the EU 
countries should strive to increase the number of alternative gas suppliers and 
more competition over gas prices, including: 
1. Additional gas supplies from Russia;  
2. Natural gas from Turkmenistan and Central Asia via a new pipeline 
through Turkey and the Balkan region; 
3. Pipeline(s) from the Middle East (potentially from Qatar and Iran);  
4. Additional undersea pipelines from Libya and Algeria to Italy and Spain; 
5. New LNG projects from Northern Russia, North Africa, Middle 
East/Persian Gulf, etc.) (Piebalgs, 2008) (See more in Chapters 5 & 6). 
2.7. Various external gas routes toward the EU  
In the EU, natural gas has been imported mainly by pipelines from Russia, 
Norway and, to some extent, from Algeria, amounting to 85%, by these countries’ 
energy giants, including Gazprom, Statoil Hydro and Sonatrach, respectively 
(European Commission, SEC (2011) 1022 final on 7.9.2011: 3). As European 
production decreases and future dependence on imports from LNG points or 
pipelines from more remote areas will increase, so this dependence is the EU’s 
special concern (European Security Strategy, 2003: 3). Only diversifications of 
routes, LNG import terminals and interconnection grids could help to mitigate 
these and other related risks. 
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Russia is the major pipeline supplier to Europe, all of which goes through 
pipeline, followed by Norway. The major gas pipeline routes from Western 
Siberian gas fields to Western European export markets run across Ukraine. 
However, Russia wants alternative routes for the gas it sells to Europe, like the 
Yamal–Europe gas pipeline II, to reduce its reliance on routes through Ukraine 
and Belarus. Accordingly, North Stream gas pipeline was inaugurated in 
December 2011, bypassing Ukraine.   
There are more than three million miles of oil and gas pipelines worldwide at an 
average cost of more than 1.3 million dollars per mile to build (Luft & Korine, 
2009: 26). According to Eurogas 2010, the length of all pipelines within the EU–
27 is 2,030,070 km, as shown in table 2 and at the end of 2009, total length of 
pipelines, transmission and distribution, increased by approximately 2% in 
comparison with 2008 (Eurogas Statistical Report, 2010: 11)  .  
The EU in 2009 received 31% of its natural gas 
from Norway and partially from the UK, the 
Netherlands and other EU member states and 
34% from Russia. The rest of EU’s gas imports, 
35%, came from Algeria, Qatar, Libya, Egypt, 
Nigeria and other exporters.   
Natural gas can be transported either by 
pipelines or turned into a liquid, shipped by 
tankers and regasified at the destination in the 
form of LNG. Europe’s gas imports are nearly 
81% delivered by pipelines (Eurogas Statistical 
Report: 2010), however, the situation in the 
EU’s gas market has changed considerably 
over the last few years with the start of the 
technology of liquefaction of natural gas and 
the importing of large amounts of LNG by 
tanker to Europe. LNG has been used since the 
Table 2: The length of pipelines in the 
EU, by2010
 
Source: Eurogas Statistical Report 
2010: 11 
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1960s, particularly in Spain, the UK, Italy, France, Belgium and Greece. So far 
only six of EU–27 member states possess the required technology of LNG (Kulick, 
2012: 14). 
In addition, based on Eurogas 2010, Spain leads Europe in LNG imports, 
followed by the UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal and Greece.  
Algeria is currently the most important LNG exporter to Europe with deliveries 
to France, Spain, Belgium, Italy and the UK. Spain, moreover, imported LNG 
from Egypt. 
The EU, particularly Spain and France, has consumed LNG from Nigeria since 
1999. Egypt and Qatar have also increased their LNG exports to Europe mostly 
to Spain. The EU, moreover, receives some smaller LNG volumes from other 
sources such as Oman, Libya and Trinidad and Tobago (RREEF Research, 2011: 
3).   
Based on a CEDIGAZ estimation in 2011 (figure 21), the European gas market 
needed 570 bcm of natural gas in 2010 and almost 15% of the EU’s net imports 
were delivered by LNG, nearly 80 bcm/y, and it is expected that this figure will 
rise to 24% by 2020, 120–160 bcm/y, and to increase by 40% until 2030 with 220–
300 bcm/y, so the EU’s LNG needs will rise 60% in 2020 and around 270% by 
2030, compared to 2010. However, continental gas production will decline from 
51% in 2010 to 33% by the end of the current decade. 
Consequently, a high number of new LNG import terminals have been proposed 
in recent years in response to the increase in LNG demand in the EU and some 
of them are under construction. Nearly 80% of new facilities would be in France, 
Italy, and Spain in order to meet domestic use and transportation inside the 
region (map 1). 
2.7.1. External gas pipelines toward the EU 
Pipelines are expected to remain the most dominant means of gas transport in 
Europe by 2020, and based on table 6, if the whole of the foreseen pipeline 
projects materialise, they can transfer between 135–144 bcm/y natural gas to the 
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EU market from ultra–regional gas producers. It should be noted that, a few 
pipelines are currently under development, such as Langeled pipeline.  
Russia has supplied its piped gas to Europe via Yamal–Europe, Nord Stream 
and Blue Stream. Among them, it is important to recall the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline connecting Russia with Germany via the Baltic Sea, inaugurated in 
2011. This gas pipeline passes under the Baltic Sea, as the longest sea–bed 
pipeline worldwide, with no transit country’s involvement, thus enabling 
transportation fees to be reduced and ruling out possible political risks toward 
Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, France, Denmark and other European 
countries. 
Algeria has been the third supplier of natural gas, after Russia and Norway, to 
Europe since the 1960s. The Enrico Mattei and the Pedro Duran Farell pipelines 
have shipped nearly 40 bcm/y of Algerian gas to Italy and Spain (C. Schofield, 
2011).  
Libya supplies its natural gas to Italy through an off–shore pipeline, the so–
called Green Stream (Catalano, 2011: 10). The South Caucasus Gas Pipeline 
(SCGP) from Republic of Azerbaijan was completed in December 2006, in 
parallel to the BTC oil pipeline. 
Another important route under study is the gas corridor from the Middle 
East/Persian Gulf and the Caspian region via Turkey to Greece, Bulgaria and 
Italy, the so–called “South–Europe Gas Ring” or the “South Gas Corridor”. The 
ITGI (Interconnection Turkey–Greece–Italy Pipeline), the TAP (Trans–Adriatic 
Pipeline), and the Nabucco compete with each other to play the main role to 
transport piped gas from the above–mentioned regions, especially Republic of  
Azerbaijan and Iran to Europe (Catalano, 2011: 9–10). 
The “Mediterranean Integrated Gas Ring” or “Medgas Ring” from South 
Mediterranean gas reserves is another project, including connection of North 
African gas holders and also Trans–Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP) in the Niger 
Delta, in Southern Nigeria, to Europe, even via the Nabucco by the Arab Gas 
Pipeline (AGP) in Egypt (Mott MacDonald’s report, 2010: 9–10). The Medgaz 
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pipeline, moreover, has originated from Algeria to Spain, then France and the 
European market, followed by the Galsi pipeline, connecting Algeria to Italy via 
Sardinia across the Mediterranean Sea. 
In addition to the continental pipelines, such as Langeled, a couple of 
interconnected gas pipelines are operational within Europe, like Zeebrugge 
between Belgium and the UK, ITG between Turkey and Greece. The Langeled 
pipeline (originally known as Britpipe) is an underwater pipeline transporting 
Norwegian gas to the United Kingdom. Before the completion of the Nord 
Stream pipeline, it was the longest sub–sea pipeline in the world (“Nord Stream 
Passes ships and bombs”, the Moscow Times, 05.05.2011). The Baltic Pipeline 
from Norway to Denmark, Poland and then Germany via the Baltic Sea–bed 
with 3–5 bcm/y is also other planned European gas pipeline. The suspended 
Skanled pipeline was also supposed to transport Norwegian gas to Denmark and 
Sweden. The TAP, starting from Greece, Albania, the Adriatic Sea and Italy, is 
considered to be the shortest interconnection in the Southern Gas Corridor, 
linking Europe to new sources of gas in the Caspian and Middle East/Persian 
Gulf regions. 
Table 3: List of the most important gas pipelines toward the EU 
Project  Supplier  Via  To Capacity 
(bcm) 
 Start–up 
Enrico Mattei 
(The Trans–
Mediterranean Pipeline) 
 Algeria (the 
Hassi R'mel 
field) 
 Tunisia & 
Mediterranean Sea 
 Italy 27–
32 
 1983, 
1990 & 
2012 
The Maghreb–Europe 
Gas Pipeline/Pedro 
Duran Farell 
 Algeria  Morocco  Spain & 
Portugal 
8–12  1996 
Yamal–Europe  Russia  Belarus  Poland & 
Germany 
33  1997 
Green Stream  Libya  Mediterranean Sea  Italy 8–11  2004 
 97 
 
Blue Stream  Russia  Black Sea  Turkey 16  2005 
Langeled  Norway  Ormen Lange  UK 20  2006 
BBL2  Netherlands  –  UK 16–
19 
 2006 
SCGP 3/ 
BTE4 
 R. Azerbaijan  Georgia  Turkey 6.6/ 
up to 
20 
 1st leg: 
2006 
2nd leg: 
planned 
Nord Stream/ NEGP5  Russia  Vyborg  Germany 27–
55 
 2011 
Medgas  Algeria  Mediterranean Sea  Spain 8–10  2011 
GALSI  Algeria  Mediterranean Sea  Italy & 
France 
8–10  2014 
South Stream  Russia  Turkey & Black 
Sea 
 Bulgaria, 
Greece, 
Austria  & 
Italy 
63  2015 
White Stream  Caspian region  Georgia & Ukraine  Romania 32  2016 
ITGI  Caspian  Greece  Italy 8–10  2017 
Nabucco  Caspian  Turkey  Austria 25–
30 
 Since 
2018 
 
    
Source: By Author, based on: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_natural_gas_pipelines; European 
Commission (2007), “Energy corridors, European Union and Neighbouring countries”, EUR 22581; Remme, 
Uwe &  Blesl,Markus & Fahl, Ulrich (2008), “Future European gas supply in the resource triangle of the 
Former Soviet Union, the Middle East and Northern Africa”, Energy Policy, Volume 36, Issue 5, May:1622–
1641 
                                                          
2 Balgzand Bacton Line 
3 South Caucasus Gas Pipeline   
4 Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Pipeline (Shah Deniz Pipeline) 
5 North European Gas Pipeline 
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If all pipelines that are planned materialised in the future, including the 
connection of the Nabucco to the current South Caucasus gas pipeline and the 
Tabriz–Erzurum pipeline from Iran, and Norway also increases its exports to 
Europe with the new Europipe III, along the current pipeline capacity, the EU 
will be faced with high import pipeline supply, up to 410 bcm by 2020 (CIEP, 
2008: 67).  
However, some prominent experts like Prof. Anoush Ehteshami, on 3rd 
November 2011, Kevin Rosner (2011: 160–176) and Kulick (2012: 14) believe that 
most of the projects within the Central Asia, like the EU–endorsed but delayed 
the Nabucco pipeline, will not happen without Russian consent, as Moscow 
dominates most of the Central Asia’s natural gas (Delcour, 2011:121), while this 
country does not support natural gas and LNG diversification routes to the EU 
and maintains its bilateral energy negotiation with the EU members.  
In addition, in August 2009, the signing of several additional protocols between 
Russia and Turkey, as the main transit country for gas transportation to the EU, 
refer to nuclear and gas energy cooperation, such as construction of the Blue 
Stream II. It demonstrates the closer energy bilateral cooperation that could 
shift the balance in favour of a more effective Russo–Turkish partnership than 
Turkey–the EU (Catalano, 2011: 10). 
Russian–Algerian gas negotiations have been another example. In March 2006, 
President Putin, along with Gazprom officials, travelled to Algeria to discuss 
Russian participation in Algeria’s future oil and gas projects, including its LNG 
export markets. This trend shows that Moscow is seeking to position itself to 
influence Algeria’s future role as a major natural gas and LNG supplier to 
Europe (Belkin, 2008: 19). 
However, EU member states have established two mechanisms in order to deal 
with Moscow for energy relations: the Energy Charter Treaty, which Russia has 
signed but not ratified in 2009, and the EU–Russia Energy Dialogue that came 
to realisation in 2000 (Belkin, 2008: 12). 
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In sum, the amount of piped gas import capacity within the EU in the future, 
alongside the rate of implementation of the European energy policy, notably the 
20/20/20 by 2020, regarding energy efficiency and renewable energy sources, will 
determine the amount of extra LNG imports in the medium and long terms. 
By 2020, Europe will depend on foreign producers for over 80% of its natural gas, 
a big jump from 64% in 2009 (Eurostat 2010). Furthermore, many European 
countries are uncomfortable with their reliance on Russian gas giant Gazprom, 
and are eager to diversify their suppliers (Dorsman et al. 2011: 91).  
2.7.2. External LNG routes toward the EU  
On the other hand, most of the current LNG imports are on long term contracts, 
although some of those will come to an end at the beginning of the 2020s, such as 
Algeria, Oman, Nigeria, Norway, as well as Trinidad and Tobago, and then they 
will totally end before 2030 (figure 27). Moreover, as clarified in Chapter 5, some 
of the above–mentioned suppliers will face decreases or depletion of gas reserves 
before the end of the future decade. 
Figure 27: LNG contracted to Europe, 2009–2030 
 
Source: Mott MacDonald’s report, 2010: 26 
Sufficient LNG capacity, regasification terminals, transportation to other EU 
members alongside adequate gas storage should be available (European 
Commission, 2008: 6). In addition, only six out of the EU–27 possess the required 
technology for LNG, these being, Spain, the UK, France, Italy, Greece, and 
Belgium (Kulick, 2012: 14). Hence, further interconnection is necessary to 
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transport regasified LNG into the heart of the EU members. Of course, the 
support of the European Commission and the EU regulators’ in terms of 
investment in such infrastructures would be important (Wicks, 2009: 92), as it is 
likely that during the years to come the EU’s gas market will be well supplied 
thanks to the completion of the LNG capacity already under construction (Wicks, 
2009: 25).  
Therefore, additional gas from new suppliers will require massive investment in 
production and transportation capacity (RREEF Research, 2011: 6). 
With the currently ongoing large investments in new LNG facilities in an 
increasing number of countries in the EU, a global LNG market is arising as well 
(CEDIGAZ, “Statistical Database”, 2011), so that the EU’s LNG regasification 
capacity has increased between 2004 to 2010, to 142 Mtoe/157 bcm, and will 
continue further until 2020 (Eurogas, 2010: 6).  
A high number of new LNG import terminals have been proposed or approved in 
recent years in response to the increase in LNG demand and some of them are 
under construction. Other terminals in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK 
are under construction or being expanded and are due to become operational in 
the next three years. Some other terminals have been proposed in potentially 
new LNG importing countries such as Cyprus, Ireland, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Poland. 
A number of new LNG terminals within the EU countries are under construction, 
while existing terminals are expanded. Once some of the LNG projects approved, 
planned and under construction in the EU become operational transit risks could 
be eased and the energy security would be significantly increased (map 1). 
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Map 1: Existing, proposed, under construction and approved LNG terminals in Europe 
 
 
Source: PREEF Research (2011), “LNG Market in Europe”: 5 
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There are also plans to expand many of the existing facilities but it is not 
expected that all of those projects will proceed before 2020. Similarly, there is a 
long list of proposed and new LNG terminals, as shown in figure 28. 
Figure 28: LNG import/regasification terminals in the EU 
 
Source: Mott MacDonald’s report, 2010: 28 
It is also expected that a few of those will actually go ahead, at least before 2020, 
and, if all the proposed expansions and new facilities were to be completed, the 
total LNG regasification capacity in the EU will reach to more than 450 bcm/y by 
2030, which is nearly nine and a half times the actual imports in 2008 and 2010 
(Mott MacDonald’s report, 2010: 28). 
In Italy, for example, there are four LNG facilities and eleven proposals for the 
construction of LNG terminals and three of them have already been authorised 
and are under construction. Spain has two LNG regasificators under 
construction, in addition to the current five facilities. France has authorised the 
construction of three more LNG terminals out of five, while the UK has six LNG 
projects either proposed or under construction, despite three currently active 
LNG facilities. 
These published LNG projects would represent an additional import capacity of 
about 100 bcm/y by 2020 (European Commission, 2007, “Energy corridors 
European Union and Neighbouring Countries”: 20), while the current EU’s LNG 
import is around 80 bcm/y (CEDIGAZ, 2011). Although, some of the existing 
facilities are expected to be expanded in order to import more volume of LNG (De 
Vivies, 2005).  
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2.8. The EU’s Challenges on natural gas and LNG imports      
The EU has struggled to secure its gas supply beyond the year 2020, from both 
LNG and pipeline sources in the future by the above–mentioned projects. 
Nevertheless, it faces some challenges, as follows: 
First of all, for the EU energy policy–makers, one of the main sources of concern 
is Russia. The gas supply cuts in 1993, 1994, 1995, 2005/2006, 2007 and 2009 to 
Ukraine and Belarus, as well as the war in Georgia in 2008 has shown, Russia 
does not seem to have abandoned its ambition of maintaining its domination on 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in particular their hydrocarbon 
resources, and also can use gas as a political weapon against Europe (Pascual & 
Zambetakis, 2010: 21). 
These “cut–off incidents” made some EU countries aware of how much they 
depend on energy coming from just one huge company: Russia’s Gazprom.  
In addition, Russia’s three major gas fields (Urengoy, Yamburg and Medvezhye) 
are declining and some other fields, such as the ones within the Yamal region 
and also the Arctic with its harsh climate and lack of infrastructure (Rosner, 
2011: 160–176), need more investment (Aad Correlje et al. 2006: 542). The 
modernization of aged pipeline systems in transit countries, like Ukraine, is also 
vital (CER, 2011: 88–92). This problem could be extended by other regional 
issues within the Central Asia and Caspian region, such as unresolved legal 
status of the ownership of the Caspian Sea’s gas reserves, while only Republic of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia have already reached an agreement over 
the long–term political conflict between Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia over 
Nagorno–Karabaugh, and there is also the question of internal political strife in 
Georgia (Gheorghe & Muresan, 2011: 25–28). Therefore, diversification away 
from Russian gas is important for the EU in the foreseeable future (Wicks, 2009: 
94–95).  
Second, nearly 80% of hydrocarbon reserves are under governmental control and 
these states can use oil and gas as political pressure or leverage (Luft & Korine, 
2009: 335–350). These countries could also force the foreign companies to operate 
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on their territory in a partnership with their state–owned companies, such as 
Russian law (Bahgat, 2011: 1). As a result, nationalistic policies or possible 
internal instability and political turmoil (Belkin, 2008: 17–18) are perceived as 
major threats (see Chapter 5).  
Third, the lack of a coherent European energy foreign policy with a single voice 
(CER, 2011: 3) and also less growth in forming a regional integrated market are 
the main “inherent dilemmas” (Schweiger & Wittlinger, 2009), despite the 
Commission’s policy on the Single Market agenda in 2007 and more consensus 
on this market construction (European Commission, 2009b: 4). It seems that 
member–state behaviour has become more geopolitical, rather than enshrining 
the internal energy market rules (Young, 2009: 4).  
Although the Lisbon treaty commits the EU to secure the energy supplies of the 
Union, there has not been any coherent European energy foreign policy with one 
voice (CER, 2011: 3). The European Council, on 4th February 2011, concluded 
that there is a need for better coordination and solidarity within the EU 
members, by European Commission and Gas Coordination Group monitoring, 
regarding the external energy relations with key producers, transit, and 
consumer countries (European Commission, COM (2011) 540 final, 2011: 1–2), 
while the Commission estimates that around 60 intergovernmental gas 
agreements may exist between member states and third parties (CER, 2011: 3). 
Sascha Muller–Kraenner argued (2007: 78) that the EU should find appropriate 
answers to the following questions with regard to the future energy challenges:  
4. How to structure the relations with Russia? 
5. Will Iran successfully be integrated into the international system and 
global economy? 
6. Is Turkey to become a member of the EU? 
The European Commission and the Gas Coordination Group monitor external 
energy relations with key producers, transit, and consumer countries, while the 
European Commission estimates that around 60 intergovernmental gas 
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agreements might exist between the EU member states and the third parties 
(European Commission, COM (2011) 540 final, 2011: 1–3). 
So, moving beyond the Lisbon Strategy by more insistence on “the core common 
values” in the EU–27 is vital (Schweiger, 2009: 534), while energy, in general, 
and natural gas and LNG, in 
particular, is a shared concern. 
Fourth, further and adequate 
investment in natural gas and LNG 
industries and infrastructures in 
consumers, transit countries and 
producers (Eurogas, “Long– Term 
Outlook to 2030”: 6; W.C. Ramsay, 
2008) would be vital. For this reason, 
diversification of LNG routes and 
suppliers is expensive (Pascual & 
Zambetakis, 2010: 21). 
According to the WEO–2011, roughly $38 trillion of investment is required to 
meet global projected energy demands by 2035 and the share of natural gas is 
$9.5 trillion (figure 29).     
The EU Commissioner for Energy argued that the Union requires at least €1 
trillion of investment in its various energy sectors over the next 20 years, such as 
the construction of new import pipelines and LNG facilities, renewable energy 
sources technologies and also energy efficiency (Oettinger, 27th October 2011: 3; 
Oettinger, 2010: 2–5).  
Stern (2002) and Arianna Checchi alongside his colleagues (2009: 16) believed 
that the “investment and facility, exporters’ reliability, as well as transit risks” 
will threaten the EU’s security of supply in the future. 
However, the on–going economic crisis within the EU and also “the Eurozone 
governments’ failure to coordinate their economic policies” could possibly push 
Figure 29: The required investment in energy 
infrastructure worldwide, 2011–2035 
 
Source: World Energy Outlook, 2011 
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further countries into crisis in the future (Schweiger, 2008), similar to what has 
happened in some Southern EU member states, e.g. Greece, Spain and Italy.  
2.9. The four EU’s Case Studies regarding the natural gas and LNG 
As analysed in this chapter regarding the increase of LNG demand in the EU in 
the future, having started over recent years, there are 31 LNG terminals in the 
EU, either in existence, under construction, or under consideration, except 
cancelled and suspended ones, 24 of which, close to 80% of these facilities, are 
situated in the UK, France, Spain and Italy. The third latest countries are the 
4th, 5th, and 6th global LNG importers and Italy is the 12th one (figure 40). On the 
one hand these countries will be faced with growing LNG demands, and, on the 
other, the states mentioned are the main LNG entrances for the future single 
and integrated EU’s gas market, so their energy policy will have an effect on 
regional imports. 
2.9.1. The UK as the first Case Study 
2.9.1.1. Geo–politics of the UK                 
The UK, located off the north–western coast of continental Europe, consists of 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, so the latter is the only part of 
the UK that shares a land border with another EU country–the Republic of 
Ireland. Apart from this border line, the UK is surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean, 
the North Sea, the Irish Sea and the English Channel, connecting Britain to 
France, as the second closest country to the UK (IEA the UK Review 2006: 23). 
Notwithstanding being a major member of the EU, the UK is not part of the 
euro–zone. 
2.9.1.2. The UK’s energy policy and energy security   
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has the primary responsibility for 
the development and implementation of UK’s energy policy on the supply side 
(IEA the UK Review, 2006: 31) and the National Grid Gas is responsible for 
preparing the required data regarding the security of gas supply in this country, 
which is published jointly by Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). 
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The latter also develops a Strategy and Policy Statement for Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets (Ofgem), which reflects the British energy security policy 
objectives. The Ofgem is the regulator for electricity and natural gas with close 
relationships with industry in order to carry out more projects regarding gas 
security (UK Department of Energy & Climate Change 2011: 7&9). 
In July 2001, the DTI and Ofgem set up the Joint Energy Security of Supply 
(JESS) working group to assess the UK’s gas supply risks in the future with the 
aim of monitoring the scale of gas and electricity supplies and the availability of 
at least seven years of supply in advance (IEA, the UK Review 2006: 32). 
The significance of the energy supply has been highlighted in the UK’s first ever 
National Security Strategy, published in March 2008 and was followed by a 
comprehensive update in June 2009 (www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national 
_security) and also in the government’s National Policy Statements for energy 
development (www.decc.gov.uk) with the aim of energy developments. 
Malcolm Wicks, the member of parliament and the Special Representative for 
the UK Prime Minister, argues that “the UK’s energy security is ensured by 
stability of gas supply with reasonable price, diversification of suppliers and 
energy mix, whereas this country should retain independence in its foreign policy 
avoiding dependence on a particular supplier” (Wicks, 2009: 97–99). The UK 
must consider whether the part of its energy policy ceded to the EU, would be in 
its national interest (Wicks, 2009: 90).  
So, according to the UK’s Energy White Paper on 9th July 2003, the four key 
energy objectives include: 
 To reduce the UK’s greenhouse gases by 60% before 2050, with real 
progress by 2020, based on the 20/20/20 by 2020 policy; 
 To maintain the reliability of supply with diversifying of energy sources 
and routes; 
 To promote liberalised and competitive energy market in the UK and the 
rate of sustainability; 
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 To ensure adequate energy with affordable price (IEA, the UK Review 
2006: 165). 
The DECC in its annual energy statement on 23rd November 2011 insisted on a 
new energy portfolio based on “securing supply with affordable price toward a 
low–carbon energy”. 
So, according to the report by the Economic Policy Centre (EPC) in London 
issued in December 2009 entitled, “Securing Our Energy Future: Why and How 
It Must Be Done,” without certain access to energy, there can be no economic 
activity in the UK, and unless the price of access is low enough, economic activity 
will be limited.  
The UK in line with the EU’s energy policy, like integrated and competitive 
energy markets, has taken some important steps, such as opening its gas 
markets to competition or “freedom of access” (R. Odell, 2002: 606) since 1984 
(EIA, International Energy Outlook 2011: 46). Hence gas market liberalisation 
has started in this country earlier than other continental countries, while this 
country tried to be a gas trading hub within the EU, such as Henry Hub in the 
US (Roze, 2007: 19), while the oldest European notional hub, the so–called 
National Balancing Point (NBP) was established in the UK in 1996.  
The UK, moreover, was the first country to announce a 60% greenhouse gases 
reduction by 2050 (IEA, the UK Review 2006: 9) and the Energy Saving Trust 
(EST) and the Carbon Trust (CT), as the two independent bodies funded by the 
government, promote the reduction in greenhouse gases and the rise of 
renewable energy sources in this country (IEA, the UK Review 2006:31). 
2.9.1.3. Geo–politics of natural gas and pipelines in the UK      
Since the 1970’s, the UK has developed its off–shore gas fields, chiefly in three 
distinct areas, comprising: associated fields on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS), 
non–associated fields in the Shearwater–Elgin area of the Southern Gas Basin, 
including Elgin, Franklin, Halley, Scoter, and Shearwater 
(http://www.eia.gov/UK), located adjacent to the Dutch sector of the North Sea, 
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and also non-associated fields in the Irish Sea (IEA 2010, the UK: 15). According 
to Oil and Gas Journal, the UK’s proven natural gas reserves declined 12% in 
2011, compared to the previous year.  
There are four main internal pipeline systems in the UK that carry gas from off–
shore platforms to coastal terminals. The Shearwater–Elgin Line (SEAL), 
operated by British Shell (http://www.eia.gov/UK), transports gas from the 
Shearwater–Elgin area to the landing terminal at Bacton, England. ExxonMobil 
operates the 200–mile Scottish Area Gas Evacuation (SAGE), which transports 
associated gas from UKCS fields to the landing terminal at St. Fergus, in 
Scotland. The 250–mile Central Area Transmission System (CATS), operated by 
the British BP (http://www.eia.gov/UK), links fields in the Central North Sea to 
Teesside. Finally, Shell operates the 283–mile Far North Liquids and Gas 
System (FLAGS) linking associated gas deposits in the Brent oil system with St. 
Fergus.   
Once brought on–shore, the responsibility for transporting natural gas 
throughout the UK belongs mostly to the National Grid and privately–controlled 
Scotia Gas Networks, an offshoot of the state–owned British Gas (IEA 2010, the 
UK: 16).  
The UK’s gas network is connected internationally with continental suppliers 
(IEA 2010, the UK: 16). The Interconnector pipeline connects the Bacton 
terminal with Zeebrugge, Belgium in order to export both natural gas from the 
UK to continental Europe and import into the country, if required, whereas the 
Moffat Interconnector, operated by Gaslink, links the UK with the Republic of 
Ireland, running from Moffat in Scotland (DECC 2011: 18). Norway’s North Sea 
natural gas fields, via the Langeled (23.5 bcm in 2009) and the Frigg pipelines, 
operated by Total, as well as the Netherlands through the Bacton–Balgzand 
pipeline or BBL (6.5 bcm in 2009) are more interconnectors, connecting with the 
UK territory (map 2).  
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In late 2007, the UK’s South–North gas pipeline was completed with the purpose 
of transferring natural gas from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland (IEA 
2010, the UK: 16–18). 
In additional, some more continental interconnector pipelines are planned or 
under construction (EIA World Outlook 2011: 46). 
Map 2: The UK’s natural gas and LNG infrastructures 
 
Source: IEA 2010, the UK: Oil and Gas Security Emergency Response of IEA Countries: 17 
The exploitation of gas from the Continental Shelf in the North Sea and 
Southern Gas Basin led to an expansion in the gas consumption in the UK, 
particularly in the 1990s, by constructing more gas–fired electricity generation 
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plants, increasing the percentage of the total electricity produced by gas to 44% 
in 2009 (IEA 2010, the UK: 4) replacing coal in the power system and this 
transition has been accelerated by the goal of cutting greenhouse gases, while 
nuclear power capacity has stabilised (Eurostat Statistical Book, 2009: 98). 
2.9.1.4. Total primary energy sources demand and production, past, now and the 
future  
The UK’s total primary energy sources has dropped from over 218 ktoe in 1973 to 
a bit more than 197 mtoe in 2009, while the shares of oil and coal have declined 
considerably, unlike the gas share, rising from 12% of total primary energy 
sources to 40% (figure 30) during the same period (IEA 2010, the UK: 4).  
Figure 30: The UK’s total primary energy sources, 1973–2009 
 
Source: IEA 2010, the UK: Oil and Gas Security Emergency Response of IEA Countries: 4 
The high–cost wind plant(CER, 2011: 18) is the major renewable energy source 
for power generation in the UK by 2020, followed by tidal, and biomass (Eurostat 
Statistical Book, 2010: 98), but according to Prof. Phil Taylor, Deputy Director 
for Durham Energy Institute, at the “Smarter Energy–Will it cost the Earth?” 
Conference, which took place on 6th September 2011, in order to increase 
renewable energy sources share in the UK’s energy mix, nearly £30 bn needs to 
be invested on renewable energy sources by 2030. Some experts in this panel 
believe that unskilled workforce, lack of enough high–tech facilities and 
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expertise, huge investment and inadequate energy efficiency are the main 
challenges the UK faces in order to achieve the decarbonisation targets by 2050. 
The DECC in its annual energy statement, issued on 23rd November 2011 
estimated that the cost of this venture by 2020 would be around £14 bn. 
Currently, there are 10 nuclear power plants that are online in the UK. 
Nonetheless, the lifetime of eight of these will end by 2023, but the government 
identified some potential sites in 2009 for building new plants by 2025 
(http://www.eia.gov/countries/UK). 
Wicks (2009) warned that the UK will probably lose 30% of its generating 
capacity from coal and nuclear energy by 2021 as these plants close down (Cole, 
2010). Switching from coal to gas in the UK, has been more economical and 
environmentally–friendly, while the real loser from this change has been coal 
(figure 31), rather than oil (Kandiyoti, 2008: 38), so imported hydrocarbons could 
still account for more than 90% of UK’s energy consumption by 2020 (Sascha 
Muller–Kraenner argued 2007: 81) (figure 31) and even up to 60% of it in 2050, 
according to the previous UK’s Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, between 2005 to 2008 (Wicks, 2009: 57).  
Figure 31: The UK’s current and projected demand for primary energy 
 
Source: Wicks, 2009: 56 
While the country’s gas demand grew by roughly 70% from 1990 to 2008, the 
British gas production peaked in 2000 at around 115 bcm, and has steadily 
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declined, standing at slightly more than 62 bcm in 2009. As a result, this country, 
as a net natural gas importer (IEA 2010, the UK: 3) had to import more than 31% 
of its gas needs in 2009 (table 4). 
Table 4: The UK’s key natural gas data 
 
Source: IEA 2010, the UK: Oil and Gas Security Emergency Response of IEA Countries: 2 
It is envisaged that the gas consumption will fall by between 14% to 27% by 2020, 
however domestic production will drop over the same period as well, meaning 
that the UK’s import dependency will increase (IEA 2010, the UK: 15–16). 
Based on figure 32, National Grid’s projection shows that the UK domestic gas 
production, peaked in 2000, and is projected to decline to 26 bcm in 2020 (DECC 
2011: 14) or around 24 bcm, according to the IEA, the UK (2010: 15) and the 
UK’s LNG import might be equal to Japan, the current global leading LNG 
importer, by 2020 (Hartley & B.Medlock, 2006: 357–407), that is because the 
current British Prime Minister’s special representative for international energy 
believes that “the LNG is a vital part of the UK  gas supply and will become 
more significant” (Wicks, 2009: 98).  
Figure 32: The UK’s annual gas supply forecast, 2000–2024 
 
Source: Wicks, 2009: 67 
 114 
 
On the basis of the National Grid’s statistics, the UK might import 50–70% of its 
gas needs by then (figure 32), but the percentage of renewable energy sources in 
the energy mix impacts on the amount of gas imports. Table 7 shows that the 
EU’s renewable energy sources target for the UK is the increase of its share in 
primary energy sources from 1.3% in 2005 and 3% in 2009 to 15% by 2020, the 
most increase among the EU’s member states, so if this country is unable to 
achieve this goal, the scale of natural gas imports would rise much further, 
according to the IEA, the UK (2010: 16). 
2.9.1.5. The UK, as the leading LNG importer?  
The UK was the first LNG importer in Europe in 1959 and until the mid–1990s, 
Algeria was the only exporter to this country. Currently, the UK has four LNG 
import terminals, with the largest of Europe’s LNG terminals in South Hook 
near to the Dragon terminal, and the country was the eighth–largest importer of 
LNG in 2010, according to IEA (Key World Energy Statistics 2011: 13) with 37 
bcm/y imports, while the existing LNG capacity within the British terminals is 
more than 39 bcm/y, that could be increased by more than 20–27 bcm/y in the 
future (table 5).  
Ledesma in an interview on 16th February 2012, insisted that the UK needs to 
import LNG to meet its increasing demand requirements (figure 32) in the 
coming years and also transport inside the EU, depending on the level of gas 
demand which will be impacted by economic situations. 
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Table 5: The UK’s existing LNG terminals and those under construction and consideration 
 
Sources: by the Author on the basis of: the Energy Delta Institute, GLE LNG map 2011, NG Information 
OECD/IEA 2011, International Gas Union (IGU) World LNG Report 2010, King & Spalding 2006, The 
California Energy Commission (Western Europe LNG Map, July 2010),  globallnginfo.com, May 2012. 
Qatar has become the main LNG supplier to the UK since 2011, followed by 
Algeria, with the remaining volumes arriving from Egypt, Peru, and Trinidad 
and Tobago (table 5), though a tanker carrying the first–ever shipment of LNG 
from the US to the UK arrived on the British shores in November 2010 
(www.eia.gov/countries/the UK). Matthew Hulbert (annex 1) in an interview on 
15th May 2012 argued that the UK will use LNG from Persian Gulf, especially 
Qatar, to a greater extent compared to Italy and Spain, the other two main LNG 
importers within the EU in years to come.    
On the other hand, the UK is amongst the signatories of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) insisting on pushing the Middle 
Eastern countries, especially gas suppliers, towards the political reform and 
human rights (Young, 2009: 68).  
The main natural gas and LNG suppliers to the UK under the long–term/take–
or–pay contracts will be Qatar, Norway and Algeria up to 2025, dropping from 
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31.4 bcm/y in 2011 to 15.3 bcm/y in 2026 (table 6), according to the most recent 
Wood Mackenzie European Gas and Power Service report, published in an 
addendum to the Statutory Security Report 2011, London in November (p.20). 
However, unlike the declining of indigenous production, the UK’s natural gas 
and LNG demands will increase (figure 32), depending on the share of the 
renewable energy sources in total primary energy sources (figure 31).  
Table 6: The UK’s long–term natural gas and LNG contracts with suppliers 
 
Source: Wood Mackenzie, published in an addendum to the Statutory Security Report 2011, London, 
November: 20 
Ofgem and the DECC issued information regarding the long–term natural gas 
and LNG contracts with third–party suppliers in August 2011 and the DECC 
sent this data to the Commission, based on the EU Regulations, particularly 
Directive 2004/67/European Commission.  
The National Grid’s recent projections, published in an addendum to the 
Statutory Security Report in November 2011 in London (p.17), announced that 
the UK must meet its peak gas demand in the future as well, such as in a severe 
winter as with the cold weather in January 2010, having reached up to roughly 
600 mcm/d in 2010–2011, whereas the peak of LNG demand in this country is 
roughly 170 mcm/d and this trend moves on up to 2030 with some fluctuation 
(figure 33), depending on the scale of renewable energy sources share in this 
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country’s energy mix. The National Grid, moreover, argued that the availability 
of natural gasand LNG would be important not only for the UK but also for the 
whole EU at peak times, while any unpredictable events, like the Russia–
Ukraine gas dispute in January 2009 and also technical problems, such as on the 
Langeled pipeline from Norway, could critically threaten the EU’s gas market, 
especially in times of peak demand (IEA 2010, the UK: 18).  
Figure 33: The UK’s peak daily winter gas demand, 2010–2030 
 
Source: The UK’s National Grid, published in an addendum to the Statutory Security Report 2011, London, 
November: 17 
The UK, moreover, prepared a report concerning the assessment of security of 
natural gas and LNG supply, in November 2011, on the basis of Article 9 of the 
EU Regulation No 994/2010 adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council of 20th October 2010 regarding the required measures to safeguard 
security of supply, so the results of this assessment should be raised in two 
places; “The Preventive Action Plan” and “Emergency Plan” are set to be adopted 
and made public by December 2012 (DECC 2011: 5). 
According to this report, the UK seem to have resilience in its natural gas and 
LNG market in the short term, however, this country will face some challenges 
in the medium to long term, as the gas demand from the power generation sector 
is to increase, whereas the gas–fuelled plants replace coal–fired electricity ones 
(Davidson, 2012). 
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Consequently, the Energy Act 2011 was enacted by the British Parliament, in 
order to respond to this country’s security of supply challenges, enabling Ofgem 
to deal with the commercial incentives aims to ensure sufficient natural gas and 
LNG supply to meet the future gas demand (DECC 2011: 37), and with 
affordable pricing. So, the DECC in its annual energy statement, issued on 23rd 
November 2011 insisted on the growing increase of NG in the UK’s energy mix in 
the future, necessitating new natural gas and LNG plants. However, the global 
and consequently the British gas price will rise by 2020.  
Howard Rogers (annex 1) in an interview on 14th March 2012, argued that a 
competitive gas market which aims to receive the least expensive natural gas 
and LNG is the vital objective for the coming EU’s single market, so the Persian 
Gulf “with the relatively shallow water location of the huge South Pars and 
North could provide the significant volumes of LNG, in addition to the existing 
Qatar’s LNG supply, toward the EU and also the UK in coming years with a 
lower cost base, which would be a main competing source of new LNG, compared 
with other suppliers”. Therefore, establishment of the British “Middle East 
Energy Group” could be assessed on this basis (Young, 2009: 66).       
There are some plans to explore for unconventional gas, slightly commercially 
during the 2020s (figure 33), such as shale gas in the UK, e.g. in Lancashire (Oil 
& Energy Trends, 17th September 2010: 8). However, the House of Commons’ 
Energy and Climate Change Select Committee called for an investigation into 
the link between shale gas drilling tests in north–west England and two 
earthquakes which occurred in the area shortly after the start of operations, 
which led to the suspension of this activity in the UK and the Netherlands 
(Platts 4th July 2011: 15).  
The National Grid also suggests that the UK should increase its own natural gas 
and LNG import capacity to around 193 bcm/y up to 2020 and the LNG import 
capacity should reach roughly 60 bcm/y by the end of the current decade (DECC 
2011: 16) and this volume of imports will probably peak by 2030. Hence, it means 
if the other British LNG projects subsequently materialized, then final capacity 
will increase to approximately 60 bcm/y.  
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2.9.2. Italy as the second Case Study     
2.9.2.1. Geo–politics of Italy         
The Republic of Italy, as the boot–shaped peninsula, is located in south–central 
Europe, bordered by Switzerland, France, Austria and Slovenia to the north 
along the Alps with Sicily and Sardinia, the two largest islands in the 
Mediterranean Sea along some other smaller islands (map 3).  
2.9.2.2. Italy’s energy policy and energy security  
Since the modification of the Italian Constitution in 2001, energy policy has been 
partially handed over to the regions and autonomous provinces; nevertheless, the 
central Government is responsible for the general framework (Cortinovis et al. 
2011: 5).  
Based on “The New National Energy Strategy”, entitled Law no. 99/2009 
approved by the by Ministry of Economic Development (Ministero dello Sviluppo 
Economico or MSE) in 2009, Italy pursued some targets in its energy policy 
outlook aiming to ensure greater reliability of the energy security in the future, 
comprising: diversification of energy resources and suppliers, promotion of 
renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, improvement of energy 
competitiveness and development of its energy infrastructures appropriately in 
line with the common European internal market (Energy Policies of IEA 
countries, Italy, Review 2009: 19–27), while the process of opening the gas 
market has been on–going since 2003 (Eurostat Statistical Book, ISSN 1831–
3256, 2009: 55). 
2.9.2.3. Geo–politics of natural gas in Italy  
Around two–thirds of Italy’s gas reserves are located off–shore (IEA 2010, Italy: 
12) and for the first time in Europe, natural gas was discovered in the Italian Po 
Valley by Agip Co. during the Second World War, and also gas activities grew 
more by ENI. The Hydrocarbon National Company established in 1953, 
converted this country to the gas hub within south–west Europe becoming the 
biggest gas consumer and producer in 1965 (H. Hayes,  2006: 49–91), until huge 
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reserves were extracted in the North Sea and Groningen in the Netherlands 
(Barnes et al. 2006: 3–27). 
2.9.2.4. Total primary energy sources demand and production, past, now and the 
future  
Oil and gas have dominated in Italy’s total primary energy sources by 82–88% 
during the past three decades, while, unlike coal, the share of renewable energy 
sources, like wind, solar and biogas powers, as well as, to come extent, 
hydroelectric plants, according to the EU’s RE–SHAPING study (Cortinovis et al. 
2011: 11) which increased from 5% in 1973 to 5.2% in 2005 and 8% in 2008 (table 
1 & figure 34) and should reach the ambitious (Poletti & D’Orazio, 2009: 4&15) 
17% of the EU’s renewable energy sources target by 2020, based on the European 
Commission’s Green Package in January 2008. However, the country faces some 
constraints regarding the effective rise of renewable energies in its energy mix in 
the future (IEA 2010, Italy: 4). 
Italy needs approximately €5 bn up to 2013 in order to reach its non–
hydrocarbon targets by then (Cortinovis et al. 2011: 11), so the deployment of 
renewable energy sources has been slow, despite the numerous support schemes 
implemented since the beginning of the 1990s in Italy (Poletti & D’Orazio, 2009: 
5), but according to the European Commission “European Energy and Transport 
Trends To 2030–Update 2007”, published on 8th April 2008 by the Directorate–
General for Energy and Transport, this share would reach 8.2–9.3% by 2020, far 
below the 17% target. 
Figure 34: Italy’s total primary energy sources, 1973–2007 
 
Source: IEA, Italy 2010: 4 
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Italy’s total primary energy sources in 2008 was more than 171 mtoe, an 
increase of more than 40%  compared to 1973 (table 7 & figure 34) with the big 
jump in natural gas share in its energy basket and the energy mix is expected to 
grow to 232 Mtoe by 2030, nearly 35% up from 2008 (IEA 2010, Italy: 4).   
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) plays an important role to 
support regional members, like Italy, in order to employ more renewable energy 
sources in their own total primary energy sources by helping to develop 
industrial activities linked to renewable energies, tackle local needs and support 
public investment, so, 7% of the ERDF resources are assigned to Italy in this 
respect (Cortinovis et al. 2011: 3 & 4). 
Improving energy efficiency, based on the Italian Energy Efficiency Action Plan, 
adopted by MSE on July 2007 under the EU’s Energy End–Use Efficiency and 
Energy Services Directive 2006/32/European Commission, has been in place, too 
(Poletti & D’Orazio, 2009: 13). 
After the incident in Fukushima and the increased opposition to nuclear energy, 
the government set aside its plans on nuclear plants and decided to retain 
“Conto Energia”, the scheme providing support to energy producers using PV 
and solar thermal systems (Cortinovis et al. 2011: 11). 
Dr. Nicolo Sartori (annex 1) in an interview in May 2012 argued that in spite of 
the renewable energies rising in Italy in recent years, particularly after the so–
called “Bersani Decree” in 1999 and continuity of this process in the future on 
the basis of the 2010 Italian Renewable Energy Action Plan, as well as the public 
opinion’s opposition towards the nuclear power confirmed by the results of the 
12th and 13th June 2011 referendum, dependence on natural gas is even clearer 
in the Italian case and its role in the years to come. 
According to IEA 2010, Italy is the largest gas market in Europe behind the UK 
and Germany (Energy Policies of IEA countries, Italy, Review 2009: 99), while its 
gas demand has grown by close to 350% between 1973 to 2008 (figure 34) 
because of the increasing use of gas in power generation and the reduction of oil’s 
share in total primary energy sources (IEA, Italy 2010: 3) from 76% of energy 
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mix in 1973 to 41% in 2008, on the basis of the national programme to alleviate 
Italian dependence on oil imports (IEA, Italy 2010: 12).  
Italy’s domestic gas production is very limited that in 2010 it amounted to 
around 8 bcm or 6.6 Mtoe (IEA 2010, Italy: 12) less than 10% of total 
consumption (table 7), whereas the statistics peaked in 1995 by more than 20 
bcm/y during the nearly recent three decades. 
Table 7: Italian key natural gas data 
 
Source: IEA, Italy 2010: 2 
Import dependency on gas in Italy is very high, standing at around 90% in 2009 
and is set to increase to over 95% by the 2030s (IEA 2010, Italy: 12) turning Italy 
in 2011, according to IEA, Key World Energy Statistics  (2011: 13) in to the third 
gas importer in the world after Japan and Germany with 75 bcm.  
2.9.2.5. The Italy’s gas pipelines and LNG projects  
Almost 88% of Italy’s gas imports are being accomplished via pipeline mostly 
originating from Algeria, Russia, Libya (figure 35). The four main gas import 
routes exist in Italy, these being the EU Corridor (which includes the 
Netherlands and the UK), the Northern Corridor (Norway), the Eastern Corridor 
(Russia) and the Mediterranean Corridor (Algeria and Libya (IEA 2010, Italy: 
12). Since the year 2000, Italy has imported natural gas via the Green stream 
pipeline from Libya (8 bcm/y), development of the TAG pipeline from Russia 
(6.4–9.7 bmc/y), the Transmed and Galsi pipelines (6.5–12 bmc/y) from Algeria 
(map 3) (Poletti & D’Orazio, 2009: 23). Nevertheless, the main TPMC and TAG 
pipeline interconnections are via Mazara and Tarvisio.  
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Italy’s LNG imports have exceeded 9 bcm/y (table 8), roughly 12% of the 
country’s gas demand, either by the North Adriatic Sea off–shore terminal near 
Rovigo, inaugurated in 2009, or Panigaglia in Liguria.  
For the time being, Italy is the key EU entry point for North African gas supplies 
from Algeria and Libya and has decided to enhance its position in the future by 
new corridor and LNG terminals (Sartori, 2011). For this reason, the share of 
Russian gas in Italy’s gas market decreased by almost 26% compared to 2009, 
while the shares of Algeria have increased by 22% and the shares of Qatar 
almost tripled, on the basis of the Natural Gas Information, OECD/IEA, 2011. 
Figure 35: Italy’s natural gas imports by source 1990–2009 (bcm) 
 
Source: Carnevalini, Rosita (2010), “Case study: storage in Italy”, Florence School of Regulation, March 25th: 7 
2.9.2.6. The Italian LNG projects for the future   
The Italian Government has developed its gas trade, including the LNG 
regasification terminals, with considerable investment in recent years on 
infrastructure, while deciding to increase the current import capacity in two 
online Panigaglia (La Spezia) and Rovigo–North Adriatic (Isola Di Porto Levante) 
facilities with more than 9 bcm/y in the future from new terminals both under 
construction and under consideration (table 8), the most in the EU (Energy 
Policies of IEA countries, Italy, Review 2009: 101). 
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Map 3: Italy’s natural gas and LNG infrastructures 
 
Source: IEA 2010, Italy: 14 
The majority of these facilities will be installed off–shore, as building on–shore 
LNG terminals in Italy has caused certain local opposition (Energy Policies of 
IEA countries, Italy, Review 2009: 116). However, Rome has decided to raise its 
profile as the natural gas and LNG hub in the EU, with the most LNG terminals 
under consideration within the Union, particularly with a view to more imports 
from the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East/Persian Gulf (Eurostat 
Statistical Book, ISSN 1831–3256, 2009: 54), while attempting to increase the 
competition between the current and future gas suppliers, particularly from the 
South Gas Corridor.  
Hulbert (interview, 2012) believes that this corridor would be important not only 
for Italy but also the EU’s natural gas and LNG imports and diversification, 
linking the Italian gas system to ultra–regional suppliers and then connecting to 
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the EU single market in the future (Energy Policies of IEA countries, Italy, 
Review 2009: 114).  
Sartori (interview, 2012), furthermore, pointed to the Commission 
communication to the European Council and Parliaments, having emphasised 
that the Union should import roughly 10–20% of its required natural gas and 
LNG, equivalent roughly to 45–90 bcm/y, via the Southern Gas Corridor by 2020, 
but he added that Rome sponsors the ITGI (alongside France) and also supports 
the 900–km off–shore pipeline South Stream from Russia, notwithstanding the 
European Commission’s displeasure. 
Italy is among the European states, like Austria and Switzerland, most 
interested in gas imports from the Middle East/Persian Gulf, such as Iran, 
according to Clément Therme in an interview (2012) on 25th May 2012. He 
argued that Italy is the part of the EU’s states that have energy cooperation with 
Iran and Qatar, within the Persian Gulf, such as its support of the TAP project 
in partnership with Swiss EGL, while the Italian ENI is present in Iranian 
hydrocarbon industries (especially in production phases 4 and 5 of the South 
Pars). The Edison was also in negotiations for gas exports into Italy from the 12th 
phase of South Pars, nonetheless, most of these activities have been on hold 
because of the sanctions against Tehran. 
Table 8: Italy’s existing, under construction and under consideration LNG terminals 
LNG Terminal  Start-up  Capacity  Shareholders  Source 
     
Panigaglia(La Spezia) 1971 (e) 3.5 bcm/y GNL Italia Algeria  
Rovigo-North Adriatic(Isola 
Di Porto Levante) 
2009  (e) 5.8 bcm/y Qatar Petoleum (45%) 
Exxonmobil (45%) 
Edison Gas (10%) 
Qatar 
Livorno  2012 (u) 2.7 bcm/y EON, Golar LNG, IRIDE, 
OLT Energy 
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Brindisi cancelled 8 bcm/y British Gas of UK (BG) 
(100%) 
Egypt 
Taranto (Puglia) Not known (p) 8 bcm/y Gas Natural  
Porto Empedocle (Sicily) 2013 (p) 8 bcm/y Enel/ Nuove Energie  
Rada di Augusta Priolo 
(Sicily) 
2014 (p) 8 bcm/y ERG/ Shell  
Porto Recanati off–shore Not known (p) 5 bcm/y GDF Suez  
Gioia Tauro- San Ferdinando 
(Calabria) 
2014 (p) 12 bcm/y LNG Medgas Terminal   
Rosignano Maritimo off–shore Not known (p) 5 bcm/y Api Nova Energia  
Rosignano off–shore Not known (p) 8 bcm/y Edison/ BP/ Solvay  
Zaule  2013 (p) 8 bcm/y Gas Natural  
Montefalcone Not known (p) 8 bcm/y E.ON  
Vado Ligure (Liguria) Not known 
(p) 
 5–9 bcm/y Enel   
 
Muggia (Friuli) Not known(p) 5–9 bcm/y 
 
Enel  
 
 
 
Livorno-Olt Cross Gas  Off–shore  
Approval (p) 
4 bcm/y 
 
Endesa (51%) 
Amga (41%) 
 
 
 
Trieste off–shore Not known (p) 8 bcm/y Endesa, Friulia  
e: existing, u: under construction, p: proposed 
Sources: by the Author on the basis of: the Energy Delta Institute, GLE LNG map 2011, NG Information 
OECD/IEA 2011, International Gas Union (IGU) World LNG Report 2010, King & Spalding 2006, The 
California Energy Commission (Western Europe LNG Map, July 2010), Global LNG Info. (May 2012). 
Moreover, based on April 2005’s Italian regulation, 20–year exemption of third–
party access granted to 80% of the total capacity of each LNG terminal, showing 
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that long–term/take–or–pay contracts are important in this country. Fifty 
percent of current ones (IEA 2010, Italy: 13), for instance, the off–shore Isola di 
Porto Levante LNG terminal (the North Adriatic) in the north–east, started the 
import of 8.1 bcm/y LNG from Qatar under a 25–year exemption to third–party 
access rules under the Second Gas Directive, while the remaining 20% will be 
available to the third–party access.  
Some of the Italian LNG terminals, like Livorno have received the required 
permissions and some more projects look forward to authorisation. Nevertheless, 
according to the Law no. 99/2009 published in November 2007 by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, this procedure for new LNG plants has been eased. 
2.9.3. Spain as the third Case Study                
2.9.3.1. Geo–politics of Spain   
The Kingdom of Spain, having joined the EU in 1986, is situated in the southern 
part of Europe and is bordered to the south and east by the Mediterranean Sea, 
to the north by France, Andorra and the Bay of Biscay; and to the north–west 
and west by Portugal and the Atlantic Ocean, making it the second largest 
country in the EU after France and also the fifth most populated country within 
the Union (www.energydelta.org/ country–profile–spain).  
2.9.3.2. Spain’s energy policy and energy security  
On the basis of the Royal Decree 1716/2004 of 23rd July, CORES (The 
Corporation of Strategic Reserves of Oil–based Products, CORES by its Spanish 
acronym), established by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, is 
responsible for the gas sector, and verifies the obligation on operators to diversify 
gas supplies, while the System Operator is the body in charge of sending reports 
regarding the natural gas and LNG and the capacities to the Directorate General 
for Energy Policy and Mines at the Ministry, approving conditions and terms 
over natural gas and LNG in Spain (www.cores.es/eng/home). 
The Spanish gas sector and grid, including production, distribution and 
transmission, as well as the LNG regasification terminals at Huelva, Barcelona 
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and Cartagena, out of the overall existing six facilities, is privately controlled by 
mainly Enagás, but the largest gas supplier in Spain is Gas Natural and 
Iberdrola and Repsol are the two major energy companies in this country (Platts, 
4th July 2011: 3).  
Spain has witnessed some energy regulatory changes since the late 1990s, 
principally by setting up “the Comisión Nacional de la Energía” in 1998, as the 
focal regulatory body of the energy systems in this country in order to provide 
“more transparency in the price formation mechanisms and liberalising the 
supply”, based on the 1998 Hydrocarbon Bill (Németh et al. 2009: 7). 
The gas market has been fully opened since 2003 (Eurostat Statistical Book, 
ISSN 1831–3256, 2009: 49) and the third–party access regime rules on Spanish 
LNG terminals, based on the Hydrocarbon Act 34/1998, based on the 
Commission Gas Directive 98/30/European Commission with the objective of 
creating a single European gas(King & Spalding 2006: 20); led to a more 
competitive situation. As a result, for the time being, more than 30 companies 
have been active in Spain (King & Spalding 2006: 2), so diversification of 
supplies is a principal policy in this country’s energy policy, based on the Royal 
Decree 1766/2007 (www.cores.es/eng/cores/regulation). 
2.9.3.3. Total primary energy sources demand and production, past, present, and 
the future in Spain 
The total primary energy sources in Spain stood at 128.9 mtoe in 2009, rising 
nearly 150% from 1973 with 51.8 mtoe (figure 36) and greenhouse gases there 
increased up to 52% in the middle of the 2000s, compared to 1990 (Németh et al. 
2009: 5), while the share of renewable energies in the energy mix has increased 
from 5% in 1973 to 8.7% in 2005 (figure 36 & table 1) and 9% in 2009, partly due 
to government policies to promote hydro, despite its frequent availability 
(Davidson, 2012: 11), wind and photovoltaic solar (IEA 2011, Spain: 4), 
particularly wind energy, as the second largest producer, behind Germany, and 
ahead of the US (Eurostat Statistical Book, ISSN 1831–3256, 2009: 49); even 
though, the EU’s proposed renewable energy sources target for the country, until 
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2020,  is 20% of final consumption (figure 36) an increase of around 220% from 
2009. Some even argue that the Spanish final target by 2030 should be to 
achieve an increase of the renewable energies share in its energy mix up to the 
ambitious 46% target (Németh et al. 2009: 24), an enormous 510% jump from 
2009. However, since 2005 to 2009 this growth has been under 3% (table 1).  
Figure 36: Spain’s total primary energy sources, 1973–2009 
 
Source: IEA 2011, Spain: 4 
In addition, nuclear power in Spain has increased from 3% of total primary 
energy sources in 1973 to 11% in 2009 (figure 36), and placed it 14th out of 15 
EU’s member states (figure 44). However, it is committed to phasing out its 
nuclear reactors by 2020 and replacing those with gas–powered facilities 
(Checchi, 2009: 29). 
Based on the “Energy outlook to the 2030 horizon” (Németh et al. 2009: 11&12), 
and the “Energy Saving and Efficiency Strategy 2004–2012”, as the second stage 
after the “1984–2004 Strategy”, the Spanish government should achieve the 
objectives of the energy efficiency policies in line with the Commission’s targets 
of 20% energy efficiency stated in some documents. 
Natural gas demand has had the strongest growth in Spain’s energy mix, 
particularly for the power generation, 52%, followed by the industrial and the 
residential sectors with 28% and 10%, respectively from less than 1 mtoe in 1973, 
2% of total primary energy sources to nearly 32.2 mtoe in 2008 (around 38.2 
bcm/y), 24% of this country’s energy mix (figure 36), a 10% rise from the previous 
year (IEA 2011, Spain: 14), and is expected to grow in the future, so Spain needs 
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to expand its gas infrastructure, such as LNG terminals (RREEF Research, 2011: 
3) 
Although, as it is clear in the figure mentioned, the share of crude oil has 
decreased from 73% in Spain’s primary energy sources in 1973 to 47% in 2009, 
but it has kept its domination. Some difficulties, such as tensions between 
Algeria and Morocco during the 1970s and 1980s and also Spain’s domestic 
economy being heavily reliant on oil imports were two main obstacles to this 
country’s natural gas and LNG demands and the relevant industry development 
during that period (H. Hayes, 2006: 49–91).   
The indigenous gas reserves in Spain are very small and its reserve–to–
production ratio was nil at the end of 2009 (http://www.energydelta.org/Spain), 
while the production of gas stood at 17 mcm/y in 2007 and 2008. This country is 
highly reliant on gas imports to meet its growing consumption, one of the highest 
in Europe, particularly due to the rise in electricity demand and replacement of 
older generation nuclear and also coal–fired power plants by gas–fuelled power 
ones (King & Spalding, 2006: 20), so based on the Ministry of Industry’s “Plan de 
Energías Renovables”, the power generation should reach the ambitious target of 
40 GW electricity in 2030, compared to the 2010’s 20 GW (Németh et al. 2009: 
11). 
The consumption of gas increased from 2,323 mcm/y in 1985 to 35,821 mcm/y in 
2010 and has converted this country to the 10th gas importer worldwide, 
according to table 13, issued by the IEA (Key World Energy Statistics, 2012: 13).  
Table 9: Spain’s key natural gas data 
 
Source: IEA 2011, Spain: 2 
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2.9.3.4. Spain’s gas imports by pipelines and LNG outlook  
Spain’s gas imports by pipelines accounts for 26% of its demand, by two main 
routes from Algeria, such as the direct 8–bcm/y MedGaz deep–water pipeline 
from Beni–Saf to Spanish Almería without any transit countries, namely 
Morocco (IEA 2011, Spain: 14–16). This country has, moreover, four 
interconnected networks, two with France in Larrau (Navarra) and Irun 
(Guipúzcoa) and a further two with Portugal in Badajoz and Tuy (Pontevedra) in 
addition to a pipeline, having linked the Iberian Peninsula with the Balearic 
Islands since September 2008. However, interconnection capacities with France 
and the rest of continental Europe have been faced with limitations (IEA 2011, 
Spain: 15 & 16).  
Map 4: Spanish natural gas and LNG Infrastructures 
 
Source: IEA 2011, Spain: 16 
Among the countries in the EU, Spain is the leading LNG importer and the 4th 
global importer (figure 40), according to IGU in its World LNG Report (2010: 25). 
As Prof. Gonzalo Escribano (annex 1) argued (interview on 26th April 2012), this 
country has well diversified its LNG import routes away from Algeria to other 
ones, such as Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago and recently Qatar (figure 37), but 
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he believed that Qatar’s LNG expansion, if it happened (Chapter 4) could be 
important for the EU’s security of supply in the future and also Spain, as one of 
the Union’s entrances for LNG. He also stipulated that this volume of LNG 
imports is enough for Spain until the end of the current decade, while the new 
suppliers, such as Iran could be enter the market but unlikely before 2020, in 
order to meet increased Spanish demand and for transit to Europe (Shepherd, 
2006: 268–319).  
Figure 37: Spanish natural gas import by supplier 
 
Source: IEA 2011, Spain: 1 
On the basis of Hulbert’s comments (interview, 2012), Algerian LNG exports will 
play the most important role in Spain’s gas market in the future, particularly in 
the framework of long–term contracts, such as the 20–year LNG supply 
agreement by the Algerian Sonatrach with the Spanish power company Endessa 
(figure 27). For the time being, nearly 75% of the Spanish LNG terminals have 
been allocated to the long–term basis with more than two years, whereas 25% of 
its market is under short–term contracts of not more than two years (King & 
Spalding, 2006). 
As of May 2012, in addition to the El–Musel terminal, currently under 
construction and the two facilities under consideration in the Canary Islands 
(Tenerife and Gran Canaria) (map 4),there are six LNG regasification terminals 
operating in Spain (table 14) with the potential increase of capacity up to around 
60 bcm/y (IEA 2011, Spain: 16), compared to an estimated gas demand close to 
36 bcm in 2010 (table 9), so this LNG expansion with its degree of flexibility, 
facilitates diversification of the supply (Németh et al. 2009: 8). 
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Table 10: Spain’s existing, under construction and under consideration LNG terminals 
 
e: existing, u: under construction, p: proposed 
Sources: by the Author on the basis of: Energy Delta Institute, GLE LNG map 2011, Natural Gas 
Information OECD/IEA 2011, International Gas Union (IGU) World LNG Report 2010, King & Spalding 
2006, The California Energy Commission (Western Europe LNG Map, July 2010),  Global LNG Info. (May 
2012). 
The Spanish Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism published “POLES–Spain” 
(Prospective Outlook for the Long–term Energy System), based on a global model, 
and four energy researchers from the “Institute for Prospective Technological 
Studies” in Sevilla, worked on it and issued their own results in the European 
Review of Energy Markets (EREM) in April 2009. They argued that the Energy 
outlook to 2030 in Spain is on the basis of two scenarios, comprising:  
 Baseline scenario (BaU): The historical trends of the energy system 
continues without any additional policy influence, while the external 
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energy dependency rate falls from 78% in 2005 to 72% in 2030 and also 
greenhouse gases remains 55% and 79% above 1990 levels in 2010 in 2030, 
respectively. 
 Energy efficiency scenario (EEF): High international energy prices leads 
to the increase of the renewable energy sources share in energy mix and 
further energy efficiency, while the dependency on fossil fuel rate is 
expected to be 59% in 2030, more than 20% lower than the current 
statistics and also greenhouse gases will be 23% higher than the 1990 
level in 2030. 
As a result, under the former scenario the role of the natural gas in this 
country’s energy system increases by 2020, and renewable energies, like gas, 
increases its weight in the Spanish energy mix during this period as well. 
Indeed, in both scenarios the non–hydrocarbons grows considerably by 2020 and 
even beyond that. However, based on the latter scenario, the consumption of all 
fossil fuels decreases between 2010 and 2030. 
Figure 38: Spain’s primary energy consumption, 2005–2030 
 
Source: European Review of Energy Markets (EREM), Vol: 3, issue 1, April 2009: 15 
The IEA in its report in 2011, argued that the Iberian Peninsula gas market, as 
the European “gas island” (IEA 2011, Spain: 15) could become a big European 
gas hub if, in addition to these LNG terminals, sufficient interconnection 
capacity with France is added (IEA 2011, Spain: 16). Moreover Peimani, 
(interview on 4th March 2012) stressed that competitiveness, is an important 
factor to receive the required gas with affordable prices. He argued that any new 
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natural gasand LNG supplier in the medium–and long–terms, such as from the 
Persian Gulf other than Qatar, could “fortify the Union and also main regional 
LNG importers’ competitiveness and could not be ignored, because not only the 
EU but also Europe’s domestic gas resource are rapidly depleting”.  
2.9.4. France as the fourth Case Study                
2.9.4.1. Geo–politics of France   
France, as the largest country within the EU–27, with long coastlines along the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel, has shared 
borders with Belgium and Luxembourg to the north, Germany, Switzerland and 
Italy to the east, and Monaco, Spain and Andorra to the south 
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France). 
2.9.4.2. France’s energy policy and energy security  
The Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and the Sea 
(MEEDDM), as the main governmental energy body in France, was created in 
June 2007 by a combination of separate entities, and has led to more coherence 
in energy policy making, so it oversees on energy issues and makes the final 
decision. Since 2008, the Directorate–General for Energy and Climate (DGEC), 
also influences energy policy–making, particularly in energy markets, security of 
supply, renewable energy sources, and nuclear power (Energy Policies of IEA 
Countries, France 2009: 17–20). Nevertheless, the Directorate for Energy (DE) 
within the DGEC is responsible for security of supply (Energy Policies of IEA 
Countries, France 2009: 77). The Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), as an 
active member of the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), since its 
creation in March 2000, is in charge of cooperation between the EU regulators 
and also ensuring open access to all networks for both electricity and gas for 
various suppliers (www.cre.fr/en/presentation/missions).  
Consequently, this country’s liberalised gas market has been open to competition 
since the 1st July 2007 in compliance with the EU’s rules and has fully 
implemented the Union’s directive, such as the terms of the Second Gas 
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Directive by amending legislation passed in 2002 and 2003 (Energy Policies of 
IEA Countries, France 2009: 59). Accordingly, France’s four key principles of the 
energy policy have been defined as follows: “security of supply, competitive 
energy supply, sustainable energy development and energy service to all 
territories and all citizens” (Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 15). 
Paris has attempted to increase its energy security via encouraging more energy 
efficiency and the rise of renewable energy sources in total primary energy 
sources, particularly by Climate Plan 2004–2012, Energy Law 2005–781 of 13th 
July 2005 (www.ec.europa.eu/energy/demand/legislation/doc/neeap/france), 
diversifying of natural gasand LNG suppliers, increase of interconnection 
capacity in gas and power markets (Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 
2009: 27), such as “Gas Platform” initiative, as an intergovernmental policy in 
north–west Europe among Germany, France and Benelux (Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxemburg) with the proposal of a more integrated regional 
gas market (www.benelux.int/en/dos/dos15.asp). France has around 193,700 km 
of gas network, the second longest after Germany, while GRT gas operates about 
87% of the nationwide grid and Total Infrastructure Gas France (TIGF) runs the 
remaining 13% in south–west (GLG 2011). 
The National Strategy for Energy Research (SNRE) was adopted in France in 
2007 with the aim of increasing energy security and to combat climate change 
(Griot, 2010) while renewable energies in this country at that time was 18.7 mtoe, 
equivalent of 7.1% of energy mix (Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 
88), ranking this country in the second position within the EU–27 and 13th 
among the IEA–28 countries. The EU’s Energy Climate Package was enacted by 
the European Parliament in December 2008 (COM (2008) 19 final, 2008/0016 
(COD), and this insisted that the share of non–hydrocarbons in France’s total 
primary energy sources should reach 23% by 2020, compared to 10.3% in 2005 
(table 7), approved by the French bill in August 2009 and also 9% energy 
efficiency by 2016, according to the French Directive on Energy End–Use 
Efficiency and Energy Services (2006/32/European Commission).   
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2.9.4.3. Total primary energy sources demand and production in France, past, 
present, and the future  
In 2008, total primary energy sources was 266.9 mtoe with around 50% growth 
compared to 1975, while the nuclear energy accounted for 43% of energy mix in 
France, the highest share not only among the EU, but also amongst the IEA 
countries, followed by oil and natural gas with 31% and 15%, respectively (figure 
39).    
Figure 39: France’s total primary energy sources, 1973–2030 
 
Source: Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 16 
France’s total energy self–sufficiency and domestic production is about 50% of its 
final total primary energy sources, mostly by nuclear (figure 39), and bio–fuels 
and also wind power, ranking it as the second in the EU–27 (Energy Policies of 
IEA Countries, France 2009: 88). 
Nuclear energy has been developed in France in order to decrease its dependence 
on energy imports, following the oil crises during the 1970s, while in 2008 it 
accounted for 77% of the country’s power generation, the first in Europe (figure 
11) and 43% of energy mix (figure 39) with its 58 reactors (Energy Policies of IEA 
Countries, France 2009: 131).  
Moreover, the role of gas among the other primary energy sources in France up 
to 2020 and 2030 will increase in comparison with other hydrocarbon and non–
hydrocarbon sources. According to IEA (Key World Energy Statistics, 2012: 13), 
France is the 8th global and third EU gas importer after Italy and Germany with 
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41 bcm imports in 2011, (table 13), whereas it produced just 0.9 bcm gas in 2008 
and according to the French government, the overall internal production will 
most likely cease by 2013 (Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 58).   
The share of natural gas in France is lower than the IEA European countries’ 
average of 25%, because of its big share of nuclear power, while it is expected to 
increase the share of gas demand in the country to more than 75% of the existing 
scale by 2020 (Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 57–58). The 
2008/2009 gas crisis has impacted on France’s natural gas and LNG supply 
strategy, so the French government has been developing “pluri–annual 
investment plans (PPI)” with the purpose of reaching the targets of new energy 
capacity by 2020 (Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 27–28). 
2.9.4.4. France’s LNG import and its outlook  
LNG accounts for more than 32% of France’s natural gas basket, having 
commenced in 1964 and imports predominantly from Algeria, followed by Egypt, 
Nigeria and Qatar (table 11), making France the third importer of LNG within 
the EU after Spain and the UK and the 5th globally (figure 40) while the main 
gas exporters, via pipeline, to France are Norway, the Netherlands and Russia, 
mainly on the basis of long–term contracts (table 11). 
Table 11: France’s volume of natural gas and LNG imports by source, 2000–2008 (bcm) 
 
Source: Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 59 
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According to global LNG information in May 2012, Gaz de France and Elengy 
owns the three LNG on–stream terminals, comprising: Fos–sur–Mer near 
Marseilles since 1972, Montoir de Bretagne near Nantes since 1982 and Fos 
Cavaou. In addition, five more terminals have been under consideration (table 12) 
with the third–party access to LNG terminals, being guaranteed by the law of 
the 3rd January 2003 without any discrimination and with full transparency, 
under CRE supervision (Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 67). 
Table 12: France’s existing, under construction and under consideration LNG terminals 
 
e: existing, u: under construction, p: proposed 
Sources: by the Author on the basis of: the Energy Delta Institute, GLE LNG map 2011, NG Information 
OECD/IEA 2011, International Gas Union (IGU) World LNG Report 2010, King & Spalding 2006, 
vopaklng.com, The California Energy Commission (Western Europe LNG Map, July 2010), Global LNG Info. 
(May 2012). 
Thierry Coville (annex 1) believes (interview on 18th April 2012) that France 
alongside the other EU major LNG importers should consider importing from not 
only African suppliers, but also some other existing and future producers, 
particularly from the Persian Gulf, with nearly 40% of global gas reserves, 
especially with Qatar’s expansion and Iran’s LNG exports. Greater 
 140 
 
diversification leads to further competitiveness, hence he called this energy 
security as one of the most important issues for the Union. 
Clément (interview, 2012), moreover, argued that, despite bilateral old economic 
relationships, such as some French energy companies’ partnership in Iran, 
“France has tightened its policy on Iran following the presidency of Nicolas 
Sarkozy in May 2007 and, as a result, the activity of these companies seems 
complicated, however it might be that under the new government, presided over 
Socialist François Hollande the situation will change”. On the basis of the 
Natural Gas Information 2011, published by IEA, France, with the long coastline 
and large area in the heart of the EU, works as another gas hub for a couple of 
other European countries (RREEF Research 2011: 3), so about 15% of the 
imported gas from Norway 
and Nigeria is destined for 
transit to Spain and Italy, 
while the new LNG 
terminals in these three 
EU countries alongside 
the expansion of 
interconnections and a 
relatively integrated 
system will impact on 
transit gas flow in the 
future and finally enhance 
the security of supply in 
the EU (Energy Policies of 
IEA Countries, France 
2009: 60–62), showing 
that “the security of 
supply becomes regional, 
rather than national” (Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 31).  
Map 5: France’s gas Infrastructures
Source: Energy Policies of IEA Countries, France 2009: 61 
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Luciani (interview, 2012) argued that the future of the EU’s natural gas and 
LNG demand for imports is extremely uncertain, while some unexpected issues 
occur, such as the Fukushima disaster in 2011, which lead to increased demand 
for LNG in the Far East. As a result, the required measurements should be 
adopted, such as the enhancement of existing and future LNG terminals, not 
only in France but also in other EU countries, in efforts to meet the expected and 
unexpected demands.  
France will attempt to increase its security of supply by the development of its 
natural gas and LNG infrastructures, regional cooperation, long–term contracts 
with producing countries and diversifying suppliers and routes (Energy Policies 
of IEA Countries, France 2009: 30).  
2.10. Perspective of the EU–4  LNG importer  
Luciani (interview, 2012), believes that the EU’s demand for imported LNG in 
the future depends on “the level of economic growth in the Union, which is not 
what scenarios are based upon, on shifts in the European energy balance (how 
much nuclear, how much coal, how much renewable energy sources etc.), and on 
the potential for domestic production from unconventional gas sources”. 
Nevertheless, Laura El–Katiri (interview, 2012) also added winter weather 
conditions or seasonality (peak demand), and, to some extent, the kind of LNG 
term or spot contracts to Luciani’s factors.  
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Regarding the LNG terminals in the 
EU and the whole of Europe, there are 
four facilities which have been under 
construction in Spain, Italy (the 
Brindisi LNG Terminal has been 
cancelled), France, and Poland, while 12 
more terminals have been under 
consideration (five of them have been 
suspended in Germany, Cyprus, France, 
and the UK, while one more in the 
Netherlands’ was cancelled). Hence, the 
remaining seven planned regasification 
terminals in order to respond to growing LNG demand in the future are together 
to the existing LNG import terminals, being operational in the EU, of which 
more than three–quarters of them are in the four case studies in this research, 
and in the Union, according to the newly–published document by Global LNG 
Information, May 2012 (annex 11) and, moreover, these four main EU’s LNG 
importers are among the top 10 gas importers worldwide (table 13),whereas 
Spain, the UK and France are 
the 3rd, 4th, and 5th global LNG 
importers respectively and Italy 
is the 10th one (figure 40).   
To sum up, there is a total of 31 
LNG terminals in the EU that 
are either existing, under 
construction, or proposed, 
except cancelled and suspended 
ones. Seven of them belong to 
other EU countries (table 14), 
while 24 of them are situated in 
the four EU’s member states of 
Spain, Italy, the UK, and France, close to 80% (annex 10) and these countries 
  
Figure 40: LNG importers by Country in 2010 
 
Source: IGU World LNG Report 2010:8 
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import for their own use nationally or transport to other countries regionally or 
continentally.   
Bahgat (interview, 2012) indicated to the EU’s policy regarding the single and 
competitive gas market that “once gas shipments arrive any place in the EU, 
they can be moved within the Union”, so these four EU’s LNG importers play an 
important role to transport more imported of this sort of gas product not only for 
their own domestic consumption, but also to other member states in the new EU 
integrated energy market (Rosner, 2009: 160–176). 
As analysed in this chapter, Europe has converted to the second global gas 
consumers since the middle of the 2000s and this trend will continue until 2030 
and possibly beyond. However, this continent will produce the least gas 
worldwide by then (figure 14). 
Table 14: The Europe’s existing, under construction and under consideration LNG terminals 
other 
EU 
Country Project Name Start–up Capacity Shareholders 
Belgium  Zeebrugge 
(Expansion) (e) 
2008   3.3 
bcm/y      
Fluxys   
Greece    Revithoussa 
(Expansion) (e) 
 
2007   2.7 
bcm/y 
 
DEPA 
The Netherlands  
 
Gate, Maasvlakte 
(Groningen) (e) 
2011 8.8 
bcm/y  
Dong, 
EconGas 
OMV, EON, 
Gasunie, 
RWE, Vopak 
 
LionGas (p) 
 
 
Cancelled 
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Poland Swinoujscie 
(Gdansk) (u) 
2014 3.6 
bcm/y  
Gaz–System 
SA  
Portugal Sines LNG 
(Expansion Phase 
1) (e) 
2012 3.4 
bcm/y  
REN 
Sweden Nynashamn (e) 
(Brunnsviksholme) 
LNG 
2011 0.3 
bcm/y  
AGA Gas AB  
Cyprus Vassiliko (p) 
 
 
Suspended 0.7  
bcm/y 
 
Cyoriot 
Governmet/ 
Cyprus 
Energy 
Authority  
S.Ireland   Shannon LNG (p) 
 
 proposed  Shannon LNG 
 
 
Germany  Wilhelmshaven (p) Suspended 10 bcm/y E.on 
 
Non– 
EU 
Turkey  
 
 
 
(Izmir) Aliaga LNG 
(e) 
 
2006   4.4 
bcm/yr 
Egegas 
Marmara (e)  
 
2009   
Croatia  Adria(p) proposed   
Albania  
 
Levan (Falcione)(p) 
semanGas (ASG)(p) 
proposed   
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e: existing, u: under construction, p: proposed 
Sources: by the Author on the basis of:  the Energy Delta Institute, GLE LNG map 2011, Natural Gas 
Information OECD/IEA 2011, IGU World LNG Report 2010, King & Spalding 2006, The California Energy 
Commission  (Western Europe LNG Map, July 2010), Global LNG Info. (May 2012). 
In addition, according to the analytical statistics, referred to chapter 4 and also 
in figure 25, unconventional gas might be commercially viable in 2030 in Europe 
with just more than 1% of global gas production. On the basis of the figure 24, 
Europe will turn in to the biggest LNG importer worldwide after 2020 and this 
trend will continue to increases dramatically. In 2010, 19.6% of global LNG 
imports was directed to the EU, while 17% of global imports, equivalent to nearly 
87% of the whole Union’s LNG import headed to the UK, Spain, France, and 
Italy (table 15).  
Table 15: The outlook of the world and Europe’s LNG imports, capacity and percentage 
 
Source: by the Author on the basis of: IGU World LNG Report 2010,  King & Spalding 2006, GLE Map and 
GLE Investment Database 6th Sep 2011, CEDIGAZ 24th June 2011, BP  2012, Energy Outlook 2030, IEA 
Special Report 2011: 45. 
Of the four LNG terminals under construction and the six which are under 
consideration in the EU, eight of them, nearly 80%, are located in Italy, the UK, 
France and Spain, in addition to the on–stream regasification terminals. Hence, 
by growing role of LNG in the Union’s gas market in the future, these four 
countries will be much more important in the future not only for the Union, but 
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also for the whole of Europe, because for the time being, there are only two 
online terminals, operating in Turkey and three proposed terminals (table 14) 
which will be in Croatia and Albania. 
2.11. Conclusion 
Natural gas is projected to be the fastest growing fossil fuel all over the world 
and, unlike the US, security of supply within the EU means security of gas 
supply. The need for more gas supplies has been highlighted not only from 
decreasing levels of European indigenous gas production, but also from a firm 
increase in demand. The high gas import dependence on a special supplier is a 
great concern for the EU. On the one hand, LNG is profitable compared to 
pipeline in long distances and is far more flexible as it is possible to change 
suppliers without crossing several borders and conflict areas, as well as more 
short–term volumes in the market. LNG import outlook in the EU will rise to 24% 
by 2020, a 60% increase compared to 2010. European continental production will 
drop from nearly 280 bcm/y in 2010 to 222 bcm/y in 2020, and LNG share will be 
doubled from 85 bcm/y to around 160–170 bcm/y during the same period of time. 
Europe will need extra gas, between 80–100 bcm/y, coming from pipelines. 
The statistics published by the European Commission, OME, Eurogas, CIEP, 
BPG, and CEDIGAZ over the future of EU gas needs vary from 550 to 670 bcm/y, 
based on low and high demands, in the period from 2015 to 2020. The amount of 
gas imports would depend on the implementation of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy sources policies within the EU by 2015 and 2020, as well as 
the number of EU’s pipeline projects from gas producers which would materialise. 
According to CIEP, Gasprom, and GASTERRA, by 2015, European gas 
production will be around 130 bcm/y, excluding Norway, while the current EU’s 
LNG import is roughly 85 bcm/y. So, the range of natural gas import by pipelines 
vary from 330 to 410 bcm/y, based on how many of these projects will be realized. 
As a result, the requirement of additional LNG to the EU may vary from zero to 
nearly 135 bcm/y by 2015 and of course more than this number by 2020, because 
of high demand and low EU’s indigenous production. If the EU is to achieve its 
20/20/20 plan by 2020, and its energy policy targets are at an average level by 
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2015, based on reduced growth demand between high and low growth demands, 
and also if half of its pipeline projects are inaugurated, then, this region should 
import around 60 bcm/y LNG in addition to the current level of 85 bcm/y by 2015 
and around 175 bcm/y by 2020.  
Spain, Italy, France and the UK have large LNG projects under way, so that 
nearly two–thirds of current facilities together with those that are planned, 
approved, and under construction are located within these four countries for use 
by them, as well as for transport inside the EU and landlocked member states. It 
seems that the countries in the Middle East, especially from the Persian Gulf, 
with nearly one–third of global natural gas deposits, are expected to become 
significant suppliers. If some of the difficulties can be removed, this game could 
be turned into a win–win situation for both main parties.  
The EU’s decision concerning more use of gas in power generation started in 
1992, while the Union has been trying to switch to a low–carbon society by 
energy efficiency and renewable energies since 1997. So, the EU is trying to 
increase the share of renewable energy sourcesin its total primary energies from 
12% in 2010 to the ambitious target of 20% by 2020, based on the “energy trinity” 
adopted as the main EU’s energy policy, including sustainability, 
competitiveness and security of supply.  
For the EU, energy security will matter, while it emphasises on solidarity and 
regional cooperation initiatives, such as liberalization of energy markets. What 
the European Commission expects is to consider decisive moves beyond the 
unilateral actions by the member states. In sum, the EU considers its energy 
security issue regionally, instead of nationally. On this basis, security of LNG 
supply within the Union has been investigated regionally in the framework of 
the new regionalism theory in this research, as its features were discussed in 
Chapter 1.  
According to some predictions, the share of nuclear energy in the EU electricity 
generation will decrease from 31% to 21% by 2020. Moreover, the EU 
Commissioner for Energy believes that under the current regional situations, the 
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Union will attain 9% in energy efficiency instead of 20% by 2020. On the other 
hand, Europe has become the second global gas consumers since the middle of 
2000s, and BP, in its most recent report in 2012, has anticipated that this 
continent is expected to import around 80% of gas needs by 2030. Therefore, 
security of supply, as the “Gulliver in chains”, is important for the EU with its 
two internal and external dimensions and the shortest way in which to ensure 
the security of supply is diversification of gas suppliers. Europe, moreover, will 
turn in to the biggest global LNG importer after 2020. In 2010, 19.6% of global 
LNG imports were to the EU, while nearly 87% of them were imported by the 
UK, Spain, France, and Italy. The share of LNG has mounted in the EU’s gas 
import during recent years and it is expected to dramatically rise, so the role of 
these four countries will be enhanced, particularly as nearly 80% of total Union’s 
LNG terminals, existing, under construction and proposed are located in their 
territories in order to cope with growing domestic demands and also to facilitate 
transport inside the EU via the single gas market. 
The UK’s Energy White Paper in 2003 and also DECC in its annual energy 
statement on 23rd November 2011 insisted on real progress in reducing 
greenhouse gases by 2020 and 2050, diversifying of energy sources and routes in 
a more liberalised and competitive gas market with affordable prices in order to 
ensure this country’senergy security in the future. Based on the EU’s document, 
the UK should raise its renewable energies share in total primary energy sources 
from 1.3% in 2005 to 15% by 2020, the largest percentage among the EU’s 
member states with roughly 1200% increase that needs to around £14 bn 
investment. The natural gas share increased from 12% of total primary energy 
sources in 1973 to 40% by 2009, and the UK became the 8th gas importer 
worldwide in 2011 and 4th LNG importer in 2010, while the imported 
hydrocarbons could still account for more than 70% of UK’s energy consumption 
in 2025 and even between 40% to 60% of in 2050, depending on various 
conditions, such as the share of the renewable energies in total primary energy 
sources and energy efficiency. It is envisaged that the gas consumption in this 
country will fall between 14% to 27% by 2020. Nonetheless, the domestic 
production will fall over the same period, demonstrating that the UK’s gas 
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import dependency will increase. Furthermore, peak natural gas demand within 
this country increased to approximately 600 mcm/d in 2010–2011, whereas the 
peak of LNG demand in this country will be almost 170 mcm/d by 2020 and this 
trend will carry on rising until 2030. DECC in its annual energy statement, 
issued on 23rd November 2011 emphasised growing of natural gas in the UK’s 
energy mix in the future, necessitating new gas and LNG plants. The National 
Grid also suggests that the UK should increase its own natural gas and LNG 
import capacity to around 193 bcm/y up to 2020 and the LNG import capacity 
should reach approximately 60 bcm/y by the end of the current decade and this 
volume of imports will probably peak until 2030. Hence, it means that if the 
whole of the proposed British LNG projects materialise, its final capacity will 
increase to about 60 bcm/y. 
Oil and natural gas have dominated in Italy’s total primary energy sources by 
82–88% since the 1970s, while the share of renewable energies increased from 5% 
in 1973 to 8% in 2008 and should reach the EU target of 17% by 2020, but the 
development of non–hydrocarbons has been slow and needs to nearly €5 bn 
venture just until 2013. In addition, the government is to abandon its plans on 
nuclear power plants. Italy is the largest European gas market behind the UK 
and Germany while its gas demand has grown close to 350% between 1973 and 
2008 because of the growing use of gas in power generation and also the 
reduction of oil’s share in total primary energy sources. However, its domestic 
gas production is very restricted; hence import dependency on natural gas in 
Italy stood at approximately 90% in 2009, turning it in to the third global 
natural gas importer in 2011 and is set to increase to over 95% by the 2030s. 
Moreover, Rome’s LNG import is roughly 12% of its gas demand and it has 
decided to increase its profile as the natural gas and LNG hub in the EU, with 
the most proposed LNG terminals within the Union. 
The share of renewable energies in total primary energy sources in Spain 
increased from 5% in 1973 to 9% in 2009 and should achieve the target of 20% by 
2020, an increase of roughly 220% from 2009 and the ambitious 46% target by 
2030, equivalent to a 510% jump from 2009. Nonetheless, between 2005 and 
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2009 this growth has been less than 3%. The Spanish government is also set to 
phase out their nuclear reactors by 2020 replacing those with gas-powered 
facilities. On the other hand, gas demand has had the strongest growth in 
Spain’s total primary energy sources, from 2% of energy mix in 1973 to 24% of 
this country’s primary energies in 2008 and is expected to grow in the future, so 
Spain needs to expand its natural gas and LNG infrastructures. The indigenous 
gas reserves in Spain are very small and its production was equal to nil at the 
end of 2009, so this country is highly reliant on natural gas and LNG imports to 
meet its growing consumption, the 10th global gas importer, owing to the rise of 
electricity demand and replacement of older generation nuclear and also coal–
fired power plants by gas–fuelled power ones. There are six LNG terminals on–
stream in Spain with the potential increase of capacity up to around 60 bcm/y, 
converting this country in to the 3rd LNG importer worldwide and lead in the EU, 
hence, Spain within the Iberian Peninsula gas market, as the European “gas 
island” could become a big European gas hub. 
France has attempted to increase its energy security by encouraging more 
energy efficiency and the rise of renewable energy sources in total primary 
energy sources, diversifying of natural gasand LNG suppliers, increase of 
interconnection capacity in gas and power markets. This country is the second 
EU member in terms of using renewable energies, particularly nuclear energy in 
the energy mix with the share of 10.3% in 2005, being expected to reach 23% by 
2020, more than 75% of the existing level. The share of natural gas in energy mix 
will increase up to 2020 and 2030, while this country was the 5th global and 3rd 
continental gas importer in 2010 and, according to the French government, the 
internal production will most likely cease by 2013. Paris is the 3rd importer of 
LNG within the EU and the 5th globally, though LNG accounts for nearly 25% of 
its gas basket. France, with the long coastline and large area in the heart of the 
EU, works as another gas hub for a couple of European countries, while the new 
LNG terminals in these four EU countries, alongside the expansion of 
interconnections and relative integrated systems, will impact on transit gas flow 
in the future and finally enhance the security of supply in the Union. 
Consequently, by the growing role of LNG in the EU’s gas import share, these 
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four countries will be more significant not only for the Union, but also for the 
whole of Europe in the future. 
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Chapter 3: Energy geo–politics of the Persian Gulf’s and the regional security 
systems  
3.1. Introduction 
The position of the Persian Gulf, in terms of geo–strategic and geo–politics 
aspects, has attracted the attention of most great powers, during the recent 
centuries, while the discovery of crude oil in the early period of the 20th century, 
as well as the commercial supply of natural gas during the later years, has been 
highlighted the importance of its geo–economic situation.  
These developments led to the increasing presence of the Western companies, 
mostly from Britain, in the region during the first half of the 20th century and 
from then until the independence of Arab Sheikdoms in the early 1970s.   
However, oil was a commercial commodity in most Sheikdoms after the 1950s 
and the black gold affected delineation after the British departure from the 
region, while the Persian Gulfstates, mostly monarchies, made little effort to 
demarcate their territories whilst under the Britain colonial system, hence 
territorial skirmishes have occurred since the early 1970s amongst the regional 
states bilaterally or multilaterally, some of which are still in place. 
So, it could be said that the growing presence of outsiders alongside boundary 
disputes are the major consequences of commercial hydrocarbon supply from the 
Persian Gulfregion geo–politically. The commercial supply of natural gas has 
increased the importance of the Persian Gulf from a global perspective due to 
increasing world demand. 
Since British military departure from the east of the Suez Canal, the US 
replaced it as an external balancer and tried to control Persian Gulf’s oil and 
petrodollars as a means to limit its rivals.  So, the regional order can be better 
understood largely under the Cold War strategic context. 
The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, changed the status quo and then the 
Iran–Iraq war, led to establishment of the GCC in 1981. These developments, 
basically, divided the region in to three sections, comprising the GCC, as the core, 
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non–GCC Arab Iraq alongside non–Arab Iran, as the periphery, as well as 
having the powers of intervention. The results of this balance of power have been 
nothing except conflict and rivalry, but also relative cooperation. Political 
disputes and scarcity of confidence not only have been clear inside the GCC, but 
also between this Council and the periphery, especially Iran and other interested 
player(s). Tehran’s growing role in the region and its nuclear program has been 
the two controversial issues with regional and extra–regional players. 
Nonetheless, security and stability in the Persian Gulf, with the world’s largest 
hydrocarbon reserves, are more important not only for all regional states, but 
also for the international system.  
In a region where hydrocarbon is king and security is risky, the reliance on the 
oil and gas supply from the Persian Gulf will increase in the coming years and 
even decades, while the littoral countries, indeed, have a structure of “mono–
base economic”, based on oil and gas exports. So, the energy security of both 
exporters and importers is affected by stability, less stability or instability in the 
region. So, the continuation of the Iraqi crisis, the American–Iranian situation 
and the current mutual approach between Tehran and some monarchies could 
lead to more regional instability. Therefore, on this basis, the new political and 
security structure of the Persian Gulf region should be redefined according to 
new developments after Baath Party era in Iraq, the role of Iran, as well as the 
Arab spring. This achieved security model within the Persian Gulf region should 
be based on confidence–building and détente between the core and periphery and 
then develop to broader model to ensure the mutual security of LNG supply with 
the EU. 
By analysis and synthesis of the Subordinate System theory and the GCC’s 
Eastward Orientation policy towards the Asia–Pacific region, the author 
concluded that the so–called “EU–[GCC+2]” is an appropriate security model to 
ensure the regional security of LNG supply between the EU and the Persian Gulf 
region, in accordance with the balance of interests, as the win–win game.  
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 Therefore, four main questions are raised in this chapter: 
o How is the energy position in the Persian Gulf’s geo–politics? 
o What is/are the consequence(s) of this energy position in the Persian 
Gulf’s geo–politics? 
o How does the current security model within the Persian Gulfimpact on 
regional energy policies? 
o What is the most appropriate security model for the Persian Gulfin order 
to ensure its energy security? 
3.2. Geo–politics of the Persian Gulf and the presence of the powers  
The Persian Gulf is a shallow semi–enclosed sea with a surface of 260,000 km2 
between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran and links the three continents of Asia, 
Europe and Africa. The average and the maximum depth of its waters is nearly 
40 metres and around 100 metres, respectively. It is bordered by Oman and the 
United Arab Emirates on the south, Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia on the 
west and south west, Kuwait and Iraq on the north–west and Iran along the 
entire north coast. It has been an important waterway for centuries, helping to 
establish trade connections with India and China in the Middle Ages.  
The position of the Persian Gulf, in terms of geo–strategic and geo–political 
aspects, has attracted the attention of the great powers and produced important 
conflicts and competitions regarding control of this area for a long time (Naji & 
Jawan, 2011: 2). Owing to its strategic and geo–politics location, the Persian Gulf 
region has been, primarily, the centre of attention for European powers’, who 
began to be present in the Indian Ocean and South–east Asia. The Portuguese 
were the first western power to enter to the Persian Gulf, followed by the 
Netherlands, France, and finally Britain (Luciani, 2005: 149–154). Turkey’s 
Ottoman Empire, furthermore, controlled most of the region at different periods 
over a seven–century until the First World Wide.  
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During the 20th century, on the basis of some scholars’ arguments the Persian 
Gulf turned in to a place of hugely strategic importance for the global powers. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, in an article published in the National Review in 1902 
concluded that the control of the Persian Gulf could result in the domination over 
all means of access that lead to the Far East, India and Australia. 
The Middle East/Persian Gulf was called by Mackinder as the “World–Island” 
and Nicholas Spykman (1893–1943) believed that the Persian Gulf, and in 
particular Hormuz Strait, is one of the Rimland keys geo–strategically 
connecting the northern, southern, western and eastern parts of the Rimland to 
each other. Based on this comment, the control of this region alongside its 
sensitive strait means the control of earlier mentioned four parts.   
3.3. The Persian Gulf’s position after the discovery of hydrocarbons  
3.3.1 More attention towards the Persian Gulf 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, in 1908, oil was discovered for the 
first time in the Persian Gulf area and also in Iran, followed by Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia in 1932 and 1933. This resulted in drawing much more attention to 
the region once again, such as the British Anglo–Persian Oil Company (APOC) 
or the current BP (British Petroleum) Company’s activities in Iran’s oil industry 
since its establishment during the first half of the 20th century. 
The Second World War delayed development of oil fields that had been 
discovered in the 1930s, so considerably smaller fields in Qatar came in 
commercial quantities in the 1950s, and the United Arab Emirates also began to 
export off–shore oil in the mid–1960s (Kandiyoti, 2008). 
Until the 1970s, foreign companies, in most cases, European, as well as the US–
based concerns, owned and managed the Persian Gulf oil industries by creating 
the subsidiaries in specific countries. In fact, discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf 
made the region considerably important not only for Britain but to all those who 
needed the oil. Initially, BP, and Royal Dutch Shell dominated the region, 
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reflecting the European concern for secure sources of petroleum (Chapman & 
Khanna, 2006: 507–519). 
During the 1970s, most of the regional Arab countries were independent of 
British control and bought the major shares of the subsidiary companies that 
worked within their borders, so by the early 1990s, many of these branches had 
become completely state–owned concerns (Kandiyoti, 2008: 76). 
As a result, after withdrawal of the British military from the “East of Suez”, such 
as the Persian Gulf region in the late 1960s, the US and actually the “Pax 
Americana” (Luft, 2011) took over the role of “an external balancer” (Bauer et al. 
2010), cooperating with regional allies (Oktav, 2011:136) and, until the end of 
the 1980s, the regional order can be explained largely under the Cold War 
strategic circumstances (Aarts & Duijne, 2009: 65). Consequently, the US tried 
to control Persian Gulf’s oil as a means to limit its rivals such as China, Russia, 
and even the EU (Aarts & Duijne, 2009: 73) and petrodollars could be considered 
as a factor in giving shape to the type of military procurements (Ehteshami, 2003: 
263). 
Since the beginning of gas supply commercially in recent years, moreover, the 
geo–politics and geo–economics of the Persian Gulf, has increased dramatically. 
The Middle East holds 40% of global reserves, almost all of which are situated in 
the Persian Gulf, as the gas–richest area worldwide (BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy, June 2011), so four of the littoral states within the Persian Gulf, 
out of eight, are among the top seven natural gas holders worldwide (EIA 
International Energy Outlook 2011: 64). 
As a result, this area sits on top of the largest hydrocarbon reserves worldwide, 
whereas the increasing global demands, strengthened the regional positions geo–
politically, geo–strategically, and also geo–economically (Chapman & Khanna, 
2006: 507–519). 
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3.3.2. Regional Delineation   
While oil was discovered in most of the Persian Gulf coastal states before the 
Second World War, however, it was commercial in most Sheikdoms, as the “neo–
patriarchal governments” (Davidson, 2012: 10) after the 1950s and the black gold 
took effect on delineation after the British departure from the region and the 
subsequent boundary disputes, as, in advance of the oil era, the Persian Gulf 
states, mostly monarchies, made little effort to delineate their territories. This 
will be dealt with in next section. 
3.4. The end of status quo in the Persian Gulf 
Notwithstanding the huge wealth in the Persian Gulf, these vast hydrocarbon 
reserves have been often the source of regional and international tensions. 
The Islamic revolution in Iran in the late 1970s, devastated the status quo 
(Oktav, 2011) and eventually the Iran–Iraq war, led to establishment of the GCC 
in 1981 (Kandiyoti, 2008: 35) with the shared Islamic cultural, social, political 
and economic backgrounds. 
So, this organization is the core section within the Persian Gulf region, as the 
subordinate system of the Middle East, whereas Iraq, as a non–GCC Arab 
country and non–Arab Iran in this area represent the periphery of this system 
differing from the core sector in some cohesion levels by economic, organizational, 
social, or political factors. They do, however, play an important role in the 
politics of this subordinate system alongside the power(s) of intervention 
(Cantori & Lospiegel, 1969: 361–380).  
The Persian Gulf area’s structure and relations are, however categorised by 
conflict, rivalry and relative cooperation over recent decades and the intrusive 
player(s) in the Persian Gulf area, especially the US in addition to Britain and 
France, have influenced regional policies (Davidson, 2010a: 2).  
The Persian Gulf together with East Asia/West Pacific have been the major two 
regions that the Pentagon has established its combat force structure and 
deployed aircrafts carriers and marine expeditionary units there during the 
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recent decades for any probable military operations (Pascual & Elkind, 2010: 67 
& 69). 
Nevertheless, some other external actors, such as Turkey, Russia, China, India, 
Japan, South Africa or Brazil have indicated their willingness to get engaged in 
regional Affairs (Bauer et al. 2011). 
Nonetheless, the Persian Gulf has witnessed a range of disputes within the GCC, 
between the core and periphery, as well as inside the periphery, such as 
territorial, ideological, political and nuclear, despite commonalities.   
3.4.1. Differences inside the GCC  
3.4.1.1. Boundary and political disputes 
The GCC countries have faced some internal and external pressures (Davidson, 
2012: 2). Creation of an indigenous “rentier elite class” with emerging of the new 
educated youth class, mass–communication (Davidson, 2012: 5), some injustice 
and inequality against Shia population, unsustainable subsidies, huge expatriate 
labours alongside voluntary internal unemployment, as well as corruption of the 
ruling families are amongst the internal problems that these Sheikhdoms have 
already encountered with them (Davidson, 2012: 230).  
However, Christopher Davidson in his newly–published book argues (2012: 11) 
that high economic resources, small populations and governmental distribution 
of wealth are the main pillars of legitimacy within these Sheikhdoms. 
As noted in section 1.3.2, boundary disputes are the primary issues of concerns 
amongst some GCC members that are or have been involved commercial oil 
production. Before the oil era, moreover, the Persian Gulf states, mostly 
monarchies, made little effort to demarcate their frontiers. Nevertheless, most of 
the boundary conflicts amongst these monarchies have been already resolved, 
such as the Dolphin project (Dargin, 2008: 18–19), Qatar–Bahrain over the 
Hawar Islands, Oman–Saudi Arabia, as well as others (E. Wiegand, 2012: 95), 
but some are still ongoing, such as those involving the United Arab Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia, as well as the United Arab Emirates and Iran. 
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There have been some political differences among the GCC member states, 
mostly regarding the elder Sheikdoms, Saudi Arabia and also Iran. 
Some junior monarchies have accused Riyadh of developing not only its own 
perceived position as the most influential country in the Arab world (Burke & 
Bazoobandi, 2010: 13) but also its hegemony on the part of the GCC’s smaller 
states (Oktav, 2011:142). Saudi Arabian explicit opposition with the United Arab 
Emirates–Bahrain’s bilateral 2004 Free Trade Agreements with the US is one 
example regarding the internal political disparities within the GCC (Dargin, 
2008: 18). 
Furthermore, the Arab Sheikhdoms have already endeavored to take shape a 
single economic block with one common currency, however after decades of 
discussion, these efforts are still moving forward at a “snail’s space” (Maloney, 
2010: 51). 
So, some of these littoral Arab countries have attempted to adopt an independent 
approach apart from the Saudis and even compete with the biggest Arab state’s 
foreign policies. For instance, Qatar–based satellite station Al–Jazeera has been 
the main rival for Al–Arabia, causing a number of media and political 
confrontations with Saudi Arabia between 2002 until 2008. These include the 
pragmatic Doha (Burke & Bazoobandi, 2010: 8) ties with pro–Iranian Hezbollah 
in Lebanon, Hamas Movement in Gaza and Zaydi Shia rebels in Yemen. 
As mentioned in advance, these Sheikhdoms have faced a number of external 
pressures, in addition to the internals challenges. Close military relationships 
with some western countries and their bases inside these monarchies’ soil 
(Davidson, 2012: 169&170), efforts to improve relations with Israel, contrary to 
their public opinion, as well as dangerous positions regarding Iran have been 
amongst them (Davidson, 2012: 231).  
3.4.2. Differences between the GCC and Iran  
There are also significant differences in the GGC states’ policies towards Iran 
that contributed, to a large extent, to the conflicts within the Council. So, apart 
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from the positions of Kuwait and Bahrain, though for different reasons, vis–à–vis 
Iran, which are close to Riyadh’s position, the other GCC states, comprising 
Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have taken a more independent 
stance, while the latter is home to 400,000 Iranians and also 10,000 registered 
Iranian–owned companies (Aarts & Duijne, 2009: 69) and large number of 
Iranian–origin population live in other GCC countries (Davidson, 2012: 172 & 
173). 
The main mutual controversial issues have been regarding Iran’s nuclear 
programme, its regional activities, followed by conflicts concerning the ownership 
of the triple islands of Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb with the United Arab 
Emirates. 
However, some harsh stances against Iran by some GCC member states have 
been against public opinion inside these countries (Davidson, 2012: 231). 
3.4.2.1. Regional penetration  
Some Arab Sheikdoms view non–Arab Iran’s growing role in the region, in 
particular in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon as a security threat (Gause, 2005: 273) and 
they even believe that Obama’s policies towards Iran in recent years, have led to 
increase the GCC countries’ sense of vulnerability in relation to Iran based on 
the view that Iranians’ loss is Arabs’ gain (Oktav, 2011: 139). 
Tehran, on the other hand, believes that the main impediment against the 
regional stability relates to ultra–regional power(s), as this presence has 
produced an anti–Iranian alliance that prevented normalisation of relations with 
a score of Sheikdoms and creation of a “Gulfisation order” (Fürtig, 2007: 629) by 
the reduction of dependence on foreigners. 
3.4.2.2. Iran’s nuclear issue 
Energy diversification is a major policy that the regional countries have pursued, 
more or less, and taken steps towards achieving sustainable security and 
economic development in the region (Barzegar, 2010: 82–83) and nuclear energy 
has achieved a high position in this respect. 
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The “nuclearisaton of the GCC” (Davidson, 2012: 173) has started since February 
2007, and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) agreed mutually to 
work together on a nuclear power plan (Broad & Sanger, 2007), and also 
establishment of a Uranium Enrichment International Consortium for the 
Middle East based in a neutral country outside the region, an initiative also 
vigorously supported by the EU (Shenna, 2010: 11). This had been previously 
proposed by Iran. 
The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and Bahrain, furthermore, 
signed certain nuclear energy cooperation agreements with France and the US in 
2008 and the former country is to construct four nuclear reactors with South 
Korea.  
However, there is not any unified “Gulf perspective” on the Iranian nuclear issue. 
So, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman are more tolerant of the Iranian nuclear 
programme (Shenna, 2010) and recognised Tehran’s legitimate rights for making 
use of peaceful nuclear energy (Barzegar, at: fa.merc.ir), while the United Arab 
Emirates has been extremely cautious regarding Iran’s nuclear programme 
(Davidson, 2010 b: 100).  
Some of these Arab states expressed their concerns over Iran’s nuclear issues 
environmentally, ecologically and especially militarily. Nevertheless, after the 
Tehran Nuclear Disarmament Conference on 17th and 18th April, 2010, Iran, 
more strongly, insisted that the use of nuclear weapons is religiously banned.  
On the other hand, the lack of GCC involvement in the negotiations over Iran’s 
nuclear programme (El–Hokayem and Legrenzi, 2006: 8) and scarcity of mutual 
confidence between the core and periphery parts (Gause, 2005: 272) have 
hampered progress toward the cooperation between the core, periphery and even 
with intrusive player(s), which has lagged behind the economic interdependence 
(Ulrichsen, 2009: 41–42).  
Despite these disagreements, all six GCC states maintain extensive tourism and 
trading links with Tehran. So, ties of trade and shared commercial interests 
provide a powerful justification for improving relations between the GCC and 
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Iran on the basis of regional interests, for instance, in a stable and peaceful Iraq, 
as well as energy (RAND, 2009: 36–38). This became evident after Qatar’s 
decision to invite the Iranian President to the GCC Summit in Doha in December 
2007. 
3.5. The current security model in the Persian Gulf 
International politics could be described with reference to three arenas: the globe, 
the region, and the nation–states. These might be represented as the dominant, 
subordinate and internal political systems. Therefore, our conceptual framework 
for the Persian Gulf region is situated in the second category.  
Since the 1990s, the Arab Persian Gulf states and Iran have been sporadically 
discussing security arrangements to ensure the stability of the region and also a 
secure energy supply. However, some factors such as the lack of unified 
leadership in the GCC (Oktav, 2011: 139) and a couple of problems between Iran 
and also Iraq with the Sheikhdoms, especially lack of mutual trust (Davidson, 
2012: 142) have hindered the restoration of more cooperation.  
Since 2003 and the after fall of Saddam in Iraq, the tensions in the Persian Gulf 
have become more evident, increasing the divergent interests of Iran and the 
GCC countries, although, the situations in the area since the start of 2011 have 
been complicated, particularly after another round of sanctions against Iran in 
December of that year.   
They have not been able to restore mutual trust, mostly due to two factors:  
 The US policy of containing Iran; 
 Iran’s insistence on being a nuclear power.  
These two factors drive the Persian Gulf monarchies to continue relying on 
outsiders, on the basis of the balance of power (Oktav, 2011: 140) as they are 
vulnerable, given to the close proximity to major conflicts, certain potential 
threats and small populations, except Saudi Arabia to some extent (Davidson, 
2010a: 20).   
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However, their reliance on a “Western security umbrella”, particularly the US, is 
problematic, “given the strained relations between the Arab world and the US”, 
due to the Arab–Israeli conflict, in addition to the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Davidson, 2012). 
These situations could place the GCC countries at “the frontline of any fresh 
conflict in the region and lead to undermine the current generation of these 
rulers” (Davidson, 2012: 172 & 173). 
In summary, the scarcity of unified threat perception, different approaches 
within the GCC (Ulrichsen, 2009: 43), territorial and long–running 
disputes(Davidson, 2012: 231) within the region, politicisation and securitisation 
of the Persian Gulf and probable commitments to other ultra–region bodies and 
organizations, such as Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (Oktav, 2011:144) could 
be considered as the main obstacles against more regional cooperation, 
particularly between the core and periphery sections.  
3.6. The appropriate security model for the Persian Gulf 
Security and stability in the Persian Gulf has been more important not only for 
all regional states, but also for the international system, while the mentioned 
region with the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves has played a growing 
central role within the Middle East, as well as global politics (Davidson, 2011: 1).  
In addition, most of Iran’s foreign incomes and also Arab’s petrodollars 
(Ehteshami, 2003) are obtained from the export of energy through the Persian 
Gulf, as a main route of its international trade and communication.   
Amongst the number of high–profile experts, Gal Luft (annex 1), believes (2011) 
that the role of the Persian Gulf core and periphery states in energy supply will 
be most important, and new global energy geo–politics should be portrayed, 
considering the new energy map in the Persian Gulf region regarding Iran (see 
in the Chapters 2&5).  
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Paul Rogers (annex 1) in “Iran and the International System” Conference, which 
took place at Durham University on 7th June 2009, argued that the global geo–
politics, geo–strategic and geo–economic positions of the Persian Gulf countries, 
in particular Iran, will be more significant in the future as demand for 
hydrocarbons increase. 
Any economic diversification in the region, and foreign investments required a 
stable regional environment (Seznec, 2010: 11) by interdependent relationship 
(Aarts & Duijne, 2009: 73), as any instability in the region would hinder the flow 
of foreign direct investment to the Persian Gulf countries (Seznec, 2010: 11). 
Most notably, Arab Sheikdoms have been trying to improve the investment risk 
within their countries, so they have dramatically succeeded in promoting their 
positions in the global ranking, while the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed very low risk in investments and the two former 
states have stood amongst the top 10 countries in the world in terms of the best 
situation for venture in 2012 (Chapter 5). It shows that despite less stability 
within the Persian Gulf, these Arab countries could promote investment 
conditions domestically, and the periphery could also do likewise. 
In a region where “hydrocarbon is king and security is risky” (E. Wiegand, 2012: 
95), the reliance on oil and gas supply from the Persian Gulf will increase in the 
coming years and even decades, while the littoral countries, indeed, have a 
structure of “mono–base economies”, based on oil and gas exports, over 90% of 
regional exports (Naji & Jawan, 2011: 2). This shows that the energy security of 
both the exporters and importers is affected by stability, less stability or 
instability in the region. So, the continuation of the Iraq crisis, the American–
Iranian situation and the current mutual approach between Tehran and some 
monarchies could lead to more regional instability.  
Accordingly, the new political and security structure of the Persian Gulf region 
should be redefined (Kemp, 2012, Durham University) according to the new 
developments occurring after the Baath Party era in Iraq, Iran’s role (Armitage 
& Nye, 2007), development outside the region (Maloney, 2010: 45), as well as the 
Arab spring that have led to political developments in the Middle East and 
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North Africa. While the political landscape becomes more diverse than ever, the 
external actors, such as the EU, need a new approach (Bauer, 2011).    
Obviously, the regional order has become more vulnerable due to lack of 
collective security and basic unity in the six monarchies (Davidson, 2012: 231), 
the volatile relations between the GCC and Iran (Ulrichsen, 2009: 41) and it 
seems that most of the dilemmas mentioned in the Persian Gulf region are partly 
related to separation of the core and the periphery players, so the systematic 
coherence, interdependence, and vital belief to regional cooperation have not 
been observed (Ghasemi & Salehi, 2008: 70–72). 
First of all, the GCC, as a core and “de facto security alliance” (M. Pollack, 2012: 
3), needs to find a practical balance between dependence on the US, as an 
external security guarantor, and the creation of a regional comprehensive and 
cooperative security system (Ulrichsen, 2009: 53), like the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, that can provide greater stability, by Iran 
and also post–occupation Iraq’s involvement, as the peripheral states in the 
region, than the balance of power system has done so far (M. Pollack, 2012: 2). 
This new regional model could be entitled, the so–called “GCC+2” that Iran also 
proposed such as the kind of regional alliance with Arab states alongside 
Baghdad. However, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in Pahlavi’s era opposed this 
suggestion (Mojtahed Zadeh, 2010: 240). 
Therefore, realistic solutions would be required toward the interests of all 
regional and even extra–regional players (Khalil , 2007), by the substituting of  
“balance of interests” in the current balance of power amongst the core and 
peripheral states, as well as international players (Oktav, 2011:145).  
Consequently, while the presence of some Western powers within the Persian 
Gulf, in addition to competition between the core and periphery from one side, as 
well as between the peripheral Iran and intrusive player(s) on the other side, 
have complicated the security dilemma, by “increasing economic 
interdependency”, similar to what happened between the Persian Gulf’s coastal 
states with a number of Asia–Pacific countries, regional current situations could 
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be desecuritised further (Davidson, 2010 b: 109), whereas from the geo–politics of 
energy perspective, this area is the joint axis of three most important economic 
regions in the world, comprising the US, the EU and Asia pacific (Naji & Jawan, 
2011: 2). So, the Persian Gulf littoral states, particularly the GCC’s “eastward 
orientation” (Davidson, 2011 b: 183) could be expanded to the westward direction 
by the “GCC+2”.  
The Persian Gulf Emirates are keenly aware of the economic benefits of a 
pragmatic relationship with Iran (Burke & Bazoobandi, 2010: 8) and it is obvious 
that the five smaller GCC states enjoy such a relationship with the country, 
more or less. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, perceives itself to be in a strategic and 
political contest with Iran in the region that has greatly affected trade between 
Riyadh and Tehran.  
As a result, considering the common Islamic culture without any discrimination 
regarding  Sunni and Shia (Davidson, 2012: 231), interdependent relations on 
different economic, particularly energy, and political strategic aspects could be 
developed in line with regional interests (Özden Zeynep, 2011: 145), while some 
policies in the framework of the balance of power system, such as the dual 
containment strategy, sanctions against regional players, and the theory of the 
axis of evil would seem to work against these countries’ interests and would be a 
“lose–lose” game. 
Of course, this regional interdependence should be commenced “by changing the 
political boundaries to economic” in order to produce governance of peace and 
stability in the region (Zein–al–abedin: 2007) and then it could extend to 
comparative cooperation with confidence–building between the core–periphery, 
especially Iran, simultaneous with Tehran–intrusive player(s), particularly the 
US, bilaterally. 
So, this tendency should be based on a non–zero sum game and détente 
regionally, even with foreign powers, in conjunction with more bargaining rather 
than confrontation (Ghasemi & Salehi, 2008: 74–76). 
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The powers of intervention have political and strategic, as well as economic 
interests in regional peace and stability, while, given the strained relations 
between Tehran and Western powers, GCC could be in a position to serve as a 
facilitator in the conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme (Bauer et al. 2011). 
According to Prof. Geoffrey Kemp on 13th September 2012 at Durham University, 
“Washington could not do its commitments regarding the (Persian) Gulf security, 
unless negotiating even with its adversaries and rivals”. He added that the 
external powers, especially the US, should redefine their strategic and security 
presence in the region alongside the realistic relations with the littoral states. 
To sum up, the balance of interests arrangement in the Persian Gulf requires a 
couple of considerations, on the basis of: 
 Confidence–building amongst Iran, GCC, and intrusive players (Davidson, 
2012.); 
 Common political and security threats; 
 Focus on commonalities, like economic and energy instead of differences, 
such as Shia and Sunni ideologies (Özden Zeynep, 2011); 
 Participation of all regional and trans–regional actors and their 
interactions with the special role for each player in the region’s new 
security architecture (Barzegar,2010: 74); 
 Regional economic interdependence (Davidson, 2010 b: 109) that could 
lead to a common market, extension of pipelines, and establishment of a 
joint shipping lines. 
As a result of this new approach, the security of supply from the Persian Gulf 
countries could be raised further (Fattouh, 2007: 24).  
Indeed, hydrocarbon, as a clear example of interdependence between the 
exporters and importers (Pascual & Elkind, 2010: 4), plays an important role not 
only for Persian Gulf littoral states’ energy security, but for other importers, 
such as the EU. As a result, insecurity in the Persian Gulf or disruption in 
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energy supply from this waterway, even for a short period of time, could threaten 
the developed and newly– emerging economies and this region’s energy security, 
multilaterally. 
Therefore, balance of interests and security amongst the core, periphery states 
and also intrusive players, instead of balance of power, can ensure the Persian 
Gulf regional energy security and supply towards the EU, mutually. 
3.7. Conclusion 
Oil exploration within the Persian Gulf and gas commercial supply from this 
geo–strategic region has greatly strengthened its geo–economic features. Energy, 
moreover, has caused more attention to be paid to this area by the great powers 
during recent periods and has also impacted on delineation and, most significant 
of all, territorial disputes. 
By withdrawal of the British armed forces from the region, the US replaced it as 
the main intrusive player, while the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, followed 
by the Iran–Iraq war in 1980, the regional status quo changed. These 
developments led to creation of the GCC in 1981 and divided the region in three 
sections, comprising the GCC, as the core, non–GCC Arab Iraq alongside non–
Arab Iran, as the periphery, as well as the powers of intervention.  
So, the consequences of this balance of power and mistrust have been conflict 
and competition, mostly between the GCC and Iran, in addition to the US and 
the mentioned country, rather than more cooperation. Tehran’s alleged 
penetrations and its increasing regional role alongside its nuclear programme 
have been the major controversial issues with regional and ultra–regional 
players. 
Nonetheless, security and stability in the Persian Gulf, with the world’s largest 
hydrocarbon reserves, are more important not only for all regional states with a 
structure, but also for the international system.  
The reliance of natural gas and LNG supply from the Persian Gulf will increase 
in the coming years and even decades (see Chapter 5 and Final Conclusion), 
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while littoral countries have the structure, of mono–base economies, based on oil 
and gas exports.  
Obviously, the energy security of both exporters and importers is affected by 
stability, less stability or instability in the region. So, the ongoing crisis in Iraq, 
the American–Iranian situation and the current mutual disputes between 
Tehran and some monarchies could lead to more regional instability.  
Accordingly, the new political and security structure of the Persian Gulf region 
should be redefined according to new developments after the Baath Party era in 
Iraq, Iran’s role, as well as the Arab spring. 
Apparently, most of the regional problems are related to the separation of the 
core and the periphery players, instead of interdependence. However, by Iran’s 
and also post–occupation Iraq’s increased involvement, the new regional model 
could be formed, entitled “GCC+2”. In such a system, the balance of interests, as 
the non–zero sum or “win–win” game is replaced in the current balance of power 
of the zero sum or “lose–lose” game.  
The GCC needs to find a balance between dependence on the US, while the 
regional interdependence should be aided by changing the political boundaries to 
economic for more regional peace and stability in the region. 
This has been the GCC’s “eastward orientation” towards a number of Asia–
Pacific countries whilst the westward approach could be expanded by the 
“GCC+2”, based on confidence–building and détente between the core–periphery, 
especially Iran, concurrent with Tehran–intrusive player(s), particularly the US, 
that could lead to more bargaining rather than confrontation. Under these 
circumstances, the “EU–[GCC+2]” model would take shape, as it will be 
discussed further in chapter 6. 
For security in this region, there are several possible methods, such as military 
treaties between regional countries or the military presence of foreign countries 
in line with the balance of power, but historical evidence has shown that none of 
them could guarantee stability and security in this region. Therefore, regional 
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cooperation in the form of economic and energy cooperation, in the so–called 
“GCC+2”, can increase the coefficient of security stability in the Persian Gulf 
region, leading to the rise of global energy security as well. Construction of gas 
transmission lines between countries in the region and more cooperation for 
LNG supply are the kinds of regional collaboration that can be an alternative to 
military treaties. 
Hydrocarbon could be assumed to be a main element for interdependence 
between the exporters and importers and plays an important role in theirenergy 
security. As a result, insecurity in the Persian Gulf or disruption in energy 
supply could threaten regional and global energy security. 
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Chapter 4: Geo–politics of natural gas within the Persian Gulf and two case 
studies 
4.1. Introduction 
Natural gas is the world’s fastest growing fossil resource and the Middle East 
holds 40% of global reserves, while nearly the whole of these deposits are 
situated in the Persian Gulf, as the gas–richest area worldwide. Iran and Qatar 
embrace nearly 30% global natural gas or 75% of Middle East gas reserves and 
these two alongside more four littoral states in the region are among the top 20 
gas holders worldwide. Consequently, natural gas and LNG production and 
export from Middle East/Persian Gulf, especially Iran and Qatar will increase 
more than other parts of the world by 2030, while in conjunction with the 
dramatic increase in the demand for natural gas and LNG in the future, 50% 
worldwide and up to 90% in the EU, most of the global gas reserves will reduce 
or could even run out by the next decade. So, the minor producers could cease to 
produce, and the role of the major gas producers from conventional gas and 
unconventional gas will highlight further. 
The Persian Gulf, however, has some challenges in order to develop its natural 
gas and LNG industries appropriately and to export more during the coming 
years, such as unconventional gas produced by the US, the increase of LNG 
exported by Australia, as the main competitor for Persian Gulf, high domestic 
gas demands, regional political instability, inadequate international investment, 
and energy inefficiency.  
Based on Iran’s “20–Year Outlook Document (2005–2025)”, followed by “Iran’s 
Grand Energy Strategy by 2023”, this country plans to increase its existing 1% 
share of gas global market to 8%–10% by 2023 and takes part in GECF more 
actively, so LNG projects will play an important role in this regard. Tehran has 
some LNG facilities under consideration and under construction and plans to be 
among the top five global exporters by 2020. However, foreign sanctions as well 
as high domestic consumption are the main impediments against achieving this 
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target. As a result, there are three main scenarios regarding these two principal 
obstacles against Iran’s piped gasand LNG projects and exports. 
Qatar’s “Gas Strategy” emerged in order to shift from oil to natural gas, basically 
LNG, leading to the construction of 14 trains, with 77 Mmt/y export, resulting in 
its becoming the leading LNG exporter worldwide. Qatar’s economic and 
domestic growth, on the other hand, has accelerated and demand for energy 
more than doubled since 2000, and will continue to increase in the future. 
Because this country is the fourth largest gas consumer in the Middle 
East/Persian Gulf, it is attempting to put an end to the enormous subsidisation 
of local energy prices and aim for more conservation while increasing use for 
natural gas, based on “Qatar’s National Vision 2030 Document”. Some predict 
that Doha might have some problems in the future in attempting to increase its 
exports, while some officials are of the view that this country should decide not 
to build any more LNG facilities in years to come. The others also believe the 
country could increase its current export capacity to preserve its global position 
against other competitors.  
On the topic of GECF, this intergovernmental organization might play an 
important role in the globalised gas market while Iran’s, Russia’s and Qatar’s 
positions and coordination, as the three top global gas holders in this body, with 
54% of the global gas deposits, are influential. However, this forum raised 
concerns with many importers over the possibility of the emergence of a Gas–
OPEC. This forum also faces some challenges on its way to becoming more 
powerful, including different views among the members, a high number of the 
existing members, new unconventional gas holders outside this organization, 
duel membership of some countries in both GECF and OPEC, as well as energy 
market liberalization and development of renewable energy sources in the future.  
So, in this chapter, the subsequent questions are considered more: 
o Given the production of gas from unconventional gas, as well as new 
competitors for Persian Gulf, such as the US, Canada, and Australia, and 
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also Persian Gulf domestic consumption, what is the position of the littoral 
states, particularly Iran and Qatar in the global gas market in the future? 
o How could Iran handle the main impediments against its Energy Outlook 
aims to increase its natural gas and LNG exports by 2023, and how many 
scenarios there are in this respect? 
o As Qatar is the leading LNG producer worldwide for the time being, what 
is this country’s gas outlook in the years to come, and also its LNG export 
plans? 
o How could the GECF impact on the global gas market, with consideration 
to Iran’s and Qatar’s positions in this body? 
4.2. Geo–politics of natural gas in the Persian Gulf 
Natural gas is the world’s fastest growing fossil fuel in many regions, 
particularly in the electric power and industrial sectors because of its low capital 
costs, thermal efficiencies, environmental attraction compared with coal and oil, 
significant price discount compared with oil in many world regions, and based on 
governments’ policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (EIA International 
Energy Outlook 2011: 43). 
According to the Oil and Gas Journal in January 2012, the world’s gas reserves 
at the beginning of 2012 were 3,330,137 bcf (table 21). 
The Persian Gulf region, as having the most important natural gas deposits 
within Middle East and North Africa, holds an estimated 2,400 tcf of natural gas 
reserves (EIA International Energy Outlook 2011: 33) or 76.16 tcm (BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011), situated in this region and five 
of its countries out of eight, are within the top 15 gas holders worldwide (table 
21), while according to some international energy organizations, there is the 
likelihood that some more gas reserves would be discovered in the future within 
the Persian Gulf region, while Iran’s proved reserves increased from 1,045,670 
bcf in 2011, 15.7% of global deposits, to 1,168,000 bcf in January 2012, 17.3% of 
the world’s reserves. 
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Qatar has, however witnessed a decline from 895,800 bcf in 2011, 13.5% of total 
deposits worldwide, to 890,000 bcf in January 2012, 13.3% of the world’s reserves 
Other Persian Gulf states, more or less, have had such this increase, such as 
Saudi Arabia (table 21).  
According to BP (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011; BP, 2010: 
22), Middle East and North Africa holds roughly 48% of global natural gas 
reserves and 40% of these reserves are situated in the Middle East/Persian Gulf, 
nevertheless, based on map 1, roughly a total of 40% of Middle East’s gas 
reserves are located in the Persian Gulf region (figure 41). 
Figure 41: Distribution of proven natural gas reserves in the world
 
Source:  By Author, based on Oil and Gas Journal, Jan 1, 2012, USGS, EIA International Energy Outlook 
2011: 64 (see Chapter 6). 
So, the natural gas reserves within the Persian Gulf differ widely from one 
country to another, from a low of 0.90 tcm and 0.98 tcm in Bahrain and Oman 
respectively; to a huge amount of 29.61 tcm and 25.37 tcm in Iran and Qatar 
respectively (map 6). Furthermore, 61% of the region’s natural gas is situated in 
a single giant field shared between Qatar and Iran that is known as the North 
Field in Qatar and the South Pars in Iran, as the world’s largest non–associated 
natural gas field. That leaves these two for the expanding non–associated gas 
output and export.                           
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Map 6: Proven natural gas reserves in the Middle East/Persian Gulf (tcm) 
 
Source: M. Wietfeld, 2011: 206 (based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010 and 2011) 
However, most of the proven natural gas reserves in the GCC, with the exception 
of those found in Qatar, are in associated form together with oil that leaves, in 
the GCC, only Qatar with a huge scope for expanding gas output and export 
(Abi–Aad, 2009: 6). 
Figure 42: Non–associated and associated giant gas field within the Middle East/Persian Gulf 
 
Source: http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/6/8/155013/7696 
4.2.1 Unconventional gas as a rival for Persian Gulf’s conventional gas 
Most of the gas reserves worldwide, including Latin America and sub–Saharan 
Africa are relatively small compared with the Persian Gulf states’ and will 
reduce in a number of years to come, so after that the Persian Gulf’s natural gas 
reserves will be more strategic than ever (Rogers, 2012: 168–174). 
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According to BP (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011), while 
global gas production was 2413.4 bcm/around 86.86 tfc and 3193 bcm/roughly 
115 tcf, in 2000 and 2010 respectively, and gas production rose 7.3% more than 
2009 (annex 6), some predict (US EIA 2011: 50) that these numbers will increase 
to 133.8 tcf and 168 tcf by 2020 and 2030, while some regions, like Europe, will 
be faced with a fall of reserves and production (annex 7). An increasing amount 
of gas, therefore, will be produced at locations more remote to the centres of 
demand and transported to consumers (Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1518–1528) and, 
according to IEA (IEA, 2007: 86), 50% of natural gas demands until 2030 will 
originate for power plants.  
Most of the gas production increase in OECD countries will be allocated to the 
US, Canada, and Australia (annexes 6&7). The US will progress in 
unconventional gas as the “game changer” (Bahgat, 2012), including shale and 
tight gas, as well as coal–bed methane from 10.9 tcf in 2008 to 19.8 tcf in 2035, 
and more than 75% of this country’s gas production will be unconventional gas 
(US EIA, 2011: 50; Skagen, 2010) and with this breakthrough, the OECD 
Americas region would be relatively self–sufficient by 2035 (US EIA 2011: 58) 
and even “many European companies are making progress to apply UG in 
Europe during the next decade” (Bahgat, interview), but slightly (US EIA 2011: 
50). On this basis, the “unconventional gas revolution” (IGU World LNG Report, 
2010: 23) or “energy revolution”, according to Dr. Christopher Davidson in the 
workshop being held at Durham University on 27th November 2012, could 
reshape the LNG system, providing that the US will no longer need to import 
LNG over the coming decades, and other countries could replicate the experience 
of the US (IGU World LNG Report, 2010: 9). However, unconventional gas faces 
some constraints, such as environmental (US EIA 2011: 53), financial (S.A. 
Gabriel et al. 2012: 137–152), ecological and infrastructure (Ying N, 2012); 
nevertheless, apart from these restrictions, production of unconventional gas will 
grow from 13 tcf in 2008 to 31 tcf in 2035, in particular in the US and Canada 
and non–OECD Russia and China (figure 62 & annex 7). 
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In spite of the fact that some of the energy experts count the unconventional gas 
as a serious rival for conventional gas during the two next decades, particularly 
in the North America–OECD, it could be argued that at least over the same 
period of time, conventional gas preserves its supremacy on the global gas 
market.  
Analysis of the different official data issued by international organizations, 
including BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011 (annex 6), EIA 
International Energy Outlook 2011, Oil and Energy Trends in January 2012,and 
IEA World Energy Outlook in 2008, illustrates that the percentage of 
unconventional gas compared to conventional gas in global gas production will be 
under 18% by 2030, while this number was 12.5% in 2010 and will be 15% in 
2020 and then will increase to 17.95% by 2030 (figures 43 & 44). 
Figure 43: Comparison of unconventional gas and conventional gas by region/country, 2010–2030 
 
Source: by Author 
Moreover, more than 85% of unconventional gas in 2009 and 75% in 2030 
devotes to the US, as the leading producer and also more than 92% production 
allocates to this country alongside Canada. For this reason, the US will preserve 
its second global gas producer position, after Russia, by 2030, though Iran and 
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Qatar will replace Asia since the second half of the current decade and keep 
significant production even after 2030. 
In addition, whereas the US increases its unconventional gas in the future, but it 
will be the leading gas consumer worldwide by 2030 and the whole of Europe will 
follow the US by the next two decades (table 16). 
Table 16: The main gas producers and consumers by country/region, 2010–2030 
 
Source: by Author, on the basis of different official data, like BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 
2011 (annex 6 & 8, Chapter 2); The Baker Institute World Gas Trade Modes (BIWGTM) (Chapter 5); US 
EIA, International Energy Outlook 2011; 
The table above also shows that Middle East/Persian Gulfwill move from the 
fourth top producer in the world during the 2020s to the main Russian 
competitor during the decade after that. This shows that while the North 
America’s unconventional gas production raises, however, based on the official 
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forecasts, it should mostly consume domestically (annexes 7, 9 &17). Therefore, 
unconventional gas will ensure 24% of gas demand in the US in 2035, up from 6% 
in 2008 (DOE–IEA, Annual Energy Outlook 2010: 3). 
Some believe that by the US’ becoming more self–sufficient in gas production, 
the previous volumes of gas exported to this country, will be directed to different 
countries and areas, but some others insist that global gas demand will 
dramatically increase at the same time, and attract even much more production.  
Natural gas production in Australia/New Zealand region doubles (EIA 
International Energy Outlook 2011: 50) and it might grow by triple (figure 4) 
(World Gas Intelligence, 2011:10) between 2008 to 2030 with the share of nearly 
8% for unconventional gas and the CBM–to–LNG (US EIA 2011: 52). Hence, 
LNG exports from Oceania will increase by 2020 (World Gas Intelligence, 
2011:10), and will be transported to China, India, and probably Europe (Oil & 
Energy Trends, 21.01.2011: 4), as well as Taiwan, Thailand, Japan and the 
Philippines (Oil & Energy Trends, 15.01.2010: 7). It might even overtake Qatar 
as the world’s largest LNG producer at present (Sky News, 30.09.2011). On the 
other hand, domestic natural gasand LNG use within Oceania will also increase, 
based on governmental efforts to reduce greenhouse gases (EIA, International 
Energy Outlook 2011: 46) with the rate of annual growth of natural gas and LNG 
up to 12.6% over the next two decades (Robins, 2011). 
CBM–to–LNG also would also raise a number of environmental difficulties (Oil 
& Energy Trends, 21.01.2011: 6) while the lack of the required $US 150 bn 
capital (Robins, 2011) to build a score of planned LNG export terminals by 2017 
is another barrier against this country’s LNG development.  
However, concerns about the extensive use of expensive (Inkpen & H.Moffett, 
2011: 6) hydraulic fracturing in order to carry out exploration of unconventional 
gas have been raised globally, especially by the public in the US because of the 
significant amount of water required, contamination of ground water, and other 
environmental risks (US EIA 2011: 53), resulting in restrictions on the issuing of 
drilling permits, especially in the State of New York. France has recently taken 
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legislative action to ban hydraulic fracturing in that country (US EIA, 2011: 49) 
so, some argue, it is unlikely that the US will become the next Middle East, as 
infrastructure and ecological constraints will limit the country’s ability to 
produce and export more LNG from unconventional gas (Ying N. 2012) while the 
natural gas “troika” composed of Russia, Iran, and Qatar could produce and 
export more gas at much cheaper cost to the global market even the US (S.A. 
Gabriel et al, 2012: 137–152).  
Consequently, we can conclude (figures 43 & 44) from global official data that 
while the total amount of global conventional gas production would account for 
between 83%–87.5% between 2010–2030, production of unconventional gas 
increases from more than 12.5% to around 17% during the same period. 
Figure 44: The balance of global conventional gas and unconventional gas production 
 
Source: Iran’s LNG Conference, Tehran, October 2011 
4.2.2 Comparison of different regions within the World’s natural gas and LNG 
outlook 
Regarding Russia, it remains the dominant gas producer (US EIA, 2011: 54); 
however, the IEA stated that ‘‘Russian Gazprom could face a growing difficulty 
to meet its export contracts if it does not advance the agenda of investment in 
new fields’’ (IEA, 2006b: 34–35). 
Natural gas production in Africa for domestic consumption and also export 
increases around 50% by 2020, while in 2008; almost 78% of Africa’s gas was 
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produced in North and West Africa (US EIA, 2011: 55) and nearly 75% of exports 
flow to the European countries, such as Spain, Italy by pipeline, and LNG 
shipment (50%–50%) (Davidson, 2012:62). 
Apart from Norway, gas production in OECD Europe has been in decline (US 
EIA, 2011: 51) while Malaysia and Indonesia, both face declining production 
from many older fields and must make more investment to maintain current 
production levels (Davidson, 2012.: 56), although Indonesia has at least 20 active 
production–sharing contracts for coal–bed methane drilling (CEDIGAZ, 2010: 2). 
In summary, the largest changes in increasing production from 2008 to 2035, 
based on figure 44, are projected for the Middle East/Persian Gulf, particularly 
originating from Iran and Qatar by a combined one–fifth of the total growth in 
world’s gas production (EIA International Energy Outlook 2011: 43) and also the 
US’ production change will be to the fifth position out of nine.  
The Middle East/Persian Gulf and the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) 
regions are the most important gas exporters to different regions and countries 
in order to create a more globalised gas market, while African suppliers only 
serve Europe and the US and also Pacific Basin supplies its LNG only to the US 
and the Far East markets (Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1518–1528).  
Natural gas trade and LNG shipments grew by 10.1%, as well as 22.6% in 2010 
and in 2011, while the global LNG trade grew more than 50% in 2010, compared 
to 2005 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011: 29; IGU World LNG 
Report, 2010: 4&5), so that the global LNG capacity has been increased, from 
approximately 176 Mmt/y at the end of 2005 to 260 Mmt/y at the end of 2010, 
with a 40% increase and final LNG consumption was 10.4 tcf in 2010 (CEDIGAZ, 
2011: 15). Consequently, based on statistics, global LNG capacity will nearly 
double by 2030 (US EIA, 2011: 44). 
The LNG trade has not only grown in volume, but geographically increased from 
13 exporters in 2005 to 18 in 2010, however roughly 80% of global LNG is 
transmitted by the 8 top exporters (figure 45).       
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Figure 45: The top LNG exporters in 2010 
 
Source: IGU, World LNG Report, 2010 
On the other hand, 80% of global LNG imports, belonged to the top 10 importers, 
while Spain, the UK, France and Italy, as the Author’ s four case studies within 
the EU, together imported 25% of the world’ s LNG exports, and this region is set 
to diversify its gas import routes away from piped Russian gas (White, 2011). 
So, the number of importers from 2005 to 2010 grew around 200% to 22 (figure 
46), just the US decreased its LNG import during 2005 to 2010 due to the 
domestic supply from unconventional gas (IGU World LNG Report, 2010: 8) and 
there are some predictions that because of shipping technology improvements, 
leading to a fall in transport costs (S.A. Gabriel et al. 2012: 137–152), LNG 
exports will increase in the near–term, particularly to South–east and non–
OECD Asia, as well as the EU (IGU World LNG Report, 2010: 9)while Europe’s 
LNG regasification capacity has almost tripled in just 6 years (CEDIGAS, 
Statistical Database). 
Most of the increase in liquefaction capacity is in the Middle East/Persian Gulf 
and Australia, (US EIA 2011: 44) so that, net exports of NG from the Middle 
East/Persian Gulf grows from 1.8 tcf in 2008 to 4.8 tcf in 2035 (Oil and Gas 
Journal, 7th March 2011: 4). As a result, according to Malcolm Wicks, the UK’s 
ex–Energy Minister, Middle East/Persian Gulf is expected to become the greatest 
gas exporters by 2030 (Wicks, 2009: 35). 
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Figure 46: The top LNG importers in 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IGU, World LNG Report, 2010 
Since 2005, annual LNG send–out capacity has increased by 70%, reaching over 
572 MMtpa at the end of 2010 and an additional 110 MMtpa is under 
construction in 30 countries. By 2015, when these facilities would be online, the 
global regasification capacity will increase to 680 MMtpa and the growth of 
global LNG receiving capacity is expected to continue on a strong path (IGU, 
2010: 25–35) whereas, at least 29 more countries, the most belongs to Europe 
with 11, have some planned LNG terminals (Davidson, 2012.: 29).  
Global gas consumption, moreover, will increase, especially in the US, as the top 
global largest gas consumer, and with Canada, the both hold 60% of the total 
increase for OECD countries (US EIA 2011: 44; IEA 2007), followed by the EU, 
Russia, non–OECD Asia (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2011: 4) from 
111 tcf in 2008 to 133 tcf and 168 tcf by 2020 and 2030, so in order to meet this 
demand, the world’s gas producers will need to increase supplies by almost 50%, 
and the biggest increase in supply is expected to come from non–OECD countries 
(Davidson, 2012.: 49), so the demand and supply factors impact on gas price 
volatility and on the supply side, the current suppliers have limited ability to 
expand their production in short and mid–terms (Pascual & Zambetakis, 2010: 
12).  
As a result, some new natural gas exporters must be added in the future in order 
to fulfill the demand–supply gap (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 
 184 
 
2011), especially from the gas–rich Persian Gulf region (US EIA 2011: 43) with 
its geo–political position, enormous gas reserves, the least expensive cost 
extraction, and to some extent transportation. 
4.2.3. Persian Gulf, as the least expensive and largest natural gas region 
Generally, field size and its geographical location have the largest impacts on 
extraction costs (table 22). Thus, the lowest production costs can be observed in 
large onshore gas fields, the highest in smaller off–shore fields in deeper waters. 
So, according to table 23, Iran and Qatar have the cheapest production costs, in 
total, amongst other gas holders all over the world (Lochner & Bothe 2009: 1518–
1528), but their transportation cost is a bit more than a number of exporters, 
depending on the destinations (figure 67).  
Simultaneous with the declining of gas fields, is the timing of government 
decisions to provide more stable investment in order to develop new ones to meet 
growing demands with the lowest cost (Bahgat, 2011:13–14) as discovering new 
gas reserves is the lifeblood of the industry, otherwise the industry would die 
(Inkpen & H. Moffett, 2011: 5) so, low gas price is always a complex issue 
(Inkpen & H. Moffett, 2011: 71). 
In two interviews on 4th and 14th March 2012, Peimani (annex 1) and also 
Howard Rogers (annex 1) argued that the investment within the Persian Gulf 
gas reserves is the least expensive compared with other areas worldwide, so the 
final gas price would be cheaper for importers, like the EU.  
However, Anne Korine (annex 1), in an email communication on 5th March 2012, 
argues that despite abundant natural gas deposits in Iran and Qatar and the low 
cost to gas producers, however, “we cannot be certain the cost to gas consumers 
will be low as well, such as Saudi oil are $2 a barrel, yet the spot price is above 
$100”.  
The LNG market has been tightening since 2010 as a result of the greater 
demand for LNG in Japan in the aftermath of the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi, 
political unrest in some Arab countries in North Africa (Kitasei, 2012), 
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recovering of the global economy after recession in 2009, growing requirements 
in Europe (IGU World LNG Report, 2010: 29; US EIA 2011: 47) and LNG 
markets likely to need additional liquefaction capacity until and after 2015 to fill 
the gap between liquefaction and regasification capacities (IGU, 2010: 35), 
making the security of fresh gas supplies once again a top priority. If the global 
economy grows by an average of 2.5% a year from 2010 to 2015 ( IEA, 2009: 365 
& 425) so, the price of hydrocarbon, particularly natural gas is significant, for 
this reason the importance of a cheap gas holder, like Iran, is twofold in the 
coming years (Rogers, 2012: 168–174).  
With 40% of the world’s proven natural gas reserves, the Middle East and 
particularly the Persian Gulf region accounts for the largest increase in regional 
gas production, while more than 55% of Middle East gas production belongs to 
Iran and Qatar (annexes 6, 7&16) and both are the top two gas producers in the 
Middle East/Persian Gulf by 2035 (US EIA 2011: 53). 
4.2.4. Gas plans within the Persian Gulf states, excluding Iran and Qatar 
New gas developments are planned in the Persian Gulf countries over the next 
5–10 years to increase their gas productions for internal use and export the 
surplus, as well (Oil & Energy Trends, October 2011: 7). 
While the exploitation of Saudi Arabia’s natural gas reserves, 40% non–
associated and 60% associated (Dargin, 2008: 21), are rather expensive (US EIA 
2011: 54) and more complex than other regional countries (Fredrik Palm, 2007: 
52), it has some plans to raise its gas production in its non–associated Karan gas 
field in the Persian Gulf, out of its three off–shore gas fields, comprising sour gas 
fields Arabiyah and Hasbahby 2016 and developments of the Rub’ al–Khali along 
the kingdom’s southern border as well (Oil and Energy Trends, October 2011: 7–
8). However, this country’s gas policy in coming years is not based on natural gas 
exports that might reduce international demand for Saudi’s oil (US EIA 2011: 54) 
and even turn in to the gas importer for their huge domestic use (Oil and Energy 
Trends, August 2011: 7–8) that is forecast to double by 2025 (M. Wietfeld, 2011: 
206). 
 186 
 
Kuwait also hopes for development of the Dorra field, which lies off–shore in the 
Persian Gulf, while being held up by disagreements with Saudi Arabia and Iran 
over the demarcation of this field’s boundaries and while the United Arab 
Emirates decides to develop its Shah sour non–associated gas field, but both Abu 
Dhabi and Kuwait are net importers of gas (Oil and Energy Trends, October 
2011: 7–8). 
The LNG plant at Das Island, in the United Arab Emirates, has been the centre 
of the off–shore gas infrastructure since 1977 by ADGAS (Abu Dhabi Gas 
Liquefaction Co.), producing and exporting LNG primarily to Japan (M. Wietfeld, 
2011: 225) and plans to develop its LNG production despite the high cost of its 
gas production, nearly 2.08 $/MBtu among the other regional gas holders 
(Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1518–1528), but not before 2019 (M. Wietfeld, 2011: 222) 
though this country is predicted to face a gas deficit of 1.5 bcf/d by 2017 (Dargin, 
2008: 9) and must increase imports from Qatar via the Dolphin Project, new 
imports from Iran, like the Salman pipeline, or produce more NG internally 
(Dargin, 2008:51).  
According to BP (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011), Oman has 
expanded its gas production, a more than three–fold increase from 2000 (annex 
6), to South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Spain, France, and the US. However, its gas 
development depends on production of tight gas reservoirs, to some extent like 
Saudi Arabia, which are geologically more difficult to access than conventional 
gas reserves, and this led to the signing of a production sharing contract with BP 
in 2007 for development of the Khazzan/Makarem tight gas fields (Dargin, 2008: 
11). 
On the other hand, based on Oman’s ambitious “Oman 2020”, domestic gas 
demand has been enhanced (Dargin, 2008: 52), as two–thirds of total energy 
consumption comes from natural gas(M. Wietfeld, 2011: 222), and will rise to 
16.5 bcm/a and 20 bcm/a by 2013 and 2020 respectively (EIA, 2009b), so this 
country has been importing gas from Qatar via the Dolphin pipeline since 
October 2008 (M. Wietfeld, 2011: 224) to fulfil its LNG export commitments, 
managed by Oman LNG and Qalhat LNG.  
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In Oman, like Saudi Arabia, natural gas is the main commodity for the future 
domestic energy consumption and that leaves more oil for export (M. Wietfeld, 
2011: 222). 
Unlike Qatar, in other LNG producers within the GCC, alongside some other 
Middle East states, the low percentage of non–associated gas reserves and 
growing domestic demands, have resulted in natural gas and LNG imports (US 
EIA, January 2011; Abi–Aad, 2009: 6) and that is unlikely to change in the 
future (US EIA, 2011: 62). 
However, based on an interview with El–Katiri, on 9th February 2012 (annex 1), 
“the regional gas market within the Persian Gulf has been strongly politicised, so, 
these Arab Persian Gulf states are not keen to become import–dependent on 
another GCC country, in this case Qatar. So, currently, Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates import LNG via contracts with Shell and Vitol as well, which are 
at far better terms than what Qatar had originally offered”. 
Iraq, as the more Persian Gulf littoral state, has a number of natural gas fields, 
comprising Akkas, Mansuriyah and Siba with the capacity of 11 tcf (Oil & 
Energy Trends, 19.11. 2011: 7) and produces gas from the three large southern 
oilfields of Rumailah, Zubair and West Qurnah–I (Oil & Energy Trends, 
18.06.2010: 7), but this country faces two main problems; widespread lack of 
power (Oil & Energy Trends, 19. 11.2011: 7) and considerable local opposition 
over the involvement of foreign companies, such as that which arose against the 
recent agreement over the development of the Akkas field in the troubled Al–
Anbar province (Oil & Energy Trends, 19. 11.2011:8) so, it could be imagined 
that Baghdad would be a quite minor contributor to regional gas supplies during 
the forthcoming two decades (US EIA 2011: 53).  
In addition, like oilfield development, there is a dispute between the Iraqi 
government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), whereas the KRG 
wants to develop various fields in Kurdistan for export, Baghdad’s priority is the 
internal gas market (Oil & Energy Trends, 19.11.2011：8) 
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4.2.5. Persian Gulf’s challenges against its natural gas outlook 
While the Persian Gulf has the highest natural gas reserves worldwide, it only 
accounts for roughly 12% of global production (M. Wietfeld, 2011:206) as it faces 
a number of internal and external challenges in order to increase its own natural 
gasand LNG exports in the future and also improve its ranking within the global 
gas market: 
 Unstable political environment (Maloney, 2010: 55) and security 
challenges, such as the dispute over the Iranian nuclear and missile 
programmes, as well as political fragility and instability in some 
regional Arab countries, like Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. 
These have led to intensify the balance of power system and securitise 
energy within the Persian Gulf (Husseinis, 2007), based on mistrust 
and a zero–sum game (Bauer, 2011). So, apart from some disparities 
within the GCC, these countries, Iran, and Iraq have been competitors 
rather than partners in the energy sector (Bauer et al. 2010: 7). 
However, the interests of all countries in the region should be to look 
for realistic solutions by extending political and economic bridges 
(Husseinis, 2007) and the GCC, particularly due to geographical 
proximity, should try to serve as an intermediary, along with the EU, 
as the Western mediator between the US and Iran over its nuclear 
dispute( Al–Munajjed, 2009: 6); as a result, within the framework of 
such this space, as during the 1990s, Tehran and the GCC could talk 
about confidence building, mutual defence pacts, and cooperation over 
the regional security matters (Ehteshami, 2003: 268); 
 Subsequent to Al–Katiri’s remark (interview, 2012), over “the 
politicisation of the Persian Gulf gas market”, as the “Gulf of Politics”, 
according to Howard Rogers (interview, 2012), any decision regarding 
the production, price, trade, and investment in this region has been 
made on the basis of political and strategic considerations, rather than 
“supply and demand equilibrium” (Bahgat, 2011: 82);  
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 Failure to attract sufficient levels of international investment, because 
of imposing restrictions on Western investment and presence (Young, 
2009: 57), unstable regional situations and some governmental rules, 
preventing a suitable partnership by the Oil International Companies 
(OIC) or other overseas energy companies (G.Victor et al. 2006), despite 
the economic venture in the Persian Gulf region, for instance Saudi 
Arabia rejects any foreign investment in upstream projects (exploration 
and development), while Iran and Kuwait impose strict conditions on 
foreign participation, so most capital goes to other areas (Bahgat, 2011). 
Notwithstanding some Middle Eastern gas producers suppose that 
foreign direct investment (FDI) would be unpopular with their people 
(Young, 2009: 54), but Qatar and the United Arab Emirates with 
exceedingly authoritarian regimes have been open to overseas ventures 
in their oil and gas sectors (Young, 2009: 57). 
 High indigenous gas demand (M. Wietfeld, 2011: 203–228), however 
domestic gas consumption differs from one country to another one, for 
instance the most internal demand belongs to Iran, but other littoral 
states have already faced growing demands as well and these will rise 
in the future. Qatar, contrary to other ones, and Oman, to some extent, 
have LNG productions which are higher than consumption, while its 
demands have been steadily rising and will continue to do so in future, 
so the latter has to import gas from the former; 
Map 7: Production and domestic consumption in Persian Gulf countries (bcm) 
 
Source: M. Wietfeld, 2011: 207 (based on BP, 2010: 24 & 27; CEDIGAZ, 2009: 10 & 34) 
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 Energy inefficiency and dependence on hydrocarbon consumption, 
although there is a fast growing awareness of the potential of 
renewable energy sources in the Persian Gulf, especially solar and 
wind energies, particularly by the establishment of the EU–GCC Clean 
Energy Network Project launched at the end of 2009 (Bauer et al. 2010: 
7). Accordingly, Saudi Arabia plans to be a main centre for solar energy 
research and also Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, as the headquarters of 
the United Nations International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 
and the world’s first city that will fully depend on renewable energy 
sources are two more examples in this respect. Iran has invested in 
renewable energy sources, especially solar plants, and inaugurated a 
huge solar power plant in Shiraz in 1391/2012, as the first solar plant 
in the Middle East, and was joined to this club after the US, Spain and 
Germany (IRINN.ir, 16.01.1391/ 04.04.2012). Hence, energy efficiency 
and development of renewable energy sources in the Persian Gulf 
states could save their natural resources for export and guarantee 
hydrocarbon supplies for the region (Al–Munajjed, 2009: 10 & 11).   
 The emergence or expansion of other LNG developers, such as the US, 
with unconventional gas, and Australia (Abi–Aad, 2009: 6). 
It is obvious that the Persian Gulf states should remove these obstacles locally 
with collaboration with each other and also internationally with the partnership 
of influential players. This trend could accelerate the emergence or expansion of 
regional natural gas plans and help security of supply. 
4.3 Geo–politics of natural gas in Islamic Republic of Iran 
In an increasing energy–hungry world with the new emerging economies, energy 
development and the best transport routes have been important (Akhlaghi, 2009). 
So, Iran has some prominent features with its global geo–political position and 
geo–strategic importance based on its hydrocarbon reserves (Rogers, 2012: 168–
174).It is the only bridge between the Middle East/Persian Gulfin the south and 
Central Asia/the Caspian Sea in the north, with over half of the world’s known 
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hydrocarbon reserves (K. Kashgari, 2011) and the short and cheap energy 
corridor for Caspian, and to some extent, Persian Gulf basins. It, moreover, aims 
to transfer hydrocarbons to India subcontinent, Far East, Europe and Africa 
with the current broad pipelines, potential LNG and facilities alongside the 
skilled workers (Mojtahed Zadeh, 1389/2010: 268). Therefore, while the northern 
parts of this country are parts of the heartland, Iran’s position has played the 
role of the Rimland of this heartland with the 1,259 km coastline along the 
Persian Gulf, according to Spykman (Taghavi–Asl, 2008: 49–52) and situated at 
the centre of the “Energy Ellipse”, according to Geoffrey Kemp (Kemp & Harkavy, 
1997: 111). These figures were highlighted in John Woolf’s remarks (Woolf, 2000), 
as the US’ representative in the Caspian Sea seminar in London over the role of 
Iran between the two most important huge energy basins in the 21st century. 
According to the US Department of Energy’s report (US.EIA, 2007), EIA (EIA 
International Energy Outlook 2011: 64) and Oil and Gas Journal (Oil and Gas 
Journal, as of January 2012 in table 21), Iran owns the world’s second biggest 
natural gas reserves, with 17.3% of the global known reserves (annex 20).                                                        
The majority of Iranian natural gas reserves are situated in South and North 
Pars, Kish, Kangan–Nar, Golshan, Ferdowsi, Aghar, Dalan, and in the lesser 
fields, such as Homa, Khouzestan, Kish, Mozdouran, Nar and Kangan, Sarajeh, 
Sarkhoun, Shanol, Shourijeh, Tabnak and Varavi (Oil and Gas Journal, as of 
January 2010). However, the bulk of 62% of these deposits remains unexploited 
(US EIA, 2007; BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009), for example Kish, 
with estimated reserves of 50 tcf, is expected to produce 3 Bcf/d of gas with two 
phases in 2016 while other of Iran’s gas projects, such as Golshan, Ferdowsi, and 
North Pars gas fields are unlikely to come in to operation until the next decade 
(http://www.eia.gov/countries/IRI). 
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Map 8: Iran’s proven hydrocarbon reserves and existing infrastructure
 
Source: Policy Brief (2008), Issue No. 6, Centre for Iranian Studies, School of Government and International 
Affairs, Durham University: 4 
Moreover, regarding the field size and the amount of non–associate gas Iran is a 
world leader (Chapter 5). 
According to figure 47, Iran’s natural gas reserves are predominantly located off–
shore, more than 68%, although more than 85% of these reserves are non– 
associated gas (figure 42). The South Pars, as the largest non–associated gas 
field in the world, is the name of the Northern portion of the joint field with the 
Qatari North Dome in the Iranian territory, discovered in 1990 and located 62  
miles off–shore in the Persian Gulf (Mashal,08.04.2011: 2). It needs a $50 bn 
spending programme to complete the development of this giant field (Oil & 
Energy Trends, 16.04.2010: 8) so, according to Mousa Souri, General Manager of 
the Pars Oil and Gas Company, the South Pars would be worth roughly $8,800 
bn and it would be more than Iran’s oil revenue since the exploration of crude oil 
in this country at the beginning of the 1900s and also cost nearly 100 years of oil 
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exports based on $100 for each barrel (“Gas hidden war” (1390/2012), Iran 
Economics, No. 156, Bahman/ February). 
4.3.1. Islamic Republic of Iran’s regional pipeline projects   
Under Article 229 of the “Fifth 
Development Programme 2010–2015”, 
10% of Iran’s annual oil income has 
been devoted to the development of the 
South Pars, which started production in 
early 2002 and the 24 phases should be 
in operation by the end of the 
programme (Mashal,08.04.2011: 2) .  
According to table 17, five of the first 
eight blocks in the South Pars are 
designated for domestic markets and 
three of which for oil field reinjection. 
Any more exports primarily depend on 
blocks 9 and 10. A number of LNG projects have been proposed as well, however, 
only one LNG project still remains in place, Iran LNG in phase 12, and sanctions 
continue to delay the development of these projects. The other LNG projects in 
the South Pars, including Pars LNG (the South Pars’ phase 11) and Persian LNG 
(the South Pars’ phases 13 &14) have been on hold as a result of financing 
difficulties and political disputes (www.eia.gov/countries/ IRI). 
So, the first 10 phases of theSouth Pars have been inaugurated from 2001 until 
2007 and also the phases of this huge complex will probably increase to 28 (Usefi 
& Naderian, 2011: 98) in order to increase production capacity from 260 bcm/y to 
1410 bcm/y during the future decade (Usefi & Naderian, 2011: 103).  
Ayatollah Khamenei, in the first week of the 1390, Iran’s solar calendar, (March 
2011) visited different natural gasand LNG projects and stages in the South Pars 
region personally showing the significance of the progress of these plans in line 
with Iran’s Energy Outlook. 
Figure 47: Composition of Iranian 
natural gas reserves 
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Table 17: The South Pars’ project phases 
 
Source: By Author, based on the US, EIA at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IR& www.nigec.ir/ 
Howard Rogers (interview, 2012) explains that “Many International Oil 
Companies’ have long hoped to be able to access to the on–shore and off–shore oil 
and gas development opportunities in Iran, particularly LNG development on 
the South Pars field, as an attractive opportunity”.  
Iran’s history of utilising natural gas dates back to 1873 where it was used for 
fuelling street lamps (Hariri et al. 2011: 1), while Iran’s gas exports started 
around 1344/1965 from Khouzestan province to USSR via the 1106 km–long 
pipeline, but until 1983, most of the gas produced in Iran was associated from 
the major common oil and gas fields, generally used for gas injection to oilfields, 
and this production increased slowly but steadily through the 1980s thanks to 
the development of a number of on–shore and non–associated gas fields. This 
trend continued to grow through the remainder of the 1990s (BP 2010: 24).  
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Iran’s gas production has risen strongly since 2002 and there are a number of 
regional and ultra–regional plans under consideration and under construction, 
including pipelines and LNG that are set to be online for a further sharp rise in 
gas production, and the start of exporting gas on a large scale, while, given these 
giant hydrocarbon deposits and geo–political location, this country is now 
considered an energy superpower (M.P. Amineh & O.H. Holman, 2010: 63; Luft, 
2011). 
Development of the South Pars has shifted the focus of Iran’s energy policy from 
oil to a balance between oil and gas exports (Crane et al. 2008: 71), but some of 
these plans are already behind schedule or held up because of political and 
technological concerns (Oil & Energy Trends, 18.02.2011: 5).  
Iran has currently an extensive gas domestic pipeline system, more than 33,000 
km, connecting most of the urban and rural areas (Shana News, 1390.01.14/ 
01.04.2011) and should increase up to 70,000 km by 1404 (2023) (Imam, 
1390/2011: 10). 
Moreover, these domestic pipelines have partially extended to the neighbours. 
The 745 mile long Iran–Turkey pipeline, completed in 2001, and the 87 mile long 
Iran–Armenia pipeline can transport up to 1.4 bcf/d and 86 mcf/d of natural gas, 
respectively, to be added to by another gas pipeline currently under construction 
from Khoi in north–west Iran to Republic of Azerbaijan (http://www.nigec.ir/). 
Iran’s gas authority decided to develop IGAT (Iranian Gas Trunkline) pipeline 
series from South Pars (map 8). Accordingly, IGAT–7 (2011) transports up to 3 
Bcf/d of gas along southern Iran, between Assaluyeh (the South Pars’ gas fields) 
and Iranshahr. IGAT–8 (2012/2013) will run nearly 650 miles to Iran’s northern 
consumption centres, including Tehran. IGAT–9 or Persian pipeline, which is 
1863 km long, is set to primarily send $8 bn worth of gas from Assaluyeh to the 
north–western city of Bazargan, near the Turkey border by around 2013 and this 
volume could increase up to 30–35 bcm/y under plans to export to Europe 
(www.nigec.ir/projects), more than the potential Nabucco and Gazprom South 
Stream’s capacities (Molavi & Shareef, 2008: 6) aided collaboration of foreign 
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investors and local contractors (www.nigec.ir/projects). So, negotiations started 
in the middle of the 2000s, with Greece, Austria, Italy, Germany, and 
Switzerland, while France and Spain will be added to these countries 
(http://www.nigec.ir/projects & www.eia.gov). Gas export to Switzerland (EGL) 
from IGAT–9 is set to export 5.5 bcm/yr natural gas to Switzerland and 
elsewhere in Europe for a 25–year period. In addition, Gas export to Austria 
(Econgas Pipeline), originating from IGAT–9, is expected to contribute in the 
Nabucco consortium from the Caspian Sea’s gas basin to Europe 
(http://www.nigec.ir/projects) whereas, the potential 3,900km Turkmenistan–
Iran–Turkey–Europe gas pipeline with the help of Shell, could also supply up to 
30 bcm, as an alternative for Nabucco (Molavi & Shareef, 2008: 6). The IGAT–10, 
however, is still in the planning phase and is unlikely to become operational 
before 2017 (www.eia.gov). 
Iran, moreover, predicts that by 2014 it will be exporting natural gas to some 
Persian Gulf states, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and 
Oman (Tehran Times, 03.09.2010). On this basis, Iran and Kuwait have been 
holding talks on the construction of a 570 km–long pipeline, but the two sides 
have yet to agree on the gas price and governing rules. There have been 
negotiations between Bahrain and Iran to transport up to 10 bcm/y of natural 
gas over a 25–year period, but there have been inconsistencies after bilateral 
political tensions in February 2009 and domestic instability in Bahrain since 
February 2011. 
A negative example of the relationship between Iran and the United Arab 
Emirates is the contract, signed between The National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC) and the United Arab Emirates–based Crescent Petroleum Company, 
which resulted in arbitration proceedings in 2009 over unresolved disagreements 
about the gas price, but the positive aspect, is an memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) in September 2009 between the National Iranian Gas Exports Company 
(NIGEC) and a foreign company aimed at exporting gas to the United Arab 
Emirates over a 25–year period.  
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Given Oman’s LNG units and industries, it would be Iran’s potential gas client 
in the Persian Gulf region. However, the dispute over the gas price has yet to 
finalise an agreement between these two countries. 
In an electronic interview on 7th March 2012, Prof. Giamoco Luciani (annex1) 
argued that “the probable lack of serious determination to export on the Iranian 
part by squeezing of the customers, while natural gas is a competitive business, 
is a barrier against Tehran’s gas export prospects”, while Ledesma (annex1) in 
an email communication on 16th February 2012 insists on this point and believes 
that “following Iran’s ability to secure LNG technical skills, it would be a secure 
market for LNG on a long–term basis”. 
Iran, moreover, plans to start exporting 8.7 bcm/y piped gas to Pakistan in a 25–
year deal (Shana Petroleum New Agency, 29/02/2012) by the middle of 2012, 
while the bilateral disagreements have been resolved, according to Hamid 
Ahmadi Sharaf, the project manager of Iran’s gas export to Pakistan, (Mashal, 
08.03.1390/ May, 2011: 5) by extension of Iran’s domestic IGAT–7 pipeline into 
Pakistan (http://www.eia.gov/countries/IRI). However, this could be extended 
further to India through a 1,724–mile IPI or Peace Pipeline from the South Pars 
by 2014, while Delhi has some dispute with Tehran over the gas prices and 
transit fees through Pakistan’s soil, apart from Washington’s pressure on Indian 
officials to cancel this project. Consequently, Iran and India started discussions 
on an off–shore route through the Sea of Oman (bypassing Pakistan). So, if Iran 
could succeed in transferring its gas to Pakistan and India, it could promote 
peace within South Asia, leading to an increase in Iran’s international position 
(Kandiyoti, 2008: 111). 
Iran’s swap contract with Turkmenistan followed by inauguration of the 
Dauletabad–Sarakhs–Khangiran pipeline in early January 2010, produced a 
more regional gas program, connecting Iran’s northern Caspian region to 
Turkmenistan’s gas field. Iran, moreover, signed another contract with Republic 
of Azerbaijan in December 2009 over the 1,400km Kazi–Magomed–Astara 
pipeline after another swap contract with Baku in 2002 (nigec.ir/default) 
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Nevertheless, National Iranian Gas Exports Company proposed that Iran and 
Russia could reach a durable bilateral swap agreement, based on mutual 
national, as well as European interests. Accordingly, Iran’s northern countries 
receive roughly 10 bcm/y natural gas from Russian Gasprom and Tehran exports 
a similar amount of natural gas to Europe (nigec.ir/default). 
Additionally, the governments of Iran, Iraq and Syria on 03.05.1390/ 25 July 
2011 have signed a draft to build the 1500 km–long Islamic pipeline aimed to 
transport 110 mcm/d natural gas from the South Pars to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon 
and then extending to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, bypassing Turkey, by 
sending roughly 68–80 mcm/d out of 110 mcm/d to this continent (Oji, 
25.02.1390/15.05. 2011: 5). However, this project has been suspended a result of 
the turmoil in Syria since March 2011 (http://www.eia.gov/countries/IRI). 
Although, Javad Oji, the General Mamager of National Iranian Gas Company 
(NIGC) argued in Iranian senior energy managers’ summit that “Iran must 
export gas to the EU via Iraq, Syria and Turkey by two independent ways” 
(Shana Energy News Agency, 27.10.1390). 
Map 9 illustrates the whole of Iran’s current and coming pipelines and LNG 
projects to be added to by LNG exports to the EU in the future, and in order to 
realize these projects, Tehran’s top officials approved a grand energy outlook up 
to the middle of the next decade. 
Map 9: Iran’s natural gas and LNG projects 
 
Source: Ghasemzadeh, Davood (2005), “Natural Gas Industry in Iran”, Baker Institute for Public Policy, 
Houston, Texas, the US, 5th May: 22 
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4.3.2. Islamic Republic of Iran’s Grand Energy Outlook Document by 1404/2023 
The government has recognised the economic and political benefits of utilising 
natural gas for Iran’s domestic consumption, as well as export purposes, a fact 
clearly illustrated in the 20–Year Outlook Plan (2005–2025). On the basis of 
“Iran’s 20–Year Outlook Document” issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader in 2003 
(1382.09.11), the Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution, moreover, was amended 
in 2004 to allow the privatisation of the state–run companies as an important 
step toward the realisation of the aims of this document, including energy firms. 
So, this modification was followed by Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei’s 
recommendation to the government in 2007; as a result, the officials have 
announced a reduction in state–ownership in the economy by 20% in 2015. 
The four main targets in this document are related to the energy policy that 
Tehran should achieve by until 2025, so Iran must be: 
   The first producer of petrochemical products in the region;  
 
  The second largest oil producer within the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) with a capacity of 7% of global market 
demand (of course before the recent oil sanction having started in July 
2012); 
 
  Third largest gas producer in the world with 8% to 10% of global 
market, putting Iran in the second position of gas exporters 
worldwide;  
 
  First place in the area of oil and gas technology in the region 
(www.mop.ir).  
Iran’s Majlis or Parliament Energy Commission in 1387/2008 called for the 
Ministry of Petroleum, the Ministry of Power and some other organizations to 
study a medium/long– term energy plan, based on the 20–Year Outlook Plan, 
leading to publication of “Iran’s 20–year Energy Grand Strategy Document”, as 
the Iran’s energy roadmap for the use of all available capacities in the energy 
sector (www.vision1404.ir). 
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Iran’s “Fifth Five–Year Development Plan (2010–2015)” is part of the “20–Year 
Outlook Plan (2005–2025)”, which is the country’s main blueprint for long–term 
sustainable growth.  
Based on Iran’s gas export outlook, published by Ministry of Petroleum during 
the LNG conference in Tehran, October 2011 (figure 48), until the beginning of 
the 7th development plan, starting in 1400/2021, this country should increase 
natural gas and LNG exports to other importers in order to achieve the third 
energy target of “Iran’s 20–Year Outlook Document” and strengthen its market 
position (Soligo in G.Victor et al. 2006). That requires, according to Mostafa 
Kashkooli, deputy of National Iranian Gas Company, the need to reinforce 
infrastructures, including refineries, transmission networks, etc. (Kashkooli, 
04.03.2012: 5). 
Figure 48: Iran’s natural gas and LNG export schedule, 2008–2021 
 
Source: Iran’s LNG conference, Tehran, October 2011 
Evidence given by Javad Oji (annex 1) in an interview on 15th April 2011 and 
also a personal conversation on the fringe of the “the role of Iran’s natural gas in 
global energy security” Conference, which took place in Tehran, he argued that, 
while global gas demand will dramatically rise by 2020 and 2030, based on Iran’s 
1404/ 2023 Energy Outlook, upstream and downstream gas industries should 
attract the necessary investment from existing $37 bn to $101 bn. On this basis, 
if the phasing out subsidy process is implemented properly, then it could lead to 
more fuel efficiency and energy saving with more orientation towards exports 
through pipelines, as well as LNG shipments (Oji, 10th July 2011: 5). 
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4.3.3. LNG projects in Islamic Republic of Iran          
Iran has a number of plans to construct and develop its LNG projects and make 
use of them in addition to the mentioned pipeline projects.  
In a conversation on 13th January 2012, Dr. Mohsen Ghamsari (annex 1) argued 
that “an inevitable way for Iran to hold 8%–10% of global gas trade in the future 
is access to and rapid development of LNG industry, because of its flexibility, 
trading with wider range of gas consumers, achievement of high–tech LNG 
industry, more bargaining power against the ultra–regional buyers (C. Jansen & 
Seebregts, 2010: 1656), earning of higher export revenues, as well as better 
political relationship with other countries due to sign longer term contracts”. 
Luft and Korine also believed (2009: 13) that “without LNG there would be no 
way for Iran to sell its gas to some far–distance importers in the east like China, 
and to the west, like EU countries in order to increase its share in global gas 
market in the future”.  
Clément Therme (annex 1) in an interview on 25th May, 2012, confirmed this 
point and argued that Iran should try and ensure that the imposed sanctions be 
lifted in order to develop its LNG industry, coincidental with containing 
progressive domestic gas demand. So, in this case, Tehran could increase its 
share in global gas markets and participate in the GECF more actively. 
That is because, Iranian Oil Minister, Rostam Qassemi, in Iran’s LNG 
Conference which took place in October 2011, in Tehran, called LNG a 
“strategically important issue”, leading to improve Iran’s position within the 
international gas market. He added that “pipelines meets domestic needs and 
transfer natural gas to the neighboring countries, even though LNG helps to 
diversify of the country’s energy basket and helps access to remote areas” (Shana 
Energy News Agency, 24th and 25th October 2011).  
Ghamsari (interview, 2012) also believed these remote areas should be Asian and 
European LNG markets, while the global markets face a shortage of LNG supply 
after 2013, due to the late arrival of new capacities, fuel switching in Japan, the 
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EU’s tendency to reduce its dependence on Russian piped gas, etc., so “without 
LNG industry, Iran is not powerful enough”.  
The National Iranian Gas Company, a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil 
Company and as the body responsible for Iran’s gas infrastructures, was created 
in 2003 and manages and supervises all Iran’s gas pipeline and LNG projects, 
while since May 2010, the Ministry of Petroleum transferred the National 
Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC) under the National Iranian Gas 
Company’s supervision in an attempt to carry out LNG investments and projects 
on behalf of the National Iranian Oil Company, as well as taking responsibility 
for Iranian gas marketing and sales all over the world (US EIA 2011: 52). 
Furthermore, the National Iranian South Oil Company (NISOC), as the 
subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company, is responsible for much of the 
southern gas production, but the entire South Pars project is managed by the 
Pars Oil and Gas Company (POGC), a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil 
Company, and the Pars Oil and Gas Company is responsible for dividing of 
upstream and downstream LNG developments in the South Pars amongst the 
various companies. Iran’s LNG production will come from different projects, each 
associated with a phase of the South Pars development: Pars LNG (phase 11), 
Iran LNG (phase 12), and Persian LNG (phases 13 and 14). 
Table 18: Iran’s LNG projects 
 
 SP: The South Pars 
Source: by Author, based on MoP, NIOC, NIGC data; Platts, 2010: 10 
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If Iran’s currently planned LNG projects together with those under construction 
come in operation, it would be among the top five exporters worldwide by 2020, 
providing that Tehran is able to attract the required investment, finance, and 
technology from international institutions and companies and achieves its aims 
to participate in the international LNG chain with the appropriate time scale. 
This is according to the personal comments, in an interview by the author with 
Dr. Hossein Iranmanesh (annex 1), the Head of the Institute for International 
Energy Studies, in Tehran, in the sideline of the 8th International Energy 
Conference in Tehran, Iran, on 24–26 May 2011.   
Hence, if Iran follows a moderate approach and takes steps in order to attract 
the required investment and reduce the political tensions, the whole of the 
National Iranian Gas Export Company’s plans for LNG and piped gas exports 
could be realised by 2021. In that case “Iran’s Energy Outlook on the Horizon of 
1404/2023” regarding gas export could fully materialised. However, some of these 
plans, based on the mentioned approach and scenario, like Pars LNG and to 
some extent, Iran LNG, have not yet commenced in 2012 and some have even 
been suspended. Nevertheless, Tehran has the potential to accelerate its 
progress, particularly after 2013, based on the red line (figure 49). 
Figure 49: Natural gas and LNG exports projects by NIGEC, 2001–2027 
 
Source: Hariri et al. 2011, Idam Consulting Group: 16 
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4.3.4. Islamic Republic of Iran’s main obstacles against its piped gas and LNG 
targets by 2023 
As Bahgat (2010: 333–347) and a lot of experts and even policy–makers argue 
that Iran’s goal to become a major global natural gasand LNG exporter has been 
restricted and hindered by two main impediments, including high domestic 
consumption and foreign sanctions, so, Iran cannot fully utilise its massive gas 
resources without the necessary foreign investment and technology. 
Iran is also the Middle East/Persian Gulf’s largest user of re–injected natural gas 
for enhanced oil recovery operations and this will continue to rise until 2020 (US 
EIA, 2011: 54). 
Figure 50: Iranian marketed natural gas production and consumption, 2000–2010 
 
Source: The US EIA at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IR 
For the time being, around 65 million people, out of nearly 77 million total 
population, in Iran use natural gas as the main fuel (Shana Energy News Agency, 
19.10.1390) but as a result of the heavy public subsidies and low gas price 
(Bahgat, 2010: 333–347) this resulted in energy inefficiency (M. Wietfeld, 2011: 
210). Iran’s Majlis on 5th January 2010 ratified the subsidy reform plan which 
aimed to bring prices to the real market level by the end of the fifth development 
plan, 2010–2015, (Tehran Times, 25.01.2010). As a result, high domestic gas 
consumption in Iran, has started to ease since 2010 (BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy, June 2011), for instance, gas consumption in winter 1389/2011 
fell around 1.5% to 5% in comparison with the same time in 1388/2010 (Mashal, 
01.05. 2011: 5). 
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The Institute for International Energy Studies, in Iran, in its unpublished recent 
report in 2011 (Usefi & Naderian, 2011: 209) argued that while this country has 
been an importer of natural gas, but with respect to the huge reserves, its 
outlook and plans, as well as the fall in domestic consumption by the reduction 
or stopping of the gas subsidy, the country is seeking to actively participate in 
export markets in the future. 
Lovatt (2010: 4), moreover pointed to gas flaring, as another evidence of 
inefficiency, while roughly 150 bcm/y of gas is flared globally, Iran was foremost 
at 10.3 bcm/y in 2008. 
The Iranian gas sector is in need of modernisation, alternative sources of energy, 
more energy efficiency in order to fulfil domestic energy demand without 
endangering export capacity (P. Amineh & H. Holman, 2010: 60), as well as 
requiring widespread foreign investments for gas reserves to be developed 
(Bahgat, 2011: 65), as National Iranian oil Company lacks the necessary capital 
and technologies to develop new gas fields (Crane et al. 2008: 68). 
Moreover, Iran has paid more attention to renewable energy sources, like solar, 
according to Javad Oji (Shana Energy News Agency, 19.10.1390) and this has 
considerable potential for using non–hydrocarbon, as well as impacting on 
energy conservation (Rogers, 2012: 168–174 )  
Iran’s gas production, on the other hand, has increased by over 550% since 1990 
(http://www.eia.gov/countries/IRI) and even increased strongly in 2009 and 2010 
(BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011), ranking Iran as the fourth 
global gas producer. This country’s gas production during the 41 years up to 1389 
(2010) was around 1,860 bcm, while Iran’s production in 1389 (2010) was 9% of 
this total number, equivalent to the first 20 years of production, because of the 
increase of production from the 6th, 7th, and 8th and also inauguration of the 9th 
and 10 phases of the South Pars (Mashal 22.03.1390/12.06.2011: 5). Iranian 
production of gas is expected to increase over the next few years due to 
continuing discoveries in Persian Gulf reserves, particularly the South Pars (Oil 
& Gas Directory Middle East, 2011: 1075) so, the Ministry of Petroleum 
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announced that Iran could reach its planned gas production from around 219 
bcm/y in 2011 to between 400 bcm/y and 440 bcm/y until the end of the 20–Year 
Energy Outlook (www.nigec.ir/default) and export even more than 200  bcm/y 
(Oji, 29th July 2011: 5), while the capacity of gas production in 1385/2004 was 
350 mcm/d (Oji, 10th  July 2011: 5).  
However, so any rise in Iran’s gas production is related to the structural 
industrial and technological changes and more attractive rules (Aarts & Van 
Duijne, 2009: 74) the aim is to absorb $200 bn of investment by the end of the 
Five–Year Development Plan in 2015 for the whole energy industry (Oil & Gas 
Directory Middle East, 2011: 1075). Iran’s Oil Minister, Rostam Qasemi, stated 
that $40 bn was needed for the development of the new Iran’s oil and gas fields. 
Given that Iran’s constitution bans foreign companies from holding shares in 
Iran’s reserves or participating in the form of Production–Sharing Agreements 
(PSAs), some believe that this law is a barrier against the flow of foreign capital 
(M. Wietfeld, 2011: 214). Nevertheless, Tehran has developed the third 
generation of buy–back contracts and “sweetened” them with more incentives, 
such as raising the rate of return (Bahgat, 2010), as well as lengthening the 
number of years of buyback (Fesharaki, 2007: 31–33). 
Howard Rogers (interview, 2012) describes the buy–back scheme as an 
unattractive and inappropriate method of attracting foreign capitals, while “a 
more progressive and risk–sharing framework allows the International Oil 
Companies’ to operate production projects on a long–term basis, being a 
necessary component of successful Iranian LNG development”. 
Clément Therme (interview, 2012) counted the buy–back contract, in addition 
the imposed sanctions against Iran, as an impediment against venture flow, 
while “it only allows the investor to pay off its investment and generate profits 
based on the performance of the field it puts in production”. 
Iran has been under various US sanctions since 1979, like The Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), prohibiting US and other energy companies from 
participating in oil and gas projects, denying Iran access to some of the 
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technology it needs to develop its gas fields, even though over 50 countries have 
invested in Iran’s gas industry during the period 1992 to 2008 (Groot, 2010: 64–
65). This has led to Tehran’s approach changing toward cooperation with 
Brazilian, Russian, Chinese, and Malaysian corporations which do not possess 
the more advanced Western technology (Bahgat, 2010; Amineh, 2010: 61). 
The United Nations Security Council, moreover, imposed some more sanctions 
against Tehran owing to its nuclear programme, including 1737 (23rd December 
2006), 1747 (24th March 2007), 1803 (3rd March 2008), 1835 (27th September 
2008),and 1929 (09th June 2010 ) so, in nearly all the primary and secondary 
sources, including interviewees, journal and book writers, analysts, etc, that 
have been studied by the author, it has been insisted that Iran must attempt to 
be removed from these imposed sanctions against itself in order to achieve more 
progress in its energy industry and increase gas production, to counter 
consumption. 
The US pressure on foreign energy companies to withdraw from Iran’s project 
has been obvious during the recent years, such as in the Nabucco project, while 
Tehran was not invited to the international summit in Turkey in June 2009, 
despite Ankara’s and some European’s desire for the presence of Iranian officials 
(Houshialsadat, 1388/2009). 
Hassantash (annex 1) in a communication and interview on 14th February 2012 
explained that Tehran should solve these political disputes first, while he 
insisted on an integrated gas policy in Iran.  
Peimani (interview, 2012) and Bahgat, in an interview on 16th February 2012 
also insisted that Tehran must solve the current political disputes with the US 
firstly, primarily regarding nuclear issues and then most of the Iranian and the 
EU’s problems could be resolved more easily. So, Iran’s energy plans face 
difficulties until tensions ease over Tehran’s nuclear programme (Oil & Energy 
Trends, 17.09.2010: 6). 
Moreover, Korine, (interview, 2012) added “the potential disputes and rivalries 
among the Persian Gulf states and differences with Iran”, mostly because of its 
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nuclear programme are other barriers to the expansion of Iranian LNG exports, 
in parallel with sanctions, that should be dealt with, while El–Katiri (interview, 
2012) insists that this harsh political situation in Iran–GCC relations is not 
helpful for Iranian LNG shipments.  
In summary, if Iran wishes to increase strongly its gas production and develop 
LNG facilities, it needs to decrease its domestic consumption, as well as attempt 
to solve political disputes, leading to a normal international situation, but, of 
course, without imposed sanctions.  
4.3.5. Islamic Republic of Iran’s three major scenarios regarding the two 
impediments 
There are three main scenarios regarding the two principal impediments against 
Iran’s natural gas export in the future that impact on gas and LNG production 
during the 20–Year Outlook Document and beyond.  
Clément Therme (interview, 2012) defined three “pessimistic, progressive and 
optimistic scenarios” regarding Tehran’s future gas production, as follows: 
 Low Production Scenario (pessimistic): Both foreign and domestic 
investment in the gas sector remains low due to the continuation of 
economic sanctions against Iran, while its domestic energy companies try 
to develop gas fields, like some phases in the South Pars, but some of the 
plans, such as LNG projects should be operationalised by foreign 
companies. So, based on this black scenario, the nuclear dispute escalates, 
strong sanctions are taken by the mostly Western powers, leading to more 
instability in the Middle East/Persian Gulf, such as what has happened in 
the region, notably since January 2012. The result is not only lower 
investment, but combines all catastrophic forecasts and consequences.  
 Medium Production Scenario (progressive): Foreign and domestic 
investment will remain low by 2014, but will increase thereafter due to 
the economic climate improvement and easing of sanctions against Iran. 
 209 
 
This “gray scenario” goes towards normalisation before the middle of the 
current decade.   
 High Production Scenario (optimistic): Rapid increasing of foreign and 
domestic investments due to a sudden boost in Iran’s economic and 
political climate (Hariri et al. 2011: 4). According to this “white scenario”, 
after long and difficult negotiations, an agreement is found on the nuclear 
dispute very soon and unexpectedly. Under these conditions, the Western 
powers, especially the US, agree to lift sanctions completely. As a result of 
breaking this isolation, Iran could attract tremendous new foreign 
investors and ventures for its natural gasand LNG industries. 
The above–mentioned scenarios, with three brown, red and blue lines in the 
diagrams below, are accompanying domestic low, medium and high gas 
consumption cases. 
As can be seen in figure 51, issued by Idam Consulting Group, based on Iran’s 
different ministries’ and organizations’ official data, if this country’s gas demand 
were to maintain low levels and prevention measures for curbing excessive 
consumption, like dramatically reducing the level of governmental energy 
subsidy since December 2010, were to be implemented well, the country will 
experience surplus gas production from around 2013. The amount of excess gas 
in the low, medium and high supply scenarios will reach 45 bcm, 155 bcm and 
300 bcm in 2015 and 260 bcm, 320 bcm and 330 bcm in 2025, respectively.  
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Figure 51: Iran’s low domestic demand vs production scenarios 
 
Source: Hariri et al. 2011, Idam Consulting Group: 19 
Regarding Iran’s medium domestic demand with three low, medium and high 
production scenarios, as figure 52 clearly illustrates, if this country’s gas demand 
were to increase at a moderate pace, and prevention measures implemented in 
line with the 20–Year Outlook Plan (2005–2025), so the country will experience 
surplus gas production from 2014 and the amount of excess gas in the low, 
medium and high supply scenarios will reach 0 bcm, 155 bcm and 270 bcm in 
2015 and 115 bcm, 210 bcm and 230 bcm in 2025, respectively. 
Figure 52: Iran’s medium domestic demand vs production scenarios 
 
Source: Hariri et al. 2011, Idam Consulting Group: 20 
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The high demand scenario is based on the assumption that the government does 
not implement any prevention measures and gas consumption will increase at a 
fast rate over the next 15 years, so according to figure 53, the country will 
experience surplus gas production as of 2014. The amount of excess gas in the 
low, medium and high supply scenarios will reach 0 bcm, 50 bcm and 205 bcm in 
2015 and 65 bcm, 120 bcm and 140 bcm in 2025, respectively. 
Figure 53: Iran’s high domestic demand vs production scenarios 
 
Source: Hariri et al, 2011. Idam Consulting Group: 21 
What could be analysed on the basis of different sources, such as communication 
with Iranian and non–Iranian energy officials and scholars, is that, since 
December 2010, Iran’s government has fulfilled the legislation passed by Majlis 
over the modification of consumption patterns, as well as the steady reduction of 
governmental energy subsidy by 2015, so domestic consumption has been 
dropping since 2011 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011). On this 
basis, Iran’s high domestic demand could be contained. 
As Iran’s Energy Policy has been based on shifting to gas from oil, since the 
2000s (Crane et al. 2008), and the number of gas subscribers has increased, this 
trend will be maintained in the future (Shana Energy News Agency, 19.10.1390), 
so the low demand scenario in Iran in the coming years would be unlikely to 
materialise. 
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Consequently, Iran’s medium domestic demand and above–mentioned “gray 
scenario” will remain in the short– and mid–term, while internal gas demand 
would increase, and prevention measures are implemented in line with the 20–
Year Outlook Plan (2005–2025). So the country will have excess production 
between nil to 270 bcm/y in 2015 and 115 up to 230 bcm/y in 2025 and will be 
close to the medium case scenario in both supply and demand. 
As Iran is the fourth gas producer worldwide and the Middle East’s largest gas 
producer (US EIA 2011: 52) hence, production will increase in the future (Oil & 
Gas Directory Middle East, 2011: 1075; Oji, 29th July 2011: 5). Therefore, this 
country’s production rate will not be low; instead it would be at least at a 
moderate pace. As a result, Iran would be able to have extra gas production from 
between 155 to 270 bcm/y in 2015 and 210 up to 230 bcm/y in 2025. 
Iran must pay attention to the rise of its gas production in conjunction with a fall 
in consumption. These statistics clearly show that the gap between Iran’s gas 
production and domestic consumption could be significant in order to increase 
exports in line with the 20–year energy outlook by 2024.  
Nevertheless, Clément Therme (interview, 2012) mentioned the importance of 
foreign investment. He believes Iran holds huge gas reserves and even its 
domestic consumption would be upward, but the significant increase in foreign 
investment would enable the production surge for exports to be faster than 
domestic consumption. 
Iran’s natural gas and LNG exports potential could only be realised by 2020 if 
the problems of large domestic consumption, massive gas reinjection 
requirements (Elkind, 2010: 131) and lack of access to capital are resolved, while 
some of these steps are about to be taken, like sharp decrease of energy and gas 
governmental subsidy. Hence, a general concern is Iran’s ability to adhere to 
project timetables and the access to required technologies, given the sanctions 
and diplomatic pressure being orchestrated by Washington in such a globalised 
energy market (Bahgat, 2011: 82). So, the most important issue to be solved is 
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the nuclear dossier, as the biggest foreign policy challenge facing Iran since 1979 
(Mousavian, 2008: 7&8).  
On the other hand, some believe that sanctions not only prevents the major 
economic reforms in Iran from taking place but will also delay rapprochement 
with the West (Molavi & Shareef, 2008: 7). The issue of sanctions will also serve 
to unify the Iranian public against the Western policies, and make these 
sanctions counter–productive (Sadeghiani, 2012: 175–190). Despite some 
crippling results, this tendency has led to some progress in Iran, such as in 
gasoline industry. Although, almost 70% of Iran’s total hydrocarbon imports in 
recent years was gasoline, but after the US’ sanction on any gasoline exports to 
Iran in 2010, Tehran expanded its gasoline production and even planned to 
construct some new refineries. Therefore, it could result in Iran becoming a 
gasoline exporter around 2015 (http://www.eia.gov/countries/IRI). As a result, 
despite efforts to isolate or contain Tehran, the country has taken some huge 
steps towards (Ehteshami, 2012: 120–129) becoming a regional power, according 
to Samuel Hantington (Huntington, 1999; Peimani, 2012) with its political 
influence and geo–political weight (Ehteshami, 2012). 
Needless to say that Russia observes Iran as a huge competitor for gas export 
toward the EU, according to Clément Therme (interview, 2012), while Prof. 
Geoffrey Kemp, in “Asianisation of the Middle East” Conference which was held 
at Durham University, in the UK, on 13th Sep 2012, described Iran’s gas reserves, 
plans and outlook as the “Russian huge nightmare”.  
Therme added that Moscow has not got any interest to support the rapid 
development of Iran’s gas industry to export to the EU, except in the event that 
future Iranian gas supply would otherwise be directed, mainly, towards India 
and China. 
Another way is that Iran could send its piped gas to Russian customers in 
Central Asia, like Armenia and Georgia, whereas Moscow continues supplying to 
Iran’s potential European importers, of course, by pipeline. So, Tehran could 
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send its LNG to the European gas market in the future, rather than piped gas 
(Usefi & Naderian, 2011: 229).  
4.3.6. Islamic Republic of Iran and the EU energy relations, background and 
perspective 
A part from the US, Iran’s historical ties with several European countries and 
geographical proximity, led to complicated relations with the EU (Bahgat, 2010). 
Shortly after the end of the Iran–Iraq war (1980–8) under the pragmatist 
presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami by the policy of detente, this approach led to 
immediate response by the EU countries in 1990s and then economic sanctions 
against Iran were removed (Takeyh, 2009: 5). In other words, in the 1990s, based 
on new geo–political realities, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy moved 
towards a closer relationship with its Eurasian hinterland, including the EU, 
Russia, China, and Central Asia (Ehteshami, 2009: 324–349). 
Meanwhile, unlike the US’ confrontational approach, the EU adopted a policy 
based on engaging the Islamic Republic, commenced by “critical dialogue” in 
December 1992 (Minkova, 2011: 7), based on diplomatic discussion and economic 
incentives, which led to Anglo–Iranian relations (Takeyh, 2009: 143–144) and 
this was then followed by “comprehensive or constructive dialogue,” more 
effective than the American’s Dual Containment policy against Iran and Iraq 
(Sabet–Saeidi, 2011: 55–73).  
The European Commission and Iran formed a working group on energy in May 
1999 and the two parties created another working group to deal with trade and 
investment issues and thereafter Tehran was invited to participate in 
INOGATE6. As a consequence of their energy security interdependence with Iran, 
the EU member states have initiated energy investment and cooperation with 
this country, like the development of the South Pars by France’s Total, Norway’s 
Statoil–Hydro, the Dutch–British Shell, and Spain’s Repsol. On 17th June 2002, 
the Council of the EU agreed on opening negotiations with the Iran for a Trade 
                                                          
6 INOGATE, originated in 1995, is an energy cooperation programme between the EU and the 
littoral states of the Black and Caspian Seas, as well as their neighbouring countries, with the 
exceptions of the Baltic States and the Russian Federation.  
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and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), however the EU suspended negotiations for 
more cooperation with Iran in September 2003, when Iran resumed its nuclear 
activities (ec.europa.eu/trade). 
The EU approach regarding Iran was softer than the US (Th. Drenou, 2011: 73–
84) so, the US pressurised the EU by way of economic sanctions against Iran, 
banned any foreign investment of more than $40 million per year in oil and gas 
projects. Some pointed out that EU’s energy security contradicts with its nuclear 
diplomacy against Tehran (Young, 2009: 70). Nonetheless, European companies 
continued to invest in Iran, replacing American investors in Iran and making 
American sanctions ineffective (Sabet–Saeidi, 2011), for example, the French 
company Total replaced the American company Conoco with a $2 bn contract 
with The Iranian National Oil Company, in the South Pars (Th. Drenou, 2011: 
73–84). The ILSA was the second phase of American sanctions against foreign 
companies investing in Iran’s petroleum sector in Iran in 1996, while nearly 80% 
of EU imports from Iran in recent years have been hydrocarbon products. 
However, the EU responded with strong legislation preventing European 
companies and citizens from complying with ILSA (Sabet–Saeidi, 2011). 
Since President Ahmadinejad came to power and with his stance regarding  
Iran’s nuclear activities and the Holocaust after 2005, these relations, 
particularly with the three big EU nations, Germany, France, and the UK have 
been damaged (Mousavian, 2008: 190). This attitude has made the Union change 
its policy more towards the US’ approach regarding Iran (Sabet–Saeidi, 2011) 
leading to some harsh decisions, like significantly decreasing oil imports from 
Iran since July 2012. 
Seemingly, the post–election events in Iran in June 2009, to some extent, and 
failure to understand the recent changes in the socio–political landscape in this 
country, such as the “Green Movement”, led to the loss of a number of 
opportunities and more mutual mistrust and suspicion about some controversial 
issues, like Tehran’s nuclear activities (Sadeghiani, 2012: 175–190). 
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The EU is a strategic partner for Iran (Sabet–Saeidi, 2011) and Tehran’s largest 
trading partner (figure 54), accounting for a third of all Iranian exports 90% of 
which are energy related. So, this country is the EU’s 6th largest energy supplier 
(http://ec.europa.eu/ trade), as a result any harsh relationship between these two 
partners would be rather expensive (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2011: 141–155).   
Figure 54: The EU’s trade balance with Iran
 
Source: European Commission DG Trade (2012), “EU Bilateral Trade With Iran”, 27th March: 3 
The European companies have shown growing interest in developing Iran’s oil 
and gas resources, such as Norway’s Norsk Hydro, the Spanish Ansaldo Energia, 
Italy’s Einmeccanica, Germany’s Steiner Prematechnik Gastec, Austria’s OMV 
AG, and Switzerland’s EGL (Bahgat, 2010). For instance, in April 2007 OMV AG, 
a leading partner in the Nabucco project, signed an $18 bn deal with Iran and in 
March 2008 the Swiss energy group EGL signed a 25–year deal with the 
National Iranian Gas export Company to deliver 5.5 bcm/y of natural gas 
(Tehran Times, 18th March, 2008).  
The United Nations Security Council, as well as the US’ sanctions against Iran 
followed by Foreign Affairs Council in its 3142th meeting in Brussels on 23rd 
January 2012 after the European Council’s decision on 9th Dec 2011, leading to 
adoption of a package of new measures, including oil embargo, sanctions on the 
petrochemicals industry and a partial freezing of the assets of the Central Bank 
of Iran (www.ec.europa.eu/trade). However, the European energy companies 
have found themselves under political pressure, on the one hand and to develop 
a country rich in oil and resources and lucrative business on the other, so they 
have had to postpone their involvement to later phases of the South Pars 
development (Bahgat, 2010), as Jeroen van der Veer, the chief executive of Shell, 
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indicated in referring to this challenge: “We have a dilemma. Iran’s oil and gas 
reserves are too big to ignore, but we have all the short–term political concerns.” 
(New York Times, 13th February 2007). 
At present, Iran is not a major supplier of natural gas to the EU, but could be a 
reliable oil and gas provider for the EU, according to Iranian Foreign Minister 
Ali–Akbar Salehi (Xinhua News Agency, 21.02.2012, Tehran) and this situation 
for the country between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea will not remain 
minor forever; Iran will be a major player in the medium term (Friedemann, 
2003: 68). So, Simon Henderson, Director of the Persian Gulf and Energy Policy 
Programme at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, highlights “the 
EU’s increasing interdependence with Iran” (Henderson, 2007; Friedemann, 
2003) given the increasing natural gas and LNG needs around 2015 in the EU 
(LNG Journal, April 2008) and some other issues, like more diversification of 
natural gas routes away from Russia (Sajedi, 2009: 77–89). On the other hand, 
according to Howard Rogers (interview, 2012) engagement with the EU member 
states in natural gas and LNG trades could diversify Iran’s export routes and 
create a “more open and progressive stance on the part of Tehran towards 
economic and political engagement with the biggest regional organization”, while, 
it should be based on, bilaterally, the best interests and confidence building 
measures, such as in the 1990s (Moradi, 2006: 184), leading to “promote stability 
in the global energy market and economic prosperity to all concerned parties” 
(Bahgat, 2010). 
El–Katiri (interview, 2012), argues that “the EU’s gas interests on a commercial 
side are in line with Iran and more natural gas and LNG exports from Iran is a 
win-win situation for everyone if political hurdles, especially nuclear conflict, can 
be overcome”. 
Iran could assume an important role in the supplying of natural gas toward the 
EU in the future (US EIA, 2007), as the EU does not take advantage of a 
shortage of Iran’s gas capacity, while the Asian markets attract most of the 
global LNG (Peimani, 2012). This requires that Iran’s relations with the EU and 
the US should be normalised and that the political issues would be resolved. 
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Peimani also argues that any cooperation with Iran will be necessary for 
maintaining peace, security and stability in the Middle East/Persian Gulf and 
even Central Asia, also being important for the EU, politically and economically, 
while Rogers believes (2012: 168–174) that “the Persian Gulf region in general 
and Iran in particular, will be the sustained focus of ultra–regional powers over 
the next two decades”. This interdependence necessitates that both Iran and the 
EU pay more notice to bilateral relations, as Bahgat (2010) indicated that the 
there are not any permanent enemies or friends; rather, energy can be seen as 
an area where Tehran’s and Brussels’ interests converge. 
Dr. Mousavian, from the University of Princeton, in the US and the Iran’s former 
senior nuclear negotiators proposed a “permanent working group” creation with 
the structure of a Steering Committee to lead the Iran–EU oil and gas issues, 
such as technological cooperation, investment, etc, to extend to more areas 
(Mousavian, 2008: 239–241). Nevertheless, Bahgat, (interview, 2012) 
emphasised this important point that natural gas, like oil, is a “political 
commodity”, and so, on this basis, “energy could not be separated from policy and, 
consequently, there is no way to predict what will happen in Iran by 2020”. 
4.4. Geo–politics of natural gas in Qatar 
The State of Qatar is an Arab country located on the north–eastern coast of the 
Arabian Peninsula and is bordered by Saudi Arabia in the south and the Persian 
Gulf on the north, east and west with a total surface of 11,586km2 and is 
inhabited by approximately 1,951,591, based on the July 2012 estimation, (CIA 
library publication) with the highest per capita income in the world. According to 
the Oil and Gas Journal, as of January 2012, Qatar’s natural gas reserves 
capacity has declined from 895,800 bcf in 2011, 13.5% of total deposits worldwide, 
to 890,000 bcf in January 2012, 13.3% of the world’s reserves (table 21).  
Qatar Petroleum (formerly known as Qatar General Petroleum Corporation), 
was founded in 1974, by its subsidiary, the Gas Operations Department, as the 
main body responsible for all upstream, midstream and downstream activities in 
the oil and gas industries (Qatar Petroleum, 2011, “ Development of …”: 13). 
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Associated gas, moreover, is produced from the off–shore Maydan Mahzam and 
Bul Hanine fields, which began production in 1965 and 1972, respectively and 
also in Shargi Dome (North and South), Al–Shaheen Field, Al–Khaleej Field, Al– 
Rayyan Field, and Al–Karkara with the help of overseas companies (map 5) 
(Qatar Petroleum, “Corporate Profile”: 2), while non–associated gas was 
produced from the off–shore fields in the early 1970s when the giant North Field 
was discovered in 1971. In 1978, Qatar began to collect non–associated gas from 
the on–shore Khuff reservoir in the Dukhan area, located 84km, west of the 
capital Doha, to meet growing domestic demand and also as a back–up in case of 
gas shortage (Qatar Petroleum, 2011: 27). So, local demand was met first, and 
the rest delivered to Qatar’s first LNG plant at Ras Laffan in 1997 (M. Wietfeld, 
2011: 216). Ras Laffan City, along the northeast coast of Qatar, wholly owned by 
state–owned Qatar Petroleum, began operations in 1996 and enabled the 
production of LNG to send to the global markets, particularly the Far East and 
Europe. This port was developed to exploit Qatar’s vast gas reserves in the North 
Field, as the largest global non–associated natural gas field which was operated 
by the Qatar Petroleum and which lies 80 km off–shore from Ras Laffan with six 
LNG facilities (map 10). It covers an area of 6,000km2, equivalent to about half of 
Qatar’s land area. The first commercial exploration of the North Field gas 
resource started in late 1991 with initial gas production from the North Field 
Phase 1 Alpha project (NFA) (Qatar Petroleum, 2011: 27).  
4.4.1. Qatar’s gas and LNG strategy and plans 
Doha’s Gas Strategy emerged and aimed to shift from oil to gas, basically LNG 
from the second half of the 1990s, because of the following reasons: 
 Relative stability in the Persian Gulf after the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) 
and Iraq’s attack to Kuwait in 1990;  
 Some problems in Qatar oil industry, such as price fluctuation in 1982 and 
1983 and its impact on domestic progress, and also Oil International 
Companies’ dissatisfaction with Qatar’s services;  
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 Current King’s approach, based on natural gas preference, contrary to the 
previous monarch, subsequent to coming to power with a bloodless coup in 
June 1995; 
 Qatar’s goal aims to reduce Saudi Arabia dominance on Sheikdoms and 
the GCC and also more independent foreign policy by shifting from oil to 
natural gas and LNG, especially after Riyadh’s disagreement with passing 
Qatari gas pipeline via its territory to Kuwait (Dargin, 2008: 1); 
 Broader relations with Eastern and Western powers, particularly the US 
by the new LNG industry (Hashimoto et al. 2006: 234–268). 
Hence, Qatari officials resolved this country’s boundary disputes with its 
neighbours in GCC, such as the United Arab Emirates and Oman, Saudi Arabia 
and its differences with Bahrain over the Hawar Islands since May 1999 to 
December 2003 (Hashimoto et al. 2006: 234–268).   
Qatar Petroleum plays a dominant role in upstream and downstream natural 
gas and LNG sectors with the help of some Oil International Companies, like 
ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total and owns and operates within the Dukhan, 
Maydan Mahzam and Bul Hanine fields, while the remaining off–shore fields are 
operated by the International Oil Companies via the Production sharing 
agreements (www.eia.gov/countries/Qatar). Nevertheless, Qatar Petroleum has 
maintained a majority share in most of its LNG projects by Qatargas and 
RasGas LNG Company Limited 'RL'. RasGas is 70% owned by Qatar Petroleum, 
as well as 30% by ExxonMobil, and acts as the operating company on behalf of 
the project owners, while the QatarGas consortium includes Qatar Petroleum, 
Total, ExxonMobil, Mitsui, Marubeni, ConocoPhilips and Shell. Nevertheless, 
Qatari officials have attempted to get access to the modern technology and 
attract the required investment by EPSA and ADPSA with these overseas firms 
(Qatar Petroleum, 2011: 22). 
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Map 10: Qatar’s Oil and gas infrastructures 
 
Source: Country file, Qatar, MOE’s Report, December 2011: 9 
RasGas and Qatargas have 14 LNG trains currently online and five of which 
were added in 2009 and 2010, with a total LNG liquefaction capacity of 3,770 
bcf/y, around 77 MMt/y, according to Dr. Mohammad Bin Saleh Al–Sada, 
Minister of Energy and Industry, Chairman of Qatargas (The pioneer, May 2011: 
3) that was exported from Ras Laffan Port, as the largest LNG harbor, all over 
the world in 2010 and 2011 (Qatar Petroleum, 2011: 38 & 49), while this port 
could increase its current export capacity up to 140 mmt/y (Davidson, 2012.: 38).  
RasGas, founded in 1993, with around 120 gas wells from 14 platforms (Rasgas 
Magazine, Issue 23: 9) operates seven LNG production trains with the total 
production of LNG around 37 MMt/y (table 19) and developed world–class 
facilities for extracting, storing, processing and exporting LNG (Qatar Petroleum, 
“Corporate Profile”: 5).  
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Qatargas Operating Company Limited was founded in 1984 to develop and 
process natural gas from the North Field, while its Qatar LNG Company, 
established in 2001 to produce LNG for export by Qatargas I–IV projects located 
off–shore about 80 km north-east of Qatari territory. Qatargas involves seven 
production trains for liquefying natural gas with a total capacity of 42 MMt/y of 
LNG (table 19), which is exported to the major markets in Asia, Europe and the 
US (Qatar Petroleum, 2011, “Development of …”:50). 
Table 19: Qatar’s LNG infrastructure, January 2011 
 
Source: The US EIA at:// http:www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=QA 
Qatar Gas Transport Company Ltd., known as Nakilat (carriers in English) was 
established in 2004, operates and manages 54 LNG vessels, the largest owners of 
vessels worldwide and aims to transport LNG to different areas (Qatar 
Petroleum, 2011, “ Development of …”: 54 & 55).   
However, Qatari officials have noted that they do not anticipate building any 
more LNG facilities in the near future, and Qatar Petroleum would resist calls 
for new orders until at least 2015, while the existing plants could produce 12 
MMt/y of LNG production capacity from its existing trains which already 
produce 77 MMt/y (figure 55), based on Qatar Petroleum’s manager for gas 
development, Khalid Mohammed Hamed Al–Hitmi (Platts, 4 July 2011: 25). 
Nevertheless, Ledesma (interview, 2012) argues that “Qatar will not build any 
new facilities as it seeks to develop its domestic industry with gas in the future”, 
hence, according to Bahgat (interview, 2012), Doha has frozen any new natural 
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gas and LNG deals and has sought to assess its production, domestic needs, as 
well as export policies.  
Figure 55: Qatar’s gas production and consumption, 1995–2009 
 
Source: The US EIA at:// http:www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=QA 
Moreover, Qatar has no urgent need for additional revenues, since it already has 
the world’s highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita ($92,000), 
according to the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
Database, October 2009. 
Qatar Petroleum with ExxonMobil, has also worked to develop LNG import 
terminals in several European countries (Dargin, 2008: 51), such as in the 
regasification capacity in the framework of Qatargas II Project in Milford Haven 
in Wales, in the UK under the long–term supply agreement (Wicks, 2009: 98) 
and also RasGas II terminal in Belgium, as well as Poland’s invitation from 
Qatar to be a partner in a regasification terminal project in the Baltic Sea which 
is set to be commissioned in 2014 (M. Wietfeld, 2011: 218& 219).  
In addition, the 364 km–long Dolphin Project, which reaches a maximum 
underwater depth of 50 metres and as the only gas network in the Persian Gulf 
region, has exported nearly 21 bcm/y natural gas (Hashimoto et al. 2006) from 
the Qatari North Field to the United Arab Emirates since July 2007 and Oman 
from October 2008 that brings together three member states of the GCC (Qatar 
Petroleum, 2011, “Development of …”: 57) and also may possibly include 
Pakistan in the future (Hashimoto et al. 2006). 
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Turkey signed an agreement with Doha in August 2009 so as to participate in 
the Nabucco pipeline and Pakistan, in addition to Bangladesh, are looking to 
import LNG from Qatar (M. Wietfeld, 2011: 218& 219). 
In addition, the fate of ambition to provide a gas pipeline between Qatar and 
Israel, having risen since the middle of the 1990s, would be uncertain, because of 
the peace process between Tel Aviv and Palestinians (Hashimoto et al. 2006).  
4.4.2. Qatar’s National Vision 2030 Document and its natural gas and LNG 
outlook 
Based on “Qatar’s National Vision 2030 Document”, approved by an Emiri 
Decision in 2008 with four interconnected pillars including, Human, Social, 
Environmental, and Economic Developments (Qatar National Vision 2030, 2008: 
11), simultaneous with the implementation of “Qatar National Development 
Strategy 2011–2016” (Rasgas Magazine, Issue 34: 7), the wise management and 
long–term maintenance of the strategic hydrocarbon reserves (Qatar National 
Vision 2030, 2008: 24 & 28) alongside balance between deposits and production, 
as being essential for Qatar’s interests (Rasgas Magazine, Issue 23: 8) have 
become a primary goal for the country’s sustainable development (Qatar 
National Vision 2030, 2008).   
As Qatar’s growth has accelerated, the demand for energy in this country has 
more than doubled since 2000 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 
2011: 27) while Qatar is the fourth largest gas consumer in the Middle 
East/Persian Gulf (IEA, Natural Gas Information 2010) and attempts to put an 
end to the enormous subsidisation of local energy prices as it aims to increase 
conservation (M. Wietfeld, 2011: 225), but this internal gas consumption will 
increases faster in the future (Rasgas Magazine, Issue 34: 5).   
Qatar’s principal gas project to meet growing domestic demands is the 
development of the Barzan field at Ras Laffan Industrial City by a partnership of 
Qatar Petroleum (93%) and ExxonMobil (7%), which started on 20th February, 
2007. It envisages that the trains 1 and 2 would be online by 2014 and 2015 
(http://www.rasgas.com), with production of approximately 1.4 bcf/d of natural 
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gas (Qatar Petroleum, “Corporate Profile”: 6) and will push Qatar’s production 
up to about 23 bcf/d gas from the North Field, equivalent to more four million 
barrels of oil (Rasgas Magazine, Issue 34: 11). The project has the potential of 
maximizing up to 6 trains to use Qatar’s infrastructure plans in transport, 
health and education, industry growth (Oil and Energy Trends, October 2011: 7–
8), power and water sectors, as well as new airport, sea port and facilities for the 
FIFA World Cup in 2022 (Rasgas Magazine, Issue 34: 5&8), while RasGas will 
operate this project on behalf of the two shareholders. This project, according to 
Dr. Mohammed Bin Saleh Al–Sada, Minister of Energy and Industry and 
Chairman and Managing Director of Qatar Petroleum, as well as RasGas 
Company Limited, is a catalyst for the future development of Qatar 
(www.qp.com/mediacentre, 22nd December 2011). 
The Al–Khaleej Gas (AKG) project, established in 2000 and adjacent to RasGas 
Trains 3 and 4, is another Qatari project to develop the North Field gas reserves 
and produce 2 bcf/d for use in the local market that, as in the first plant, AKG–1, 
came on stream on 2nd November 2005 at Ras Laffan Industrial City, and the 
second leg of the project, AKG–2, started up in late 2009. The project is 
undertaken by ExxonMobil Middle East Gas Marketing Limited and under the 
operation of RasGas Company Ltd. (Qatar Petroleum, 2011, “Development 
of …”:60).  
Although Qatar began exporting LNG only in 1997 to Japan, heavy government 
emphasis on this sector, both in terms of making investments and attracting 
foreign investors contributed to the rapid development of Qatar’s LNG capacity. 
As a result, since 2006, Qatar has been the largest LNG supplier in the world 
(MOE, 2010: 2; www.eia.gov/countries/Qatar) with 3,154 bcf/y in 2009, three 
times more than the 2000’s production and 4,121 bcf /y in 2010 (figure 56), while 
its domestic consumption (figure 20) in 2009 and 2010 was 745 and 770 bcf 
relatively (http://www.eia.gov/countries/Qatar) through the interconnected 2,200 
km–long gas pipeline network with more than 50 distribution stations (Qatar 
Petroleum (2011), “Development of …”: 30). 
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Figure 56: LNG production capacity of Qatargas and Rasgas 
 
Source: Qatar National Bank 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines this leadership in the LNG supply as the 
key policy goal for the government in the future (European Commission, Qatar 
Country File, 2011). As a result, economic policy is mostly focused on developing 
non–associated natural gas reserves (IEA, Natural Gas Information 
2010).Moreover, Qatar’s gas export has been more than doubled between 2008 
and 2011 with its prominent geo–political position enabling Qatar to supply both 
Asia and Europe (Wicks, 2009: 98) and even South America, such as shown by a 
recent agreement between Qatargas and Argentinian oil and gas company 
Energia Argentina for the sale of 5 mmt/y of LNG from 2014, as the first 20–year 
long–term contract for South America (Platts, 4thJuly 2011: 25). Asian LNG 
markets, especially Japan, S. Korea, India, Taiwan and also the US market have 
imported more than 60% of Qatar’s LNG in recent years (figure 57) under long–
term contracts as well (http://www.eia.gov/countries/Qatar).  
Figure 57: Qatar’s LNG exports, 2006–2011 
 
Source: Energy Tribune website 
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4.4.3. Qatar and the EU LNG relations  
The EU’s natural gas and LNG markets including Belgium, the UK, Italy, and 
Spain have been attracting around 33% of the Qatari LNG destination in recent 
years; most of them are under the spot contract 
(http://www.eia.gov/countries/Qatar).  
By comparing the rates of the EU’s LNG imports from Qatar in 2009 and 2010 
(figures 58), it could be concluded that the EU’s LNG imports from Qatar have 
dramatically increased during recent years, excluding Belgium which fell from 
99% in 2009 to 97.5% in 2010, even though France, Greece, and Portugal joined 
the group of LNG importers from Qatar. 
Figure 58: Structure of LNG imports of selected EU countries (2010) 
 
Source: Country file, Qatar, MOE’s Report, December 2011: 12 
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In 2010, 95% of Qatar exports to the EU were fuels, while 70 % of total EU 
imports originated from the GCC countries (European Commission, Qatar 
Country File, December 2011). As a result, most of Qatar’s exports to the EU 
have been based on LNG supply in recent years and nearly all of the energy 
experts in their own essays, as well as interviews, insist that this gas 
relationship could broaden in the future, but it depends on seasonal conditions in 
the EU, the price which Qatar wants to charge, the economic situation in Europe, 
as well as distinguishing between term–contract LNG and spot LNG, while 
Qatar, unlike with Asia, is willing to send spot LNG to the EU, according to El–
Katiri (interview, 2012), whereas Korine (interview, 2012) foresees that “in case 
of poor economic growth, the EU even might decide to abandon its focus on 
greenhouse gases emissions and thus turn to potentially lower–cost options for 
power, e.g. coal from Poland”. 
El–Katiri (interview, 2012) added that “Qatar is in no urge to further increase 
exports to the EU if its price will not be accepted in the framework of spot LNG; 
however, it is unlikely the current volume of LNG export will be lifted before 
2015”.  
On the other hand, the US EIA predicts that the rate of Qatar’s LNG exports will 
reduce after 2015, because of the current moratorium on further development 
from the North Field (US EIA, “Country Analysis Briefs: Qatar”, January 2011), 
domestic needs for power generation, water desalination, as well as local 
industry (US EIA 2011: 61). Consequently, “there is no way to predict the 
outcome of this assessment over the amount of Qatari LNG export to the EU”, 
according to Bahgat (interview, 2012).  
Peimani (interview, 2012), believes “in the absence of the American gas market, 
becoming more self–sufficient in gas thanks to its shale gas industry, and the 
EU’s growing natural gas demands, Qatar would be able expand its LNG export 
capacity to this huge region, like the current export level toward the Asia–Pacific 
market”. Howard Rogers (interview, 2012) also added this point that “Qatar 
might raise its natural gas and LNG exports to the EU, if Australia expands its 
LNG supply and displaced some Qatari LNG back into the Atlantic basin”. 
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Hossein Hassantash, Iran’s former parliamentarian in the Energy Commission 
(interview, 2012) being in a negotiating team with some of the Persian Gulf 
states regarding gas interactions believes that “Qatar is going to have a 
considerable share in the EU gas market in addition to more venture in EU’s 
LNG terminals, while this country has to export gas to some other sheikhdoms 
within the Persian Gulf, like United Arab Emirates, Oman, and maybe Bahrain 
and also should send more LNG towards the East Asian countries”. This process 
shows that “Qatar is interested in diversifying its export markets, while 
decreasing the US’ imports, Doha will maintain its huge gas export volume to 
the EU”, based on Bahgat (interview, 2012). 
Natural gas, as the clean–burning fuel, based on Qatar’s Minister of Energy and 
Industry (Rasgas Magazine, Issue 34: 5),is about twice as clean to burn as oil, so 
its global demand is expected to increase by 50% over the next 25 years (US EIA 
2011: 43; Qatar Petroleum, 2007, Issue: 1). This has resulted in most of the 
consumers, such as the new Asian players and also European LNG companies, 
starting negotiation with Qatar with the aim of importing from this country. 
4.5. The role of the GECF in global natural gas and LNG markets by its Troika  
Dramatic changes within the international gas markets are currently in progress, 
such as globalization of these markets (Huntington, 2009), rising shares of LNG 
trade (BP, 2011: 57), and spot contracts (IGU, 2010: 12), as well as increases in 
the prospects of unconventional gas supply (Potential Gas Committee, 2010; US 
EIA International Energy Outlook 2011: 50) 
These developments impact on gas players, including exporters, importers, and 
even transit countries, and under these situations one issue is about the role and 
impact of any cartel, as well as establishing what are the positions of Iran and 
Qatar, as the second and third natural gas holders worldwide in the framework 
of this gas cartel. 
There are some conditions in order to establish any cartel, including: 
 The number of gas producers with the biggest share of global reserves; 
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 Production quota by gas producers; 
 Any excess production capacity under gas producers’ control; 
 Any new gas producer as a member of this cartel or extra gas production 
weakens its capability (Soligo, M.Jaffe, 2006: 437–469). 
There is a limited number of huge natural gas holders worldwide, enabling this 
gas cartel to controlled, the so–called GECF. It was set up as a forum in the first 
ministerial meeting in Tehran, Iran on 19th and 20th May 2001 with a few 
members from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Nevertheless, the 
international governmental organization’s charter was approved in the seventh 
ministerial meeting in Moscow, Russian Federation on 23rd December 2008 
(gecforum.org), when it was agreed to institutionalise their cooperation in gas 
and coordinate joint projects, through the establishment of the Big Gas Troika 
(Reuters, 21st October, 2008).   
The 11–member GECF, holding more than 63% of global natural gas reserves 
(BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011), while Iran, Russia and 
Qatar, as the three top global gas holders and this organization’s members 
(Davidson, 2012), account for about 54% of the global natural gas deposits (BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2010: 22), represents the interests of gas 
producing nations and is occasionally described as the natural gas version of the 
OPEC. There have been some speculations about whether this entity would turn 
into the so–called Gas–OPEC, first proposed by Vladimir Putin (S.A. Gabriel et 
al. 2012: 137–152) and some expressed their strong support of the Russian 
president’s suggestion, such as his Kazakh counterpart and Iranian officials 
(CNN, 02.02.2007). 
It was formed with the purpose of exchanging experiences and information in 
gas–related matters, strengthening of collaboration and coordination among the 
member countries over the volume of gas exports, transportation, exploration, 
and further assistance to gas industry development (Information Booklet First 
Gas Summit, 2011: 16). This was in an effort to derive the most value from their 
gas resources (WGI, 2010), as well as more negotiations among the producers 
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and gas consumers with the aim of encouraging more stability and security of 
supply and demand within the global gas markets with the objective of a fair 
price for both sides (www.gecforum.org).  
However, the creation of a forum, such as this, raised concerns in many 
importing countries over the possibility that it might become a Gas–OPEC, 
behaving like OPEC, and restricting production in order to increase the gas price. 
For instance, gas company executives attending the conferences in Paris and 
Rome expressed their own concerns regarding GECF, while Guy Broggi, senior 
adviser to the Director of LNG at Total, said (Bloomberg, 15th Nov 2011) at the 
European Autumn Gas Conference (EAGC) in Paris on 15th and 16th November, 
2011,“if GECF members link the price to OPEC crude oil, someone else is taking 
care of their interests”, and Marco Arcelli, head of Italian utility Enel Spa 
(ENEL)’s Upstream Gas Division at the World LNG Summit in Rome on 14th to 
17th November, 2011 argued that the EU should monitor the gas situation 
concerning imports that come mainly from Russia, Algeria and Qatar, as the 
main GECF’s members (Bloomberg, 15th Nov 2011). 
4.5.1. The challenges against a stronger GECF outlook 
The GECF has some challenges on its way that should be considered in order to 
be more influential within the global arena: 
o Different views among the number of GECF members regarding a range of 
issues, such as quotas of production, gas price (Cohen, 2009), and 
privatisation of gas industry in producers (Soligo, M.Jaffe, 2006). For 
instance, Abdoallah bin Hamad Al–attieh, the Second Deputy of Qatari 
Prime Minister addressed in the Institute for Public Policy Conference on 
26th May 2006 that any Gas–OPEC would not emerge and his country will 
not attend this probable body and also this country’s Energy Minister 
Mohammed bin Saleh al–Sada told a press conference in Doha (AFP, 13th  
November 2011) that it is not the duty of GECF to determine the gas price, 
however, Vladimir Putin, Russian President, in February 2007 described 
Gas–OPEC as a vital idea simultaneous with globalizing of the gas market 
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(the Economist, 5th February 2007). As another example regarding quotas 
of production, according to Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, the Emir of 
Qatar (Nigeria Energy Intelligence, 28th November 2011), “producers need 
to narrow the gap between prices for gas and crude oil without trying to 
limit production”. By contrast, Iran’s Oil Minister, called on the GECF to 
develop “a comprehensive market management plan” that would allow 
them to react to demand fluctuations by adjusting supply and quotas of 
production, leading to the best price (Nigeria Energy Intelligence, 28th 
November 2011). Algeria also prior to the GECF meeting in April 2010, 
called for coordinated cuts of gas production by members, but this was 
rejected at the meeting (WGI, 2010). Some believe that any cooperation 
among gas producers regarding quotas of production and the rise of gas 
prices can give rivals access to one another’s markets (Tuttle et al. 15th 
November 2011); 
o Despite relatively high number of the existing members, a number of the 
minor gas producers will be marginalised by 2025 and then the market 
power of the bigger gas holders will be enhanced (Cohen, 2009); 
o The US, Norway, Australia, the Netherlands and Canada hold a large 
amount of natural gas (EIA International Energy Outlook 2011: 64), but 
they are not interested in joining GECF, because of their relationships 
with developed countries, and the main natural gas and LNG importers 
and unconventional gas, particularly in the US (Soligo, 2006);  
o The membership in both OPEC and the GECF with two complicated 
policies, hence, these members may seek to connect these two 
organizations’ policies with each other in the future (OPEC.org), so some 
of these members, particularly Middle Eastern ones, such as Algeria, Iran 
and Qatar might obtain further market power by coordination in the 
future (S.A. Gabriel et al. 2012: 137–152). Notwithstanding some 
similarities, the gas market has some characteristics that differ from the 
oil market. The former is more regionalised, unlike the more globalised 
structure of the latter, so globalised gas trade, rather than just 
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transportation within a region, is much more important, according to 
Clément Therme (interview, 2012); 
o Energy market liberalisation and development of renewable energy 
sources, particularly during the next decade, are other impediments 
against the emergence of powerful GECF, because this policy leads to 
more rivalry between the producers and may cause to reduction of 
exporters’ market power (Soligo, 2006). 
4.5.2. How would the GECF become more powerful by its Troika? 
At the moment, GEFC is characterised by different arguments regarding its 
future role and goals so, some believe that any powerful Gas–OPEC group would 
be difficult politically in the short–term (Cohen, 2009) and also with oversupply 
in natural gas and LNG, as well as a subsequent price decrease (S.A. Gabriel et 
al. 2012). There is also the likelihood that some other gas producers and 
exporters will enter the global gas market (Soligo, 2006), contrary to some 
arguments over the growing strength of the GECF in years to come. For instance, 
Russia supports this cartel and has emphasised in its “Energy Strategic of 
Russia Document up to 2030” (2010: 58), that this entity should control the gas 
price and production. 
Robin Mills, head of consulting at Dubai–based Manaar Energy Consulting and 
Project Management, believes (Nigeria Energy Intelligence, 28th November 2011) 
“any oil–linked prices means high gas prices and could be an obstacle against 
gas–on–gas competition and transparent market–based pricing, and also the 
ability of gas exporters to control prices is limited by the fragmented nature of 
global supply and competition among producers”. For example, the US’ natural 
gas and LNG prices are lower than those in Europe, while spot LNG market 
prices in Europe are currently lower than those in long–term contracts based on 
oil prices, unlike in Asia, due in part to Japan’s need to import more LNG after 
its nuclear power plant disaster this year (White, 11th Sepember 2011).  
Since the beginning of the current decade, the January 2011 Japanese nuclear 
crisis, political uprisings in the Middle East, as well as rising of gas demands 
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have impacted on the GECF and this was highlighted during the first summit of 
the head of the states on 15th November 2011 (Mashal, 22.03.1390/12.06.2011: 
11). 
The focus of GEFC is reportedly shifting towards LNG, while the members 
provide 85% of the world’s LNG exports, but partly under long–term contracts. 
So, gas pipeline supply and this kind of contract, instead of spot contract, are the 
main obstacles against a strong GECF (Hurst, 2009: 271–282). 
In addition, Russia, Iran and Qatar together hold about 54.3% of the world’s 
natural gas reserves (Oil & Gas Journal, Jan 2011; EIA International Energy 
Outlook 2011: 64), hence their positions and the rise of LNG activity, especially 
in the framework of the spot markets, leads to increase of market power for 
Russia, Iran and Qatar and turns the GECF into an effective gas cartel (US EIA, 
2008). Some also believe that the GECF members should discuss dividing 
international gas markets, like at the Doha meeting in 2008, particularly in 
Europe, where Russia and Algeria are major players already and Iran may join 
in future years (Cohen, 2008). 
Accordingly, Iranmanesh (interview, 2012) says that, in order to be strong and 
effective in GECF, Iran must strengthen the infrastructures of natural gas, LNG, 
etc., and also complete and develop its liquefaction facilities, like Qatar.   
Even though, unconventional gas and gas transportation, via pipeline or LNG, 
are two important parameters for the future gas market in the world (S.A. 
Gabriel et al. 2012). However, unconventional gas, that mostly produced by the 
US, could diminish the gas cartel’s power (US EIA, 2008). For this reason, 
Leonid Bokhanovskiy, who became the secretary general of the GECF in 
December 2009, told National Journal on the fringes of a major energy 
conference believes that “this organization should negotiate more with the US 
Energy Department for more global coordination regarding gas issues, but the 
GECF has not yet asked the US to join this body”.  
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The current regionalised trend is towards a more globalised gas market with 
more spot contracts that differ across the regions and this method could improve 
the GECF’s position in the future (S.A. Gabriel et al. 2012). 
4.6. Conclusion 
The Middle East holds 40% of global natural gas reserves most of which is 
situated in the  Persian Gulf region, while Iran and Qatar hold around 30% of 
the world’s natural gas reserves or 75% of the Middle East deposits with the 
world’s largest non–associated natural gas field. In addition, they have the 
lowest production and exploitation costs among the other natural gas holders 
worldwide, so these two countries together will be the third natural gas and LNG 
producers by 2030, after Russia and the US. 
Gas produced from unconventional gas by the US and partially by Canada is a 
serious rival for conventional gas during the two next decades, while the former 
decreases its LNG imports. However, conventional gas preserves its dominance 
in the global gas market, so the percentage of unconventional gas production will 
rise from around 12.5% in 2010 to around 18% by 2030. In addition, gas 
production in some regions, like Europe, drops, some of the minor natural 
gasand LNG exporters will be eliminated during the coming years, and global 
consumption will rise. Despite that, the North America’s unconventional gas and 
Australia’s LNG productions will increase as natural gas consumption in these 
countries, particularly in the US rises to become the leading consumer worldwide 
by 2030, followed by Europe. Hence, the natural gas and LNG demand is 
expected to increase globally by 50% until 2030 and up to 90% in the EU. The 
world’s LNG capacity, for instance, has been increased at 40% between 2005 and 
2010, whereas it will nearly double by 2030. 
In addition, unlike natural gas from Russia and the Persian Gulf, the least–
cheap unconventional gas production has some environmental and financial 
problems in these countries. 
However, unstable political environments and security challenges, such as 
tension concerning  Iran’s nuclear programme has led to intensification of the 
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zero–sum game in the Persian Gulf region, while because of the geographical 
proximity and economic interdependence, they must attempt to solve these 
challenges and aim to attract more foreign capital for energy projects. 
On the basis of Iran’s “20–Year Outlook Document (2005–2025)”, alongside 
“Iran’s Grand Energy Strategy by 2023”, this country plans to increase its 
current 1% share of gas global market to 8%–10% by 2023, so it follows some 
more regional pipeline projects and LNG plans must be both considered and 
constructed and, in the case of opening up of its first 4 or 5 LNG plans, Tehran 
will take its place in the top five LNG exporters by 2020. Nonetheless, foreign 
sanctions, preventing the required capital and advance technology for this 
country and high domestic consumption are the main hindrances against this 
target. As a result, the three main scenarios perceived concerning these two 
principal hurdles against Iran’s natural gasand LNG projects and the volume of 
export, are Low, Medium, and High Production Scenarios. Given the prevention 
measures and the phasing out of energy subsidies in Iran, implemented by the 
government and the continuation of negotiations aimed at solving this country’s 
controversial nuclear programme, it seems that Medium Scenario would be more 
reasonable. While internal gas demand would increase somewhat, the country 
will have excess production between nil to 270 bcm/y in 2015 and 115 up to 230 
bcm/y in 2025 for export, particularly to Asian and European gas markets. 
The States of Qatar’s Gas Strategy, moreover, emerged and aimed to shift from 
oil to natural gas, and led to an increase in its LNG production capacity from its 
existing 14 trains up to 77 MMt/y and turned it in to the first exporter worldwide, 
and as an example, the EU’s LNG import from Qatar has dramatically increased 
during recent years. As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines this 
leadership in the LNG supply as the key policy goal for the government in the 
future. On the other hand, Doha has frozen any new natural gas and LNG deals 
and decided not to develop its LNG facilities, in number, in the future, while its 
domestic consumption has noticeably increased and this trend will continue in 
the future. Based on “Qatar’s National Vision 2030 Document”, simultaneous 
with the implementation of “Qatar National Development Strategy 2011–2016”, 
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the long–term maintenance of the strategic hydrocarbon reserves alongside the 
balance between deposits and production have become primary goals for the 
country’s sustainable development. It seems that LNG exports will grow in the 
future, particularly toward Asia and the EU, rather than the US, but it depends 
on the seasonal conditions in the EU, the price which Qatar wants to charge, the 
economic situation in Europe, as well as distinguishing between term–contract 
LNG and spot LNG. 
Simultaneous with the dramatic changes within the international gas markets, 
GECF was set up with the aim of coordination among the member states over 
the volume of gas exports, prices, more negotiations between the producers and 
consumers, etc.  
However, this forum raised concerns in many importing countries over the 
emergence of a Gas–OPEC, while GECF faces other challenges to be solved in 
order to become stronger in the future. Some different views among the members, 
particularly the Big Troika, including high numbers of existing members and 
lack of more important producers, like the US, Canada, Australia, Republic of 
Azerbaijan, Norway (as a state on observer in GECF) in the GECF, production of 
gas from unconventional gas as a serious rival for conventional gas and, to some 
extent renewable energy sources, are the main challenges facing this forum. In 
addition, the GEFC is shifting towards LNG, while the members provide 85% of 
the global exports, so development of LNG facilities with spot contracts will 
make this body stronger. As a result, Iran must construct and develop its LNG 
projects, to at least 70% of the current planned capacity as soon as possible to 
assist its aims to reinforce itself as a regional and global market power, like 
Qatar. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of the impacts of the energy security’s indicators on the EU’s 
LNG relationships with different suppliers  
5.1. Introduction 
Energy security and security of energy supply have been a significant concern 
during the past hundred years and will be the main anxiety for almost all 
countries worldwide during the 21st century. It has, moreover, got four regular 
indicators comprising, acceptability (environmental and social elements); 
availability (geological aspects); affordability (economic criterion) and 
accessibility (geo–political dimensions) and realization of these criteria could 
ensure security of energy supply. 
This term had, traditionally, concentrated on crude oil supply, but since the 
1990s, natural gas has increasingly become “the fuel of choice” and therefore, 
“Gas is the new oil”. 
Global natural gas demands will increase around 50% by 2030 and its share in 
the world’s energy mix will rise from 21% in 2010 to 25% in 2030. 
LNG, known as “the floating pipeline”, has become more popular in recent years 
and according to some official stimations, more than 50% of global gas trading 
will be by LNG carriers by 2030.  
The EU will the world’s largest natural gas and LNG importer by 2030 and 
import around 80% of its demands after 2020. So, the share of LNG in the EU’s 
gas market will rise from nearly 15% in 2010 to around 40% by the end of the 
next decade. As a result, diversification of LNG suppliers has also been at the top 
of the EU statements, particularly since the early 2000s. Therefore, the 
classification scheme of the core indicators of the energy security is the 
cornerstone for testing them on the EU’s LNG relationships with different actual 
and potential suppliers, such as the Persian Gulf and then comparing them for 
ranking to clarify the most appropriate suppliers in the future for the Union.  
So, the main questions in this chapter will be, as follows: 
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o How is the position of each actual and potential LNG supplier towards the 
EU in the global ranking, based on each of the sub–indicators of energy 
security? 
o Which gas holder(s) could be the main LNG supplier(s) towards the EU in 
the future, on the basis of the energy security’ indicators and sub–
indicators? 
5.2. Comparison of the main actual and potential LNG suppliers to the EU, 
based on the main indicators of the energy security   
Natural gas can be transported either through pipelines or in liquid form on 
vessels, as LNG, known as “the floating pipeline” (Jaffe & Soligo, 2006: 437–468). 
The latter has become more popular in recent years because of the unlimited 
transportability by tanker (Sascha Muller–Kraenner, 2007: 8), flexibility in 
distance, volume, contract and also suppliers being more globalised, as well as 
the reduction in costs in the LNG value chain due to technological advances 
(Palm, 2007: 3). 
According to official projections, gas demand will enhance at faster rates than 
other fossil fuels in the future (OPEC Energy Outlook 2011: 54; EIA, 2011: 43) 
and continues to be the fuel of choice in many countries and regions of the world 
(Luft & Korine, 2009: 555), because of its:  
 Acceptability: its lower carbon intensity, compared to oil and coal, making 
it a clean fuel (Luft & Korine, 2009: 555) and an attractive fuel source in 
countries where governments are implementing policies to reduce 
greenhouse gases (EIA, 2011: 43);            
 Availability: discoveries of gas fields are still possible, in addition to the 
current huge proven global reserves, and also unconventional gas 
resources to develop but albeit with some uncertainty (EIA, MOSES 2011); 
 Affordability: its significant price flexibility (K. Sovacool & Lim, 2011: 417), 
alongside its low capital costs for power plants, due to the technological 
advances can lead to cost reductions (Palm, 2007: 3) with favourable 
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thermal efficiencies relative to oil (EIA, 2011: 43), simultaneous with the 
escalating of the oil price in recent years and also in the future (Luft & 
Korine, 2009: 555); 
 Accessibility: its geo–political, infrastructural risks are less than those 
with oil and also with the capacity of diversifying of suppliers (K. Sovacool, 
2011: 9; Checchi et al. 2009: 43). 
5.2.1. Acceptability/Sustainability of natural gas and LNG 
Global warming, air pollution and climatic changes, caused by greenhouse gas 
emissions, “make the current energy landscape unviable in the medium–to long–
term” (Proedrou, 2012). Carbon dioxide, as “the chief greenhouse gas” remains in 
the Earth atmosphere for hundreds of years and some other gases stay for even 
thousands years (Borenstein, Associated Press, 31.05.2012). On the basis of some 
global summits and protocols, the main developed and developing countries must 
cooperate with each other to counter this dilemma. Alhajji, linking the 
environmental dimension of the energy securitydirectly to pollution issues, 
argued that, “to ensure energy security, governments should integrate their 
industrial and technology policies into their energy policies” (Alhajji, 2007d). 
Following the 1992 United Nations Climate Convention, the 1997 Kyoto protocol 
has expanded the decision–making process for climate–change policy. The latest 
attempt to solve environmental problems and reduction of greenhouse 
gasemissions on a global level was the Copenhagen summit in 2009, having 
resulted in the so–called Copenhagen accord. This demonstrates the idea of 
connection between environment and security, raised by the Copenhagen school, 
which identifies the environmental sector of energy (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 
1998).  
On the basis of the Energy Security Unit, Joint Research Centrefor the 
European Commission(Costescu Badea, 2010: 4) environmental and social 
concerns are the two key elements for acceptability of any energy resource.  
The IEA has classified some issues, relating to environmental dimension of 
energy security, such as the role of renewable energy sources and bio–fuels, 
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energy efficiency, fossil fuels, technological progress (IEA, 2004) in order to 
achieve “green energy” (Proedrou, 2012) and lower the negative impacts of 
energy use upon the environment. 
Global temperature continues to rise and ecosystems will cause more damage by 
the growing use of fossil fuels, principally coal and oil, unless the share of 
renewable energies in the energy mix increases and also cleaner fossil fuels are 
to be consumed (Proedrou, 2012).  
According to the IEA, 2009 and BP, 2011 Energy Outlook for 2030, the global 
energy mix will change within the coming two decades. Oil and coal consumption 
is set to decrease, while natural gas and LNG demands will further increase 
owing to environmental and strategic/security reasons (R. Odell, 2002: 432). 
Natural gas, as a colourless and odourless material, (Palm, 2007: 7), is the 
cleanest of all fossil fuels without any production of sulphur dioxide and also it 
generates considerably less carbon dioxide (CO2), toxic gases and carbon 
intensity per unit of energy, 40–50% less than coal and 25–30% less than oil 
(table 20). Methane’s poisonous emissions, as the primary component of natural 
gas, besides ethane, propane, butane, pentane and hexane (Palm, 2007: 7) are 
very low.  
It is often found together with oil, known as associate gas, being separated from 
the oil and taken to the processing plant, while non–associate gas is originally 
without oil. So, the importance of natural gas, as the least carbon–intensive 
fossil fuel, is expected to increase (IEA, 2007: 492). 
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Table 20: Comparison of the fossil fuel’s compositions 
 
Source: US’ Geological Survey; G. Victor et al (2006), Natural Gas and Geo–politics, from 1970–2040; 
Wikipedia–the free encyclopedia; NaturalGas.org; Centre for Energy Economics (CEE) 
The coal is composed of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen and sulphur, while 
the percentage of these elements differ in various types of coals, such as lignite, 
subbituminous, bituminous (65%–85% carbon and 5%–15% oxygen), semi–
anthracite or hard coal (80%–85% carbon), as well as anthracite or hard and 
durable coal (85%–95% carbon), while these kinds of coal have hydrogen contents 
of 3%–6%. 
The heavy, extra heavy, conventional and sand oils are, moreover, the main 
kinds of this hydrocarbon with different percentages of chemical elements (table 
20). 
LNG is odourless, colourless, non–corrosive, and non–toxic. The liquefaction 
process requires the removal of some of the non–methane components, such as 
water and carbon dioxide, from the produced gas to prevent them from forming 
solids when the gas is cooled to about LNG temperature (–162 degrees Celsius). 
As a result, LNG is typically made up mostly of methane (table 20). It is, 
occasionally, confused with other concepts, such as Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) 
and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), as the wet gases; as well as, Compressed 
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Natural Gas (CNG), Gas–to–Liquids (GTL) and LNG, as the wet gases 
(Naturalgas.org). Moreover, the volume of natural gas is measured in a number 
of ways, e.g. cubic feet, tons, oil equivalents and cubic meters (annex 10).  
NGL is made of molecules heavier than methane, so 95% of its compositions are 
ethane, propane, and butane with additional carbon atoms. LPG, furthermore, is 
a mixture of propane and butane in a liquid state and highly flammable. It has 
been used as fuel in light duty vehicles. LNG is not the same as CNG, while the 
latter has the same composition as piped gas and is mostly used as a fuel for 
vehicle transportation. LNG is also not synonymous with GTL, whereas the 
latter is a conversion of natural gas to other products, in particular methanol, 
according to the Centre for Energy Economics (CEE). 
Besides the economic advantages of LNG, its stronger environmental 
friendliness relative to other energy carriers is a fact that makes this fuel one of 
the cleanest fossil fuels. Therefore, if we determine the emission index of 
greenhouse gases for coal as 100, this index is 75.5 for crude oil, 66 for LPG, 56 
for natural gas and under 55 for LNG (figure 59). 
Figure 59: Environmental pollution ratio for various fossil fuels 
 
Source: Iran’s LNG Conference, Tehran, October 2011 
As a result of processing, LNG tends to contain slightly more of these higher 
hydrocarbons than piped gas. On the other hand, LNG has only minor amounts 
of nitrogen and no carbon dioxide (table 20). All in all, pipeline gas contains at 
least ten times the quantity of inerts or neutral gases. Summing up, LNG, as a 
logistics concept in Europe, might be considered as a superior quality fuel to 
pipeline gas (European Commission, Joint Research Centre, 2009: 14).  
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Figure 60 represents the differences in the chemical compositions, in terms of 
methane or less methane, of piped gas and LNG towards the EU from different 
actual and potential suppliers. The grouping of LNG suppliers in the bottom–
right part of the graph is very prominent. Conversely, pipeline natural gases are 
concentrated on the left–hand side, indicating lower purity in comparison to pure 
methane (top–right corner). Altogether, these facts underpin the distinction 
between LNG and the pipeline gas.  
The second aspect of acceptability or sustainability (Peimani, 2011:3; K. Sovacool, 
2011: 9) is social dimension. The Official Journal of the EU (6th March 2012: 18) 
with reference to the “European Economic and Social Committee” meeting on 
14th June, has proposed that “any energy pact within the Union should enshrine 
the strategic and vital nature of energy, including accessibility, affordability, 
reliability and regularity, so such a European social energy could respond to 
public concerns”. It means that all the people within a community, even the poor, 
can afford getting access to more affordable energy with the best price. Alhajji 
believed (2007c) that higher energy prices widen the gap between the rich and 
the poor which can lead to political unrest and affect the economic growth of any 
country. Fatih Birol, IEA Chief Economist, even considers the “energy poverty”, 
as a term against the energy security, in particular for the poor, and one of the 
three major 
strategic challenges 
that the global 
system will face in 
future (Birol, 2007: 
1–6). 
In conclusion, 
environmental 
risks (acceptability) 
at the heart of the 
“Climate–Energy” 
strategy (European  
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Commission, COM 2007: 1), require the urgent need for more acceptable, cleaner 
and reliable energy sources, according to the EU Energy Commissioner in 2010.  
5.2.2. Availability of natural gas and LNG, two variables 
Geographical distribution of energy reserves is important and might adversely 
influence security of supply, if these resources are found in only a few regions 
(Lako & Kets, 2005: 52). K. Sovacool (2011: 9 & 191) defined physical availability 
as when the consumers are able to secure the amount of natural gas that they 
need from gas–rich regions and countries. 
The availability of fossil and fissile energy sources, such as nuclear energy 
sources, is described in terms of discovered and also undiscovered reserves with 
a probability of exploration in the future, the estimation of available deposits and 
in which areas, alongside the size of these fields.   
The declining availability of hydrocarbons may cause increases in fuel prices and 
the sustainability of energy supply in future, while renewable energy sources 
may not be appropriately developed in time, perhaps until 2050 (or 2035, if 
applicable) (Lako and Kets, 2005: 13). 
Most of the official predictions regarding the prospect of the global energy 
market focus on further dramatic changes toward natural gas in the future years 
and decades, so the share of this kind of hydrocarbon will increase more than in 
the past in the global energy mix. The majority of countries have to import 
natural gas and LNG for ensuring their energy needs (Proedrou, 2012) even from 
remote regions (G. Victor & H. Hayes, 2006: 319–357), such as the Arctic. 
According to the US’ Geological Survey (USGS) in a 2000 assessment, 
approximately 25% of the undiscovered petroleum reserves are in the Arctic, 
especially in Russian Siberia, making this far–distance region’s hydrocarbons an 
important economic and geopolitical issue. This issue has created some disputes 
amongst the Arctic’s adjacent countries lying entirely south of the Arctic Circle, 
including Alaska/US, Canada, Norway, Russia, Greenland/Denmark (Mikkelsen 
& Langhelle, 2008: 2–6). 
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According to the European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Energy Security 
Unit (Costescu Badea, 2010: 4), the availability of natural gas defines the 
amount of global conventional and unconventional resources (geological feature) 
and the share of each country and region. So, the main question in this criteria of 
the energy security is “which countries or regions control the major natural gas 
reserves?” (annex 20). 
Russia possesses close to one fourth of total gas reserves worldwide. Beyond 
Russia’s predominant role on the global gas market in the future, Iran comes 
second in terms of world gas reserves, followed by Qatar. Other significant 
exporters are from the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, North Africa and then Asia–
Oceania (table 21). So, three–quarters of global reserves are situated in the 
Middle East/Persian Gulf and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, while 
nearly 40% of globally–proved gas reserves is situated in the Persian Gulf (table 
21). The US is the only western well–developed economy which also has huge 
unconventional gas reserves. 
Table 21: The world’s top 15 proven natural gas holders, 2010–2012 (bcf) 
 
Source: OGJ Jan 1, 2012, USGS, EIA International Energy Outlook 2011: 64 
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So, the biggest increase in gas discovery at the start of 2012, compared to one 
year before that, has occurred in Iran, followed by the US and Saudi Arabia. 
Oil and Gas Journal’s annual look at worldwide gas reserves shows an increase 
to 6,746.8 tcf in 2012 from 6,647.3 tcf in the 2011 survey. Total gas reserves for 
OPEC are up nearly 4% from a year ago. Reported gas reserves climbed by 12% 
in Iran and declined in Libya by 3%. As of Jan. 1, 2012, OPEC’s gas reserves 
totalled 3,330.1 tcf, or 49% of the world’s resources.  
Figure 61: The world’s largest natural gas reserves 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2012 
According to BP, 2009 and the USGS, 2000, the current proved conventional gas 
in the world would be sufficient for nearly 70 years, based on, of course, on 
current demands, while the volume of unproved levels of conventional gas is 
twice the total amount of the existing, discovered natural gas reserves (Jaffe & 
Soligo, 2006: 437–468). 
Clément Therme in an interview on 25th May 2012, argued that in the Persian 
Gulf, particularly Iran, there are significant natural gas reserves, which are not 
yet exploited and, on the basis of Peimani’s interview (2012), “this country has a 
distinct potential to emerge as the first largest gas holder worldwide in the 
future, given its continued discovery of new gas fields”. He added that the 
availability of the Persian Gulf’s natural gas reserves, especially in “Iran and 
Qatar basins, having the world’s 2ndand 3rd largest gas reserves are crucial for 
the EU’s energy security”, although discovery projects are underway in other 
areas, such as Libya and Iraq, and Australia, as well as small countries, e.g. 
Mozambique, according to Luciani in an interview on 7th March 2012.  
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According to OME’s report (2012:10) Israel will, furthermore, join the 
Mediterranean gas exporters club with a modest contribution with the total 
potentiality for export from 80 bcm/y in 2010 to 140–190 bcm/y by 2030, after 
Algeria, Egypt and Libya. Based on this report and also the above–mentioned Oil 
and Gas Journal 2012, almost 5% of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves are 
situated in the Mediterranean region. Algeria with 50.3% of regional NG 
reserves is the foremost, followed by Egypt (24.7%), Libya (16.7%), Israel (5.3%), 
and 3% of the rest are in other regional countries. So, Israel places in 45th 
position of global gas holders (annex 20). 
Nonetheless, Simon Henderson, the Baker fellow and director of the Persian Gulf 
and Energy Policy Programme at the Washington Institute, in his latest essay on 
7th 2012, has indicated some of the challenges that Israel encounters 
commercially, diplomatically, financially and geo–politically.  
The world economy system is changing fundamentally with the newly–emerging 
economy giants in Asia, e.g. China and India, Latin America and other regions. 
At the same time, well–developed states and regions, such as the US, Japan and 
the EU are mature natural gas consumers, albeit that the global economic 
recession of 2007–8 seems to have put a hold on energy demand in the western 
world (Stern, 2009: 1), whereas China and India have dramatically increased 
their consumption. These main natural gas and LNG importers will compete 
more with each other for further access to adequate supplies to try and avoid the 
economic and social problems of energy shortages. As a result, natural gas will 
encounter a “big jump” by 2030, according to Prof. Geoffrey Kemp (annex 1) in 
the “Asianisation of the Middle East” at Durham University on 13th September 
2012. 
The EU will be the world’s largest gas importer by 2030 (figure 70) (European 
Commissionworking Paper, 2011: 2; BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 76) and 
meeting this growing demand clearly involves more natural gas discovery or 
access to the economical gas fields to increase volumes of natural gas and LNG 
imports (R. Odell, 2002: 439). 
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Luciani (interview, 2012) raised one more point, that the supply of gas, notably 
LNG, is expected to be abundant. “This is the consequence of the turnaround in 
the US supply situation (the US is on the way to become a net exporter of LNG) 
which displaced the large increase of capacity in Qatar and Australia”. Thanks to 
the Fukushima accident, the displaced gas found a market in the Far East, but it 
is not clear that this can be projected into the future. However, it could be added 
to his argument that while unconventional gas will develop in North America 
and the amount of LNG exports toward the US could divert to other areas, global 
natural gas and LNG demands will increase dramatically. 
As explained in chapter 4, unconventional gas reserves are abundant and 
sporadic in different regions and countries respectively, but face some financial, 
environmental and other challenges. So, according to the US EIA International 
Energy Outlook (2011: 50) it will cover around 18% of global production by 2030 
(figure 62) most of which is to be consumed in the US, while the whole of Europe 
will hold 9% of the world’s unconventional gas production by then, equivalent to 
nearly 1.5% of global gas production.  
Figure 62: The global proved and unproved conventional and unconventional gases 
 
Source: MIT multidisciplinary report, “The Future of Natural Gas”, the US, 2012: 23 
According to the BIWGTM, regarding the role of natural gas, LNG, 
unconventional gas in the future, while the production of gas from coal started in 
1792 commercially and the first company, the so–called Baltimore, in this regard 
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was established in the US in 1816, but before 2020 these kinds of unconventional 
gas industries could not compete with conventional gas with less than $5 in 
mbtu. Moreover, in 2030, high–tech unconventional gas could replace 
conventional gas by around 18% (figure 43 & annex 7) with the base price of 
$5.50 in mbtu and finally in 2100 the replacement technologies could most likely 
give up the natural gas completely with the $5.50 in mbtu (Hartley & Medlock, 
2006: 357–407). 
With the continuing decrease or depletion of fields in the UK and the 
Netherlands, Norway will thus become the single most important supplier 
within the borders of Europe in the future (Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1526) (see 
Chapter 2).Müller Kraenner (2008: 17) believed that this era faces the crisis with 
declining availability of fossil fuels, in particular natural gas, on the one hand 
and the restricted ability to contain the environmental pollution, on the other.  
Figure 63: The global fossil demands, 1990–2030 
 
Source: BP 2012, Energy Outlook 2030: 76 
According to an interview with Thierry Coville (2012) on 18th April 2012, 
increased natural gas and LNG supply toward the EU will ensure its energy 
security and, apart from political issues, more imports from the gas–rich 
countries and regions could ensure the security of the gas supply of the Union.  
Prof. Pirouz Mojtahed Zadeh (annex1), in an interview on 17th May 2012, 
confirmed Thierry’s argument and added that the availability of gas reserves in 
some gas–rich countries, such as Iran and Qatar with nearly one–third of global 
gas deposits and the actual and potential LNG suppliers toward the EU, Asia, 
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and the other importers, will ensure their energy security because of the huge 
availability of gas. 
On the other hand, Yergin (2006: 75), believed that the major obstacle(s) to the 
development of the existing and potential deposits is not geological, but political, 
geo–political, financial and technological. Although, the availability of natural 
gas supply is important, “natural gas and LNG importers are concerned not just 
with the availability of this hydrocarbon but also security of supply, production, 
uninterrupted transportation and timely distribution inside their region and 
countries with affordable prices” (Peimani, 2011: 2&3).  
In conclusion, in such a world with its growing gas demands outlook, the main 
crucial gas players are, geo–politically, the ones holding the large amounts of 
natural gas reserves and also enjoying strong management to prepare suitable 
situations for attracting the required investment and confidence (G. Victor & H. 
Hayes,  2006: 319–357), that is shown by the fact that Trinidad and Tobago has 
turned in to the major LNG exporter to the US, whereas Venezuela, with huge 
gas reserves and a shorter distance to the US has been marginalised (M. Jaffe & 
Soligo, 2006: 437–468).  
To sum up, the best gas reserves are those with easy access and huge shallow 
off–shore ones but also close to the coastline with enough liquefaction facilities 
and also near to gas markets. As a result, these gas suppliers should be either so 
close to gas consumers that pipelines become economical or so far from the 
importers’ markets that LNG would be reasonable and affordable and that will 
be dealt with them in the next section (G. Victor & H. Hayes, 2006: 319–357). 
5.2.3. Affordability of natural gas and LNG towards the EU, three variables 
Economic affordability (Sovacool, 2011: 191), as one of the main four energy 
security indicators “involves not only low or equitable prices relative to income, 
but also stable prices that are non–volatile” (Sovacool, 2011: 9); that is a shared 
concern for both producers and consumers (Pascual & Zambetakis, 2010: 12). 
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The Energy Security Unit, Joint Research Centre for theEuropean Commission, 
(Costescu Badea, 2010: 4) defines affordability when, “the consumers are able to 
afford energy services, capital and operating cost structures for developing 
various energy sources” in order to achieve more reasonable natural gas and 
LNG prices.   
As mentioned earlier, Fatih Birol (Birol, 2007) called energy poverty one of the 
triple challenges in the world and emphasised the essential role of affordable 
energy in economic growth and human development.   
5.2.3.1. Natural gas and LNG pricing mechanisms  
Unlike with crude oil, natural gas does not have a global market or price, but is 
regional, hence some additional natural gas and LNG players may have a need 
for a globalised and liberalised gas market in the future (Cherp & Goldthau, 
2011) and by increasing LNG trading and with more flexibility in its markets, 
gas markets could witness more integrated pricing (Barnes, et al. 2006: 3–27), 
reduction of risks, diversifying of suppliers and more security of supply (Jaffe & 
Soligo, 2006: 437–468).  
The establishment of any coherent global gas market will be probably practical, 
while any event in one country or region affects directly on other regions (Jaffe & 
Soligo, 2006: 437–468). 
“Improved LNG systems would increase competition with the new suppliers 
being able to enter the market and this could lead to reducing the price of 
natural gas reasonably, as the low cost natural gas and LNG can only lead to 
waste”, on the basis of Clément Therme’s comments (interview, 2012). This is 
because Howard Rogers (interview, 2012) predicted that in the future LNG 
global markets, different suppliers will send their products to various regions. 
He took Australian’s LNG as an example that might replace some Qatari LNG 
supply into the Atlantic basin and also more LNG producers within the Persian 
Gulf, sending their products to the east, south Asian and European markets. As 
explained in chapter 4, any creation of Gas–OPEC and the stronger GEFC, with 
90% of the world’s LNG exports, could challenge these gas markets in the future 
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and lead to more coordinated actions in order to increase the price (RIA Novosti, 
12nd February 2007).  
Until then, the natural gas prices are negotiated locally and quite often are not 
made public and this lack of transparency provides for more opportunities for 
securitisation. In the North American market, moreover, gas is traded at the 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) hub in accordance with supply and 
demand forces (Proedrou, 2012), like the Atlantic LNG project in Trinidad and 
Tobago (G. Victor & H. Hayes, 2006: 319–357), but in the European continent, 
gas prices have followed oil–linked price formulas, based on three–quarters of 
the price of one basket of crude oil (M. Victor & G. Victor, 2006: 122–169) and 
other considerations, such as transportation costs, add up to the final price 
(Proedrou, 2012). In the East Asia and Japanese markets, natural gas and LNG 
are calculated on the basis of JCC (G. Victor & H. Hayes, 2006: 319–357). 
With regard to gas pricing, there are some pricing mechanisms in different 
regional gas markets. Clément Therme (2012) also believed that “energy model 
of free market with fluctuating prices is the favoured option for LNG exports 
(Qatari’s model) and a state model, based on the administered price of exports 
through gas pipelines is another choice (Russian model)”.  
Albeit, some argued that if the oil price remains high, an independent gas 
pricing mechanism will be 
developed in Europe 
(Proedrou, 2012; Stern, 2009: 
15–16) and excess gas supply 
relative to demand, coupled 
with the seller’s motivation to 
sell more natural gas and 
LNG, could possibly lead to 
making gas prices more 
independent of oil (R. Odell, 
2002: 448). 
Figure 64: Outlook of gas price in various hubs, 2002–2038 
 
Source: Hartley & B. Medlock, 2006: 357–407 
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Figure 64 shows the American Henry Hub and the European Zeebrugge are the 
main sources for gas prices worldwide and the role of some other regional 
resources would be increased, such as Tokyo, Beijing and Delhi in Asia, as well 
as Buenos Aires in South America. This figure, moreover, illustrates that the 
price in the mentioned sources will become closer to each other and integrate 
more, thanks to the growing role of LNG in the future’s global gas market, such 
as Japan’s situation right now and globalisation of the natural gas and LNG 
price in the future, like oil (Hartley & B. Medlock, 2006: 357–407).  
If energy prices are high, it could lead to escalate the energy efficiency and thus 
reduce pollution, according to Alhajji (2007d), therefore the price does determine 
the extent and the kind of energy use (Proedrou, 2012). 
Supply costs are the cost of delivering natural gas and LNG to the relevant 
country or region, including production and transportation costs (Lochner & 
Bothe, 2009: 1523).  
5.2.3.2. LNG production costs in different suppliers 
Investment in production facilities, which make up more than 90% of total 
supply costs, depends on field size and depth, on–shore or off–shore location, 
associated or non–associated gas, environmental conditions, availability of 
infrastructure and also a skilled workforce (OME, 2001: 3). It is particularly field 
size and geographic location that have the largest impacts on per–unit extraction 
costs (Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1521). The Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and 
Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) are two kinds of investment in both gas 
production and its upstream industries (M. Victor & G. Victor, 2006: 122–169).  
The depth and the size of gas reserves are the two main important factors for 
measuring the rate of investments, according to the USGS (Hartley & Medlock, 
2006: 357–407). So, the gas production costs could vary from one country or 
region to another one, while the lowest production costs belong to the large non–
associate on–shore gas fields, the production from the smaller off–shore fields in 
deeper waters are the most expensive (Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1521). According 
to table 22, the largest non–associated gas fields in the world, more than 50%, 
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are situated in Iran and Qatar, particularly the former country. As a result, the 
lowest production costs in gas reserves in the world, apply to these two gas 
holders (table 23). Howard Rogers (interview, 2012) argued that “given the 
relatively shallow water location of the Iranian South Pars and Qatari North 
Field and the co–production of condensate, such LNG projects would have a 
lower cost base than future Australian LNG projects (which would be a main 
competing source of new LNG), so many International Oil Companies’ have long 
hoped to be able to access natural gas and LNG development opportunities in 
these attractive on–shore and off–shore areas”.  
Table 22: Largest non–associated gas fields in the world (in tcf) 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_natural_gas_fields 
IEA (2003) in its World Energy Investment Outlook, estimated that more than 
half of the investments should be allocated to discover and develop the gas fields 
(production stage), while the most risk in the investment process might be in 
excavation, exploration and exploitation parts (Hartley & Medlock, 2006: 407–
439), so any undeveloped region with huge and least expensive gas reserves, 
such as in the Persian Gulf, could lead to a fall of at least 50% of production cost.  
Some believe that in the case of a fall in the price of natural gas and LNG, the 
venture will not be economical in high–cost regions, so low–cost gas reserves 
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seem more suitable for investment (R. Odell, 2002: 432). For instance, some of 
the Russian gas fields have relatively low production costs, contrary to the gas 
fields situated in some other areas, such as in the Barents Sea which are more 
difficult to access and therefore more expensive to exploit. The US and Norway 
(due to new investments in the exploration and exploitation of the expensive 
fields) enjoy the same situations as in Russia n gas fields and the production 
costs in other regions, comprising Africa, Asia/Oceania and Latin America are 
not more than $1 in mbtu (table 23). So, a number of the known EU’s indigenous 
gas reserves are not profitable to produce (R. Odell, 2002: 441).  
Howard Rogers (interview, 2012) also believed that investment within the 
Persian Gulf’s gas reserves is the cheapest, so the price of the final natural gas 
and LNG supply might be more suitable for the EU, “while any engagement with 
the EU member states in LNG trade would hopefully engender a more open and 
progressive stance on the part of the Union’s counterparts towards economic and 
political engagement with Europe”.  
Table 23: Range of production costs for gas producing regions until 2030 (in $/MBtu) 
 
Source: Lochner, Stefan & Bothe, David (2009), Energy Policy 37: 1521 
The relative regional shares of global gas production for selected years are 
presented in table 24. According to this table, in addition to annexes 7 and 16, 
the most growth in gas production up to 2030 will take place in the Middle 
East/Persian Gulf. As a result, this region and particularly Iran and Qatar will 
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become to the third biggest gas producers and the second largest exporters in the 
world (table 24 & figure 72). 
Table 24: The percentage of gas producing regions worldwide, 2000–2030 
 
Source: By Author, based on: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011 (annex 6); EIA 
International Energy Outlook 2011: 50 (annex 7); Lochner, Stefan & Bothe, David (2009), Energy Policy 37: 
1523. 
5.2.3.3. LNG transportation costs from different suppliers to the EU 
The second phase of supply cost is related to transportation. Shipping LNG by 
sea is the only viable way to transport the natural gas over distances (Palm, 
2007: 15) and this includes three stages, comprising the liquefaction of gas, its 
maritime transport and the regasification at the destination (Lochner & Bothe, 
2009: 1522). The liquefaction process is done in what are called trains when the 
natural gas is cooled to approximately –162°C and between 5 and 15% of the gas 
is used in the plant during the cooling process. First of all, water and other 
substances are removed from wet gas and then gas is cooled to –35°C to separate 
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the heavier hydrogen atoms from the methane. This step is not done for pipeline 
gas, making LNG cleaner with higher methane content than pipeline gas, 
odourless, clear, and non–toxic liquid (BP, 2006). Finally, the gas is cooled to –
162°C and turned into LNG with 600 times more compression than in gas form. 
There are two main technologies used in liquefaction today, namely Air Products 
(APCI) and the Phillips cascade technology (Palm, 2007: 16).  
In the regasification plant, the liquid gas is heated and converts in to the gas 
again with a number of technologies, encompassing direct–fired heaters and 
heating by passing the gas through pipes submerged in seawater or heated water. 
This process requires energy as well, but significantly less than for liquefaction. 
Large compressors are used to pump the gas into the pipelines. Moreover, the 
plant contains storage facilities with tanks, being important to store the LNG to 
distribute the gas to the consumers, cover peak demand and/or minor disruptions 
in deliveries (Palm, 2007: 18). 
5.2.3.4. LNG liquefaction costs in different suppliers   
For liquefaction terminals and regasification plants, investment costs are 
assumed to be $265 million and $100 million (in 2005 terms) for 1bcm/y 
liquefaction and regasification capacity, respectively. So,the LNG receiving 
facilities are relatively cheaper and cost only between one–third and two–fifths 
of the average liquefaction terminals and 15% of the total of the LNG chain costs 
(Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1522), while the main cost is in the liquefaction process 
with close to half of the LNG transportation chain cost (Palm, 2007: 12) (figure 
65).             
Figure 65: The stages of LNG transportation chain in percentage 
 
Source: Fredrik Palm, 2007: 20 
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According to WEIO (World Energy Investment Outlook) published by the IEA in 
2003, the cost of liquefaction investment in gas holders varies from one country 
to another one. This international energy organization compared this cost in 37 
minor and major gas holders and found that Qatar, Iran, Kuwait, Russian 
Nakhodka, as well as Russian Sakhalin Island benefit from the cheapest 
liquefaction costs worldwide (figure 66). 
Figure 66: The required investment for liquefaction by country ($ in 1000 m3) 
 
Source: Hartley and Medlock, 2006: 357–407 
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5.2.3.5. LNG shipping costs from different suppliers  
Shipping costs, as the second stage in transportation value chain, consist of the 
LNG vessels’ capital and voyage costs, while the price of a LNG vessel since 2005 
has been nearly halved, compared to one decade before that date, and also larger 
vessels have been constructed, all causing a reduction in LNG costs (Palm, 2007: 
21). In addition, increasing distances, more than 3500–4000 km, favours the 
LNG technology as a means of more economical transport (Lochner & Bothe, 
2009: 1518). 
Since the 1990s, the LNG industry has been developing fundamentally 
technologically and commercially, leading to at least one–third of reduction in 
the transportation costs to consumers (Barnes et al. 2006: 3–27).  
In the Magellan gas model, as a long–term gas supply and interregional cost–
minimisation model up to 2035, raised by this corporation in the US, an average 
investment in LNG supply has declined by 1.5% per annum, since 2005, due to 
the technological progress, and these processes will impact on the average supply 
costs of LNG volumes and transportation during the next 20 years and beyond 
(Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1522). OME’s calculations regarding the cost of pipeline 
and LNG transportations from various actual and potential suppliers towards 
the EU (map 11) are very close to Magellan’s model. 
Map 11: Transportation cost for new NG/LNG delivery to EU, 2010–2020, ($/MBtu) 
 
Source: OME, “Future NG/LNG Supply Options and Cost for the EU”: 27 
 261 
 
According to figure 67, the range of lowest and highest LNG transportation costs 
from various global suppliers, excluding Asia–Pacific to the EU are situated 
between $1.47 in 1 MBtu in Libya to $2.43 in 1 MBtu in Iran. However, the gas 
supplied at the highest cost to the EU is projected to be LNG from Norway–
Barents Sea, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Nigeria, Yemen and the 
United Arab Emirates, while the cheapest belongs to Algeria, Egypt and Libya, 
followed by Qatar and Iran. The above–mentioned table 23 that shows the cost–
to–production of some other suppliers from Asia–Pacific by 2030 could complete 
the figure 67. 
Peimani (interview, 2012) argued that the close proximity of the Persian Gulf to 
Europe, in addition to the cheapest cost of production, is another factor to 
decrease the cost of LNG imports for the EU, having been in search of less 
expensive fuels for obvious reasons, including improving its competiveness and 
helping its members towards economic recovery after a long period of recession. 
Figure 67: Production and transportation pipeline and LNG costs towards the EU, 2010–2020 ($ in MBtu) 
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Source: OME, “Future gas Supply Options and Cost for the EU”: 10 
On the other hand, Korin (interview, 2012) pointed to another issue, apart from 
upstream and downstream costs. He referred to the globalised oil market 
conditions that “Saudi Arabian oil cost while lifting is $2 a barrel, but the spot 
price is around $100 in global markets”. So, he concluded that whereas the 
Persian Gulf’s gas reserves are very significant and the cost to producers is low, 
it is unclear if the price to the consumers will be the same and some other factors, 
such as political tensions will impact on the globalised gas market in the future 
similar what has happened with oil.  
As a whole, IEA (2003) in its World Energy Investment Outlook predicted that 
investments in LNG industries will double by 2020. According to this report, the 
total cost of liquefaction, transportation and also regasification has decreased 
from $494 in 1000 cm in 1995 to $387 and $292 in the same volume in 2000 and 
by 2010 respectively. According to its forecast, it could also reach nearly $200 
before 2040 (figure 68). 
Figure 68: The essential investment in LNG industry, 1995–2040 ($ in 1000 m3) 
 
Source: Hartley and B. Medlock, 2006: 357–407 
5.2.3.6. Regasification in LNG buyers   
On–board regasification is an economical new technology involving transforming 
the LNG into the gas on the ship and then pumping directly into the pipeline 
network, removing the need for on–shore regasification facilities. Furthermore, 
there are plans for floating off–shore regasification terminals, being able to 
transfer pressurised gas directly into the grid system (Palm, 2007: 18).  
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LNG buyers import this product in the framework of Cost, Insurance and 
Freight (C.I.F), comprising the price of LNG (partially in F.O.B7), the cost of 
transportation, as well as insurance (Barnes et al. 2006: 3–27) under long–term 
take–or–pay and also short–term spot contracts. Long–term contracts could help 
secure supplies, solidify the producer–consumer relation, and enable more 
ventures in new natural gas and LNG industries (Aad Correlje´, 2006: 540–542). 
However, Clément Therme (interview, 2012) argued that this kind of contract 
“makes more complex definition of an acceptable price (fixed price)”, and will 
likely lead to more spot contracts with more reduced prices, competitive markets 
and even arbitrage within the EU, too.   
However, in spite of the increasing importance of short–term contractual 
agreements, long–term supply contracts will remain the backbone of the 
European gas supplies that enjoy more gas net–backs (net profit after reducing 
of the transportation cost) in LNG compared to the US (Jaffe & Soligo, 2006: 
437–468).  
5.2.3.7. Natural gas and LNG price is a major concern in the EU 
During the history of the European natural gas and LNG industries since around 
1960, to date, the supply costs have mattered (R. Odell, 2002: 431), because of 
“the inevitability of higher prices” (R. Odell, 2002: 444). Ledesma and Hulbert 
(interview, 2012) rejected any cheap natural gas and LNG in the future, while 
the EU will make efforts to buy its required natural gas and LNG at a market 
price in competition with other thirsty importers in the “Great Game of the 21st 
century” (Sascha Muller–Kraenner, 2007). Oettinger, the EU Commissioner for 
Energy, discussed (2010: 2–5) the role of the new economic tigers in competition 
to achieve a larger share of the world’s energy resources, particularly natural gas, 
which might lead to long–term price increases. So, the new dimension of geo–
politics of energy security is competition amongst main global consumers 
(Pascual & Elkind, 2010: 3).  
                                                          
7 Freight On Board: when the gas is sold simultaneous with moving from the liquefaction plant to 
the ship (Palm, 2007: 17). 
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Hulbert (annex 1) in an interview on 15th May 2012, referred to the point 
mentioned previously that if the globalised gas market will not be created and 
the market will not assign the price, so based on the current situation, “it is 
plausible that we will witness more LNG shifting from the Middle East/Persian 
Gulf to Asian markets in future, as the LNG net–back in Asia is around twice 
that of north–western Europe”. This point is similar to Sund’s opinion (interview, 
2012) that the prospect of more LNG supply toward different markets, mostly 
Asia and Europe, will depend on prices there. 
The economic risks (affordability), such as energy price fluctuations due to 
imbalances between supply and demand, inadequate investments in energy 
industries (e.g. renewable energy sources and natural gas and LNG 
infrastructures), and financial crises, are the other issues that the EU energy 
commissioner has dealt with. He argued that insufficient investment leads to 
reduction in EU energy competitiveness. Based on Oettinger’ comments in 
Bahraini Capital, Manama, 2010, investment of around €1 trillion will be needed 
by 2020 by national and regional investors or sponsors, such as the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) to create new supply routes, infrastructures and even 
modernising them, energy storage, second generation biofuels and smart grids in 
the EU that Checchi and his colleagues described as the “facility risk” (Checchi 
et al. 2009: 43). So, the European Commission noted that “the main risk with 
regard to the Union’s energy is economic, followed by the physical risks of 
disruption of supply” (European Commission, COM (2002) 488: 8). 
The IEA projects that more than 50% of all interregional gas trading will be by 
LNG carriers by 2030 owing to expansion of LNG capacities, further progress in 
its technology (IEA, WEO 2004: 141) less geo–political complexity and cost of 
operation, than pipeline plans (Shepherd & James, 2006: 268–319), so this more 
globalised gas market alongside more competition could lead to affordable prices 
(Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1518). 
Karen Sund (interview, 2012), regarding the affordability of natural gas and 
LNG price within the EU, has raised two scenarios; that in a scenario with low 
prices in Europe, the producers will prefer other markets. In a scenario with high 
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prices in Europe, more supplies (also unconventional gas) should be available to 
decrease importing from the Persian Gulf. She added that if the Persian Gulf 
states, mainly Iran and Qatar, choose to send more low–cost gas into a low–
priced Europe, the price will fall further, which is not in their long–term interest. 
It is assumed that some of the investors will be international companies wanting 
maximum returns, thus aiming for Asia when possible, and higher prices in this 
continent might lead to more LNG supply and at shortage of this product in the 
EU, so this process could increase the price in Europe, as LNG has not been 
globalised yet. 
Although, the low–cost–to–production LNG suppliers to Europe are Oman, Iran 
and Qatar (R. Odell, 2002: 451), and although the marginal Iranian gas volumes 
will be supplied by pipeline at a slightly higher cost “Qatar is in no hurry to 
further increase exports to the EU, unless the LNG price will rise, and may 
indeed have contrary interests given the current moratorium which is unlikely to 
be lifted before 2015”, according to Laura Elkatiri (interview, 2012).  
Bahgat (interview, 2012) believes that, “Qatar has frozen any new gas deals and 
has sought to assess its production and export policies, so there is no way to 
predict the outcome of this assessment.” 
Other alternatives would be from Central Asia’s gas suppliers, such as 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, being potentially seen as additional gas 
competitors. However, some geo–political and economic situations of these 
potential gas suppliers to the EU should be considered, such as the required 
investment in gas industries, sufficient or insufficient political will, access to the 
most modern technologies, Russian control over some of these states’ gas policies, 
particularly Turkmenistan (R. Odell, 2002: 450–451).  
Bahgat (interview, 2012) argued that Russian control on most of the Caspian Sea 
littoral states’ reserves continued shortly after the collapse of the USSR. 
However, the Caspian States have grown more independent from Moscow since 
the early 1990s, such as the Republic of Azerbaijan.  
 266 
 
So, the EU’s geographic proximity to the main LNG exporters helps it to 
diversify suppliers that could lead to moderate prices to the Union (Lochner & 
Bothe, 2009: 1527), providing massive investment in production and 
transportation capacities (Palm, 2007: 38) in more affordable regional or ultra–
regional gas reserves. So, more investment only in low–risk/high–cost natural 
gas and LNG suppliers could not ensure future global demand with reasonable 
prices (Hartley & Medlock, 2006: 407–439). That will be discussed further in the 
next section in greater detail. 
5.2.4. Accessibility/Feasibility/Reliability of natural gas and LNG, three 
variables         
Ensuring sufficient natural gas and LNG supply with sustainability of access to 
resources (Proedrou, 2012), economic feasibility of social energy (GEA 2012: 22; 
K. Sovacool, 2011: 337) alongside reliability of this supply by different means, 
such as diversification of exporters (K. Sovacool, 2011: 9; Checchi et al. 2009: 43), 
are the main criteria of accessibility, as the fourth indicator of energy security, so 
the main question is, “how difficult is energy to get?”  
The Energy Security Unit, Joint Research Centrefor the European Commission, 
(Costescu Badea, 2010: 4)argued that major infrastructures and technologies 
require to explore and develop available resources for natural gas and LNG 
trading. However, the geo–political (unstable regions, sanctions and embargo, 
sabotage and terrorism), financial (recession, lack of investment, etc.) and 
human constraints are counted as the main threatening factors against security 
of supply in both the short–and long–term.  
Contrary to the previous energy security indicators, accessibility and its 
elements are more qualitative and difficult to be measured.  
H. Hayes and  G. Victor (2006: 3–49), the two natural gas and LNG experts, on 
the basis of primary data issued by international energy organizations, such as 
IEA, analysed the natural gas and LNG inter–regional trading outlook in the 
future. They have taken into consideration investment risks in different 
suppliers and transit countries in piped gas to quantify financial and geo–
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political elements. The importance of investments in different parts of LNG 
industries was analysed in the affordability section, in greater detail.  Moreover, 
a number of checkpoints in LNG routes have been replaced in pipelines in 
transit countries. Furthermore, the rate of any risk in consumers, such as 
economic downturn or higher investment risks, as well as the percentage of gas 
and LNG in these main EU importers’ total primary energy sourcesis added to 
the mentioned indexes. 
5.2.4.1. International Country Risk Guide/Composite Political, Financial, 
Economic Risk Rating in LNG suppliers 
The first variable is general risk investment, depending on the internal 
situations in gas holders, with a couple of elements on the basis of the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), being published on PRS Group Inc. 
monthly in New York, the US, that use Composite Political, Financial, Economic 
Risk Rating (CPFER) for each country and also The MEES (The Middle East 
Economic Survey) newsletter published by the MEPEP (The Middle East 
Petroleum and Economic Publications Ltd.) in Cyprus and Lebanon. 
The ICRG rating comprises 22 variables, including 100 indicators, in three 
subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic. The composite scores, 
ranging from zero to 100, are then broken into categories from Very Low Risk (80 
to 100 points) to Very High Risk (zero to 49.5 points), so the higher the points,  
the lower the risk (annex 18).  
On the basis of the PRS Group’s monthly on 7th September, 2012, Norway, with 
90.7 out of 100, is at the top of the global list for very low risk investment, while 
Oman and the United Arab Emirates are situated in 7th and 10th position in this 
ranking respectively. On the other hand, Somalia with 41.2 points is the worst 
country worldwide with very high risk investment and none of the main gas 
holders in the table below has under 57 points. 
The governmental stability on the basis of regular elections is the main 
supporter of private or public investor entities and neutrality in the executing of 
law in the new global gas market, while the state of investment, including 
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operation risks, tax system, the government’s guarantee that the profit of private 
or other states’ venture capital should be transferred to the investor’s country (G. 
Victor & H. Hayes, 2006: 319–357) and the rate of the workforce’s salary 
(Hartley & Medlock, 2006: 407–439) are the main criteria in political economic 
risks. 
The least risk, furthermore, is attached to the countries without any armed 
opponents and also where governments do not treat with their citizens violently. 
The highest risk is, however, for the states with domestic war and the middle 
score is for the countries where kidnapping and terrorist actions are likely to 
happen (Hartley & Medlock, 2006: 407–439).  
The second variable is the number of checkpoints in LNG routes, so when there 
is no any checkpoint in a particular sea lane, nil will be considered and with one 
transit state, number one and then the rating will go up, correspondingly. 
The third variable is geo–political relations. Some elements take effect on this 
variable, like political and technological risks (the rate of liquefaction and 
regasification facilities that is explained in the accessibility section in further 
detail), depth of gas reserves on the seabed (H. Hayes, 2006: 49–91), regional 
tensions, less confidence from investors (Jaffe & Soligo, 2006: 437–468), etc.  
As it is less likely to find any quantity indicators for geo–political affiliations, so 
H. Hayes and G. Victor paid more attention to a range of international 
organizations, mostly economic and commercial ones in chapter 2 of their co–
authored book and ranked them on the basis of the rate of the organization’s 
power on its members and also institutional cooperation, implementation of 
commitments and functions, as well as any historical experience in previous 
natural gas and LNG projects in that organization. Then, these organizations are 
scored at between nil to five, based on the above criteria. For example, they 
believe EFTA and NAFTA get 5 points, MERCOSUR gains a score3, while 2 
points is sufficient for OAS and GCC.  
Although this argument is true that any coherent and strong regional 
organization and institute could have an effect on its members and help more 
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security of supply by regional cooperation, however the quantification of the 
organization’s power is not perfect, while some of the main gas suppliers are the 
members of top organizations and institutions, but they sometimes fail in 
fulfilling their commitments, such as what happened in gas disruption since 
2006 against Europe by Russia. Venezuela, moreover, is a member of notable 
organizations, however the risk of investment in this country is high (table 25). 
Another criteria returns to the natural gas and LNG consumer’s risk, being 
created by these countries’ energy policy and the rate of natural gas share in 
their energy mix. It means the more the rate of gas share in any importer rises, 
the more risks in this country will arise.  
Nevertheless, one more criterion could be added to the main natural gas and 
LNG importers within the EU, therefore under current economic circumstances 
in the Union, particularly in the Eurozone, the economic risks index in these 
countries is important.  
Table 25: LNG suppliers’ positions, based on the criteria of the accessibility indicator 
Supplier LNG checkpoints to the EU CPFER/GIRI (0–100) The power of Organization (0–5)  
Russia Nil–one LR (70–79.9) CIS8,APEC9, GECF 
Norway Nil VLR (90.7) EFTA10, OECD11 
Iran three MR (60–69.9) ECO12, GECF 
Algeria Nil LR (70–79.9) UfM13, GECF 
Kazakhstan Two strait and canal LR (70–79.9) CIS 
Turkmenistan Two strait and canal N/A Zero 
The US Nil LR (70–79.9) NAFTA14,APEC, OECD 
                                                          
8 Common of Independent States 
9 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation 
10 European Free Trade Association 
11 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
12 Economic Cooperation Organization 
13 Union for the Mediterranean   
14 North American Free Trade Association 
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Venezuela Nil HR (50–59.9) OAS15, Mercosur, GECF 
Nigeria Nil MR (60–69.9) ECWAS16, GECF 
Australia Two LR (70–79.9) APEC, OECD 
Indonesia Two MR (60–69.9) APEC, ASEAN17 
Malaysia Two LR (70–79.9) APEC, ASEAN 
Trinidad Nil LR (70–79.9) ACS18, GECF 
Saudi Arabia One  & three VLR (80–100) GCC 
The UAE Three VLR (82.5) GCC 
Qatar Three VLR (80–100) GCC, GECF 
Libya Nil MLR (60–69.9) UfM, GECF 
Egypt Nil HR (50–59.9) UfM, GECF 
R. Azerbaijan Two strait and canal LR (70–79.9) CIS, BSEC19 
* Very Low Risk (VLR); Low Risk (LR); Moderate Risk (MR); High Risk (HR); Very High Risk (VHR);  
Source: By Author, based on: GIRI; PRG Group Inc. 2011; the US EIA website; G. Victor et al, Natural Gas 
and Geo–politics, from 1970–2040, 2006: 27–49 & 407–439. 
The International Country Risk Guide in the main gas holders during the past 
five years or so shows that the situation of the Composite Political, Financial, 
Economic Risk Rating has been better. For example, the Russian and Algerian 
index has improved from moderate to low risk. Most of the Sheikdoms in the 
Persian Gulf region have been situated in very low risk positions in the global 
ranking. It represents the fact that the relative unrest in the Persian Gulf has 
not had much effect on the Arab risk investment, while the index in Iran has 
decreased, to some extent, compared to around six years ago. So, Iran, Egypt, or 
any other gas holder, could improve their positions in the Composite Political, 
                                                          
15 Organization of American States 
16 Economic Community of West African States 
17 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
18 Association of Caribbean States 
19 Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
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Financial, Economic Risk Rating, like their neighbours. As Clément (interview, 
2012) said, Iranian natural gas and LNG developments require to an 
improvement to the internal political climate in order to attract the desired 
investment in the hydrocarbons sector.     
APICORP (Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation) Research in its recent 
study, published in October 2011, regarding the five‐year review of energy 
investment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), argued that a little 
more than two–thirds of the potential energy capital investment is located in the 
five regional countries, comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, 
Qatar and Algeria, none of which has faced the sort of upheaval witnessed in 
some other Arab countries. However, tighter international sanctions against Iran 
could lead to the retreat of foreign companies and energy investment (Economic 
Commentary (2011), Vol: 6, No: 9–10, September–October). 
Figure 69: Actual and potential investment in MENA, 2011–2016 
 
Source: APICORP Research, Vol: 6, No: 9–10, September–October 2011: 2 
5.2.4.2. The main sea checkpoints   
Another factor in the above table refers back to the main global checkpoints, as 
the narrow channels along widely used global sea lanes that will grow more in 
the future by increasing LNG trading, according to Geoffrey Kemp (2012). So, 
these checkpoints are a critical part of global energy security (Pascual & 
Zambetakis, 2010: 14), while the Strait of Hormuz, leading out of the Persian 
 272 
 
Gulf. The Strait of Malacca crossed by more than 80 per cent of Japanese and 
Korean as well as half of all Chinese oil and LNG supplies (Sascha Muller–
Kraenner, 2007: 23), linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans and these are two of 
the world’s most strategic checkpoints. So, for ships heading towards Asia, the 
Strait of Malacca is a probable waterway and for destinations to the Western 
countries, Bab El–Mandeb, en route to the Suez Canal faces additional 
bottlenecks. The international energy market is dependent upon reliable 
transport and the blockage of any checkpoint, even temporarily, can lead to 
substantial increases in total energy costs.  While the seven straits are 
highlighted as major trade routes for global energy transportation, Kemp 
believes (2012) piracy and terrorist attacks by extremist groups are the main 
menaces against LNG trading and Bab El–Mandeb, between Somalia and Yemen, 
is the most dangerous waterway globally.  
According to the US EIA, LNG transit through the Suez Canal has increased 
since 2008, from approximately 210 to over 500 in the total number of tankers 
and nearly six–fold in the volumes of LNG transportation. So, some EU countries, 
such as the UK, Belgium, and Italy, received over 80% of their total LNG 
imports via the Suez Canal in 2010, and France had about a quarter of its 
required LNG through the Canal. As a result, the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez 
Canal and Bab El–Mandeb are the three main waterways for LNG cargos 
heading towards the US and the EU. 
Map 12: The global sea straits 
 
Source: The US EIA website 
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Regarding the main gas holders in Central Asia and the potentiality of them for 
LNG export to the EU, the Caspian and Black Seas link to each other by the 
long– distance Volga–Don Canal, and any vessel from the Caspian littoral states 
should pass from this canal to the Black Sea and then head towards the south 
EU’s LNG terminals via the Turkish Bosporus strait, although, President 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has proposed the nearly 700km Eurasia Canal project 
between these two seas. 
In addition, LNG trading connects different exporters and importers with each 
other directly without any transit players, despite some strategic checkpoints, so 
the agreements between two players could be more easily achieved, rather than 
with various actors (H. Hayes & G. Victor, 2006: 27–49). 
In the last three decades, there have been about 40,000 LNG voyages worldwide 
(Melhem, 2005) and apart from some accidents, such as Ohio, the US in 1944; 
Arzew, Algeria in 1977; Cove Point in the Straits of Gibraltar in 1979; Bontang, 
Indonesia in 1983; and Skikda, Algeria in 2004 there has not been any other 
tragic accident in LNG facilities, while after the 9/11 attacks, concern over LNG 
carriers rose as they were considered prime targets for terrorist attacks or 
hijackings. According to the shared study conducted by the European Conference 
of Ministers of Transport with OECD in 2004, the hijacking scenario is more 
probable and the main anxiety (Hurst, 2008: 10).  
Some argue that LNG ships are not attractive targets for attacks, as methane is 
lighter than air and will be dispersed into the atmosphere in the event of leakage 
(Palm, 2007: 15). So LNG is not flammable until it is fully vaporised, mixed in 
the right proportions with air, and then ignited, therefore this combination 
events could be seen as the worst–case scenario. As a result, there has never 
been an attack against either an LNG terminal or tanker, while maritime 
terrorism has been a core part of Al–Qaeda’s strategy (Palm, 2007: 4). 
However, marine transport faces security problems and trade disruptions due to 
sea–lane checkpoints, such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, particularly 
the former, according to El–katiri (2012). Richard Perle, from the US think–tank 
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American Enterprise Institute, discussed the links between terrorist threats and 
energy infrastructure, among other geopolitical issues that might disrupt the 
energy access (Perle, 2005: 53).  
Security of gas supply will be more rapidly achieved by diversifying of natural 
gas and LNG suppliers and the number of infrastructures, like liquefaction 
facilities, that specify the amount of exports to consumers (G. Victor & H. Hayes, 
2006: 319–357).   
Indeed, a quick glance at the main gas producing areas shows that the Middle 
East/Persian Gulf is a region with regional controversies of religious, historical, 
ethnic, economic and geopolitical natures besides political volatility (Chapter 3). 
At the same time, it consists of mainly authoritarian or autocratic regimes, as 
has been clear in Arab uprisings since the beginning of 2011 (Proedrou, 2012). 
The former Soviet Republics have similar problems. Military and authoritarian 
regimes in certain of these states make them as rather lesser reliable gas 
partners, while the government–owned companies are estimated to hold 55% of 
gas reserves (Cable, 2010: 79). The energy sector is mostly state–controlled in 
some Latin American gas holders and that could also increase concerns for the 
politicisation of energy trade (Proedrou, 2012). 
So, according to Bahgat, (2011), “LNG has intense competition from pipelines”, 
but also from within the EU, on the basis of the comments of the President of 
Eurogas (Bosmans, 2007: 4). In addition, LNG demands in East Asia, such as in 
China, Japan, S. Korea and Taiwan, will increase, whereas the economic 
prosperity in these countries depends on energy imports, so that these countries 
will devote nearly 80% of the world’s LNG imports to themselves in the years to 
come, particularly from Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei (Kandiyoti, 
2008: 199).  
The international dimension of the gas trade has faced some political risks, such 
as the political unrests in Indonesia in previous years, institutional instability in 
producing and transit countries, such as Russian conflicts with Ukraine and 
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Belarus, quarrels between governments, for instance between Algeria and the 
US in the 1970s (Jaffe & Soligo, 2006: 437–468), etc.  
Moreover, by increasing the number of natural gas and LNG exporters and 
importers, as well as further development of the global gas market in the future, 
the gas players will try increasingly to reduce the investment risks, 
predominantly in infrastructure (Hartley & B. Medlock, 2006: 357–407). For 
instance the host governments could create some islands, for example, just for 
the LNG industry with the aim of ensuring a safe environment for investors, 
such as the first Russian LNG project in Sakhalin Island that is situated far 
from Moscow (G. Victor & H. Hayes,  2006: 319–357).  
The role of the governments in the developing of gas markets strongly 
transforms from direct investor and constructor of infrastructures to facilitator of 
the markets for the companies and investors, mostly private ones by reducing 
the major risks, such as with the Arun project in Indonesia in the 1970s or Qatar 
during the 1990s (Jaffe & Soligo, 2006: 437–468). 
5.2.4.3. Mismatch between liquefaction and regasification facilities worldwide  
An insufficiency of the required natural gas and LNG infrastructures and 
facilities acts as an impediment against security of supply and the ever–growing 
demands, so the situation of the global gas markets necessitates sufficient 
investment during the next 35 years (Jaffe & Soligo, 2006: 437–468). 
Regarding the mismatch between the number of liquefaction and regasification 
facilities under construction in the world, as the threatening parameter against 
the global security of LNG supply and high demand in the future (Proedrou, 
2012), “Global LNG Information” in the newly–published report on May 2012 
announced that for the time being, 10 liquefaction project are under construction 
worldwide, while Iran’s LNG project has been suspended due to the sanctions 
and also six of the other projects, out of a total of nine, are in progress only in 
Australia. In addition, 19 more planned projects exist in different gas holders, 
although 3 of them, in Iran and Venezuela, have been on hold (annex 11). 
 276 
 
On the other hand, 20 regasification projects are currently in progress in 
different countries, though 2 of them have been suspended. Of the total of 45 
regasification plans currently under consideration in various countries, 21 of 
them have been suspended or cancelled (annexes 11–15). 
This disproportionate amongst the number of liquefaction and regasification 
terminals both under construction and under consideration is obvious, whereas 
the current 9 liquefaction facilities (6 of them in one country) are versus 20 
regasification projects. There are also 19 liquefaction plants either in progress or 
suspended compared with 34 similar regasification projects. These statistics are 
additional to the current 31 liquefaction terminals which are on stream as 
opposed to 89 regasification online facilities (annexes 11–15).  
It seems this unbalance could threaten the global LNG supply in the future and 
could lead to a rise of the global gas price (Palm, 2007: 40), while the LNG 
demands will dramatically grow in the future throughout the world, in particular 
in the EU and Far East.  
While the numbers of regasification and liquefaction facilities are unbalanced, 
the capacity of these terminals is more important. For example, the EU imported 
80 bcm LNG in 2010, although these terminals have been capable of regasifying 
up to 150 bcm by virtue of the current expanded facilities (Eurogas, 2010: 5–6). 
5.3.   The EU and its proposed natural gas and LNG suppliers in the future 
5.3.1. Expansionist mode in the EU’s gas market 
The EU will be the world’s largest gas importer by 2030 (European Commission 
Working Paper, 2011: 2) and its market remains in an “expansionist mode” (R. 
Odell, 2002: 439), while the Member States should mostly try to substitute the 
coal and oil with gas, mainly in power generation plants in order to reduce 
greenhouse gases emissions (EU 2050 Energy Road Map, 2011: 17). In addition, 
the continuation of economic growth within the Union alongside fluctuating oil 
prices, mostly upward, will work to continue the growing role of gas in the future 
(Eurogas long– term outlook to 2030: 1). 
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This will involve an increase of nearly 100% in gas use in Western Europe and 
150% rise in its use in the east of the continent by 2025 from estimates based on 
1995 figures (table 26). As a result, during this 30 year period, Europe will need 
more than 16,000 bcm gas compared to a lower amount of around 5,000 bcm 
during the period from 1956–1995. Moreover, because of these levels of demand 
the cost of supplies in the longer–term could thus become a critical variable in 
the further expansion of the industry (R. Odell, 2002: 439). 
Table 26: The evolution of European natural gas use by country, 1995–2025 (in bcm)
 
Source: R. Odell, P 2002, “Oil and Gas: Crises and Controversies 1961–2000”, Volume 2: 440 
The share of natural gas in the EU energy mix was 24%, according to Eurostat, 
in 2011 and the EU has imported nearly 64% of its demand and this number will 
increase to 80% by 2020, while Denmark and the Netherlands were the only gas 
exporting countries among the EU–27 and could be expected to remain so at 
least until end–2018 and 2020 (Chapter 2). 
In addition, the share of natural gas in some EU member states’ energy mix is 
more than the Union average (figure 8), e.g. the Netherlands (43%), Italy (41%), 
the UK (40%), Spain (24%). 
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The Baker Institute has also issued The Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model 
(BIWGTM) and argued that five criteria determine the amount of natural gas 
and LNG demands in the future: comprising, “the rate of population, the level of 
economic development, the scale of gas reserves in that country or region, the 
relative price of other energy sources, and also the rate of progress in energy 
technologies” (Hartley & Medlock, 2006: 357–407). 
As figure 70 shows, issued by BIWGTM, the EU is the second LNG consumer in 
the world, followed by Mexico Atlantic, Japan, China and other importers. The 
main EU entrances for LNG imports will be the UK, Italy, France and Spain by 
different regasification terminals whether existing, under construction or under 
consideration. So, according to IGU (World LNG Report in 2010: 25) the EU 
absorbed close to 20% of global LNG supply, and 85% of this volume was 
imported by the four above–mentioned members (figure 40). Therefore, this 20% 
of global LNG import by the EU was nearly 15% of the Union’s gas demands in 
2010, according to CEDIGAZ 2011 (figure 21) and this percentage will rise to 24% 
by 2020 and around 40% in 2030. 
Figure 70: The main LNG consumers, 2002–2038 (in bcm) 
 
Source: Hartley, Peter and B. Medlock, Kenneth 2006: 357–407 
As discussed in chapter 4 and also in this chapter, the US will be the second 
global LNG producer during the next decades. However, this country will still 
remain the main LNG consumers with nearly half of the global demand, so its 
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natural gas and LNG production from conventional and unconventional gases 
will mostly be consumed domestically.  
Lochner and Bothe, regarding unconventional gas in North America, argued 
(2009: 1521) that while it impacts on the short–and mid–term development of 
the North American gas market, however, its effects on the long–term 
development are expected to be smaller, mostly because of its costs (see Chapter 
4). 
Therefore, the above figure, being prepared and published by James A. Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy at the University of Rice in the US, illustrates that the 
main LNG consumers will be the US and the EU, followed by Mexico Atlantic, 
Japan, China after around 2018 until 2038. However, the foremost consumer 
could produce LNG from unconventional gas, mostly, inside the country and will 
probably not need to import from external suppliers, unlike the other consumers, 
as the net LNG importers. 
Peimani (interview, 2012), believes that, “in the absence of the American market 
(becoming self–sufficient in gas thanks to its shale gas industry), it is possible 
that the Qataris or other suppliers continue expanding their LNG export 
capacity to the Asia–Pacific, the EU and other markets, while the world’s 
growing markets for LNG (e.g., China Indian and South Korea) needs to find 
new suppliers to ensure their demands in the future”. 
5.3.2. The estimated shares of gas holders in the global market, by 2040 
On the basis of table 27 that has been prepared in accordance with some official 
data by BIWGTM, the share of some current main natural gas and LNG 
suppliers, such as Algeria, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Brunei, Norway (to some 
extent), and Trinidad and Tobago will decrease during the period between 2010 
to 2030 and also to 2040. According to table 27, apart from the mentioned 
suppliers, the rest of the world will hold 19% of natural gas and LNG exports, 
equivalent to around 30% and 40% less than this percentage in 2010 and 2020, 
respectively. 
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Table 27: The outlook of the main natural gas holder’s share in global market, 2010–2040 (in %) 
Source: by Author, on the basis of: G. Victor et al, Natural Gas and Geo–politics, from 1970-2040, 2006: 439–
467, BIWGTM; US EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2012: 12 
The figure 71 demonstrates that on the basis of LNG supply in 2010, this wave 
grows close to 200% by 2020, around 350% in 2030 and up to 500% by 2040.  
In another view, LNG trading, compared to piped gas flows, will increase from 
24.1% in global gas trading in 2010 to 31.1% by the end of the present decade 
and then be upward to 41.4% and 48% until 2030 and 2040, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gas Supplier 2010 2020 2030 2040 Gas Supplier 2010 2020 2030 2040 
Russia 15.71 16.18 17.35 19.54 Indonesia 5.03 5.40 5.55 5.50 
The US _ _ _ slight Australia 1.88 4.10 8.46 8.09 
Norway 7.05 5.40 5.30 5.11 Malaysia 3.98 2.69 1.03 _ 
Iran _ 2.3 6.17 8.69 Trinidad 2.22 1.55 0.65 _ 
Algeria 11.3 6.72 1.89 0.20 Saudi Arabia 0.00 1.65 5.28 8.13 
Canada 7.56 3.14 _ _ Angola 0.17 0.55 1.04 0.79 
Kazakhstan 8.11 5.17 2.21 0.71 Qatar 3.47 4.68 7.87 9.50 
Turkmenistan 3.17 3.11 3.65 4.55 Greenland _ _ _ 2.12 
Nigeria 2.99 6.64 7.04 5.33 Venezuela _ 1.63 3.68 3.15 
The rest of the world 26.31 30.10 24.69 19.00 
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Figure 71: Global natural gas and LNG exports, 2010–2040
 
Source: Bosmans, 2007: 7 
In another discussion, while Qatar, Iran, Australia, Russia, Indonesia, Saudi 
Arabia will be the leading exporters, followed by the United Arab Emirates, 
Venezuela and Nigeria by the second half of the future decade (figure 72). 
Nevertheless, some regions, such as North Africa and some countries in Asia–
Pacific, like Malaysia and Brunei, as well as in Latin America, for example 
Trinidad and Tobago will encounter depletion of reserves by the end of the next 
decade. 
Figure 72: The main LNG suppliers, 2002–2038 (in bcm) 
 
Source: Hartley, Peter and B. Medlock, Kenneth 2006: 357–407 
In an interview with Inge Bernaerts, the Head of Unit Electricity and Gas, DG 
ENER for the European Commission, on 2nd April 2012, it is argued that the 
quantity of LNG imported in the EU from Qatar has been constantly increasing 
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during the past years. However, it is difficult to predict how this trend will 
evolve in future. “The amount of gas imported and choice of suppliers stays with 
commercial entities and are not steered by EU institutions. The role of 
institutions is to create a stable, clear and predictable legislative framework so 
that energy and gas companies can adequately plan and realise their 
investments”.  
Gunther Oettinger, the EU Commissioner for Energy, in his two discourses in 
the 3rd Secure Regional Workshop in Manama, Bahrain, on 9th November 2010; 
at “Conference on Energy Security Potential for EU–GCC Cooperation” and also 
in Brussels on 10th November 2010 regarding the new EU energy 2020 strategy 
discussed the EU’s growing natural gas and LNG demands, as well as new 
challenges on energy security in the future.  
In the former summit, he referred to the Union’s growing gas imports when its 
indigenous resources decline and also that some gas disputes, such as in 2006–9 
might recur in the future, considering this to be the “exporters’ reliability risk” 
(Checchi et al. 2009: 43). 
Consequently, Oettinger argued that decline of security of energy supply by more 
dependency on gas imports from one country, is the major energy challenge 
within the EU in the future (accessibility).  
Anne Korin (2012) said that “apart from political problems, like sanctions and 
just looking at the economics, the EU has to weigh between the option it knows 
and does not like (Russian gas, piped in, contracts subject to manipulation) and a 
future option, which has the appeal of diversification of suppliers and sources”. 
5.3.3. The results of testing of the energy security indicators on LNG suppliers to 
the EU 
On the basis of testing the four energy security indicators on different current 
and future LNG suppliers toward the EU in this chapter, the following table 
could categorise and summarise the relevant data. 
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Table 28: The results of testing of energy security indicators on LNG suppliers toward the EU 
Supplier Acceptability Availability Affordability Accessibility 
Pure methane Volume Field(s) size Production Liquefaction Transportation Check point CPFER Organization 
Algeria C D D B B C A B B 
Australia C D E B C N/A C B A 
Egypt B E E B C C A D B 
Indonesia C D E B B&C N/A C C A 
Iran C A A A A E D C C 
Kazakhstan C E D N/A N/A N/A C B C 
Libya C E E A&B C A A C B 
Malaysia C E E N/A E N/A C B A 
Nigeria C D E B E E A C D 
Norway C E E E C E A A A 
Qatar C A B A A D D A C 
R. Azerbaijan C N/A D B N/A N/A C B B 
Russia A A A A&B&
C 
A&C N/A B B A 
Saudi Arabia C C E N/A E E B&D A C 
Trinidad B E E B B E A B B 
Turkmenistan C C D A&B N/A N/A N/A N/A D 
The UAE C C E A E E D A C 
The US N/A C D N/A N/A N/A A B A 
Venezuela C D E B B E A D B 
Source: by Author  
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As the table 28 shows, for the acceptability, on the basis of different data in the 
mentioned section, the letters E, D, C, B and A were considered for diverse LNG 
suppliers with 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% and 100% methane in their exports. 
In the availability columns, the volume of natural gas reserves in each supplier 
and the size of gas field(s) are important, so the letters A, B, C, D and E were 
employed for the countries with 900–1700 tcf, 300–900 tcf, 200–300 tcf, 100–200 
tcf and under 100 tbc gas deposits, respectively. 
Regarding the size of the natural gas fields, the top 21 largest fields were 
examined. Moreover, some countries hold more than one huge natural gas field 
in this ranking, therefore the total of these fields for those countries were 
counted. Consequently, the letters A, B, C, D and E were applied to the fields 
with over 20,000 km3, 10,000–20,000 km3, 3,000–10,000 km3, 1,000–5,000 km3 
and under 1,000 km3. 
The third indicator for the energy security is affordability and the cost of 
production with the average of the lowest and highest production costs for each 
gas holder, the cost of liquefaction and transportation costs were considered. So, 
the letters A, B, C, D and E were used for the countries under $0.40, $0.40–$60, 
$0.60–$0.80, $0.80– $1.00, and over $1.00 in MBtu production respectively.  
In the liquefaction part, the above–mentioned letters were considered for the gas 
suppliers up to $180, $180–$190, $190–$200, $200–$210, and over $210 in one 
thousand cubic metres. The last dimension of affordability is supply and 
transport costs. The letters A to E were employed for various LNG suppliers to 
the EU with transportation cost of 1.40$ - 1.60$, 1.60$ - 1.80$, 1.80$ - 2.00$, 
2.00$ - 2.20$ and over 2.20$ in MBtu, respectively. 
Accessibility is the fourth indicator of the energy security with three criteria: the 
number of sea checkpoint(s), the International Country Risk Guide/Composite 
Political, Financial, Economic Risk Rating, and the power of organization. Hence, 
on the basis of the number of checkpoints along the LNG routes from each 
supplier to the EU, the letter A is used for the LNG routes without any 
checkpoint, followed by the letters B to E for one to three and above. Regarding 
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the International Country Risk Guide/Composite Political, Financial, Economic 
Risk Rating, the letters A to E were employed for either very low, low, moderate, 
high, and very high risks. Finally, the power of regional organization is the last 
criteria for accessibility. Hayes and Victor (2006: 3–27) categorised and ranked 
different regional organizations by numbers, so the letter A could be applied to 
APEC, OECD, EFTA, NAFTA, and ASEAN; the letter B for Ufm, OAS, 
Mercosure, ACS, BSES; the letter C for GCC, CIS, ECO; the letter D for GECF, 
ECWAS; and the letter E for any gas holder without membership in any 
organization. 
As regards the EU, the region is surrounded by over 75% of all proven natural 
gas reserves. Most of them are situated in Russia, Middle East/Persian Gulf, the 
so–called “strategic ellipse” (Sascha Muller–Kraenner, 2007: 4), Central Asia, 
and North Africa. So, experts estimated a growing focus of supply from less 
stable regions and countries–Russia, the Persian Gulf, Algeria and increasingly 
West Africa (Young, 2009: 2). 
Russia: Geographically focused on pipeline developments, although transit 
problems and aspirations to become a global player have led to Russian interests 
in LNG developments in the Atlantic basin, plausibly from the Shtokman field in 
the Barents Sea and also on the Yamal peninsula. It seems that Moscow has 
strengthened its position amongst other actual and potential suppliers toward 
the EU, but probably not in LNG exports. 
As is obvious on map 13, North and Western Africa alongside natural gas and 
LNG suppliers within the Persian Gulf, as the main ultra–regional exporters, 
will both be in the second position of trading towards Europe in 2020. 
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Map 13: The growing role of global gas trade by 2020, while inter-regional flow just 605 bcm   
 
Source: CEDIGAZ (2011), “World LNG market: current developments and prospects”, 24 June: 15 
Algeria: Both geographically and economically a gas exporter to the EU via 
pipelines and LNG tankers, Algerian LNG is expected to be still foremost and 
more competitive than other Mediterranean LNG suppliers to Europe in the 
future (Lochner & Bothe, 2009: 1525). There are plans for more LNG capacity, 
like the refurbishment of the Skikda plant and the planned Gassi Touil project. 
The Algerian Government aims to export 85 bcm natural gas in 2012 and around 
100 bcm in 2015 by pipeline and LNG to Europe (Wicks, 2009: 37).  
The Middle East/Persian Gulf: Iran and Qatar, as the second and third gas 
holders worldwide will be the most important suppliers to the European market, 
additional to some other exporters within this region. Qatar is the most 
prominent of all and has become the world’s number one LNG supplier. 
Consequently, on the basis of the figure 72, Qatar, Iran and Australia will hold 
around 50% of global LNG exports by 2040, while the first two countries could 
play an important role to connect regional gas markets with each other to 
emerge a global gas trading system. 
The Middle East/Persian Gulf is near to the growing South and South–east 
Asian LNG markets, as well as the EU ones, so more attention to Iran (Sascha 
Muller–Kraenner, 2007: 78) and Qatar, as the two important regional gas 
holders, reflects their strategic positions (Hartley & Medlock, 2006: 357–407). 
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With regards to supplies to the EU, as the primary importer followed by Asia 
and the US (MIT report, 2012: 68), Iran has two options: pipeline gas by Tabriz–
Erzurum and connection to the planned Nabucco project or extension by Turkey 
and then to the EU, and also LNG. LNG currently seems to be favoured by Iran 
(see Chapter 4). If political hurdles can be overcome, this route is much 
attractive for the EU. However, the Asian market is geographically equally 
attractive as the EU for LNG suppliers in the Middle East/Persian Gulf. 
Central Asia and Caspian region: Not yet a direct supplier to the EU, except 
from Republic of Azerbaijan, but the ambiguous Nabucco project is an attempt to 
transport Central Asian, Iran and Iraq natural gas through the Caucasus and 
Turkey, by–passing the Russian pipeline network.  
The European Commission suggests that a southern gas corridor must be 
developed for the supply of gas from Caspian and Middle East/Persian Gulf 
sources, as one of the EU’s highest energy security priorities, while the latter has 
remained fundamental to European energy security (Young, 2009: 51). So, the 
European Commission and Member States need to work with the countries 
concerned, such as Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Uzbekistan and 
Iran (European Commission 2008, Second Strategic Energy Review: 5).  
West Africa: Apart from some regional pipeline supplies, West Africa, notably 
Nigeria and Angola will be two LNG suppliers. Nigeria hopes to transmit 20–30 
bcm to Europe from 2015, despite security difficulties in the Sahel and Delta 
regions (Wicks, 2009: 37). 
Caribbean region: Trinidad and Tobago started originally with part of its 
supplies destined for Europe and part for the US, but today it predominantly 
supplies to the US market. Venezuela, with ample gas reserves, would be a 
potential LNG exporter, despite its political problems. However, the proposed 
Mariscal Sucre LNG project is still merely a proposal. The region is better placed 
geographically to supply the North American market than the European market. 
In addition, the South American gas suppliers will play the least important role 
in the global gas market in the future and this region will be neither a natural 
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gas and LNG importer nor exporter, just involved in intra–regional gas trading. 
According to the figure 72, unlike Australia, some of the natural gas and LNG 
exporters within the ASEAN will be amongst the major exporters by 2025 and 
after that they will be likely converted in to importers (Hartley & Medlock, 2006: 
357–407).  
Sascha Muller–Kraenner argued (2007: 97) that the EU is supposed to give 
preference to the “Monnet method” in its energy–political cooperation with its 
neighbours. Under these circumstances, international agreements, mostly 
individually, within the framework of joint institutions based on a legal basis for 
current energy competition sound appropriate.  
Russia, the US, Iran, Qatar, Algeria, Norway, Nigeria, and Australia will be 
amongst the 10 top natural gas and LNG producers by 2030 (annex 7 & table 24) 
but Russia, Norway and Algeria are expected to be the main exporters of gas 
toward the European market (Catalano, 2011: 9), followed by some other non–
EU LNG suppliers, such as Iran, Republic of Azerbaijan and the like. 
The European Commission (EUR 22581, 2007: 20), based on its data in addition 
to CEDIGAZ, Oil and Gas Journal, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, and OME 
predictions, argued that the EU’s potential main suppliers have significant 
reserves that will enable them to increase their productions and meet Europe’s 
gas demand in the future.  
According to this report, different natural gas and LNG suppliers will increase 
their exports toward the EU during the period between 2005 and 2030. 
Nevertheless, the most increase in gas exports belongs to the Persian Gulf region 
that would be more than 12 times in 2030, compared to 2005. 
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Map 14: The shares of the main natural gas and LNG suppliers towards the EU, 2005–2030 
 
Source: European Commission, EUR 22581, 2007: 20 
The European Commission in a non–published study in preparation for its 
Energy Green Paper emphasised that “competition with Japan, China, India, etc. 
over oil and gas from the Persian Gulf and Russia will become tougher in future” 
(Sascha Muller–Kraenner, 2007: 24), particularly the former (Young, 2009: 53). 
However, during the recent years, the EU gas approach in the Persian Gulf has 
drawn less priority than in policy towards Russia (Young, 2009: 78).  
Richard Young believes (2009: 4) that the EU has struggled to match the US’ 
direct security engagement and in some producer regions, the Union remained 
slow in strategic competition compared to China, Russia, etc. 
Needless to say that if any pipeline projects in the future do not materialise, 
such as the Russian pipeline to North–east Asia, the role of actual and potential 
LNG suppliers, even with the higher cost, would be increasingly important 
(Hartley & Medlock, 2006: 407–439).  
The more the market is open, the better the energy security situation will be, so, 
if new LNG suppliers enter the EU gas market, this would influence the current 
suppliers’ market power and shares (Palm, 2007: 68). While Qatar and Algeria 
have been the main LNG suppliers to Europe, nevertheless, the continental 
imports in the future will, mainly, originate from the Middle East/Persian Gulf 
and North/West Africa, according to CEDIGAZ (2011: 15).  
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So, both economic (geographical proximity, technology, low prices), as well as 
political criteria (cooperation or conflict with friendly and unfriendly states) are 
important for the EU in choosing its LNG suppliers (Proedrou, 2012), while Inge 
Bernaerts (interview, 2012) believes that, “political stability and full respect of 
the International Treaties have been counted as two more essential conditions to 
develop gas relations with the EU”.  
Geoffrey Kemp argued (2012) that the ellipse between the Mediterranean Sea to 
the Hindu Kush mountain range is full of gas reserves, but the biggest conflicts 
and disputes also happen in this huge area. 
As a whole, pursuit of diversified sources, suppliers, routes of supply, as well as 
more investment in the main gas holders’ LNG facilities could play significant 
roles to minimise risks and vulnerabilities for the EU, whereas the increase in 
the size of the Union’s LNG market for imports will become considerable in the 
future. Likewise, any adopted policy that lessens political tensions and promotes 
regional energy cooperation is the best criteria against the threat for the energy 
security of the EU (Sascha Muller–Kraenner, 2007: 25). Therefore, these 
situations could lead to oversupply of LNG toward the EU and easier access to 
the required natural gas by 2030 and even beyond. 
5.4. Conclusion 
Energy has always been seen as a matter of security, while security of gas supply 
has become important since the 1990s, with a rise in consumption in recent 
years and also expected in the future, in particular within the EU. So, energy 
security is defined as uninterrupted physical energy supply to meet the growing 
demands over a period of time at reasonable prices, while respecting 
environmental concerns.  
As a result, acceptability, availability, affordability and accessibility are the 
main indicators for the energy security that imply the environmental and social, 
geological, economic, as well as geo–political elements. 
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On the subject of acceptability and the percentage of methane of LNG in various 
suppliers, Russian gas is the first, followed by Egypt and Trinidad and Tobago 
and the percentage of LNG cleanliness in other global suppliers are at the 
relatively same level.  
Regarding availability, the volume of natural gas reserves in each gas supplier 
and the size of gas field(s) are important. According to attained results, the 
Persian Gulf has the richest gas reserves and also the most extensive natural 
gas fields worldwide, followed by Russian and Caspian Sea gas deposits. So, 
while Russia holds the highest percentage of global reserves and Iran, as well as 
Qatar stand in the next positions, Iran has the widest gas reserves in the world, 
followed by Russia and Qatar. 
The cost of production and supply cost are two criteria of affordability. The 
lowest cost–to–production belongs to the Persian Gulf, including Iran, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates. Russian reserves, Caspian Sea and North African gas 
holders are situated in the second global position in this regard.  Supply cost, 
moreover, is divided into liquefaction, transportation and regasification sections. 
In terms of liquefaction, Qatar, Iran within the Persian Gulf, and Russian, 
excluding gas reserves within the Russian Barents Sea, are the leaders, followed 
by North African Algeria, Latin American Trinidad and Tobago, and Asian 
Indonesia. 
The most suitable LNG transportation prices relate to North African suppliers, 
particularly Libya, however, the Persian Gulf, West African, South American 
and Asia–Pacific suppliers are regarded as having the least–cheap shipping costs 
toward the EU. 
Nonetheless, the cost of Norwegian supply gas in the 2020s will be high due to 
need for new investments in the expensive gas fields, too. 
Accessibility is the fourth indicator of the energy security with three criteria, the 
number of sea checkpoint(s), the International Country Risk Guide/Composite 
Political, Financial, Economic Risk Rating, and the power of organization. 
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Concerning the sea checkpoint(s), North African and American suppliers 
alongside Norway have the least number in their LNG shipping routes toward 
the EU, whereas the Persian Gulf suppliers should send their vessels through 
three major checkpoints. Regarding the International Country Risk 
Guide/Composite Political, Financial, Economic Risk Rating, Norway and Arab 
Sheikdoms within the Persian Gulf have the best position globally, followed by 
Russia, some Caspian littoral states, Algeria, Trinidad and Tobago and Asia–
Pacific, except Indonesia. The highest risk investment belongs to Venezuela and 
Egypt, while Iran is situated in the middle of this ranking with moderate risk 
investment. It demonstrates that, aside from Iraq, Iran has the highest risk 
investment among other gas holders within the Persian Gulf and this country 
should try to improve its conditions more domestically than regionally. 
Accordingly, it is expected that Russia, the US, Iran, Qatar, Algeria, Norway, 
Nigeria, and Australia will be amongst the top 10 gas producers by 2030. 
Moscow, as the existing EU’s largest supplier, will most likely strengthen its 
position and Algerian LNG is predicted to be still foremost and more competitive 
than other Mediterranean LNG suppliers to the Union in the coming years. In 
addition to Russia and Algeria, other suppliers, comprising Qatar, Iran, 
Australia, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia will be the leading global LNG exporters 
by the end of the next decade, followed by the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela 
and Nigeria. 
Global gas consumption will increase by almost 50% by 2030 and LNG demands 
will rise to 200% by 2020, 500% in 2030 and even more beyond that date. So, in 
order to meet this demand, the world’s gas producers should raise their supplies 
and some new exporters must be added in order to fill the demand–supply gap. 
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Chapter 6. Final Conclusion  
Energy is the motor behind growth and development and has always been 
regarded as a matter of security and will be the most significant challenge 
during the 21st century. On the other hand, energy security is threatened 
nationally, regionally, and globally by some dangers, such as decrease of global 
reserves, fluctuations in energy prices, and growing global competition for energy 
access, the rise of greenhouse gases, disruptions of energy supplies, while any 
failure to ensure energy security could lead to an energy crisis. 
The European Commission has concentrated more on the energy security since 
the 2000 Green Paper on “Security of Energy Supply” and defined this term 
having common main features with other definitions by energy organizations, 
institutions, and scholars: “Energy supply security must be geared to 
ensuring…the proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical 
availability in short, medium and long–terms …at a price which is affordable… 
while respecting environmental concerns… security of supply must seek to 
reduce the risks of energy dependence”.  
For importers, energy security means security of supply without any energy 
shortage at reasonable and even competitive prices without further deteriorating 
the state of the environment. For exporters, on the other hand, “energy security 
equates with security of demand at affordable prices that will guarantee 
significant profits for the exporter with no excessive cost to the environment”. 
Energy security, moreover, has four regular indicators, comprising acceptability 
(environmental and social elements); availability (geological aspects); 
affordability (economic criterion) and accessibility (geo–political dimensions) and 
realisation of these criteria could ensure security of energy supply.  
This term had, traditionally, concentrated on crude oil supply disruption by the 
end of the Cold War. However, since the 1990s, natural gas increasingly became 
“the fuel of choice”, due to high oil prices, political instability within the oil 
market, function of the cartels like OPEC, discovery of new giant gas fields, the 
least–carbon intensity of natural gas, technological innovations, technological 
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growth in unconventional gas and the like; therefore, “Gas is the new oil”. 
Therefore security of gas supply has entered the global energy literature, while 
natural gas is more coincidental with energy security indicators, compared to 
other fossil fuels.  
The global energy mix will change between 2010 and 2030, primarily to 
renewable energy sources, followed by natural gas. As a result, the share of the 
former will increase to around one third of total primary energy sources 
worldwide, while the latter is the fastest growing fossil fuel throughout the world. 
It seems that natural gas acts as the main bridge for the transitional era to 
renewable energy sources for global use. So, the global gas demands will increase 
around 50% by the end of the next decade and its share in the global energy mix 
will rise from 21% in 2010 to 25% in 2030. 
The unconventional gasrevolution could reshape the global gas system, providing 
that the US will no longer need to import natural gas and LNG in the future, 
while according to projections, more than 75% of the US’ gas production comes 
from unconventional gas. However, unconventional gas faces some 
environmental, financial, ecological and infrastructural constraints. 
Nevertheless, apart from these restrictions, production of unconventional gaswill 
grow from 13 tcf in 2008 to 31 tcf in 2035, in particular in the US, with more 
than 85% of global production in 2009 and 75% in 2030, followed by Canada, 
Russia, China and Europe. Unconventional gas might be commercially more 
important around 2030 in Europe with just more than 1% of global NG 
production. It is essential to mention that the percentage of unconventional 
gasin the global gas market will be under 18% by 2030 while this number was 
12.5% in 2010 and will be 15% in 2020 and then rise up to 17.95% by 2030. 
Energy was also a cornerstone of European integration and has always been a 
shared issue among the European countries, leading to the grand EU’s energy 
policy approval by its “energy trinity”, comprising emergence of the competitive 
internal market, environmental/climate change, and security of supply together 
to prepare the Union for the 21st century energy challenges, as well as 
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Europeanisation of energy by the increasing of the renewable energies share in 
the energy mix. 
The EU’s energy security has been influenced by both internal and external 
factors, comprising fluctuation in energy prices, declining European gas 
production, fragmented internal energy, newly–emerging economies with 
dramatic growing demands, political instability in gas suppliers, as well as some 
transit states, the threat of terrorist strikes against infrastructure, any possible 
disruption of gas supply by natural or political reasons, and more dependence on 
special suppliers. 
The EU, with the 27 independent countries at present, is united under one 
European institutional structure, while sustaining national sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, this most integrated region worldwide might be enlarged even 
further with some potential new members in the future. 
This kind of integration could emerge on the basis of different aspects, ranging 
from economic, cultural, political, and social characteristics to security aspects, 
leading to regionalism. If any non–state actors, organizations, institutions and 
social groupings, in addition to the states, play important roles in this process, 
then “new regionalism” can be established and the EU is the best example of this. 
Although energy, as a matter of security could be one criterion causing some 
states to from a closer relationship around the issue of energy, it was a 
cornerstone of European integration after the Second World War and has 
already been a common issue amongst the European countries. 
The new energy paradigm within the EU insists on energy efficiency initiatives, 
more use of renewable energy sources, and security of gas supply.   
The EU’s decision concerning the increasing use of natural gas in its industries, 
particularly power generation, has been in operation since 1992, though the 
Union has tried to move to a low–carbon society by energy efficiency and 
renewable energies since 1997.  
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This region has converted to the second gas consumers throughout the world 
since the middle of the 2000s. Accordingly, 11 member states out of the EU–27 
import the total of their gas needs and 9 more import more than 80% of their 
required natural gas from other suppliers, and, as a result apart from Denmark 
and the Netherlands, the whole of the Union’s members are natural gas 
importers. Therefore, natural gas will be the “Achilles heel of the EU’s energy 
security”, according to Herbert Ungerer, Director DG ENERGY for the European 
Commission and this organization, in its published Green Paper in 2001, 
describes the situation of natural gas within the Union as the “Gulliver in 
chains”.  The Green Paper, 2000, also predicted a greater reliance on gas import 
in the future, around 80% of natural gas needs in 2030. 
It is important to mention that the EU has tried to shift its members’ unilateral 
energy policies towards a regionalised energy approach and form a united front 
to reinforce its regional energy security. So, the European Commission would be 
the major policy–maker organization regarding energy issues with the help of 
some other regional and non–governmental bodies. 
As a result, the main energy policies and actions within the EU have been 
enacted and implemented regionally, for instance: 
– The EU’s grand energy policy to ensure the regional energy security; 
– Various adopted policies, such as the “Europeanisation” of energy, the creation 
of a single gas market in the future, the Energy Charter Declaration, the 
Commission’s White Papers, “Diversification” of energy suppliers and sources, 
etc.; 
– Some actual and potential regional initiatives between the EU and some other  
gas–rich neighbours and partners, such as the Euro–Med Energy Forum and the 
EU–GCC Partnership. 
On this basis, the “new regionalism” theory has been the most proper theoretical 
framework for the EU to analyse the situation of the regional gas policies. 
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The EU’s growing need to shift fuels in order to achieve the target of the climate 
change policy is a major energy challenge during the coming years given the 
relatively high price of renewable energy technology. The EU–27’s renewable 
energies share in total primary energy sources is set to rise from 9.2% in 2006 to 
15% in 2015 and then 20% up to 2020. Most of the EU member states have a 
long way to go to achieve the renewable energies target for 2020, while 16 out of 
27 should promote their own non–hydrocarbon sources use between 200% to 
more than 1250% by the end of the current decade. 
Regarding nuclear power, a number of EU members, like Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Spain, have committed to phase out their nuclear 
reactors by 2020 and replacing them with gas–powered facilities. 
It seems that natural gas will be the “Achilles heel of the EU” and energy 
security within the EU means security of gas supply, as the “Gulliver in chains”, 
so the shortest way to aim to ensure security of supply is primarily 
diversification of gas suppliers. The EU has imported nearly 64% of its gas 
demand and this figure will increase to 80% by 2020, making the Union the 
world’s largest gas importer by 2030. This involves nearly 100% increase in gas 
use in Western Europe and 150% rise in its use in the east of the continent by 
2025 from estimated figures for 1995, and more than three times the period of 
1956–1995. The EU gas production in 2000 was close to 232 bcm, and this 
number reached to 175 bcm in 2010, equal to 5.5% global gas production, while 
Denmark and the Netherlands were the only gas exporting countries among the 
EU–27 and could be expected to remain so until the end of 2018 and 2020 
respectively. In addition, the share of natural gas in some EU member states’ 
energy mix is more than the Union average of 24%, e.g. the Netherlands (43%), 
Italy (41%), the UK (40%) and Spain (24%).  
It is possible to perceive of different scenarios concerning the amount of natural 
gas and LNG demands within the EU in the future, based on the rise of the gas 
price, further advances in unconventional gas, etc., although, on the basis of the 
renewable energy sources growth within the EU in the future two scenarios 
could be considered: 
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 Scenario 1: Strong growth in gas demand or base case demand; 
 Scenario 2: Limited growth or Low demand.  
LNG has become more popular and has the capability of changing the regional 
gas markets to a more globalised one. Hence, LNG capacity will increase from 
270–296 bcm in 2008 to 450 bcm in 2015 and 540–566 bcm in 2020. The LNG 
trade has not only grown in volume, but geographically expanded from 13 
exporters in 2005 to 18 in 2010, however roughly 80% of global LNG is 
transmitted by the 8 top exporters. It is expected that the capacity of global LNG 
trading will double by 2020 and more by 2030. According to a number of 
projections, more than 50% of all interregional gas trading will be by LNG 
carriers by 2030, and its trading will be close to 200% by 2020.  
The number of importers from 2005 to 2010 grew by around 200% to 22; only the 
US decreased its LNG imports during 2005 to 2010 due to the domestic supply 
from unconventional gas. This country will be the second global gas producer 
during the next decade(s), however, the country will still remain the main LNG 
consumer with nearly half of the global demand, so its gas production from 
unconventional and conventional gases will mostly be consumed domestically.   
It is worth mentioning that 80% of global LNG imports, belonged to the top 10 
importers, while Spain, the UK, France and Italy, as the 3th, 4th,5th, and 10th of 
global LNG importers respectively imported 25% of the world’s LNG supply.  
Pipelines are expected to remain the most dominant means of gas transport 
towards the EU in the future, although LNG will account for nearly one–fourth 
of European total natural gas needs by 2020, compared to 15% in 2010, and, due 
to growing demands and decline of continental gas production, from 51% in 2010 
with nearly 280 bcm/y to 33% with approximately 222 bcm/y by the end of the 
current decade, LNG share will be doubled from 85 bcm/y to around 170 bcm/y 
during the same period.   
Apart from the current 17 on–stream regasification terminals, there are 14 
under construction and proposed LNG facilities, except cancelled and suspended 
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ones, within the EU, 24 of which are situated in Spain, the UK, France and Italy, 
close to 80%, so that nearly 87% of the required LNG is imported by these 
countries. Moreover, the rate of the EU’s LNG imports will rise close to 90% in 
2020, compared to 2010 and this percentage will increase further by 2030. The 
EU’s member states referred to above are much more important in the future not 
only for the Union, but also for the whole of Europe, while for the time being, 
there are just two online terminals operating in Turkey and three proposed 
terminals exist in Croatia and Albania.  
Russia, Norway and Algeria represent together 85% of the EU’s gas imports and 
the rest comes from Algeria, Qatar, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria and other exporters. In 
addition, this region has been attracting around 33% of the Qatari LNG, as the 
leading supplier worldwide, in recent years. 
Diversification of LNG suppliers has also been at the top of the EU statements, 
particularly since the early 2000s.  
The Middle East, with a high potential for more exports to the EU in the future, 
holds 40% of global gas reserves, approximately all of which are situated in the 
Persian Gulf, as the gas richest area worldwide with its exclusive features 
economically, politically, strategically, geo–politically, etc. and six of its countries 
out of eight, are within the top 20 gas holders worldwide, while there is the 
likelihood that some more natural gas reserves would be discovered in the future 
within the Persian Gulf region. The discovery of natural gas in Iran, for example, 
in 2011–2012, compared to one year before that, has had the highest percentage 
all over the world. However, most of the proven natural gas reserves in the 
region, with the exception of those found in Iran and Qatar, are in associated 
form together with oil. Iran and Qatar embrace nearly 30% of global or 75% of 
the Middle East’s gas reserves and more than 55% of the Middle East/Persian 
Gulf’s gas production belongs to these two countries.  
While the Persian Gulf has the highest natural gas reserves worldwide, it only 
accounts for around 12% of global production as it faces a number of internal and 
external challenges in order to increase its gas exports in the future, such as 
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unconventional gas produced by the US, rise of LNG export by Australia, high 
indigenous gas demands, regional political volatility, inadequate international 
investment, energy inefficiency and dependence on hydrocarbon consumption, as 
well as governmental rules restricting foreign investment and participation in 
some regional states. 
It is obvious that the Persian Gulf states should remove these obstacles locally 
with collaboration with each other and also internationally with the partnership 
of influential players. This trend could accelerate the emergence or expansion of 
regional gas plans and help security of supply. 
“Regional Security Complex Theory” is able to explain the effects of natural gas 
and LNG exports from the Persian Gulf to the EU on both regions’ energy 
security, as indicated in the hypothesis. This theory also serves to connect the 
Persian Gulf’s subordinate system and the EU’s new regionalism theories to each 
other. The sectors of security in the Regional Security Complex Theory are 
military, political, economic, societal and environmental security and these five 
criteria have definitely impacted on regional security. 
While energy has been a “matter of security”, it could be added as the 6th factor 
affecting security. Therefore, the term of energy security could enter the 
Regional Security Complex Theory literature. 
This theory consists of four main concepts, comprising: maintenance of the status 
quo, internal transformation within the current boundaries of the complex, 
external transformation, as well as overlay, which, in military security means 
military presence in any weaker state(s). 
Considering the above–mentioned concepts, the structure of the EU’s energy 
security based on the current regional energy policy regarding natural gas and 
LNG could be complex and redefined, as follows:   
 Status quo: the EU has pursued more diversification of natural gas and 
LNG suppliers, routes and resources apart from the current exporters to 
the Union, so it does not support the status quo in its gas policy; 
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 Internal transformation: LNG projects, like the liquefaction facilities 
within the EU show that the Union seeks to alter the present situations 
and import more LNG in the future; 
 External transformation: This stage can occur as a result of the new 
routes bringing additional LNG to the complex from ultra–regional 
suppliers, such as the Persian Gulf and leads to change the energy 
dependency patterns and link new states to the complex; 
 Overlay: It could be viewed as massive reliance on a special gas supplier; 
however, owing to the high degree of securitisation of its energy 
dependence, the EU has followed this policy to expand its gas suppliers 
away from Russia. 
On the basis of the current EU’s energy policy, the Union plans to increase its 
natural gasand LNG imports in the future and the number of existing LNG 
facilities; together with those under construction and under consideration 
verifies this point (Internal transformation). The Union, moreover, is dissatisfied 
with huge dependency on Russian gas during recent years and diversification of 
gas suppliers is amongst the vital EU energy trinity (Overlay). These situations 
show that the EU is seeking to change the status quo in its energy needs, in 
general, and natural gas, in particular.  
Besides, a number of LNG projects are in progress in some gas suppliers and the 
EU is one of the most important destinations of these actual and potential 
exporters in the future (External transformation). 
In addition to some gas holders within the Persian Gulf, some other actual and 
potential LNG suppliers could send their product to the EU in the future, but it 
is less clear as to which of these exporters could be on the top and more 
influential on the Union’s energy security, on the basis of the energy securityfour 
main indicators.  
The classification scheme of the mentioned energy security indicators is the 
cornerstone for testing them on the EU’s LNG relationships with different actual 
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and potential suppliers, such as the Persian Gulf and then comparing them for 
ranking to clarify the most appropriate suppliers in the future for the Union. 
For the acceptability and the percentage of methane of LNG in various suppliers, 
Russian gas is the foremost, followed by Egypt and Trinidad and Tobago and the 
percentage of LNG cleanliness in other global suppliers is at a relatively similar 
level. 
Regarding the availability criteria, the volume of natural gas reserves in each 
supplier and the size of gas field(s) are important. The final results show that the 
Persian Gulf has the richest gas reserves worldwide, while Russian is the 
foremost nationally, followed by Iran and Qatar. The size of the natural gas 
fields is another factor both in the availability and affordability indicators. The 
Persian Gulf holds the widest gas reserves in the world, primarily by Iran. 
Russian reserves, in terms of extent, are placed in second position, followed by 
Qatar. Furthermore, the share of some current main gas suppliers, such as 
Algeria, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Brunei, Norway (to some extent), and Trinidad 
and Tobago will decrease by the 2020s.   
The cost of production is the first criteria of affordability, as the third indicator 
for the energy security. The lowest cost–to–production belongs to the Persian 
Gulf, including Iran, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Russian reserves, 
Caspian Sea and North African gas holders are situated in the second global 
position in this regard. Supply cost is the second part of the affordability 
indicator and it is divided into liquefaction, transportation and regasification 
sections. In terms of liquefaction, Qatar, Iran, and Russian, excluding gas 
reserves within the Russian Barents Sea, are leading, followed by Algeria, 
Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Indonesia in some reserves and facilities. The 
last dimension of affordability, apart from regasification, is supply and transport 
costs, while the most proper LNG transportation prices relate to North African 
suppliers, particularly Libya, the Persian Gulf, West African, South American 
and Asia–Pacific suppliers place as the least–cheap shipping cost toward the EU. 
In terms of cost–to–production three of the gas holders within the Persian Gulf 
are at the top, followed by Russia, Caspian Sea and North African countries. The 
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best price for liquefaction is in Qatar and Iran within the Persian Gulf, as well as 
Russia. Nonetheless, actual and potential LNG suppliers from the Persian Gulf, 
alongside other exporters, except North African ones, are amongst the suppliers 
towards the EU with the most expensive shipping cost. The cost of Norwegian 
supply gas in the 2020s would also be high due to need for new investments in 
the expensive gas fields.  
Accessibility is the fourth indicator of the energy security with three criteria, 
consisting of the number of sea checkpoint(s), International Country Risk 
Guide/Composite Political, Financial, Economic Risk Rating, and the power of 
organization. On the subject of the sea checkpoint(s), North African and 
American suppliers, alongside Norway, have the least number in their LNG 
shipping routes toward the EU, whereas the Persian Gulf suppliers should send 
their vessels through three major checkpoints. Regarding the International 
Country Risk Guide/Composite Political, Financial, Economic Risk Rating, 
Norway and Arab Sheikdoms within the Persian Gulf enjoy the best situation for 
investment globally, followed by Russia, some Caspian littoral states, Algeria, 
Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Asia–Pacific, except Indonesia. The highest risk 
investment belongs to Venezuela and Egypt, while Iran is situated in the middle 
of this ranking with moderate risk investment. It demonstrates that, the 
periphery states, including Iran and, remarkably, Iraq have the highest risk 
investment among other gas holders within the Persian Gulf and Tehran should 
further try to improve its domestic conditions. 
The membership of the Sheikdoms in the GCC has promoted the position of 
these gas holders in negotiation and partnership with the EU, while Iran’s 
membership in other organizations, such as ECO was of limited help. However, 
Western and Asia–Pacific gas holders, in addition to Russia, have the highest 
positions in terms of membership in high–ranking regional organizations, 
followed by North African states. 
Global gas consumption will dramatically increase by almost 50% more than the 
current level by 2030, so in order to meet this demand, the world’s gas producers, 
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specially non–OECD countries, need to increase their supplies and some new gas 
exporters must be added in order to fill the demand–supply gap. 
Russia, the US, Iran, Qatar, Algeria, Norway, Nigeria, and Australia will be 
amongst the top 10 natural gas and LNG producers by 2030. Moscow, as the 
existing EU’s largest supplier, will most likely strengthen its position and 
Algerian LNG is predicted to be still foremost and more competitive than other 
Mediterranean LNG suppliers to the Union by 2030. In addition to Russia and 
Algeria, other suppliers, comprising Qatar, Iran, Australia, Indonesia, and Saudi 
Arabia are expected to be the leading global LNG exporters by the end of the 
next decade, followed by the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and Nigeria.  
Apart from Norway, gas production in OECD Europe has been in decline, while 
it will probably transport its gas to the continent by pipeline. South American 
gas suppliers will play the least important role in the global gas market in the 
future and this region will be probably neither a gas importer nor exporter, just 
involved intra–regional gas trading.   
Unlike Australia, some of the natural gas exporters within the ASEAN, such as 
Malaysia and Brunei, will be amongst the major exporters by 2025 and after that 
they will probably convert in to importers. Indonesia, moreover, will face 
declining production from many older gas fields and must make more 
investments to new fields or its unconventional gas reserves.  
According to some predictions by some major energy bodies, such as IGU, BP, 
IEA, and the Baker Institute (annex 2), Qatar, Iran and Australia will hold 
around 50% of global LNG exports by 2040, while the first two countries could 
play an important role to connect regional gas markets with each other to 
emerge on the global gas trading system. 
The European Commission in different meetings and statements, such as the 
Green Paper on energy security in March 2006, concluded that, “Europe has 
entered in to a new energy era with increasing dependence on natural gas 
imports from unstable regions. So, both economic (geographical proximity, 
technology, low prices), as well as political criteria (cooperation or conflict with 
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friendly and unfriendly or less–friendly states) are important for the EU to 
choose its future LNG suppliers, while the ellipse between the Mediterranean 
Sea to the Hindu Kush mountain range is the full of gas reserves, but the biggest 
conflicts and disputes happen in this huge area.   
The more the market is open, the better the energy security situation happens to 
be, so, if new LNG suppliers enter the EU’s gas market, this would impact on the 
current suppliers’ market power and shares. The reasonable choice is that the 
main importers should not invest in and trust the minor gas holders in the mid 
and long–terms, therefore the best options would be the low–cost huge gas 
holders with lower risks. 
Qatar is the best option in this respect, followed by Russia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, 
Australia (apart from its long distance) and then Iran. However, some suppliers 
are suitable for short and mid–terms, like Trinidad and Tobago.  
Based on “Qatar’s National Vision 2030 Document” with four interconnected 
pillars, simultaneous with the implementation of “Qatar National Development 
Strategy 2011–2016”, the wise management, long-term maintenance of the 
strategic hydrocarbon reserves alongside balance between deposits and 
production are in accordance with this country’s interests.  
Qatar’s economic and social growth have accelerated, leading to an increase of 
domestic demand that has more than doubled since 2000 and turned this state 
into the 4th largest gas consumer in the Middle East/Persian Gulf. It is expected 
that the internal NG consumption will increase even faster in the future.  
Doha’s LNG exports have more than doubled between 2008 and 2011 and 
converted this country to the 1st–placed exporter worldwide. It has supplied 
nearly 33% of its product to the EU, including the UK, Belgium, France, Greece, 
and Portugal.  
Consequently, there two main arguments regarding the future of Qatar’s LNG 
supply that take effect on this state’s energy security in the future. The first 
insists on the preservation of the current supply, while some Qatari officials 
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have emphasised that this country’s leadership in the global LNG supply should 
be maintained in the forthcoming years. 
Iran, is the Middle East and Persian Gulf’s largest gas producer, situated at the 
centre of the “Energy Ellipse”, as the only bridge between the Middle East and 
the Persian Gulf in the south and Central Asia/Caspian Sea in the north, with 
over half of the world’s known hydrocarbon reserves. Its reserves are 
predominantly located off–shore, more than 68%, and more than 85% of these 
reserves are non–associated gas. It has two main Grand Energy Strategy and 
Outlook Documents, as well as ambitious targets by 2023 in raising its current 1% 
share in the global gas market to 8%–10% by 2023 and taking part in GECF 
more actively, while this country alongside Russia and Qatar, as the top three 
global gas holders and this organization’s members, account for about 54% of the 
global natural gas deposits.  
In addition, the GEFC, despite its internal and external challenges on its way to 
becoming more powerful, is reportedly shifting towards LNG, as the members 
provide 85% of the world’s LNG exports. Iran has a number of plans to construct 
and develop its LNG projects to connect itself to regional and global gas markets, 
particularly the EU and Asian, increase its share in this market, and be more 
active in GEFC, as “without LNG industry, Iran is not powerful enough”.  
So, these LNG projects could assist Iran in achieving its targets and put this 
country among the top five global exporters by 2020, while, on the other hand, 
this trend could definitely impact on Tehran’s energy security in the future, 
providing that Tehran is able to attract the required investment and technology 
from abroad, implement time management plans to participate in the 
international LNG chain, as well as modernisation of its industry. 
However, foreign sanctions in addition to high domestic consumption are the 
main impediments against these objectives and three main scenarios regarding 
these two principal hurdles against Iran’s pipeline and LNG projects and export 
could be conceived.  
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If Iran decides to achieve its gas targets by the early 2020s, it should construct 
and develop its LNG industry with the main destinations, including the EU and 
Asia. The major impediment for this country would be accessibility, regarding 
the International Country Risk Guide/Composite Political, Financial, Economic 
Risk Rating and regional institutionalism. Accordingly, if Tehran could solve its 
problem(s) regarding the accessibility of LNG for other importers, its position 
would dramatically improve in the global ranking, even better than Qatar. So, 
engagement with the EU in LNG trade could diversify Iran’s export routes, 
leading to intensify its energy security and increase its share in the global gas 
market. 
Regarding the International Country Risk Guide/Composite Political, Financial, 
Economic Risk Rating, the local situation is more important than the regional 
and international situations, as all the Arab Sheikdoms within the Persian Gulf 
have improved their conditions and converted to very low–risk countries, despite 
regional volatilities. So, Tehran must improve its International Country Risk 
Guide/Composite Political, Financial, Economic Risk Rating by different ways 
more domestically, such as more political stability and domestic reconciliation, as 
well as governmental rules, otherwise it might miss short–and mid–term 
benefits of LNG and gas markets.    
The role of the government in developing of gas markets will strongly transform 
from direct investor and constructor of infrastructures to the facilitation of 
markets so that the main companies and investors, mostly private ones, will face 
reduced major risks. 
Regarding the second point, it is important to indicate that despite some internal 
disagreements amongst the GCC members, like fears of Saudi hegemony on the 
smaller member–states, there is no unified “Gulf perspective” within the Council 
regarding some regional issues, such as the Iranian nuclear issue.  
It seems that most of the mentioned dilemma in the “politicised Gulf” is partly 
related to separation of the centre and the periphery players, so the systematic 
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coherence, interdependence, and vital belief to regional cooperation has not been 
observed. 
The Persian Gulf, as the sub–system of the Middle East, is politically in turmoil 
and economically stagnant mostly within the periphery, so the regional 
arrangements are fragile and security interdependence amongst various regional 
and ultra–regional players is insufficient.   
This region consists of the GCC, Iraq, as a non–GCC Arab country and non–Arab 
Iran, as well as some ultra–regional players, such as the US, the UK, and France. 
In accordance with the “subordinate system theory”, the core or centre sector, the 
peripheral section and the intrusive player(s) counted as the main regional 
players. This system consists of a score of adjacent and interacting states which 
have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, religious, and historical 
bonds, or at least have geographical proximity. However, the diplomatic 
orientation of some of these states, like the GCC, is sometimes toward the ultra–
regional player(s), particularly the US. 
The states within the GCC, as the core sector, have shared social, political, 
economic, religious or organizational backgrounds. The peripheral sector, 
including Iran and Iraq, is separated from the core sector to some degree by 
economic, organizational, social, religious or political factors, but plays a role in 
the politics of the subordinate system. In addition, the relationships between the 
core and periphery are crucial. 
As a result, the core and periphery sections within the Persian Gulf have been 
competitors and a balance of power system, based on mistrust and zero–sum 
game (lose–lose), has dominated the regional political atmosphere, leading to 
securitise energy, while the periphery members (especially those which are 
isolated) often attempt to manipulate the security objectives of the intrusive 
powers. 
The intrusive player(s) consist(s) of the external power(s) participating in the 
region politically, militarily, etc. The US is the major power of intervention in 
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the Persian Gulf, while some other ultra–regional states, such as France and the 
UK, have participated in regional order and policies. The power of intervention, 
moreover, has politically significant involvement in the regional balance of power 
and affects the politics of the core and periphery parties, as well as the regional 
affairs. 
This theory is consistent with the Persian Gulf region’s characteristics and could 
illuminate the current regional context in order to find a proper solution for more 
stability in this area. It is obvious that this situation could help transport energy, 
in general, and LNG, in particular, to other consumers more safely.  
They have not been able to restore mutual trust, mostly due to two factors: the 
US’ policy of containing Iran’s and Tehran’s nuclear stalemate and regional 
disputes. These two factors drive the Sheikdoms to continue relying on outsiders.  
First of all, the GCC as a core needs to find a practical balance between 
dependence on the US, as an external security guarantor (Davidson, 2012: 169 & 
170), and the creation of a regional comprehensive and cooperative security 
system, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, that can 
provide greater stability than the balance of power system has done by engaging 
with Iran and also post–occupation Iraq as peripheral states in the region that 
could be entitled as the “GCC+2”.  
In the second stage, Iran should solve its nuclear issue via negotiation, 
bargaining and more confidence–building and its counterparts could help resolve 
it, but this needs to be a mutual trend. 
Nonetheless, the interests of all countries in the region should be based on 
finding realistic solutions by creating and extending political and economic 
bridges and the GCC, particularly, due to geographical proximity, along with the 
EU should try to serve as an intermediary, between Washington and Tehran 
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over some regional and international conflicts, such as nuclear disputes, as is 
clear in negotiations between Tehran and 5+120.  
As a result, within the framework of this space, such as during the 1990s, Iran 
and the GCC could talk about confidence–building, mutual defense pacts, and 
cooperation over regional security matters in order to create “Gulfisation of 
security”, on the basis of “the core– periphery relations” (Davidson, 2012: 169 & 
170).  In this case, the balance of interests and security amongst the core and 
peripheral states, as well as intrusive player(s) would be emerged.  
It should primarily concentrate on commonalities, rather than differences, and 
could be commenced from economic needs, such as energy, and then extend to 
comparative cooperation, such as creation of a regional common market, 
extension of gas pipelines, and establishment of joint shipping lines. So, it could 
help to reduce the security dilemma based on non–zero sum (win–win) game and 
détente even with foreign powers, such as happened from the mid–1990s until 
the mid–2000s. 
If the ultra–regional players, especially the US accept an Iranian role in the 
region’s new security architecture, Washington and Tehran could consequently 
establish an accommodation that might advance the interests of all parties, both 
regional and trans–regional actors in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, the US will 
produce additional oil and gas from unconventional resources in the future; being 
more independence from the Persian Gulf’s hydrocarbons and this trend could 
impact on Washington’s policy with regard to the region, according to 
Christopher Davidson on 27th November 2012.  
On the other hand, the interaction between the mentioned players could lead to 
political, economic and security stability, in particular in hydrocarbon exports 
from the Persian Gulf region to other areas, such as the EU. 
                                                          
20 The 5+1 consists of five permanent members of the United Nation Security Council, including 
China, France, Russia, the UK and, the US plus non–memberGermany. 
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As a result, balance of interests and security amongst the core, periphery states 
and also intrusive players, instead of balance of power, can ensure the global and 
regional security of LNG supply in the future. 
The EU, on the other side, consists of 27 independent countries, but has long 
presented itself to the world as the most developed model of regional integration. 
Regionalism has been observed as a multidimensional integration ranging from 
economic, cultural, political, social specifications to security aspects with various 
states, non–state players. Nevertheless, after nearly three decades and since the 
end of the bipolar Cold War, regionalism entered the new phase in a multipolar 
world order and new regionalism was basically formed, particularly in the EU.  
The energy policies in the EU, especially the Energy Policy, are implemented 
regionally with the three main cornerstones of competitive internal energy 
market, sustainability and security of supply. Nonetheless, the main regional 
institutions and policy–makers have struggled to promote energy solidarity 
within the Union and decline any single voice by the member states individually.  
As investigated previously, security of LNG supply is one the EU’s energy 
targets in the future. Spain, the UK, France and Italy, as the main LNG 
importers not only in Europe but also in the world, have already imported of 
nearly 87% of the required LNG in the EU, while close to 80% of the existing on–
stream regasification facilities together with the future terminals, comprising 
the under construction and under consideration ones, are situated in these 
countries.  
Obviously, these EU member states are more significant for the whole of Europe 
in the future. As a result, energy decision–making within the Union is more 
regionally and on this basis, the security of LNG supply has been scrutinized in 
the framework of the new regionalism theory to analyse the energy security of 
the EU in years and even the decades to come. 
In conclusion, pursuit of diversified LNG suppliers and routes of supply, as well 
as more investments in the main gas holders’ LNG facilities could play 
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significant roles to minimise risks and vulnerabilities for the EU in the mid and 
long terms. With ever–changing international relations, security of supply 
becomes more imperative and some of the low–risk suppliers might be able to 
charge a higher price if not only the EU market, but also other regions and 
countries consider just the risk–premium to gas from certain sources in the 
world with its growing demands.  
When gas corridors are key for security of supply but hindered by political 
uncertainty, the EU can play an important role to remove this obstacle or make 
it easier to be resolved. It could be based on interests of all the involved parties, 
by further dialogue, such as “critical dialogue”, followed by “comprehensive or 
constructive dialogue” as happened with Iran in the 1990s and energy diplomacy, 
such as the creation of a working group on energy established in May 1999 by 
the European Commission and Iran, as the EU’s 6th largest energy supplier to 
the Union before the oil sanction in June 2012. Further participation of the EU 
in INOGATE, as well as mutual negotiations for TCA (Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement) in June 2002 could be two more instances.  
Creation of “a prosperity, stability and security belt” in the EU’s surroundings, 
based on common values (Schweiger, 2012), like the “Barcelona Process” could 
definitely increase the Union’s interests, while energy is the main linkage 
between the Persian Gulf states and the EU. 
Nevertheless, the reform, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
have been priorities for the EU in order to develop its relations with other 
counterparts, according to the Head of Electricity and Gas Unit, Directorate–
General for Energy and Transport for theEuropean Commission (interview, Op. 
cit.).  
While the EU proclaimed its support for governance reforms and transparency, 
more democracy, as well as human rights in oil and gas producers as an 
approach to its energy security, but “it was highly inconsistent on this issue and 
energy and democracy–related decisions were disconnected from each other … 
and also the quality of democratic process in these countries played no 
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determinant role in investment decisions at the EU level” by the International 
Oil Companies (Young, 2009: 5–6). 
As an example, The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was 
signed by a few EU member–states, however was not already Europeanised. 
While the Commission has called this plan as a good initiative, but it declined to 
support the EITI and most European governments have blocked proposals to 
exert strong and united regional pressure on main energy producers in Africa, 
the Caspian and the Persian Gulf regions. For this reason, the EITI currently 
includes states with 5 to 10 per cent of world oil and gas production (Young, 2009: 
47). 
So, these policies could be pursued with other countries, mutually, such as the 
National Indicative Programme 2007–2013 in Libya, in parallel with other issues, 
such as energy negotiations. 
Natural gas, like oil, is a “political commodity”, so any decision regarding the 
production, price, trade, and investment in any producers, like the Persian Gulf, 
has been made on the basis of political and strategic considerations, rather than 
“supply and demand equilibrium”.  
Notwithstanding, the Persian Gulf is an “unstructured region”, but it could be 
named as the “regional grouping” and the Regional Security Complex Theory 
enables to connect this “micro region” to the EU, as the “macro region”. 
The Regional Security Complex Theory consists of five main sectors of military, 
political, economic, societal and environmental security. While the energy policy 
has been securitised, energy could be embedded as the sixth element, the so–
called energy security. As a result, the EU and the Persian Gulf would be more 
active under the Regional Energy Security Complexes by mutual energy 
interaction and interdependence of energy security. 
It is important to mention that security of one state or region cannot be easily 
separated from the security of another, for this reason, the importance of the 
security interdependence could be highlighted. Therefore, any development in 
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LNG supply from the actual and potential suppliers in the Persian Gulf to the 
EU could affect the energy security of the both regions in the future (figure 2). 
On this basis, the four criteria of the Regional Security Complex Theory are 
redefined in the Regional Energy Security Complexes. The EU is supposed to 
escalate its LNG imports in the future and the number of the current LNG 
facilities, together with those under construction and under consideration, 
mainly in the four case studies, demonstrates the “internal transformation” in 
the energy area of the EU. 
Likewise, the Union becomes dissatisfied with huge reliance on Russian gas, 
hence diversification of LNG suppliers in the future at the same time with the 
regional growth in LNG demand would definitely change the status of quo in gas 
supply within the EU. 
On the other hand, some LNG projects are in progress in a number of the current 
and future overseas suppliers and this Union would be amongst their 
destinations. Therefore, the Union’s external LNG situation will be undoubtedly 
transformed. 
It is recommended that strategic partnerships be developed between the EU and 
the major gas supply and transit countries, such as extending the “EU–Russia 
dialogue”, the “Neighborhood Policy” with the Caspian Sea littoral states, the 
“Baku Initiative”, based on the EU’s energy policy paper in January 2007. 
Energy concerns have been an important element behind the EU’s new Strategic 
Partnership with main gas and LNG producers (Young, 2009: 64). For this 
reason, the “EU–[GCC+2] Partnership”, as the win–win game, in accordance 
with the interdependence of the energy security sounds perfect.  
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Tehran Iran’s NG/LNG policies 
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 Ministry of Petroleum Iran 
 National Iran Gas Export Company Iran 
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Annex 3: The list of used journals 
The Name of Journals  
Energy Economics Energy Economy Quarterly 
 
 Energy Journal  Energy Policy 
 Energy Tribune  European Review on Energy Market 
Geopolitics International Gas Union Magazine 
Journal  
Journal of Asian Studies  Journal of Energy Security (by IAGS) 
Journal of Energy Economics (by IIES)  LNG Journal 
 Mashal (Flame, in English), Iran’s Petoleum 
Ministry 
Middle East Journal 
 
 Middle East Policy Middle East Quarterly 
 Official Journal of the European Union  
(by EUR-Lex) 
 Oil & Gas Journal 
 Oil & Gas Trends  Rasgas Magazine 
Scandinavian Oil & Gas Magazine 
 
 
World Gas Intelligence 
 
International Journal of Energy Sector 
Management 
 VII 
 
 
 These journals have been used more than the other ones, based on alphabetical order, left to 
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Source: By Author 
 
 
Annex 4: The Interview Questions 
 
I.What is the position of Iran & Qatar’s LNG export amongst the exporters to Italy, Spain, the 
UK, and France by 2020? 
o The LNG export from current suppliers, such as North African countries, Nigeria, 
and Qatar to these four EU member states will still be adequate in the future, 
despite rise of import capacity in the EU; 
o Iran's LNG export and Qatar's expansion would be important for the EU security 
of gas supply in the future; 
More comments:  
 
 
II.Which is/are the most important barriers for the LNG export from Iran to the prominent EU 
LNG developers in the future and what are the main challenges for this LNG relation? (one or 
more options ) 
o Political and security disputes and instability within the Persian Gulf; 
o Political disparate between Iran and the most important western countries and 
the sanctions imposed on Tehran over its nuclear program; 
o Different political will and views among the EU members; 
o The US massive attendance in the PG region;         
o Technical problems within the Iranian gas, particularly LNG industry; 
More comments:  
 
 VIII 
 
 
III.If Iran's LNG programs will be quite materialized in coming years, and Qatar will also 
increase its export toward the four EU members, which achievements will be perceived for both 
sides politically and economically in the future? 
o More stability within the PG region, leading to further international steadiness; 
o Ensuring of more energy security within the EU & PG by diversifying of 
importers and exporters, as well as energy sources; 
o Investment within the PG gas reserves is cheaper, so the price of final gas supply 
might be more suitable for the EU; 
o Nearly one – third of global gas reserves are situated in Iran & Qatar, so this 
LNG supply toward the EU will ensure its energy security because of this 
availability; 
More comments:  
 
 
IV.In your opinion, as Qatar will have to export gas to some other sheikhdoms within the PG, 
like UAE, Oman, and maybe Bahrain and also should send more LNG toward the East Asian 
countries, such as South Korea, Japan, China after opening up the two new LNG facilities, is 
there any possibility that Qatar will increase its LNG export capacity toward the coming EU 
LNG regasification terminals in the future? 
 
 
V.I most be grateful if you mention some more points in this respect, help me analyze this 
probable cooperation between these two regions and case studies within them. 
 
 In certain interviews, some more questions have been asked from certain interviewees, in addition of above 
ones, depending on the time and conditions. 
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Annex 5: Research Ethics Policy, SGIA, Durham University
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Annex 6: Global gas production since 2000 to 2010  
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011  
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Annex 7: World’s natural gas production by region/country, 2008–2035 (tcf) 
 
EIA International Energy Outlook 2011: 50 
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Annex 8:  World’s gas Consumption                                                                                
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011 
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Annex 9: Global Demands Outlook of gas as the Primary Energy by 2030 (bcm) 
Region /  
Country 
2000  2006  2015 2030 Growth Average 
(%) 2006 - 2030 
OECD–North America 799 766  848 908 7.0 
The US  669 611 652 631 0.1 
OECD–Europe 
 
478 541 614 694 1.0 
OECD-Pacific 130 158 183 225 1.5 
 
Japan 82 94 104 128 1.3 
OECD 1407 1465 1645 1827 0.9 
Eastern Europe & 
Eurasia 
606 676 779 846 0.9 
Russia 395 444 507 524 0.7 
Asia 185 285 414 666 3.6 
China 28 58 121 221 5.8 
India 25 38 57 117 4.8 
Middle East 182 276 378 676 3.8 
Africa 62 90 124 168 2.6 
Latin America 100 124 174 252 3.0 
Brazil 9.0 21 32 46 3.3 
Non-OECD 1135 1451 1867 2607 2.5 
The World 2541 2916 3512 4434 1.8 
The EU 482 532 606 681 1.0 
source: by Author based on: IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2008; The Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model 
(BIWGTM) 
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Annex 10:  Conversion Table of Volume 
To: NG (bcm) NG (bcf) Million 
tonnes of 
oil 
equivalent 
Million 
tonnes of 
LNG 
Trillion Btu Million 
Barrels of 
oil 
equivalent 
One bcm of NG 1 35.3 0.9 0.73 36 6.29 
One bcf of NG 0.028 1 0.026 0.021 1.03 0.18 
One Million 
tonnes of oil 
equivalent 
1.111 39.2 1 0.805 40.4 7.33 
One Million 
tonnes of  LNG 
1.38 48.7 1.23 1 52 8.68 
One Trillion Btu 0.028 0.98 0.025 0.02 1 0.17 
One Million 
barrels of oil 
equivalent 
0.16 5.61 0.14 0.12 5.8 1 
Source: By Author, based on G. Victor et al (2006) & IEA 2011, Key World Energy Statistics: 58  
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Annex 11: Global LNG liquefaction Plants and Regasification Terminals, as of 
May 2012  
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Source: globallnginfo.com 
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Annex 12: List of Recently Commissioned Liquefaction Plants 
 
Source: IGU World LNG Report 2010: 36 
Annex 13: List of Under Construction Liquefaction Plants 
 
Source: IGU World LNG Report 2010: 37 
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Annex 14: List of Recently Commissioned LNG Regasification Terminals
Source: IGU World LNG Report 2010: 38-39 
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Annex 15: List of Under Construction LNG Regasification Terminals  
 
Source: IGU World LNG Report 2010:40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 XXII 
 
Annex 16: Global gas production by country, region and continent, 2000-2040 (tcf) 
Region/Country 2000 2006 2010 2016 2020 2026 2030 2036 2040 
Africa 5.87 8.31 9.65 12.70 14.53 16.69 16.79 16.23 14.86 
Algeria 3.70 4.36 4.61 4.81 4.55 3.80 3.12 2.35 2.04 
Angola 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.36 0.85 0.91 0.90 0.90 
East Africa 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.44 0.47 
Egypt 1.06 1.37 1.57 2.04 2.30 2.67 2.88 3.15 3.14 
Libya 0.26 0.94 1.28 1.63 1.71 1.81 1.76 1.34 1.11 
Morocco 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nigeria 0.61 1.04 1.30 2.54 3.68 5.31 5.93 6.24 5.73 
South Africa 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.11 
Tunisia 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.35 0.29 0.21 0.18 
West  Africa 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.19 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.21 
Asia - Pacific 11.63 16.08 18.43 21.80 24.57 28.37 29.92 28.96 26.80 
Afghanistan 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.31 0.41 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.45 
Australia 1.37 2.14 2.09 2.69 3.85 6.87 8.64 9.87 10.10 
Bangladesh 0.38 0.71 1.07 1.23 1.24 1.14 0.96 0.65 0.51 
Brunei 0.45 0.49 0.52 0.60 0.72 0.88 0.95 0.79 0.64 
China 1.29 2.29 2.70 2.97 2.94 3.10 3.16 3.04 2.81 
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
India 1.02 1.32 1.55 1.94 2.02 1.76 1.39 1.04 0.80 
Indonesia 2.94 3.29 3.48 4.05 4.78 5.95 6.69 6.99 6.59 
 XXIII 
 
Japan 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Malaysia 1.98 2.61 2.84 3.14 3.24 3.28 3.16 2.56 2.07 
Myanmar 0.25 0.42 0.70 0.95 1.01 1.02 0.94 0.62 0.49 
New Zealand 0. 18 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.04 
Pakistan 0.84 1.10 1.52 1.86 1.91 1.30 0.95 0.64 0.52 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.00 0.00 0.20 0.64 1.00 1.18 1.25 1.07 0.86 
The 
Philippines 
0.07 0.13 0.15 0.25 0.47 0.65 0.70 0.73 0.63 
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Korea, South 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Taiwan 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Thailand 0.57 0.77 0.69 0.58 0.53 0.39 0.32 0.22 0.19 
Vietnam/Laos/ 
Cambodia 
0.10 0.36 0.36 0.28 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.07 
Europe 11.99 14.46 13.22 11.21 9.74 8.33 8.77 9.85 10.07 
Austria 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Balkan Region 0.19 0.31 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.4 0.03 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Czech 
Republic 
0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Denmark/ 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.37 1.49 2.33 
 XXIV 
 
Greenland 
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
France 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.41 0.52 0.40 
Germany 0.77 1.01 0.95 0.91 0.83 0.60 0.46 0.28 0.19 
Region/Country 2000 2006 2010 2016 2020 2026 2030 2036 2040 
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hungary 0.23 0.31 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Ireland 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Italy 0.81 1.00 0.80 0.76 0.67 0.43 0.30 0.18 0.20 
The 
Netherlands 
2.77 3.25 3.17 2.63 2.07 1.33 0.97 0.58 0.45 
Norway 2.27 2.67 2.75 3.01 3.12 3.69 4.56 5.41 5.32 
Poland 0.33 0.50 0.38 0.21 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 
Portugal 0.00 0.00v 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Romania 0.73 0.99 0.85 0.54 0.37 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.10 
Slovakia 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Spain 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.40 0.45 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Switzerland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The United 
Kingdom 
3.38 3.81 3.37 2.56 2.08 1.51 1.22 0.73 0.51 
FSU 28.54 31.87 34.67 38.70 42.10 47.56 52.03 56.78 38.26 
Armenia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 XXV 
 
R. Azerbaijan 0.34 0.78 0.93 1.01 1.13 1.62 2.12 2.67 2.78 
Belarus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Estonia  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Georgia  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kazakhstan 1.21 2.89 3.51 3.65 3.54 3.17 2.93 2.44 2.10 
Kirgizstan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Moldova 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Russia 22.87 23.46 25.16 28.42 31.15 35.80 39.68 44.48 46.01 
Tajikistan  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Turkmenistan 1.63 1.65 1.70 1.94 2.37 3.24 3.84 4.84 5.56 
Ukraine 0.69 1.25 1.51 1.80 2.00 1.85 1.63 1.00 0.80 
Uzbekistan 1.81 1.85 1.87 1.88 1.90 1.88 1.83 1.36 1.01 
The Middle East 8.95 10.81 12.46 16.06 19.80 28.55 35.81 47.47 52.11 
Bahrain 0.33 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.19 0.43 0.52 0.49 0.39 
I.R. Iran 2.68 2.67 2.64 3.04 3.79 5.93 8.34 13.01 15.62 
Iraq 0.07 0.76 1.65 2.93 3.73 4.73 5.14 5.39 5.26 
Kuwait 0.35 0.38 0.89 1.50 1.66 1.70 1.70 1.69 1.50 
Oman 0.43 0.29 0.22 0.44 0.67 1.02 1.09 1.30 1.40 
Qatar 1.19 1.39 1.61 2.12 2.78 4.92 6.48 8.53 9.39 
Saudi Arabia 2.24 2.60 2.67 3.22 4.06 6.07 7.94 10.97 12.16 
 XXVI 
 
Syria/ Jordan 0.20 0.60 0.60 0.43 0.30 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.10 
Turkey 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
The UAE 1.43 1.65 1.73 1.92 2.13 2.70 3.47 5.00 5.26 
Yemen 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.27 0.46 0.86 0.97 0.96 1.01 
North America 28.04 32.48 29.97 28.33 26.05 22.64 20.14 16.41 15.03 
Canada 6.44 6.65 6.56 6.42 5.97 5.42 4.74 3.95 3.85 
Mexico 1.24 1.41 1.00 0.89 1.01 1.04 1.01 0.67 0.53 
The USA 20.36 24.42 22.41 21.02 19.07 16.17 14.39 11.80 10.66 
Central & South 
America 
4.19 5.72 6.88 8.52 9.95 12.03 13.01 12.78 12.43 
Argentina 1.28 1.48 1.52 1.55 1.51 1.53 1.50 1.10 0.89 
Bolivia 0.18 0.50 0.58 0.72 0.77 0.98 1.03 0.95 0.85 
Brazil 0.38 0.38 0.46 0.71 0.98 1.14 1.37 1.87 2.30 
Central America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chile 0.11 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.16 0.14 
Colombia 0.24 0.33 0.92 1.23 1.26 1.22 1.16 0.89 0.71 
Cuba 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Ecuador 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Paraguay 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Peru 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.42 0.57 0.65 0.79  0.79 
Suriname/ 
Guinea 
0.00 0.07 0.23 0.47 0.63 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.54 
Trinidad & 0.75 1.24 1.35 1.45 1.56 1.61 1.51 1.05 0.93 
 XXVII 
 
Tobago 
Uruguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Venezuela 1.22 1.31 1.35 1.80 2.43 3.90 4.74 5.18 5.21 
The World 99.22 119.73 125.29 137.31 146.72 146.17 176.47 188.48 189.55 
Source: By Author, on the basis of: G. Victor et al, Natural Gas and Geopolitics, from 1970-2040, 
Cambridge University Press, the UK, Part 3, chapter 11: 357-407. 
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Annex 17: Global gas demand by country, region and continent, 2000-2040 (tcf) 
Region/Country 2000 2006 2010 2016 2020 2026 2030 2036 2040 
Africa 2.65 3.35 3.65 4.33 4.81 5.56 6.08 6.83 6.95 
Algeria 0.82 0.89 0.95 1.11 1.23 1.45 1.60 1.84 1.77 
Angola 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.16 
East Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Egypt 1.05 1.33 1.47 1.71 1.88 2.16 1.37 2.70 2.82 
Libya 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.56 
Morocco 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Nigeria 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.37 0.42 0.51 0.58 0.68 0.74 
South Africa 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 
Tunisia 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.33 0.39  0.43 0.45 0.47 
West  Africa 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 
Asia - Pacific 12.22 16.19 18.27 21.69 24.23 28.28 30.42 31.92 31.94 
Afghanistan 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Australia 0.96 1.33 1.44 1.63 1.79 1.99 2.11 2.27 2.35 
Bangladesh 0.37 0.49 0.56 0.66 0.72 0.82 0.87 0.91 0.93 
Brunei 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 
China 1.33 2.18 2.69 3.68 4.49 5.83 6.48 6.93 7.13 
Hong Kong 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
India 0.97 1.49 2.31 2.97 3.38 3.99 4.30 4.56 4.58 
Indonesia 1.31 1.63 1.74 1.92 2.04 2.22 2.33 2.31 2.23 
 XXIX 
 
Japan 2.71 2.73 2.49 3.61 2.80 3.25 3.54 3.74 3.71 
Malaysia 1.09 1.35 1.48 1.70 1.85 2.10 2.25 2.29 2.25 
Myanmar 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 
New Zealand 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.24 
Pakistan 0.83 1.08 1.19 1.39 1.53 1.76 1.95 2.25 2.17 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
The 
Philippines 
0.07 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.29 
Singapore 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.12 
Korea, South 0.88 1.17 1.25 1.53 1.74 2.03 2.20 2.25 2.25 
Taiwan 0.30 0.53 0.60 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.70 
Thailand 0.89 1.18 1.27 1.37 1.42 1.49 1.46 1.43 1.40 
Vietnam/Laos/ 
Cambodia 
0.10 0.35 0.51 0.72 0.85 1.05 1.14 1.23 1.24 
Europe 18.65 22.01 22.34 23.77 24.90 26.35 27.17 27.86 27.46 
Austria 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.46 
Balkan Region 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.28 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg 
0.66 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.87 
Bulgaria 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Czech 
Republic 
0.35 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.48 
Denmark/ 0.21 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 
 XXX 
 
Greenland 
Finland 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.32 
France 1.77 1.89 2.06 2.15 2.23 2.39 2.54 2.72 2.72 
Germany 3.31 3.72 3.61 3.72 3.84 4.00 4.12 4.25 4.22 
Region/Country 2000 2006 2010 2016 2020 2026 2030 2036 2040 
Greece 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Hungary 0.49 0.57 0.60 0.68 0.75 0.83 0.86 0.88 0.87 
Ireland 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 
Italy 2.60 2.86 2.89 3.11 3.28 3.47 3.55 3.60 3.54 
The 
Netherlands 
1.64 1.87 1.92 2.03 2.11 2.16 2.21 2.25 2.20 
Norway 0.29 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.53 
Poland 0.49 0.63 0.64 0.70 0.76 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.86 
Portugal 0.12 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Romania 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.73 0.80 0.91 0.94 0.97 0.96 
Slovakia 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 
Spain 0.85 1.43 1.64 1.91 2.06 2.21 2.24 2.28 2.26 
Sweden 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Switzerland 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 
The United 
Kingdom 
3.67 4.21 4.29 4.45 4.57 4.75 4.90 4.99 4.81 
FSU 22.34 26.70 28.52 31.24 33.12 35.89 37.50 38.26 37.33 
Armenia 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 
 XXXI 
 
R. Azerbaijan 0.35 0.54 0.64 0.77 0.85 0.97 1.05 1.17 1.18 
Belarus 0.64 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.78 
Estonia  0.05 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Georgia  0.05 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 
Kazakhstan 0.59 0.75 0.80 0.89 0.97 1.09 1.16 1.26 1.32 
Kirgizstan 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.29 
Latvia 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Lithuania 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Moldova 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Russia 15.10 18.04 19.31 21.12 22.32 24.05 25.10 25.26 24.31 
Tajikistan  0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Turkmenistan 0.43 0.56 0.64 0.75 0.83 0.95 1.03 1.17 1.26 
Ukraine 3.01 3.52 3.63 3.85 4.01 4.26 4.29 4.22 4.12 
Uzbekistan 1.70 1.83 1.94 2.16 2.33 2.62 2.83 3.17 3.18 
The Middle East 8.94 10.20 10.63 11.81 12.88 14.69 16.01 17.93 18.93 
Bahrain 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.53 0.58 0.65 0.63 
I.R. Iran 3.06 3.18 3.22 3.67 4.13 4.39 5.53 6.45 7.05 
Iraq 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.39 0.50 0.66 0.76 
Kuwait 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.46 0.50 0.56 0.60 
Oman 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.39 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.60 0.65 
Qatar 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.54 
Saudi Arabia 2.17 2.56 2.67 2.91 3.11 3.44 3.69 4.06 4.31 
Syria/ Jordan 0.20 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.45 0.48 
 XXXII 
 
Turkey 0.68 0.96 1.07 1.27 1.43 1.67 1.84 2.01 1.95 
The UAE 1.34 1.64 1.72 1.79 1.82 1.86 1.87 1.87 1.88 
Yemen 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 
North America 27.68 32.58 31.95 32.38 33.16 36.42 38.91 41.35 40.93 
Canada 3.08 3.88 3.97 4.15 4.27 4.55 4.77 4.92 4.82 
Mexico 1.61 2.03 2.15 2.47 2.70 3.08 3.37 3.74 3.87 
The USA 22.99 26.67 25.83 25.76 26.19 28.79 30.78 32.69 32.24 
Central & South 
America 
3.79 4.83 5.28 6.09 6.68 7.64 8.18 8.88 9.22 
Argentina 1.09 1.28 1.39 1.62 1.79 2.06 2.20 2.37 2.42 
Bolivia 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 
Brazil 0.50 0.92 1.08 1.34 1.50 1.79 1.95 2.20 2.35 
Central America 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Chile 0.25 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.46 
Colombia 0.19 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.38 
Cuba 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Ecuador 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Paraguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Peru 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 
Suriname/ 
Guinea 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.3 0.03 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
0.44 0.53 0.61 0.71 0.78 0.89 0.97 1.00 1.02 
Uruguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 XXXIII 
 
Venezuela 1.23 1.31 1.32 1.43 1.55 1.72 1.84 2.03 2.17 
The World 96.18 115.86 120.67 131.32 139.78 154.83 164.28 173.02 172.74 
Source: By Author, on the basis of: G. Victor et al, Natural Gas and Geopolitics, from 1970-2040, 
Cambridge University Press, the UK, Part 3, chapter 11: 357- 407. 
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Annex 18: International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) Methodology 
 
 
POLITICAL RISK COMPONENTS 
Sequence Component Points 
(max.) 
 
A Government Stability 12 
B Socioeconomic Conditions 12 
C Investment Profile 12 
D Internal Conflict 12 
E External Conflict 12 
F Corruption 6 
G Military in Politics 6 
H Religious Tensions 6 
I Law and Order 6 
J Ethnic Tensions 6 
K Democratic Accountability 6 
L Bureaucracy Quality 4 
Total 
 
100 
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 CPFER = Composite political, financial and economic risk ratings 
 
Very High Risk 
 
00.0 to 49.9 points 
High Risk 
 
50.0 to 59.9 points 
Moderate Risk 
 
60.0 to 69.9 points 
Low Risk 
 
70.0 to 79.9 points 
Very Low Risk 
 
80.0 to 100 points 
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Annex 19: Global Investment and Political Risk by country, region and continent, 
2011 
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Source: The PRS Group, Inc, 2011 
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Annex 20: Global proved conventional gas reserves, by country 
 
 
                                                                                   
Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/g; Oil and Gas Journal 2011 & 2012 
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